SIXTH DIVISION
May 2, 2003

No. 1-02-0906

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (the Department),appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County that granted a writ of prohibitionenjoining the Department from holding further hearings to suspend, revoke or otherwisediscipline the medical license of plaintiff Emmanuel Ikpoh (Ikpoh) which had previously beenrevoked and further ordered the Department to dismiss the administrative action pending againstIkpoh. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

On August 2, 1990, the Department summarily suspended Ikpoh's medical license forimmoral and unprofessional conduct. In November 1991, the Department revoked Ikpoh'smedical license for a minimum of five years on grounds of his felony conviction for criminalsexual abuse of a 13-year-old minor and other sexual misconduct with his patients.

In February 1996, Ikpoh filed a petition to restore his license. In his petition, Ikpoh statedthat no medical license issued to him by another state had ever been disciplined or challengedand that he had not been arrested or convicted since the time his Illinois license was disciplined.

In October and November 1996, a hearing was held before the Department'sadministrative law judge, Philip S. Howe (ALJ Howe), on Ikpoh's petition for restoration.Shortly thereafter, on January 8, 1997, ALJ Howe recommended to the Department's MedicalDisciplinary Board (the Board) that Ikpoh's petition be denied. Shortly thereafter, on February19, 1997, the Board adopted ALJ Howe's decision and recommended to the Director of theDepartment, Nikki Zollar (Director Zollar), that Ikpoh's petition be denied. The Board based itsrecommendations on several factors, including the following:

(1) that Ikpoh did not make full restitution to the female victim;

(2) that Ikpoh showed no contriteness and was not credible, but insteadargumentative;

(3) that Ikpoh did not submit a current psychological evaluation to showthat he was sufficiently rehabilitated;

(4) that Ikpoh did not provide sufficient evidence of qualitative andquantitative rehabilitation; and

(5) that Ikpoh did not disclose on certain application forms his felonyconviction for criminal sexual abuse and his Illinois license revocation.

Upon receipt of the 20-day notice informing him that the Board recommended denial ofhis petition, Ikpoh filed a motion for rehearing. During the time that Ikpoh's motion for rehearingwas pending, two events occurred. The first event occurred on August 7, 1997, when theMedical Licensing Board of Indiana placed Ikpoh's Indiana medical license on indefinitesuspension. The second event took place on August 26, 1997, when Ikpoh was arrested by thepolice department of Bartlett, Illinois, on the felony charge of failing to register as a convictedsex offender. Ikpoh took no action after August 7, 1997, to inform the Illinois Department aboutthe Indiana suspension and took no action to correct the then-false statement in his petition forrestoration that no license to practice medicine in another state had been disciplined. In addition,Ikpoh failed to take any action after August 26 to inform the Department of his arrest and took noaction to correct the then-false statement that he had not been arrested since the time his Illinoislicense was disciplined. On September 11, 1997, presumably unaware that these events hadtranspired while Ikpoh's motion for rehearing was pending, Director Zollar rejected the Board'srecommendation that Ikpoh's petition for restoration of his license be denied and ordered thatIkpoh's license be restored subject to certain conditions.

On September 12, 1997, a grand jury indicted Ikpoh for his alleged crime. On or aboutSeptember 17, 1997, the Department learned of Ikpoh's arrest and subsequently learned of hisindictment. As a result, on September 19, 1997, the Department filed with the Director a motionto supplement the record and vacate her order of September 11, 1997. On the same day, findingthat Ikpoh's arrest for failure to register as a felon convicted of sexual abuse may pose animmediate danger to the public and that Ikpoh's arrest and indictment for failure to register as afelon convicted of sexual abuse was newly discovered evidence that was relevant to the petitionfor restoration, the Director granted the Department's motion and vacated her September 11,1997, decision. She remanded the case to the ALJ and ordered that an additional hearing be held.

On December 15, 1997, prior to the start of the supplemental administrative hearingordered by Director Zollar, the Department filed a nine-count administrative complaint, with theadministrative case number of 1997-51323, against Ikpoh. In March 1998, Ikpoh's motion todismiss the complaint was denied. In August 1999, the Department filed an amended complaint,adding an additional count. The counts contained in the amended complaint can be summarizedas follows:

Count I: On August 7, 1997, Ikpoh's Indiana medical license wasindefinitely suspended;

Count II: Ikpoh failed to report the Indiana discipline;

Count III: Ikpoh's failure to report that discipline while his petition forrestoration was pending constitutes fraud and misrepresentation;

Count IV: The allegations contained in count II also constitutedishonorable conduct;

Count V: Ikpoh's failure to report his August 26, 1997, arrest during thependency of his petition for restoration constitutes fraud and misrepresentation;

Count VI: The allegations contained in count V also constitutedishonorable conduct;

Count VII: In December 1995, Ikpoh was terminated from an Indianahealth care institution due to multiple charges of sexual harassment from staff andan incident endangering the life of a patient, and Ikpoh failed to report thisadverse action to the Department;

Count VIII: Ikpoh misrepresented his status in his petition for restorationwhere he claimed that he had "successfully engaged" in the practice of medicineoutside the State of Illinois, but failed to mention his termination from the Indianahealth care institution;

Count IX: The allegations contained in count VIII also constitutedishonorable conduct; and

Count X: On June 8, 1999, Ikpoh was convicted of attempted obstructionof justice by failing to register as a sex offender, which constitutes dishonorable,unethical, or unprofessional conduct.

Ikpoh filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On April 10, 2001,administrative law judge Shari Dam (ALJ Dam) granted Ikpoh's motion to dismiss counts V, VI,VII, VIII, and IX on the basis of res judicata because those allegations had been previouslylitigated in the hearing on Ikpoh's petition for restoration. ALJ Dam denied Ikpoh's motion todismiss counts I, II, III, IV, and X, finding that those counts were drafted with sufficient detail.⁽¹⁾ ALJ Dam also rejected Ikpoh's argument that the Department lacked jurisdiction over a licensethat had been revoked. ALJ Dam set the matter for status on May 21, 2001.

On May 18, 2001, Ikpoh filed the underlying action in the circuit court, which is thesubject of this appeal. On February 20, 2002, the court entered the order granting Ikpoh's motionfor summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225ILCS 60/2 et seq. (West 2000)) "does not grant any authority to the Department to take actionagainst a person to revoke his license when that license has already been revoked." The courtissued a writ of prohibition enjoining the Department from holding additional hearings in thecase and further ordered the Department to dismiss the administrative action pending againstIkpoh. The Department filed a timely notice of appeal.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The issue we decide here is whether the Illinois Department of Professional Regulationhas the authority⁽²⁾ to hold a hearing to consider a complaint seeking discipline of a medicallicense for alleged violations of the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225 ILCS 60/2 et seq. (West2000)) (the Act) where the license has already been revoked for prior statutory violations. Therelevant provisions of the Act are section 22 (225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2000)) and section 43(225ILCS 60/43 (West 2000)). Section 22 of the Act provides as follows:

"The Department may revoke, suspend, place on probationary status, ortake any other disciplinary action as the Department may deem proper with regardto the license * * * of any person issued under this Act to practice medicine[.]"225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2000).

Section 43 of the Act states:

"At any time after the suspension, revocation, placing on probationarystatus, or taking disciplinary action with regard to any license, the Departmentmay restore it to the accused person, or take any other action to reinstate thelicense to good standing, without examination, upon the written recommendationof the Disciplinary Board." 225 ILCS 60/43 (West 2000).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that a court must ascertain and give effectto the intent of the legislature. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation,153 Ill. 2d 76, 91, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 (1992). The statute's plain language provides the bestindication of the legislature's intent. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103, 745 N.E.2d541, 545 (2001). We evaluate the statute as a whole, construing each provision in connectionwith every other section. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91, 606 N.E.2d at 1118. This court affordsde novo review to decisions involving questions of law such as the interpretation of a statute.Yang, 195 Ill. 2d at 103, 745 N.E.2d at 545. Nevertheless, although this court is not bound by anadministrative agency's interpretation of a statute, we recognize that where an agency is chargedwith the administration and enforcement of a statute, the agency is in a good position to makeinformed judgments upon the issues, based on its experience and expertise. Bonaguro v. CountyOfficers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 398, 634 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1994). As a result, we mayaccord some deference to an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute. Bailey & Associates,Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 289 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 683 N.E.2d 1204, 1208(1997); Morse v. Department of Professional Regulation, 316 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667, 737 N.E.2d678, 680 (2000).

ANALYSIS

The Department contends that the plain language of section 22 of the Act unambiguouslyprovides the Department with the authority to discipline a license that is already revoked. Weagree.

Section 22 confers broad authority to discipline licenses with its language providing thatthe "Department may revoke, suspend, place on probationary status, or take any otherdisciplinary action as the Department may deem proper." (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS 60/22(West 2000). More specifically, the Department may take disciplinary action "with regard to thelicense * * * of any person." (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2000).The legislature'suse of the phrase "license * * * of any person" does not limit the Department's authority todiscipline only those physicians currently holding active or undisciplined licenses. The plainlanguage unambiguously provides the Department with the authority to proceed with thedisciplinary action against Ikpoh.

Ikpoh does not challenge the authority of the Department to discipline a license, nor doeshe contend that the language of the Act is ambiguous. Instead, he contends that his license nolonger exists. He asserts that his license was "annulled or canceled" when it was revoked and,therefore, "there is no license to take action against." The trial court agreed withIkpoh. As theDepartment correctly notes, however, had the General Assembly meant to limit the Department'sauthority in the manner found by the trial court, it could have stated that the Department maytake disciplinary action only against "a valid, existing license" or "an active license" or a"physician licensed under this Act," a license in "good standing," or a license that is "valid and infull force and effect," just as the legislature used those terms elsewhere in the Act. See225 ILCS60/3 (West 2000) (referring to "a valid, existing license" and "an active license"); 225 ILCS60/38 (West 2000) (referring to a "physician licensed under this Act"); 225 ILCS 60/43 (West2000) (referring to a license in "good standing"); 225 ILCS 60/48 (West 2000) (referring to"licenses [that] are valid and in full force and effect"). The legislature, however, did not restrictthe language of section 22 in any such manner.

Courts must not depart from a statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions,limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc.,197 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 754 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2001). There is nothing in the plain language of the Actthat would limit the meaning of "the license *** of any person" to except the license of anyperson who has temporarily lost the privilege of practicing medicine because the license isrevoked. Section 22 does not distinguish between physicians actively practicing and those whoselicenses are revoked or otherwise disciplined. The circuit court erred in straying from the plainlanguage of the statute and reading into the statute limitations not intended by the legislature.

Moreover, as noted earlier, this court evaluates a statute as a whole, construing eachprovision in connection with every other section. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91, 606 N.E.2d at1118. Section 43 of the Act provides that "[a]t any time after the suspension, revocation, placingon probationary status, or taking disciplinary action with regard to any license, the Departmentmay restore it to the accused person, or take any other action to reinstate the license to goodstanding, without examination, upon the written recommendation of the Disciplinary Board." 225ILCS 60/43 (West 2000). When sections 22 and 43 of the Act are read in pari materia, it is clearthat a license still existed which the Department had the authority to discipline. The very factthat the Department may restore a revoked license and that Ikpoh himself petitioned theDepartment to restore his license without examination refutes the premise of Ikpoh's contentionthat his license no longer exists. Ikpoh's contention on appeal that "a revoked license requiresthat the person make application anew" relies on an out-of-state case and is an inaccuratestatement of Illinois law. In view of the fact that section 43 of the Act provides that theDepartment may "restore" or "reinstate" the license, as well as the fact that Ikpoh himselfpetitioned, there is no basis for his argument that his license has become a nullity. Contrary tothe trial court's conclusion, the Department's contention that Ikpoh's license was in "revokedstatus" was not a "word manipulation" but, rather, was a correct statutory interpretation. BecauseIkpoh's license was revoked for a minimum of five years, it did not cease to exist.

Although it is the judgment of the lower court that is on appeal to the reviewing court andnot what else may have been said by the lower court (Material Service Corp. v. Department ofRevenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 457 N.E.2d 9, 12 (1983)), we nonetheless believe it would beinstructive to further address an issue that appeared to play a role in the trial court's decision. During the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, Ikpoh's pending petitionto restore his license was discussed by the trial court. Indeed, the trial court stated that it thoughtthat "the substance of these new charges can be very well addressed in the context of [Ikpoh's]petition to restore now pending or any other petition to restore." We do not believe that theintent of the legislature, in providing that the Department may restore, was to prohibit theDepartment from proceeding to discipline a license in revoked status until a person petitions forits restoration.

It is undisputed that the purpose of the Medical Practice Act was to protect the publichealth and welfare from those not qualified to practice medicine. See, e.g.,Carter-Shields v.Alton Health Institute, 201 Ill. 2d 441, 458, 777 N.E.2d 948, 958 (2002), quoting Potts v. IllinoisDepartment of Registration & Education, 128 Ill. 2d 322, 330, 538 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (1989)("The Medical Practice Act 'regulat[es] medical professionals in order to protect the publicwelfare' "); Metz v. Department of Professional Regulation, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1036,773N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (2002); Siddiqui v. Department of Professional Regulation, 307 Ill. App. 3d 753, 764, 718 N.E.2d 217, 228 (1999); see also 20 ILCS 2105/2105-10 (West 2000)("Legislative declaration of public policy. The practice of the regulated professions, trades, andoccupations in Illinois is hereby declared to affect the public health, safety, and welfare of thePeople of this State and in the public interest is subject to regulation and control by theDepartment of Professional Regulation.").

In challenging the Department's jurisdiction, Ikpoh notes that neither section 22 nor anyother statute expressly grants the Department the authority to discipline a "revoked license." TheDepartment notes, however, that it should come as no surprise to counsel for Ikpoh that theDepartment's authority to act can arise by "fair implication and intendment from *** express[statutory] provisions, as an incident to achieving the objectives for which the agency wascreated." Albazzaz v. Department of Professional Regulation, 314 Ill. App. 3d 97, 104, 731N.E.2d 787, 793 (2000) (Ikpoh's counsel represented Albazzaz, whose license was suspended forthe unethical and immoral treatment of female patients). As the Department correctly notes, inaddition to Albazzaz, this court has upheld actions taken by the Department based on the well-settled principles that administrative agencies have both express and implied powers to do allthat is reasonably necessary to accomplish statutory objectives, and not every agency power mustbe explicitly articulated in the governing statute. See, e.g., Wilson v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 317 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63-64, 739 N.E.2d 57, 61-62 (2000) (Department has authorityto file a motion requesting that the Director take action contrary to the Board's recommendation);Gersch v. Department of Professional Regulation, 308 Ill. App. 3d 649, 658-59, 720 N.E.2d 672,680 (1999) (Department's authority to cancel an invalid license may be implied from the Act);Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 289, 559 N.E.2d 884, 891(1990) (Department's authority to appoint advisor to assist it is implied in its statutorily grantedpowers). Administrative agencies must be given wide latitude to accomplish their duties.LakeCounty Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 428, 519 N.E.2d 459,463 (1988). Thus, although the Act does not explicitly state that the Department has the authorityto discipline a revoked license, the Department has the implied power to do so under the Act.

Our research has disclosed cases from other jurisdictions challenging the authority orjurisdiction of a licensing board to take any action against a licensee unless his or her license iscurrent or active. While none of these cases was factually similar to the instant case andinvolved statutes of other states, the reasoning and principles expressed in these cases is asrelevant to the situation in the instant case where a license is revoked, yet the former licensee hasthe option of petitioning for restoration of the license.

In Wang v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 405 Mass. 15, 537 N.E.2d 1216 (1989), aphysician challenged the board's jurisdiction because his license had expired before the boardinitiated proceedings against him. A state statute authorized the board to "'investigate allcomplaints relating to the proper practice of medicine by any person holding a certificate ofregistration.'" Wang, 405 Mass. at 18, 537 N.E.2d at 1218, quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112,