FOURTH DIVISION
March 31, 2004

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent Pavel P.'s parental rights as to seven of his children, Abner P., Elizabeth P.,Nathaniel P., Aaron P., Jacob P., Stephanie P., and Sara P. (collectively, the children), wereterminated pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)⁽¹⁾ ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et. seq. (West2002)). Respondent filed a motion to quash service by publication and vacate void judgment,which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, respondent contends that the orderterminating his parental rights is void because the service by publication effectuated by the Statewas defective and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him. Specifically,respondent argues that: (1) the State's affidavit for service by publication did not comply with therequirements of the Act; (2) the clerk did not mail notice to respondent's last known address; (3)the trial court erred in striking respondent's Rule 237(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 237 (b)) notice to appear;(4) diligent efforts were not used to serve process either personally or by certified mail; and (5) itwas error for the trial court to find that laches applied. We affirm.

On May 24, 1999, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship on behalf of thechildren. Respondent was personally served with summons and the adjudication petitions on June30, 1999. The summons contained language informing respondent that he would not be entitledto further notice or publication of proceedings in the case, including the filing of an amendedpetition or a motion to terminate parental rights. Respondent filed his appearance on March 14,2000, and was present personally and through counsel at the adjudication hearing, whichcommenced on February 6, 2001. On February 7, the trial court found that the children wereneglected and physically abused.

On April 15, 2001, the State filed a petition to appoint a guardian with right to consent toadoption on behalf of the children. Respondent filed an answer denying the allegations in thatpetition. On November 14, 2001, the State filed a Rule 237(b) notice for respondent to appear atthe termination of parental rights trial. Respondent filed a motion to advance and reset the trialdate of December 10, 2001. On February 26, 2002, the State was granted leave to withdraw itsmotion to appoint a guardian with right to consent to adoption. On April 16, 2002, respondent'scounsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw, which the trial court granted. Respondent did notrequest to be appointed another attorney. On June 4, 2002, the trial court entered dispositionalorders finding that respondent was unwilling and unfit to parent his children and adjudicating themwards of the court and appointing the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) asguardian.

On November 14, 2002, the State filed supplemental petitions for appointment of aguardian with the right to consent to adoption on behalf of the children. These petitions werefiled under the same case numbers listed on the summons that was personally served torespondent on June 30, 1999. On November 15, 2002, the State issued a summons advisingrespondent of the termination proceeding. A sheriff attempted to serve respondent at 4933 WestCuyler on December 3, 2002, at 7:47 p.m. and December 5, 2002, at 11:25 a.m. The summonsreturn forms indicated that respondent was "not listed" as a resident.

On December 24, 2002, the State filed an affidavit for service by publication and notice bypublication was subsequently printed in the Chicago Sun-Times on January 16, 2003, advisingrespondent of the January 30, 2003, hearing date, as well as the time and location. The noticealso warned respondent that his parental rights could be terminated and that a guardian could beappointed with power to consent to the adoption of his children.

Respondent did not appear at the January 30, 2003, hearing, and the trial court entered anorder defaulting him for want of appearance. Thereafter, on March 4, 2003, the trial courtentered an order involuntarily terminating respondent's parental rights with respect to the childrenon the basis that he was unfit. The order also provided for appointment of a guardian withauthority to consent to the adoption of the children.

On April 4, 2003, respondent filed a pro se notice of appeal from the March 4, 2003termination orders. The children, through the public guardian, filed a motion to dismiss theappeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30days after the entry of the contested order. On May 20, 2003, this court granted the children'smotion. Prior to entry of the dismissal order, respondent filed a pro se motion seekingappointment of counsel, which the trial court granted. On May 20, 2003, respondent's counselfiled a "Motion to Quash Service By Publication and Vacate Void Judgment" in the trial court. On June 20, 2003, the State filed its response to respondent's motion and attached the affidavit ofKimberly Seymore, chief deputy clerk of the Cook County juvenile court child protection division.

Respondent filed a notice to appear under Supreme Court Rule 237(b) (166 Ill. 2d R.237(b)) requiring Mesha G. Miller, who signed the affidavit in support of service by publication,to appear at the hearing. The State filed a motion to strike that motion. The trial court ruled inthe State's favor, finding that a Rule 237(b) notice was not appropriate for a posttrial motion. Respondent then sought to strike Seymore's affidavit, arguing that it did not comport with therequirements of Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). The trial court denied respondent'smotion.

A hearing on the motion to quash service by publication and vacate void judgment washeld on July 7, 2003. On July 11, prior to ruling on the motion, the trial court stated that it wastreating respondent's motion as a section 2-1401 motion pursuant to the Illinois Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)) because it was filed after 30 days but within 2 yearsof the order terminating his parental rights. The trial court then denied the motion, finding thatservice by publication was proper. The trial court further found that respondent's proceduralattack on the order terminating his parental rights was barred by the doctrine of laches and thatrespondent had actual knowledge of the termination proceedings. Respondent then filed thistimely appeal.

On appeal, respondent first argues that the trial court's order terminating his parentalrights is void because the service by publication effectuated by the State was defective andtherefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him.

An order rendered by a court is void "'only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in thecourt which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.

[citation.]'" In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174, 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998). Proper service of summons is required to establish in personam jurisdiction. In re D.J.S., 308 Ill.App. 3d 291, 294, 719 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (1999). The manner in which summons was to beserved in this case is governed by the Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"(3) *** The summons shall contain a notice that the parties will not be entitled to further written notices or publication notices of proceedings in this case, including the filing of an amended petition or a motion to terminate parental rights, except as required by Supreme Court Rule 11.

***

(5) Service of summons and petition shall be made by: (a) leaving a copy thereof with the person summoned ***." 705 ILCS 405/2-15(3), (5) (West 1998).

Respondent does not dispute that on June 30, 1999, he was personally served withsummons in the underlying adjudication phase of the juvenile cases in question. Pursuant to theAct, the summons with which he was served stated as follows:

"YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO FURTHER WRITTEN NOTICE OR PUBLICATION NOTICES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE INCLUDING THE FILING OF AN AMENDED PETITION OR A MOTION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS EXCEPT AS REQUIRED BY SUPREME COURT RULE 11."

We find that the summons that was served personally upon respondent contained therequisite language and otherwise met the requirements of the Act, and therefore vested the trialcourt with personal jurisdiction over him. Respondent argues, however, that the jurisdiction thetrial court gained over him by way of personal summons did not extend to the termination phaseof the case. Prior to addressing respondent's specific arguments regarding the propriety of thesubsequent service by publication, we must address the question of whether it was necessary forthe trial court to reestablish personal jurisdiction over respondent upon the inception of thetermination phase of this case.

Respondent concedes that he has found no cases specifically on point, but argues that dueto the complete finality and extreme gravity of an order extinguishing all parental rights, asupplemental petition seeking such relief should be considered to be a new proceeding, althoughfiled under an existing case number. Therefore, he argues, it should be necessary for a court toreestablish jurisdiction over a parent prior to terminating parental rights. The question of whetherthe termination of parental rights phase of a juvenile case constitutes a new proceeding such thatjurisdiction over the parties must be reestablished at its inception appears to be one of firstimpression.

In a recent Fourth District case, in deciding whether respondent's motion to substitutejudge was properly denied, the majority stated that "[b]y filing a motion to terminate parentalrights, the State initiated an entirely new proceeding, albeit in the same circuit court casenumber," but cited no authority for the proposition. In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d 211, 224, 748N.E.2d 271, 282-83 (2001). In his dissent, Justice Cook noted that the majority's reasoning thatseparate proceedings are involved is at odds with the Act, which provides that the parties are notentitled to additional notice upon the filing of an amended petition or a motion to terminateparental rights. In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 748 N.E.2d at 285 (Cook, J., dissenting). Onappeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that it did not need to reach the issue of whether thefiling of a petition to terminate parental rights in a case that has been proceeding under the Act"'begins a new case within that case number'" in order to resolve the substitution-of-judge issue. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 507, 777 N.E.2d 930, 947 (2002), quoting In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3dat 224.

Left without guidance from case law, we look to the language of the Act itself to answerthe question before us. Section 2-15 of the Act, which concerns summons, was amended byPublic Act 90-28, effective January 1, 1998. The amendment added the provision requiring thatthe summons provide notice to the parties that they will not receive further written notices orpublication notices of proceedings in the case, including the filing of an amended petition or amotion to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-15(3) (West 1998). To hold thatjurisdiction over a respondent in a juvenile case must be reestablished upon the filing of atermination petition would render the language added to the summons section of the Act by wayof Public Act 90-28 meaningless. See First Chicago Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Gaughan, 275 Ill.App. 3d 53, 59, 655 N.E.2d 936, 941 (1995) ("[Statutory] language should be given its plain andordinary meaning [citation] and no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be renderedmeaningless"). This we will not do.

Based on the language in the Act added by Public Act 90-28, we agree with JusticeCook's reasoning that the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights does not initiate anentirely new proceeding within an existing case number. We find that because the Act does notrequire notice of the filing of a motion to terminate parental rights upon a respondent who hasbeen properly served with summons, then it is also not necessary to reissue a summons for thatparty upon the filing of such a motion. We further find that because a new proceeding is notinvolved and because the termination phase of a juvenile case proceeds under the same casenumber as the adjudication phase of the case, jurisdiction over a respondent need not bereestablished once it has been properly established in the existing juvenile case in question.⁽²⁾

Additionally, this court has held that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over arespondent who had not been served with summons upon the filing of a petition for adjudicationof wardship, but who nonetheless voluntarily appeared at the initial hearing, thereby subjectinghimself to the jurisdiction of the court. In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 294, 719 N.E.2d at 1171. This court further held that the orders of the trial court, including the order terminatingrespondent's parental rights, were not void. In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 294, 719 N.E.2d at1171. The facts in the case at bar provide stronger support for our holding that the trial court'sorder terminating respondent's parental rights is not void. Not only did the respondent hereappear at the adjudication hearing, thereby subjecting himself to the court's jurisdiction, but hewas also served with personal summons along with the petitions for adjudication of wardship.

Because we find that the trial court did not need to reestablish personal jurisdiction overrespondent upon the initiation of termination proceedings, the trial court's order terminatingrespondent's parental rights was not void. Because the remainder of respondent's arguments onappeal are predicated on the assumption that jurisdiction over him had to be reestablished, weneed not address them.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

QUINN, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.

1. The children's mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights and consented to adoptionof the children and takes no part in this appeal.

2. We reject respondent's contention that the gravity of a termination proceeding requires acourt to reestablish jurisdiction over the parents whose rights are at stake, as the Act specifies thata respondent who is properly served is not entitled to notice of the filing of a motion to terminateparental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West 1998).