SIXTH DIVISION

February 8, 2002

Nos. 1--99--1005)

        1--99--1006)

JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent-appellant C.J., a minor, was adjudicated delin-quent. He appeals, contending that the pretrial detention provis-ion of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act), (705 ILCS 405/5-501 (West 1998)), violates the United States and Illinois Constitu-tions. We affirm.

The minor's adjudication of delinquency arises from twoseparate cases. On November 16, 1998, when the minor was almost 16years old, he was stopped by Chicago police officers. During afield interview, a clear plastic bag containing a yellow rock fellout of his mouth. Subsequently, he spit out three more such bags,all containing suspect cocaine, and was arrested. The next day,the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship allegingpossession of a controlled substance.

It is unclear whether the minor was ever detained on thischarge. There is no such indication in the record. All thatexists regarding this drug case is an order for temporary detentiondated November 17, 1998, which states there is probable cause tobelieve the minor is delinquent but does not indicate the required"immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him. Moreover, no judgeever signed this order.

While his drug case was pending, the minor was again arrestedon January 23, 1999. In response to shots fired at an apartmentbuilding, Chicago police officer Ted Davis patted down the minorand recovered a .38-caliber revolver. On January 25, 1999, theState filed a second petition for adjudication of wardship allegingunlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm.

A detention hearing on this weapons case was held that sameday. The State asked to proceed against the minor by way ofproffer pursuant to section 5-501 of the Act. The proffer includedOfficer Davis' testimony and police report, signed by two otherofficers and their sergeant. The minor objected and asked thecourt for leave to file a motion declaring section 5-501unconstitutional. The court granted leave and continued theconstitutional challenge.

However, the detention hearing proceeded. First, based on theState's proffer, the court found probable cause to believe theminor was delinquent and in need of supervision. Second, based onthe minor's juvenile record published at this hearing, the courtfound "immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him pursuant tosection 5-501(2) (705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 1998)). That recordrevealed that he had three referrals to juvenile court: two (thedrug case of November 17, 1998, and a burglary case from December4, 1998) were pending, and a third (an armed robbery on June 27,1996) had already resulted in a finding of delinquency. Theminor's record also showed various probation violations and arrestwarrants.

However, the case was continued until the next day for thehearing on the minor's constitutional challenge to the Act. Theparties appeared, but the matter was set for February 22, 1999,with a separate hearing on the constitutional claim to be heldbefore that date. There is no indication in the record that ahearing on this claim took place.

At the adjudicatory hearing on February 22, 1999, the courtheard arguments on the minor's motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence on both his drug and weapons cases. The court denied themotion as to both cases and finally adjudged the minor delinquent. On March 8, 1999, the court entered a disposition of 30 days in thejuvenile detention center, time considered served, and 5 years'probation.

The minor appeals his disposition. He contends that section5-501 of the Act, which allows a juvenile court to order thepretrial detention of a minor based on the State's proffer, isunconstitutional in several respects. He argues that it violatesthe Illinois Constitution in that it denies juveniles the sameprocedural protections as adult criminals. He also maintains thatit violates the fourth and sixth Amendments of the United StatesConstitution (U.S. Const., amends. IV, Vl) in that it deniesjuveniles a preliminary hearing, the right to effective counsel andan adequate determination of probable cause.

We note that at oral argument before our court, the minorrequested leave to file supplemental authority. We granted thisrequest. The minor then cited Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463 (7thCir. 1986). While Williams stands for the proposition that thereare two levels of probable cause in an adult criminal proceeding(Williams, 789 F.2d at 470 (the probable cause to bind adult overfor trial in preliminary hearing is more stringent than theprobable cause necessary to arrest adult)), we do not believe, forthe reasons set forth below, that this aids the minor in his cause.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute;therefore, it is subject to de novo review. See Miller v. Rosenberg,196 Ill. 2d 50, 57 (2001). However, a statute is presumed to beconstitutional, and the burden lies with the party challenging itto clearly establish its constitutional invalidity. See ArangoldCorp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999); Russell v.Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998) (courtmust construe statute to affirm constitutionality if reasonablycapable of such construction).

The Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 (Pub. Act 90-590, eff. January 1, 1999) are a set of provisions that becameeffective on January 1, 1999, and changed several delinquencyportions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. In the instant case,the minor makes both state and federal constitutional challenges tosection 5-501 of the Juvenile Court Act as reformed by Public Act90-590 that now permits pretrial detention of minors based on aproffer made at the detention or shelter care hearing. Specifically, the minor challenges this portion of the statute:

"At the appearance of the minor beforethe court at the detention or shelter carehearing, the court shall receive all relevantinformation and evidence, including affidavitsconcerning the allegations made in the peti-tion. Evidence used by the court in its find-ings or stated in or offered in connectionwith this Section may be by way of proffer based onreliable information offered by the State orminor." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-501(West 1998).

We are confronted with two distinct cases on appeal: theminor's drug case and his weapons case. Because different factsare involved, we address each separately.

As a threshold matter, the instant facts indicate that theminor does not have standing to constitutionally challenge section5-501 as it relates to his drug case. Thus, this part of hisappeal is dismissed.

As a general principle, the legal doctrine of standingprevents a party from challenging the constitutionality of astatute that does not affect him. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 425 (2000) (standing ensures only those with real interestin outcome of controversy raise such issues); Chicago TeachersUnion, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000) (court will not analyze constitutionalityof statutory provision which does not affect parties to cause athand). The standing requirements for a statutory challenge underour federal constitution include an actual "case or controversy": the plaintiff must allege that he was personally injured byunlawful conduct fairly traceable to the defendant and requestrelief that will likely redress this injury. See Allen v. Wright,468 U.S. 737, 751, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 569-70, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324(1984). Similarly, a statutory challenge under our state constitu-tion requires the plaintiff to have sustained, or be in immediatedanger of sustaining, a direct injury from the enforcement of thestatute and that injury is (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairlytraceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likelyto be redressed by granting the relief requested. See Glisson v.City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999).

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the minor wasever detained on his drug case. Police took him into custody onNovember 16, 1998, and the State, believing he should be detainedfurther, filed a formal petition for adjudication of wardship thenext day, all pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. See 705 ILCS405/5-415(1), (2), 5-520 (West 1998). An order for the minor'stemporary detention is in the record, but it is incomplete: theminor's name is filled in under part one of the two-step detentionanalysis that indicates a finding of probable cause to believe hewas delinquent (see 705 ILCS 405/5-501(1) (West 1998)), but theorder is blank as to a finding of "immediate and urgent necessity"for detention (see 705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 1998)). Moreover,the order was never signed or issued by any judge. Nothing in therecord shows that a detention or shelter care hearing was evenconducted on the drug case. Thus, the State's ability to proceedat such a hearing by way of proffer under section 5-501, which theminor challenges here, never materialized.

It is clear that the minor did not sustain a distinct injuryin his drug case directly traceable to the enforcement of theproffer provision of section 5-501. He was not detained for thisoffense and, thus, the proffer provision was neither used againsthim nor even played a role. Striking this portion of section 5-501, the relief the minor seeks, will not provide any redress orremedy. Accordingly, the minor has no standing under either thefederal or state constitution to challenge section 5-501 and thus,his appeal on the drug case is dismissed.

However, the minor does have standing to challenge section 5-501 in relation to his weapons case, as the juvenile court found,based on the State's proffer, both probable cause to declare himdelinquent and an "immediate and urgent necessity" to detain him onthese charges.

The minor asserts that the detention or shelter care hearingis equivalent to a preliminary hearing in an adult criminal case. Thus, he contends, section 5-501 must conform to article I, section7, of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1990, art. I,