SECOND DIVISION
March 18, 2003

The main issue in this appeal is whether a court order drafted by an attorney andpresented to a judge for signature is within the scope of the "pleading, motion and other paper ofa party" language of Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). The order containeddispositive language on an issue that was represented as agreed to by the parties. In fact, therewas no agreement. The trial judge signed the order. When he later learned that there had notbeen an agreement, he imposed a sanction on the drafting attorney under Rule 137. For thereasons that follow, we vacate the sanction.

Petitioner Margaret Oleksy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Judgment fordissolution was entered on November 13, 2000. Margaret was granted sole custody of theparties' children, Peter and Pauline. Respondent Henryk Oleksy was ordered to pay $1,315.84 amonth in child support. Henryk filed his first notice of appeal on February 22, 2001. Thatappeal was resolved separately in In re Marriage of Oleksy, No. 1-01-0734 (2002) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). In February 2001, Peter left his mother's house and movedin with his father. Henryk then filed a petition for modification of child support, change ofcustody, reimbursement of costs and other relief. He also filed a petition to modify, suspend orterminate the order for withholding. In May 2001, Margaret filed a petition for award of interimattorney fees. On August 1, 2001, the trial court reduced the child support award to $700 amonth, retroactive to April 27, 2001.

At the August 1, 2001, hearing, Henryk's counsel asked the court to rule on his petition tomodify, suspend or terminate the order for withholding to account for the credit for overpaymentof child support since April 27, 2001. Margaret's counsel stated, "We understand that he isentitled to a credit." The record shows that Henryk's counsel drafted a "Uniform Order forSupport" and a separate order to modify withholding, both of which purported to be agreedorders. The modification order directed that the credit for an overpayment of child supportshould be satisfied by suspending Henryk's child support payments for three months. The partieshad not, in fact, agreed to this method of awarding the credit. The trial court entered the orders.

At a hearing on August 7, 2001, Margaret's counsel stated that he had not agreed to theorder to modify withholding in the manner set out. The trial court granted the motion to vacatethe order. Margaret's counsel then filed a motion for sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137(155 Ill. 2d R. 137), which the trial court also granted, ordering Henryk and his counsel to pay$1,006 as a sanction. The court also ordered Henryk to pay $4,000 in interim attorney fees. Henryk appeals from both orders.

Henryk first argues that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions under Rule 137. Henryk contends that his attorney submitted the draft order for the judge to sign, but that it wasnot a pleading, motion or paper within the meaning of Rule 137. He also argues that, assuming aRule 137 sanction was appropriate, the court did not set out the factual basis for its award ofsanctions as required by the rule.

We will not overturn a trial court's award of sanctions absent an abuse of discretion. Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc., 133 Ill. 2d 458, 551 N.E.2d 1319 (1990). A trialcourt's decision must clearly set forth the factual basis for the result. Peterson v. Randhava, 313Ill. App. 3d 1, 729 N.E.2d 75 (2000).

Supreme Court Rule 137 provides in part:

"Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by anattorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,whose address shall be stated. *** The signature of an attorney *** constitutes acertificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to thebest of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it iswell grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argumentfor the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is notinterposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessarydelay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. *** If a pleading, motion orother paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon itsown initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, orboth, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other partyor parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of thepleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee." 155 Ill. 2dR. 137.

Henryk cites In re C.K., 214 Ill. App. 3d 297, 299-300, 573 N.E.2d 378 (1991), in whichRule 137 was held not to apply to a subpoena because, although drafted by an attorney, asubpoena is issued by the clerk of the court. He reasons that a draft order, like a subpoena,although drafted by an attorney, is issued by the court. Henryk points out that Rule 137 sanctionshave been confined to pleadings, motions or other papers filed by a party, as in Hernandez v.Williams, 258 Ill. App. 3d 318, 632 N.E.2d 49 (1994).

In her brief, Margaret defends the Rule 137 sanction. She suggests that there is no caseprecisely on point, but argues that our focus should not be on the order "but rather the conduct ofHenryk's attorney in presenting the order to the trial court for entry." The argument is notwithout appeal, but requires an expansive reading of a judge's discretion under Rule 137. Itconflicts with the narrow construction this court has consistently placed on the intent and use ofthe rule. See generally Shea, Rogal & Associates, Ltd. v. Leslie Volkswagen, Inc., 250 Ill. App.3d 149, 152, 621 N.E.2d 77 (1993); Singer v. Brookman, 217 Ill. App. 3d 870, 879, 578 N.E.2d 1(1991); Lewy v. Koeckritz International, Inc., 211 Ill. App. 3d 330, 334, 570 N.E.2d 361 (1991).

Rule 137, as we read the cases, is aimed at the abuse of the judicial process by penalizingclaimants who bring vexatious or harassing actions based upon unsupported allegations of law orfact. Singer, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 879. The rule is aimed at the pleadings and papers-the workproduct, if you will-of attorneys. Rule 137 "does not provide a sanction against all assertedviolations of court rules and for all acts of professional misconduct of an attorney." C.K., 214 Ill.App. 3d at 300, citing Tabor & Co. v. Gorenz, 43 Ill. App. 3d 124, 132, 356 N.E.2d 1150 (1976). We do not believe an order signed by a trial judge, though drafted by an attorney, meets thedefinition of "pleading, motion and other paper of a party." (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R.137; C.K., 214 Ill. App. 3d at 299-300. A court order, whoever drafted it, remains the ruling of ajudge. It is not a "paper" of a party.

The proper remedy for Henryk's attorney's alleged misrepresentation of facts to the courtis a petition for adjudication of criminal contempt. In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26,58-59, 558 N.E.2d 404 (1990). Contempt of court is an act that is calculated to embarrass orobstruct a court in the administration of justice, or that is calculated to lessen its authority ordignity. In re Estate of Kelly, 365 Ill. 174, 178, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1936). Indirect criminal contemptis retrospective, imposed to punish past misconduct. Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 43, citing Hicks v.Feiokc, 485 U.S. 624, 631-35, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721, 731-33, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1429-31 (1988). Oneof the purposes of criminal contempt is to punish those who commit fraud upon the court. Betts,200 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45. "Utter disregard of attorneys as to the truth or falsity of matterscontained in papers and documents presented to courts warrants condemnation as unethical andcontemptuous." Kelly, 365 Ill. at 184. In Kelly, an attorney who filed a spurious will andapplication for its probate was held in criminal contempt. Kelly, 365 Ill. at 179. "[T]he trial ofan indirect criminal contempt charge must conform to all procedural requirements and rightsnormally applicable to criminal trials." Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58. We believe this is the patha trial judge must take in a case where an attorney charged with drafting an order for thesignature of the court misrepresents the rulings the judge has indicated he wishes to make. Because we find that sanctions under Rule 137 were improper in this case, we need not addresswhether the trial court's order set out a sufficient factual basis to support the sanction.

Henryk also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding Margaret $4,000 ininterim attorney fees and costs. The court ordered Henryk to pay interim attorney fees soMargaret could "participate adequately" in the litigation. Margaret's petition for interim fees andaccompanying affidavits identified four separate pending motions for relief filed by Henryk forwhich assistance of counsel was needed. While this appeal was pending, Margaret filed a motionto dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portion of Henryk's appeal related to interim attorney fees. The motion was taken with the case and is now granted.

Margaret contends that this court lacks jurisdiction because the plain language of sections501(c-1)(1) and (2) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(1), (c-1)(2) (West 2000)), precludes the appeal of interim orders under In re Marriage ofTetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1039, 711 N.E.2d 346 (1999). Henryk responds that Tetzlaffdoes not apply because that case involved interim attorney fees for predissolution proceedings,but this case involves fees for postdissolution proceedings. This is incorrect. Section 501(c-1)applies to both predissolution and postdissolution decree proceedings. In re Marriage of Beyer,324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 314, 753 N.E.2d 1032 (2001).

Henryk cites In re Marriage of Lawrence, 146 Ill. App. 3d 307, 496 N.E.2d 538 (1986),to analogize interim attorney fees to "temporary" maintenance, which was held to be final andreviewable. In that case, the trial court awarded "temporary" maintenance payments to a party,subject to review by the trial court in three years. The appellate court determined that three yearswas long enough to be considered final for the purposes of appeal. Lawrence, 146 Ill. App. 3d at310. The trial court here found that Henryk "has the financial ability to pay reasonable amounts"to "enable [Margaret] to participate adequately in the litigation." Unlike Lawrence, this orderwas not set for future review by the trial court. Neither was the $4,000 designated as a one-timeor final interim fee payment. These facts support the conclusion that the order was interlocutoryand not subject to appeal. Petitioner's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portion ofthe appeal related to interim attorney fees is granted.

We reverse the award of sanctions under Rule 137. Lacking jurisdiction to consider theissue of interim attorney fees, we dismiss that portion of this appeal.

Reversed in part and dismissed in part.

McBRIDE, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.