THIRD DIVISION
FILED: 03/12/03

This is a permissive interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155Ill. 2d R.308). Central to our resolution of each of the five questions certified by the trial court isthe interpretation of subsections (d) and (e) of section 6.17 of the Hospital Licensing Act (HLA) (210ILCS 85/6.17(d),(e) (West 2000)). However, before addressing the certified questions, we willbriefly set out the procedural history of the litigation giving rise to this appeal.

In its decision in Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 759 N.E.2d 533 (2001),our supreme court upheld the constitutionality of subsections (d), (e), and (h) of section 6.17 of theHLA (210 ILCS 85/6.17(d),(e),(h) (West 2000)). After the Burger decision was issued, the plaintiffsin numerous medical negligence actions pending in the circuit court of Cook County filed motionsfor protective orders, seeking, inter alia, to prohibit, limit or control communications between theattorneys and certain other agents of the defendant hospitals and the medical staff members, agentsand employees of those hospitals who rendered medical care to the plaintiffs but whose treatmentwas not alleged to be the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries (hereinafter referred to as "non-Morganhealth care providers" (see Morgan v. County of Cook, 252 Ill. App. 3d 947, 625 N.E.2d 136(1993)). On January 29, 2002, the presiding judge of the law division of the circuit court of CookCounty entered an order designating a single judge to hear all of these motions on a consolidatedbasis and directed that the cases proceed under a master docket number.

Following a hearing, the circuit court entered a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" in whichit denied the plaintiffs' consolidated motions for protective orders with one exception. The circuitcourt held that, after a suit is filed, only a hospital defendant's attorney may communicate ex partewith the hospital's health care providers who rendered treatment to the plaintiff. The orderspecifically provided that: "Those parties responsible for peer review, utilization review, qualityassurance and risk management are not to continue ex parte communications with patient'scaregivers after the filing of a lawsuit." On the defendant hospitals' motion for reconsideration, thecircuit court modified its order to provide that hospital employees and agents responsible for peerreview, utilization review and quality assurance may continue to communicate ex parte with apatient's caregivers after a suit is filed against the hospital but reaffirmed its prior prohibition againstrisk managers doing so. In addition to ruling on the defendants' motion for reconsideration, the trialcourt also found that its resolution of the consolidated motions involved questions of law as to whichthere is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from its ordersmay materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The circuit court set forth in itswritten order the following five questions of law involved:

"1. After a medical negligence case is filed against a hospital, may hospitalcounsel communicate ex parte with plaintiff's non-Morgan health care providers?

2. After a medical negligence case is filed against a hospital, may parties atthe hospital responsible for peer review, defense of claims, quality assurance andutilization review communicate ex parte with plaintiff's non-Morgan health careproviders?

3. Do the HLA and the MCRPRA [Medical Care Reform and Patients' RightsAct (215 ILCS 134/1 et seq. (West 2000))] conflict so as to prohibit enforcement ofthe HLA amendments relating to ex parte communications between hospital counseland persons responsible for risk management with non-Morgan health careproviders?

4. Do the conflicts between the HLA and the MHDDCA [Mental Health andDevelopmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West2000))], PCCPCLA [Professional Counselor and Clinical Professional CounselorLicensing Act (225 ILCS 107/1 et seq. (West 2000))], and the CSWSWPA [ClinicalSocial Worker and Social Work Practice Act (225 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 2000))]prohibit enforcement of the HLA amendments relating to ex parte communicationsbetween hospital counsel and persons responsible for risk management with non-Morgan health care providers?

5. Under the HLA, may those parties responsible for hospital riskmanagement confer ex parte with non-Morgan health care providers after notice thata medical negligence suit has been filed against the hospital?"

The plaintiffs filed a timely application for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). This court granted leave to appeal and, as the circuit court failed todesignate a lead case in these consolidated proceedings, we designated the instant case as such. Forthe reasons which follow, we answer certified questions 1, 2, and 5 in the affirmative and certifiedquestions 3 and 4 in the negative.

Certified questions 1, 2 and 5 all deal with post-suit ex parte communications between aplaintiff's non-Morgan health care providers and a defendant hospital's legal counsel or those hospitalemployees responsible for peer review, utilization review, quality assurance, risk management, ordefense of claims. In support of their consolidated motions for protective orders, the plaintiffsargued to the trial court, inter alia, that such post-suit ex parte communications: 1) infringe upon theplaintiff's right to privacy as guaranteed under the Illinois Constitution; 2) violate this court's holdingin Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986); and 3) arecontrary to the strong public policy against ex parte communications with a patient's health careproviders, which policy is grounded in the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship. They madesimilar arguments in their application for leave to appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 308. However, in the brief filed with this court, the plaintiff appears to limit the argument toone of public policy as embodied in the principles underlying the Petrillo doctrine.

Our resolution of certified questions 1, 2, and 5 requires that we interpret subsections (d) and(e) of section 6.17 of the HLA which provide as follows:

"(d) No member of a hospital's medical staff and no agent or employee of a hospitalshall disclose the nature or details of services provided to patients, except that theinformation may be disclosed to the patient, persons authorized by the patient, theparty making treatment decisions, if the patient is incapable of making decisionsregarding the health services provided, those parties directly involved with providingtreatment to the patient or processing the payment for the treatment, those partiesresponsible for peer review, utilization review, quality assurance, risk managementor defense of claims brought against the hospital arising out of the care, and thoseparties required to be notified under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act,the Illinois Sexually Transmissible Disease Control Act, or where otherwiseauthorized or required by law.

(e) The hospital's medical staff members and the hospital's agents and employeesmay communicate, at any time and in any fashion, with legal counsel for the hospitalconcerning the patient medical record privacy and retention requirements of thisSection and any care or treatment they provided or assisted in providing to anypatient within the scope of their employment or affiliation with the hospital."[footnotes omitted] 210 ILCS 85/6.17(d),(e) (West 2000).

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which reviewing courts resolve de novo. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d. 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1997). The primary ruleof statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature (County ofDuPage v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151, 485 N.E.2d 1076 (1985)),an inquiry that begins with the language of the statute itself (Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d. at 16). If thelanguage of the statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is to beascertained therefrom and the statute will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443-44, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). In construing a statute, a courtis not at liberty to depart from its plain language and meaning by reading into the statute exceptions,limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443.

Section 6.17(d) of the HLA clearly and unambiguously provides that employees and agentsof a hospital, including members of its medical staff, may disclose the nature or details of servicesprovided to a patient to, inter alia, those parties responsible for peer review, utilization review,quality assurance, risk management and the defense of claims brought against the hospital arisingout of the care rendered to the patient. Section 6.17(e) clearly states that employees and agents ofa hospital, including members of its medical staff, may communicate, at any time and in any fashion,with the hospital's legal counsel concerning any care or treatment they provided or assisted inproviding to any patient within the scope of their employment or affiliation with the hospital. Bytheir plain language, these statutory provisions encompass post-suit communications and neither ofthem imposes any restriction on such communications after a patient has filed suit against thehospital.

The clear and unambiguous language of subsections (d) and (e) of section 6.17notwithstanding, the plaintiff urges us to answer certified question 1, 2 and 5 in the negative. However, we believe that each of the arguments proffered by the plaintiff both before the trial courtand this court have already been rejected by our supreme court.

As stated earlier, in Burger, our supreme court upheld the constitutionality of subsections (d)and (e) of section 6.17 of the HLA. Specifically, our supreme court found that these statutory provisions do not violate a patient's right to privacy as guaranteed under sections 6 and 12 of article I ofthe Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,