FIRST DIVISION
April 5, 2004

Nos. 1-03-0867 & 1-03-0920

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court.

Respondents Marilyn D. and Stephen B. appeal orders of thecircuit court of Cook County finding them to be unfit parents andterminating their parental rights relating to their three minorchildren. We affirm.

In July 1997, the office of the Cook County State's Attorneyfiled petitions alleging that the respondents' three children, asix-year-old girl and three-and one-year-old boys, were abusedand neglected in that they lived in a vacant apartment buildingwhich lacked furniture and utilities; they were inadequately fed,clothed and bathed; the three-year-old was allowed to access andsleep unsupervised on the building's dangerous fire escape; themother was an admitted alcohol and drug user; and the two youngerchildren had been born with drugs in their systems. The trialcourt removed the children from Marilyn's care and granted theDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) temporarycustody and the right to place the children. The six-year-oldgirl was placed in a foster home in August 1997 and was joined byher younger brothers the following month. Following a January1998 hearing, the court found the children to be neglected andabused, and in July 1998 declared them wards of the court. InOctober 1998 and September 1999, the court issued orderscharacterizing the ultimate custodial goal for the children as"return home within 12 months."

In May 2000, as a result of the daughter's reports of ahistory of sexual abuse by Marilyn, the office of the Cook Countypublic guardian sought to suspend the parents' visitation rights. The court gave DCFS the authority to allow or refuse visitationat its discretion until June 28, 2000, and on that date orderedthat visitation be suspended "until such time as the court feelsit would be in the minors' best interest."

In August 2001, the court established a new long-termcustody goal for the children: "substitute care pending courtdetermination of parental rights." In May 2002, the State,alleging parental unfitness, petitioned for the appointment of aguardian for the children who would have the right to consent totheir adoption.

The court found Marilyn unfit under several provisions ofthe Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2002): for failureto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern orresponsibility as to the welfare of the children (750 ILCS 50/1D(b) (West 2002)); for extreme and repeated cruelty to the oldestdaughter (750 ILCS 50/1D(e) (West 2002)); for failure to protectthe children from conditions in their environment which wereinjurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1D(g) (West 2002)); fordepravity (750 ILCS 50/1D(i) (West 2002)); and for failure tomake reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which causedthe children's removal or reasonable progress toward their returnhome (750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West 2002)). Stephen, who had livedapart from Marilyn and the children since approximately one yearbefore the July 1997 filing of the original neglect petition, wasfound unfit for failure to maintain a reasonable degree ofinterest, concern and responsibility and for failure to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions causing removal ofthe children or reasonable progress toward their return home. Having found both parents unfit, the court held a hearing todetermine the custodial option which would be in the bestinterest of the children. The court found the evidence to be"overwhelming" that it was in the best interest of the childrenthat the parents' rights be terminated and a guardian with theright to consent to adoption be appointed for the children. Theparents' separate appeals have been consolidated here.

Each parent argues that the trial court's unfitness findingswere erroneous. Our analysis of this argument is guided by well-settled principles of review. The State's allegation of parentalunfitness will be sustained if proved by clear and convincingevidence; the trial court's finding on the fitness issue isproperly reversed on review only if it was contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence, i.e., if the opposite conclusionwas clearly evident. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). Afinding of parental unfitness may be based on evidence sufficientto support any single statutory ground, even if the evidence isnot sufficient to support the other grounds alleged. In re A.M.,294 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624 (1998). In the instant case, webelieve that the evidence presented to the trial court wasunquestionably sufficient to support a finding of unfitness foreach parent.

The trial court heard evidence that Marilyn lived with thechildren in an abandoned apartment building with no utilitiesuntil they were removed from her custody in July 1997. Themiddle child, a boy age three at the time of removal, wasunderweight and malnourished. He and his one-year-old brotherhad both been born with narcotics in their systems. The three-year-old was allowed to wander onto and sleep upon the fireescape of the abandoned building without adult supervision. Theeldest child, a girl age six at the time of removal, reported toadults that the children were left alone for days at a timewithout food, and that she was forced to provide care for herselfand her younger brothers during such periods. An examiningphysician testified that she bore welts and scars on her backwhich were suggestive of physical abuse. The middle son alsobore such scars, and both children reported repeated beatings byMarilyn.

Upon placement in a foster home, the girl displayed overtand aggressively sexual behavior unusual for a child her age; sheultimately confessed to her foster mother that Marilyn had forcedher to perform sexual acts on numerous men in exchange for moneyto support her drug habit. The girl also reported Marilyn'ssexual abuse to a psychologist, providing details about numerousoccasions of forced sex acts, including descriptions of incidentsduring which she or her then three-year-old brother were forcedto perform such acts with strangers, and incidents in which herbrother was forced to perform such acts on their infant brother. The children's psychologist testified that the middle siblingoffered similar accounts of sexual abuse, and that he and hissister both mimicked sexual motions and used sexual terminologyin ways not commonly observed in children so young. Bothchildren were able to arrange anatomically correct dolls insexual positions to an unusual extent.

The children's foster mother testified that from theirarrival in her home in August and September 1997 until the trialcourt's suspension of visitation in May 2000, Marilyn visited thechildren several times, but also missed numerous scheduledvisits. One of her visits was terminated by a DCFS social workerwhen he noticed signs that she was under the influence ofalcohol. Stephen visited twice. Marilyn sent gifts to thechildren for Christmas on one occasion, but the childrenotherwise received no gifts, cards, letters or financial supportfrom either Marilyn or Stephen.

Neither parent successfully completed the social serviceprograms recommended as steps toward return of the children totheir custody. In the October 1998 order establishing a returnhome as a permanent custody goal for the children, the trialcourt found that Marilyn had "made substantial progress" towardthe children's return home, and was making progress in herservices. DCFS support of the family apparently lapsed followingthat order, however. In April 1999 Marilyn filed a motion tocompel services, alleging that she had completed inpatienttreatment and a parenting course, that she had started outpatienttreatment and was attending Narcotics Anonymous and AlcoholicsAnonymous meetings, but that since the court's October 1998order, she "received no regular visitation, no referrals,assessments, assistance" and was not in contact with hercaseworker despite calling him "at least weekly." In May 1999,the trial court entered an order requiring DCFS to assist Marilynin referrals and completion of services. Although she wasassigned to programs in 2000, she apparently stopped attendingthem. She missed or failed her scheduled drug tests in 2000,including a test which revealed the presence of narcotics in hersystem during a subsequent pregnancy that year. According to thetestimony of one of the social workers assigned to the family,Marilyn admitted that she was not able to regain custody of thechildren because she continued to relapse into drug usage, butdenied that she had done anything improper in her handling of thechildren before their removal, and admittted that she wasrefusing to submit to a substance addiction treatment program. She saw nothing wrong with housing the children in an abandonedbuilding.

As previously noted, Stephen had lived apart from the familyfor approximately one year before they were removed fromMarilyn's custody. None of the evidence suggested that he hadcommitted any sexual improprieties with any of the children. Hedid not complete any of the instruction or counseling recommendedfor him, and despite being hospitalized for mental illness, hewas not following his psychiatrist's recommendation to takemedication. According to the testimony of a social workerassigned to the family, Stephen admitted to her that he thoughtthat the foster mother should be allowed to adopt the children. However, after agreeing to sign consents for the process, hefailed to appear at the December 2001 court hearing at which thedocuments were to be presented to him and had no further contactwith the family's assigned social workers.

We believe that the testimony presented to the trial courtfirmly establishes the grounds for unfitness alleged against eachparent. Marilyn's failure to remedy the conditions which led tothe removal of the children or to make progress toward theirreturn home is demonstrated by her denial of any improprieties inher care for the children, her admitted refusal to submit tosubstance abuse treatment, and her relapse into drug usage evenduring her new pregnancy. Her failure to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare ofthe children is sufficiently demonstrated by her sporadicvisitation during the period between their removal from hercustody and the trial court's suspension of all parentalvisitation in May 2000. Since parental conduct which led to theinitial removal of the children may also serve as a basis for afinding of unfitness (In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 216 (2002)),the trial court's findings of insufficient interest, concern orresponsibility for the children's welfare and her failure toprotect them from injurious conditions are further supported bythe evidence of Marilyn's long-term absences and substandard careand feeding of her sons and daughter. Evidence of her preremovalconduct also conclusively establishes her cruelty to the childrenin the form of beatings of the two older children. Similarly, webelieve that the "'inherent deficiency of moral sense andrectitude'" required by the Adoption Act's "depravity" provision(In re Abdullah, 85 Ill. 2d 300, 305 (1981), quoting Stalder v.Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 498 (1952)) is equally well-established bythe evidence of her repeated subjection of her children to sexualacts to raise money for drugs.

Marilyn characterizes the testimony regarding the allegedsexual abuse as uncorroborated and therefore insufficient tosupport a finding of depravity. This characterization, in ourview, is contrary to the facts of record. Evidence of her sexualabuse of the children was established not merely by the report ofa single accuser, repeated to several different witnesses;rather, the two older children each described similar acts tomultiple witnesses, each thus corroborating the other. Marilynalso argues that the generally disturbed behavior of the twoolder children does not corroborate the allegations of abuse,noting witness testimony that such behavior is equally consistentwith both a history of sexual abuse and the displacement traumacaused by a move to a foster home. However, this notation doesnot address the more significant element of corrborative behaviorrelied upon by the trial court: each of the two older childrendisplayed detailed knowledge of sexual terminology and mechanicsnot common to children of their age. Marilyn further contendsthat the testimony of her acts of cruelty and depravity wasunacceptably uncertain, since her daughter recanted theaccusations. We disagree. The witness who reported thedaughter's recantation also noted that denial of the occurrenceof traumatic abuse was common among young children, and thatMarilyn's daughter, though at times denying any abuse, uniformlyreturned to her original assertion that the abuse did happen. Since inconsistencies in testimony do not negate its credibility,and are merely elements to be considered by the trier of fact inweighing the testimony, we do not believe that theinconsistencies cited by Marilyn provide a basis for underminingthe trial court's finding. In re Santiago, 87 Ill. App. 3d 605,608 (1980).

Marilyn's additional assertions of error are joined byStephen: both parents claim that the findings of their unfitnesswere improper because of systemic frustration of their efforts tocare for their children. The parents point out that DCFS failedto provide services for the family for an extended period andthat the trial court order indefinitely suspending visitationforestalled their care-giving efforts. This court has beenoffered no explanation for the extended period of DCFS unresponsiveness; the agency's failure to provide services to anextent which required Marilyn's petition to the court forintervention appears to be both regrettable and unacceptable. This failure does not shield the actions of the parents fromscrutiny, however. When official action frustrates parentalefforts, their fitness will be judged by actions which show theirintent, rather than by their ultimate success. In re Bredendick,74 Ill. App. 3d 946, 954 (1979). In the instant case, the trialcourt heard evidence that the children lacked adequate food andshelter and that Stephen had not lived with them forapproximately one year before their entry into the court system. In the period of more than two years during which he was entitledto visit the children at the home of their foster mother,including the period of agency inattention, Stephen visited only twice. Marilyn, though visiting more, still missed many of thescheduled visits, according to the children's foster mother. Neither parent presented any evidence of other attempts tomaintain contact with the children before or after visits weresuspended. When social services were resumed, neither parentsuccessfully completed recommended programs. It is thus apparentthat both parents displayed the characteristics providing thebasis for findings of unfitness before, during and after theonset of the disabling acts and omissions of DCFS and the trialcourt. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the trialcourt's findings of unfitness were improper.

Both parents also argue that termination of their rights wasnot demonstrated to be in the best interests of the children. Asa preliminary matter, Marilyn argues that the trial courtimproperly excluded from the best interest hearing testimonyabout her social worker's October 2002 evaluation of herperformance against her most recent service plan. Thatevaluation indicated that during the duration of that plan,Marilyn had passed drug and alcohol tests and followed therecommendations of the psychologist assigned to her case at thattime and kept in touch with her social worker. Marilyn attemptedto introduce such testimony through cross-examination of hersocial worker, who had testified for the State that thetermination of the parental rights of Marilyn and Stephen was inthe children's best interest. The trial court reasoned that onceMarilyn was found unfit, her subsequent conduct was irrelevant tothe best interest determination. We believe that this reasoningis inconsistent with the analysis of our supreme court in In reD.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (2000), which indicates that parentalbehavior following an adjudication of abuse or neglect ispotentially relevant and admissible at a best interest hearing.

Errors in limitation of cross-examination only requirereversal upon a showing of manifest prejudice to the aggrievedparty, however. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 533(2000). We believe that the trial court's exclusion of evidenceof Marilyn's service plan performance resulted in no prejudice inthe instant case. A parent's completion of recommended socialservices does not demonstrate that preservation of her parentalrights is in the best interest of her child. In re J.J., 327Ill. App. 3d 70, 78 (2001). Any success Marilyn may haveachieved in relation to a portion of one of her service planswould therefore have been merely one factor to be considered indetermining the best interests of the children.

Consideration of other factors relating to the children'sbest interests clearly outweighed the impact of Marilyn's serviceplan performance. At the time of the best interest hearing, thechildren had been in the home of their foster mother for morethan five years. The children's social worker reported that thefoster mother was effectively attending to the needs of all threechildren: the two older children were supervised in all theirinteractions with other children, attended regular therapysessions, and received prescribed medication for emotionaldisorders. Both children attended special education programs. The youngest child also attended special education classes, andwas considered to be a candidate for therapy at a more advancedage, but had no medication needs. All three children referred tothe foster mother as "Mom," and the two older children bothreported that they wanted to be adopted by her.

In our view, the foregoing evidence establishes thatMarilyn's service plan evaluation, even if it had been properlyadmitted, would not have altered the court's judgment thattermination of her parental rights was in the best interests ofthe children. We therefore conclude that exclusion of thatevidence, though erroneous, was harmless. Given this conclusion,we find no basis for the parents' claims that termination oftheir rights in the children's best interests was contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of thecircuit court of Cook County.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY, P.J., and McBRIDE, J., concur.