THIRD DIVISION
April 25, 2001
(NUNC PRO TUNC December 6, 2000)

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent Nereida S. appeals from an order of the circuitcourt of Cook County terminating her parental rights with respectto her three minor children S.S., N.S. and Y.S., and appointing aguardian with the power to consent to their adoption. Respondentcontends that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretionbecause she was never told that her continued contact with herhusband, Francisco S., who was the father of the three minors,would result in the permanent loss of custody of her children, andshe never received adequate services in sign language.

On June 11, 1997, the three minor children were adjudicatedwards of the court based on the finding that they had been sexuallyabused by their father and were at substantial risk of physicalinjury. On May 12, 1998, the State filed a petition forappointment of a guardian with the right to consent to adoption.

The record establishes that respondent and her husbandFrancisco S. were both deaf and spoke through sign language. Theirthree children's birth dates were as follows: S.S. on March 3,1986; Y.S. on September 26, 1989; and N.S. on April 3, 1991.

Respondent also had three children from a prior marriage toWenceslao L., who was sentenced to 37 years' imprisonment forphysically and sexually abusing respondent and their three childrenduring a seven-year period. The three children from that marriageare Tracy L., born in 1976, Daisy L., born in 1977, and Jessica L.,born in 1981. Daisy was appointed the foster parent to the threechildren in the instant case.

On August 12, 1999, at a hearing on the termination ofparental rights, Daisy testified that in December 1994, after shelearned that Francisco S. was sexually molesting S.S., N.S. andY.S. with respondent's knowledge, she called the police who cameand removed Francisco S. from the home. However, because hesubsequently attempted to gain entry to the home on a number ofoccasions, in January 1995 Daisy and respondent visited the circuitcourt where they obtained the forms necessary to obtain an order ofprotection. Before visiting the court, she had told respondent ofthe purpose of their visit, and respondent agreed to accompany herto obtain the order of protection. In a nearby restaurant, Daisyfilled out the forms for respondent, who was illiterate, using theinformation that respondent gave her. She explained to respondentthe general nature of the forms, instead of translating each line,and then assured herself that respondent understood and agreed withthe information in the forms before respondent signed them. Daisyand respondent then returned to the circuit court where theyappeared before a judge. After the judge asked Daisy to swear thatshe would accurately translate from sign language to English andfrom English to sign language, he instructed her to ask respondentwhether everything in the forms was true. When respondent answeredthat the forms were true, the court entered an order of protectionbarring Francisco S. from entering respondent's home.

A short time later, respondent violated the order ofprotection by allowing Francisco S. into her home. The followingmonth, respondent fled with him and their three children to PuertoRico. After a caseworker located the children, a juvenile arrestwarrant was issued. In June 1995, the children were returned toIllinois. Daisy became their foster mother and the trial courtissued a no-contact order barring respondent and Francisco S. fromseeing the children.

Jessica L. testified that she lived with respondent andFrancisco S. from the time that she was 3 years old until she was14. During the entire 11 years, Francisco S. sexually molested herseveral times each month. When she was seven years old, respondentwalked into a room where Francisco S. was in the process oftouching Jessica's vagina. When respondent started to scream,Francisco S. hit himself with a hammer and threatened to killhimself. The following year, respondent again walked into a roomwhere Francisco S. was sexually molesting Jessica, and screamed. Francisco S. began to bang his head against the wall. After thesetwo incidents, respondent continued to live with Francisco S. Although she became more vigilant over Jessica, she also continuedto leave Jessica alone with Francisco S. In December 1994, Daisytook Jessica and the other children to Columbus Hospital to beevaluated for sexual abuse. Several months later, Jessica camehome from school only to discover that respondent had clandestinelymoved out of the apartment, taking S.S., N.S. and Y.S. with her. Jessica remained in the apartment for several days hoping thatrespondent would return. When respondent failed to come home,Jessica moved in with her sister Daisy. Jessica later learned thatrespondent had moved to Puerto Rico with Francisco S.

Salvador Perez, a case manager for Association House,testified that he was assigned to respondent's case from March 1997until June 1999. During that entire time, respondent and FranciscoS. continued to live together, and neither ever admitted thatFrancisco S. had sexually molested the children. A languageinterpreter and a relay gesture interpreter were always present atthe administrative case reviews, which occurred every six months. The reviews would not proceed in the absence of such interpreters.

Perez testified that respondent received individual counselingin American sign language at Mt. Sinai Mental Health Center. InMarch 1998, the counseling was terminated because respondent wouldnot acknowledge that Francisco S. had sexually molested thechildren. Respondent never told Perez that she could notunderstand her therapist. As of June 1999, respondent had notcompleted the therapy that she needed in order to be reunited withher children. Association House attempted to find other servicesfor respondent, such as parenting classes, but none couldaccommodate her need for an interpreter. Perez never toldrespondent that she had to separate herself from Francisco S. inorder to regain custody of her children.

Clinical psychologist, Dr. Judith Kahn, testified that shespecialized in hearing impaired patients. Because she could notunderstand respondent's sign language, which respondent had learnedin Puerto Rico, she spoke to respondent through a relay interpreterwho translated respondent's sign language into American signlanguage. Vivian Cordona, respondent's advocate, who was alsodeaf, was present during the examination. Dr. Kahn determined thatrespondent was depressed, emotionally overwhelmed and suffered froma "horrendous" history of abuse. She found that respondent was apassive dependent whose primary concern was her own safety andeconomic welfare, and that Francisco S. gave her security. Thepsychologist recommended extensive psychotherapy and thatrespondent be evaluated for antidepressive medication.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found thatboth respondent and Francisco S. had been proven unfit by clear andconvincing evidence. Specifically, respondent was found unfitbased on her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern or responsibility as to the children's welfare, failure toprotect the children from injurious conditions within theirenvironment, and failure to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for removal of the children. Francisco S. was found unfit based on his failure to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to thechildren's welfare, based on his depravity, and based on hisfailure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions thatwere the basis for removal of the children. The court noted thatalthough the case involved an extremely substantial communicationproblem, respondent and Francisco S. exhibited no cognitivedifficulties and presented themselves very well in court. Thecourt stated that despite the complexities of communicating withrespondent and Francisco S., communication during the hearing wasreadily accomplished and the court believed that they both clearlyunderstood the proceedings. The court then found that based on theclear and convincing testimony of respondent's daughter Jessica L.,Francisco S. was a pedophile. The court further found thatrespondent was aware of his depravity, having sworn to it inanother court proceeding, yet she consistently failed to protecther children from his harmful conduct. The court found mostsignificant respondent's flight from the country with Francisco S.and their three children after she had obtained a court orderpreventing any contact between him and them. The court also foundthat a transcript from a prior court case was significant becauseit indicated that respondent testified that her first husband hadsexually abused her and her children daily for seven years, but shedid nothing until one of the children was so battered that she hadto be hospitalized. It was only then that hospital personneldiscovered that the child had also been sexually abused. The courtnoted that respondent's first marriage had ended only because herthen husband was sentenced to 37 years' imprisonment. The courtconcluded that respondent clearly did not wish to confront issuesregarding harm to her children. The court also found that theagencies involved in attempting to help respondent and Francisco S.made great efforts to have appropriate interpreters available tothem. Finally, the court stated that it knew of no service thatwould be able to help respondent and Francisco S. reunite withtheir children if both parties refused to acknowledge that sexualabuse was rampant in their home.

At the hearing on the best interests of the children,caseworker Sharon Davila testified that S.S., N.S. and Y.S. werecurrently living with their half-sister Daisy L., who provided asafe and appropriate home for them. The children told Davila oftheir desire to be adopted by Daisy L. Davila highly recommendedsuch an adoption.

Daisy L. testified that she believed that it was in the bestinterests of the children to be adopted by her. The children hadno relationship with respondent and Francisco S. S.S. might bewilling to visit respondent, but only if respondent refrained fromblaming her for respondent's loss of custody of the children.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminatedthe parental rights of respondent and Francisco S., and appointedD. Jean Ortega-Piron as guardian with the right to consent toadoption.

On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court'stermination of her parental rights was an abuse of discretionbecause she was never warned that continued contact with FranciscoS. would result in her losing her children forever. Relying on Inre R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 97, 696 N.E.2d 1259 (1998), she assertsthat the trial court's order must be reversed because she was neverspecifically warned by the court that her continued residence withFrancisco S., the alleged "cause of the injurious environment,"would result in the termination of her parental rights. Shecontends that according to R.B., a similar warning from a socialworker or therapist was insufficient.

Section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act provides that a personshall be deemed unfit to have a child if he fails "to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basisfor the removal of the child from the parent, or to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parent within 9months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor." 750ILCS 1(D)(m) (West 1996).

In In re Grant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 865, 719 N.E.2d 195(1999), this court summarized the applicable law, stating:

"In a proceeding to terminate parentalrights, the State must prove by clear andconvincing evidence that the nonconsentingparent is 'unfit,' as defined under section1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1994)). [Citations.] A finding ofunfitness may be based on evidence sufficientto support any one statutory ground, even ifthe evidence is insufficient to support othergrounds. [Citation.]

Because the trial court's opportunity toview and evaluate the parties and theirtestimony is superior to that of the reviewingcourt, a trial court's finding of unfitness,or its finding that the State failed to meetits burden to prove unfitness, is accordedgreat deference and will only be reversed onreview if it is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. [Citations.] A decision isagainst the manifest weight of the evidencewhere the opposite result is clearly theproper result." Grant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d at868.

In In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000), thesupreme court held that in order to determine whether a parent isunfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)), the clear and unambiguous language of thestatute mandates that the evidence must be limited to the parent'sconduct within the 12-month period immediately following theadjudication of neglect.⁽¹⁾

Here, the three minor children were adjudicated wards of thecourt on June 11, 1997, specifically because they were abused bytheir father Francisco S. and were at substantial risk of physicalinjury. From that date until the termination of parental rightshearing on August 12, 1999, respondent continued to reside withFrancisco S. and, despite counseling, respondent never admittedthat he had sexually molested the children. Nor did she make anyeffort to correct the conditions which led to the removal of herchildren. In fact, counseling was terminated by the therapistbecause of respondent's refusal to acknowledge that Francisco S.had sexually abused her children. The record shows that althoughrespondent knew that Francisco S. was sexually molesting thechildren, she remained with him and allowed him access to thechildren. She even defied the court's order of protection bytaking the children to Puerto Rico where Francisco S. presumablyhad unlimited access to them.

Although respondent was never specifically told by the trialcourt that she had to choose between living with her husband andliving with her children, as was the case in R.B., we find littlesimilarity between the two cases. In R.B., both parents weresubstance abusers who neglected their children by failing toprovide necessary care, such as food and immunizations for thechildren, thereby creating an environment injurious to theirwelfare. R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 98. The court found that themother could not have known that after she became drug-free andcooperated with counseling and other services she would have herparental rights terminated merely because she remained with herhusband. R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 101. Here, unlike R.B.,respondent knew that Francisco S. was a pedophile, had observed himmolest their children, and knew that the children were at risk atall times that he was present in the home. Also, unlike R.B.,respondent personally obtained an order of protection againstFrancisco S. to keep him away from the home and the children basedon his sexual abuse of the children. Accordingly, we find that,under the circumstances, R.B. is not applicable here becauserespondent fully knew that remaining with Francisco S. wouldprevent her from ever regaining custody of her children and thather parental rights would ultimately be terminated if she did notseparate from him.

Respondent next contends that the Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS) never advised her what was required of herin order to regain custody of her children. She asserts that DCFSdid not expend reasonable efforts to provide "family preservation"services to prevent the removal of the chidren from the home. Sheargues that when her counselor at Mt. Sinai Mental Health Centerterminated services, DCFS did not refer her to another counselor. She also asserts that the trial court erred in excluding testimonyby an expert witness regarding whether services were available forher with her complex communications problems. She further arguesthat DCFS prevented her from making reasonable progress towardregaining custody of her children.

Respondent's caseworker, Salvador Perez, testified thatalthough it was not possible to obtain parenting classes forrespondent because of her complex language difficulties, she didreceive individual counseling in American sign language at Mt.Sinai Mental Health Center. Respondent never complained to himthat she could not understand her therapist, and counseling wasonly terminated in March 1998 because she refused to acknowledgethat Francisco S. had ever sexually abused the children.

Although respondent wishes to place the entire blame for herlack of progress on DCFS, her stubborn refusal to admit the verycause of her children's problems demonstrated that she was notamenable to therapy or counseling. Respondent has failed toestablish that under these impracticable circumstances DCFS wasrequired to refer her to additional counselors or therapists.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly determinedthat respondent was proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence.

For the reasons stated, the order of the circuit court of CookCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.

1. The statute has since been amended to require such effortswithin nine months of the adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998).