Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-11-0361 Rel

Case Date: 02/18/2011

Preview:FOURTH DIVISION February 18, 2011

No. 1-11-0361

EILEEN JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

) ) ) ) ) )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County 11 COEL 18 ) The Honorable Maureen Ward Kirby Presiding.

THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO sitting as the duly ) constituted Electoral Board to hear and pass upon ) Objections to the nomination papers of candidates ) for the office of Alderman of the 28th Ward of the ) City of Chicago for the February 22, 2011 ) Municipal General Election in the city of Chicago, ) Illinois, and its members, Langdon D. Neal, ) Richard A. Cowen and Marisel A. Hernandez, and ) CARMELITA P. EARLS, ) ) Respondents-Appellees. )

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Gallagher and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION In this appeal, we decide a case of first impression: whether a candidate in arrears on her property taxes is also in arrears in the payment of taxes due to the city within the prohibition of section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2008)). An objector's petition was filed to candidate Carmelia P. Earls' nominating papers to run for alderman, claiming that Earls was ineligible to run because she owed property taxes due to improperly claiming homeowner's exemptions on multiple properties for previous tax years. A

1-11-0361 hearing was held and the hearing officer overruled the objection, relying on a letter from the city of Chicago that the candidate did not owe any debt to the city. The Electoral Board adopted the hearing officer's recommendation and overruled the objector's petition, also ruling that the payment of property taxes is not a debt owed to the city and that section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code did not apply. We hold that, notwithstanding the city's letter, the statutory enactments of the property tax collection system establish that the portions of property tax levied by the city of Chicago, though collected by Cook County, are taxes due to the city. Therefore, the candidate was ineligible to run under section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code. BACKGROUND Respondent-appellee Carmelita P. Earls filed nominating papers on November 22, 2010, to run as alderman for the 28th Ward of the city of Chicago for the February 22, 2011 municipal general election. An objector's petition was filed by petitioner-appellant Eileen Jackson, stating that Earls was not qualified to run on the ballot as she was in arrears and owed a debt to the city of Chicago because of back property taxes due to her wrongfully receiving three homeowner's exemptions on properties she owned, when she was only entitled to one exemption. The petition stated Earls failed to pay the full amount of property taxes, which included amounts owed to the city of Chicago, going back at least two years. The petition alleged that because Earls owed these debts to Chicago, Earls was in violation of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS5/1-1 et seq. (West 2008) and Municipal Code and pursuant to Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008), her nomination papers were invalid.

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1-11-0361 Previously, Earls received a letter from the city of Chicago department of revenue dated November 17, 2010, indicating that the city did not find a record of certain delineated debts, specifically stating the following: "Please accept this as confirmation that no outstanding debt was found across any of the debt types, Parking, Water, Administrative Hearings, Inspection Fees, Cost Recovery and Tax/Licensing." Petitioner-appellant Eileen Jackson filed an objector's petition to Earls' nominating papers on November 30, 2010, listing a variety of objections, including the fact that Earls was in arrears for amounts due to the city of Chicago by virtue of property taxes in arrears due to illegally claimed exemptions for previous years on multiple properties. On December 6, 2010, the Cook County assessor's office sent a letter to Earls and her husband at their 37 N. Long residence, informing them that it had come to the office's and Alderman Smith's attention that they have received homeowner's exemptions on multiple properties. The letter outlined the dollar values of the exemptions Earls received for each of the properties. For 555 N. Lawler, Earls received a $963.20 exemption for 2008 and a $669.16 exemption for 2009. For 552 N. Lawler, Earls received a $578.55 exemption for 2008 and a $721.03 exemption for 2009. In response to this notice from the county assessor's office, Earls paid the amount owed in back taxes for the two properties on December 14, 2010. A hearing was conducted by William Cadigan of the Chicago Board of Elections. The objector introduced into evidence public records showing that Earls had claimed a homeowner's exemption on three properties: 552 N. Lawler, 555 N. Lawler, and 37 N. Long, in Chicago,

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1-11-0361 Illinois, although Earls in fact resided at 37 N. Long. These public records included the following: copies of the deeds for 552 N. Lawler and 555 N. Lawler, showing that Earls and her husband held title to both properties as tenants by the entirety; title insurance for the 37 N. Long property indicating Earls and her husband held title as joint tenants; records printed from the Cook County assessor's Web site showing a claimed homeowner's exemption status for 555 N. Lawler in 2008 and 2009; the December 6, 2010, letter from the Cook County assessor's office sent to Earls; 2008 and 2009 homeowner's exemption applications for 552 N. Lawler and 555 N. Lawler; three original certified 2009 second installment tax bills produced by the Cook County treasurer's office for all three properties; original certified PIN payment summaries produced by the Cook County treasurer's office for all three properties; copies of relevant statutory provisions; and a summary of the records relating to the properties and the tax levy and rates for the city of Chicago for the years 2008 and 2009. Earls testified that she in fact had lived at 37 N. Long since 2007. Earls also testified that she was the one who paid the property tax bills. The hearing officer relied on the letter from the city of Chicago indicating the city did not find a record of the types of debts delineated and overruled the objection. The Board of Elections adopted the hearing officer's recommendations and found that the facts did not fall within the relevant provision of the Illinois Municipal Code and the holding of the Cinkus case because "the only evidence of indebtedness presented was regarding an amount owed to the Cook County Assessor." The Board did not address the argument made that Cook County collects certain amounts in property taxes for the city of Chicago, which it then disburses to the city. The objector appealed to the circuit court, and the circuit court entered an order affirming the

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1-11-0361 Electoral Board. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS On appeal, Jackson contends that the Board erred in finding that Earls' nomination papers were valid because the debt she amassed by unlawfully obtaining homeowners exemptions on two of her properties constituted arrearages due to the city of Chicago. Because Earls was indebted to the city of Chicago at the time she filed her nomination papers, Jackson argues that she was precluded from running for elected office pursuant to section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Municipal Code 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5 (West 2008). In response, Earls initially contends that the issue of whether she erroneously received homeowners exemptions to which she is not entitled is beyond the scope of the authority vested in the Board of Elections, and she argues that the Board's authority is limited to simply ascertaining whether her papers comply with provisions of the Illinois Election Code governing those papers. Nonetheless, she argues that she did not owe a debt to the city of Chicago at the time she filed her nomination papers. She maintains that property taxes are payable to the Cook County treasurer, not the city of Chicago. Accordingly, unauthorized homeowner's exemptions would not constitute a debt to the city of Chicago, and section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Municipal Code does not preclude her from running for alderman for the 28th Ward.1 Initially, we find Earls' argument that the issue of whether she received unauthorized

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We acknowledge that the Board also filed an appellee brief; however, the Board did not

address the merits of its decision in its brief. Instead, the Board merely apprised this court of the status of ballot preparation, testing, production, and distribution. 5

1-11-0361 homeowner's exemptions was beyond the scope of the Board's authority to be without merit. It is well within the Board's authority to determine whether a candidate meets the qualifications for elective office set forth in section 3.1-10-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5 (West 2008)). See generally Bryant v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 473 (2007) (order) (reviewing an election board's decision as to whether the candidate was qualified to run for elective office pursuant to section 3.1-10-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code). More specifically, it is well within the Board's authority to determine whether a candidate is precluded from running for, or holding, an elected municipal office because he or she owes a debt to a municipality pursuant to section 3.1-10-5(b). See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008) (reviewing an election board's finding that a candidate was indebted to the village and was not entitled to run for a village trustee office). Accordingly, the issue as to whether Earls met the qualifications for elective office or whether she is precluded from running for alderman because she possessed a debt to the city of Chicago pursuant to section 3.2-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code was properly before the Board and is properly before this court. As a threshold matter, we must determine our proper standard of review. Jackson, the only party to address the standard of review applicable to this appeal, contends that the Board's decision is subject to de novo review. We disagree. An electoral board is an administrative agency and only possesses the powers conferred upon it by the legislature. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 209; Delgado v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 481, 485 (2007) (order). On appeal, a reviewing court reviews the

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1-11-0361 decision of the board, not the circuit court. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 212; Ramirez v. Andrade, 372 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73 (2007). In reviewing an administrative agency's decision, the applicable standard of review depends upon whether the question raised on appeal is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210; City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). An administrative agency's factual findings and credibility determinations are deemed prima facie true and correct, and a reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210; City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. An administrative agency's conclusions regarding questions of law, in contrast, are not subject to deference; rather, the court's review is independent and not deferential. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211; City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. However, a mixed question of fact and law can present even if the facts are clear and admitted, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is simply whether or not the law as applied to the facts is violated. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211. Ultimately, an administrative agency's decision involving a mixed question of law will not be disturbed on appeal unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211; City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. A decision is "clearly erroneous" only in circumstances in which the reviewing court is left with " `[a]definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 393 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Here, there is no dispute as to the facts. The record reflects that Earls filed her

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1-11-0361 nomination papers on November 22, 2010. Thereafter, on December 6, 2010, a letter addressed to Earls and her husband was sent by the Cook County assessor's office, informing them that they had erroneously claimed two unauthorized homeowner's exemptions. Upon receipt of the letter, Earls paid the back taxes on December 14, 2010. Earls does not dispute that homeowner's exemptions were claimed on the multiple properties and that she owed back taxes for these improper exemptions at the time she filed her nominating papers. Earls further does not dispute that she later paid these back taxes. Accordingly, there is no dispute that at the time Earls filed her nomination papers, she was in arrears on her property taxes. The law is also undisputed that "a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality" under section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2008)) renders a person ineligible to run for office. The issue is the application of the facts to the law. The hearing officer found that the city's letter "effectively rebuts any claim that the Candidate was in arrears on debts to the City of Chicago at the time she signed [t]he Statement of Candidacy and Nominating Papers," and did not address the issue of whether property taxes include taxes due to the city of Chicago. The Board of Elections, in applying section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code to the facts, determined that "the only evidence of indebtedness presented was regarding an amount owed to the Cook County Assessor," and that there was no support for the conclusion that a debt owed to Cook County would bar a candidate from running in a municipal election in the city of Chicago. Therefore, as this case presents a mixed question of fact and law, we must decide whether the Board's decision is clearly erroneous. Earls contends that any tax debt resulting from the unauthorized homeowner's exemptions

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1-11-0361 legally does not constitute arrears in taxes owed to the city of Chicago. She observes that it was the Cook County assessor's office that sent the letter that addressed the issues pertaining to the unauthorized homeowner's exemptions taken by Earls and her husband. The letter, in turn, directed them to make their payment out to the Cook County treasurer's office. Earls argues that the city of Chicago would not have standing to enforce the judgment, and accordingly, there was no "indebtedness due" to the city of Chicago. Earls also relies heavily on the letter she received from the city stating that the city's search of its records indicated she did not owe a debt to the city. Because she was not indebted to the City of Chicago, Earls argues that section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code would not bar her from running for alderman. Section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code provides the following: "A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality or has been convicted in any court located in the United States of any infamous crime, bribery, perjury, or other felony." 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2008). Based on this provision, a prospective candidate who owes a debt to a municipality at the time her nomination papers are filed is not eligible to run for or hold municipal office. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 220-22. More specifically, a tax indebtedness to a city would preclude a taxpayer from candidacy. Grabavoy v. Wilson, 87 Ill. App. 2d 193, 201 (1967). The plain language of our statutory enactments is clear that, though collected by the Cook County collector, the money levied by the city as property taxes is due to the city. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 grants counties and municipalities the authority to levy or impose taxes. Ill.

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1-11-0361 Const. 1970, art. VII,

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