Third Division
Filed: February 5, 2003

No. 1-01-3937

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court: 

The plaintiff, Earlean Jinkins, individually and as independent administrator of the estate ofher deceased husband, George Jinkins (George), brought a medical malpractice action against thedefendants, Dr. Choong Lee and Paulette Medlin, two employees of the John J. Madden MentalHealth Center (Madden), a State of Illinois mental health care facility. The defendants subsequentlyfiled a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over the claims against them based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The circuitcourt granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff brought the instantappeal. The issues before us are whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that thedoctrine of sovereign immunity applied and, alternatively, whether we should affirm the trial court'sentry of summary judgment in the defendants' favor because they are shielded from liability underthe doctrine of public officials' immunity. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand thiscase to the circuit court for further proceedings.

On June 20, 1996, George was admitted to the emergency room at Christ Hospital andMedical Center (Christ Hospital), a private hospital, and diagnosed as being acutely psychotic andexhibiting suicidal behavior. George was later transferred to Madden, where Dr. Lee, a psychiatrist,and Paulette Medlin, a psychologist, released him after evaluating him and referring him foroutpatient treatment. An hour after being released, George committed suicide by shooting himselfin the head.

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court containing four counts which allegedmedical malpractice against Dr. Lee and Medlin.⁽¹⁾ The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Dr. Lee andMedlin breached their duty to properly examine, diagnose, monitor, and treat George and to admithim to Madden, which proximately caused George's death.

In his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, Dr. Lee denied that he examined, diagnosed,treated, or cared for George, and admitted only that he interviewed and evaluated him. Dr. Lee andMedlin did admit that, in providing medical care and services to George, it was their duty to applythe knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by well-qualified heath care professionals in the sameor similar communities. As affirmative defenses, the defendants alleged that George had failed to:(1) follow the medical treatment suggested by the attending health care professionals at Madden and(2) refrain from engaging in conduct which was likely to cause injury or death to himself.

The pleadings, deposition testimony, and medical records contained in the record reveal thefollowing facts. Lorenzo Norwood, a friend of George's, testified that George began exhibitingstrange behavior about three or four months before he committed suicide. After one particularincident during which George intentionally jumped in front of a passing car, Norwood, anotherfriend named Maurice Abernathy, and George's mother, Florine Jinkins (Florine), took George toChrist Hospital.

At the hospital, Dr. Daniel Sachs diagnosed George as acutely psychotic and exhibitingsuicidal behavior. A petition for involuntary admission was prepared on behalf of George pursuantto section 3-601 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code)(405 ILCS 5/3-601 (West 1996)), and signed by Florine. The petition alleged that George washearing voices, thought he was being shot at, thought birds were talking to him, and believed he wasbeing poisoned. Attached to the petition was a certificate prepared by Dr. Sachs stating that Georgewas mentally ill, and because of his illness, was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harmon himself or another in the near future. Dr. Sachs testified that George was subject to involuntaryadmission and in need of immediate hospitalization based on comments made by Florine and eitherAbernathy or Norwood, to the effect that George repeatedly tried to kill himself by walking in frontof cars stating, "I just want to go." Pursuant to the Mental Health Code, after a petition forinvoluntary admission and accompanying certificate are filed on behalf of a patient, a psychiatristmust evaluate the patient and execute a second certificate in order for the patient to be involuntarilyheld longer than 24 hours at a mental health facility. 405 ILCS 5/3-602 (West 1996); 405 ILCS 5/3-610 (West 1996).

Social worker Leonard Kemp informed Dr. Sachs that George was going to be transferredto Madden to be evaluated by a psychiatrist. However, George was not transferred immediatelybecause his blood alcohol level was too high. He remained at Christ Hospital until approximately6 a.m. During this time, George appeared hostile and agitated, and was subsequently given Haldoland placed in restraints. At 7:30 a.m., George arrived at Madden, accompanied by Florine and theplaintiff.

Dr. Lee testified that he was working as an intake psychiatrist at Madden when George wastransferred to the facility. He explained that the intake psychiatry position exists only in Statehospitals and that, in his opinion, such positions do not exist in private hospitals. Dr. Lee explainedthat, as the intake psychiatrist, it was his job to examine individuals brought to Madden and decidewhether they needed psychiatric care. If so, Dr. Lee hospitalized the patient, and if not, he referredthe patient to an outpatient clinic. Dr. Lee stated that he exclusively did intake work and did notprovide long term psychiatric care for any patient.

Before interviewing George, Dr. Lee reviewed the records from Christ Hospital, includingthe petition for involuntary admission. The doctor acknowledged that he knew George was givenHaldol the previous night. Dr. Lee stated that, during the interview, George appeared to be calm andcooperative and showed no symptoms of psychosis or paranoid ideations. George told Dr. Lee thathe was brought to Christ Hospital because he was bleeding, hyperventilating, and intoxicated. Dr.Lee asked George about the statements contained in the petition for involuntary admission andaccompanying certificate, alleging that he was hearing voices, thought he was being poisoned, andattempted to commit suicide by running in front of cars. George denied the allegations and statedthat he wanted to go home and spend time with his family. According to Dr. Lee, the plaintiff toldhim that her husband was not suicidal, that he did not need to be in the hospital, and that she wantedto take him home. Florine also told Dr. Lee that George was doing better and that she would rathertake him home.

Dr. Lee diagnosed George with an "alcohol-related disorder NOS" (not otherwise specified)and alcohol abuse. According to Dr. Lee, he made the diagnosis because, by the time George leftChrist Hospital, his alcohol level had decreased and his psychiatric symptoms had disappeared. Dr.Lee stated that, due to the change in George's behavior while at Madden, he did not feel that Georgeneeded to be involuntarily admitted. The doctor did not believe that George was suicidal, butacknowledged there was some low suicidal risk. Dr. Lee stated that he classified George's suicidalrisk as "low" because he had a supportive family, he had not attempted suicide in the past, and didnot have any prior history of psychiatric hospitalization.

Dr. Lee testified that the first certificate for involuntary admission was filled out at ChristHospital. He explained that it was his responsibility to write a second certificate for George if hebelieved it to be necessary; however, he did not believe George was "certifiable." Dr. Lee stated that,in his opinion, George needed follow-up observation and, as a consequence, he referred George toa community mental health center for outpatient treatment. However, George refused the referral. Finally, Dr. Lee acknowledged in his deposition that George was his patient during the intakeprocedure. When asked specifically whether he was George's psychiatrist and George was hispatient, Dr. Lee replied affirmatively.

Medlin testified that she was licensed as a clinical professional counselor and classified asa "psychologist three" at Madden. She stated that she worked in intake and that her job entailedgathering information about a patient to determine if he or she should be admitted to the facility. Medlin interviewed George, the plaintiff, and Florine. According to Medlin, both the plaintiff andFlorine told her that George was not suicidal and that he should return home. Florine also toldMedlin that George's behavior was related to his alcohol consumption. Medlin stated that, althoughshe was not responsible for deciding whether a patient should be admitted into Madden, she did notfeel that George needed to be committed.

Dr. Syed Ali, a psychiatrist and expert witness for the defendants, testified that he reviewedthe policies and procedures from Madden. Dr. Ali stated that the evaluation process, standards, andprocedures that are followed to involuntarily commit a patient are the same in a private hospital asthey are in a State hospital. Dr. Ali further testified that intake psychiatrists must first evaluate thepatient, which would involve using his or her training and experience and applying the standard ofcare that a psychiatrist would use in making an evaluation. According to Dr. Ali, the applicablestandard of care in deciding whether George should have been admitted to Madden required that Dr.Lee make a diagnosis, determine the proper treatment plan, gather information from as manyresources as were available to him, and establish a plan to ensure George's well-being and safety. According to the doctor, it was also Dr. Lee's duty as a psychiatrist to assess whether or not Georgepresented an imminent threat of harming himself. Dr. Ali testified that George's symptoms couldbe explained by alcohol withdrawal, and that many people become paranoid as a result thereof. Finally, Dr. Ali stated that most patients who come to an institution with a petition for involuntaryadmission and certificate are admitted to the facility for observation.

Dr. Hasina Javed, a psychiatry resident who was working at Madden at the relevant time,testified that most patients who arrived with a certificate were admitted to Madden. Dr. Javed statedthat George's symptoms were typical of a person with an organic psychosis, meaning someone whois intoxicated, paranoid, and delusional.

George was discharged from Madden at approximately 10 a.m. on June 21, 1996. Less thanan hour later, he shot himself in the head and was taken back to Christ Hospital, where he died.

The defendants, Dr. Lee and Medlin, filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that thecircuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against them based on thedoctrine of sovereign immunity. Relying on this court's decision in Kilcoyne v. Paelmo, 204 Ill.App. 3d 139, 562 N.E.2d 231 (1990), the trial court granted their motion and made the requisitefindings under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed atimely notice of appeal.

Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation (Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186, 766 N.E.2d 1118 (2002)), and should be granted only when "the pleadings,depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuineissue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"(735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998)). Appellate review of an order granting summary judgment isde novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d1204 (1992). In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we construe the evidentiary matterstrictly against the moving party and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Espinozav. Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). A triable issueof fact exists where there is a dispute as to a material fact or where, the facts are undisputed butreasonable minds might differ in drawing inferences from those facts. Petrovich v. Share HealthPlan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 31, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999).

Article XIII, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution abolished sovereign immunity "[e]xceptas the General Assembly may provide by law." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII,