FIFTH DIVISION
March 31, 2004

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Lusta Johnson, Jr., by his father and nextfriend, Lusta Johnson, Sr., appeals the order of the circuitcourt granting summary judgment for defendant, the Cityof Chicago, on plaintiff's negligence action. Upon appeal,plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in determining,as a matter of law, that section 3-106 of the IllinoisGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2000)) immunizesdefendant from liability in negligence for failing tomaintain or repair a gated fence surrounding a Chicagopublic library parking lot. We reverse and remand.

Defendant owns and operates the Legler branch of theChicago Public Library, which includes a fenced-in parkinglot next to the library intended for the use of librarypatrons and staff. On May 5, 1995, plaintiff was walking alongthe sidewalk adjacent to the Legler library parking lot whenthe gate to the fence fell on his leg, injuring him.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that his injurieswere caused by defendant's negligence in maintaining andrepairing the fence and gate. Defendant filed a motion forsummary judgment pursuant to section 3-106 of the TortImmunity Act, which states:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employeeis liable for an injury where the liability is based on theexistence of a condition of any public propertyintended or permitted to be used for recreationalpurposes, including but not limited to parks,playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosedrecreational facilities, unless such local entity orpublic employee is guilty of willful and wantonconduct proximately causing such injury." 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2000).

Defendant argued that it was immunized from liabilityin negligence because the gate and fence surrounding thelibrary parking lot were recreational property within themeaning of section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act. The trialcourt granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings,depositions, admissions and affidavits establish that thereis no genuine issue of material fact and the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cramer v. InsuranceExchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (1996). We review the grantof summary judgment de novo. McNamee v. State of Illinois,173 Ill. 2d 433, 438 (1996).

Our supreme court has held that section 3-106 applies ifpublic property is intended or permitted to be used forrecreational purposes, regardless of the primary purpose ofthe property. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill.2d 372, 384 (1995). In addition, the immunity provisions ofsection 3-106 apply to nonrecreational facilities orstructures that increase the usefulness of public propertyintended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes. Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 508 (1997).

Defendant argues that the Legler library is intended orpermitted to be used for recreational purposes, and that thegate and fence surrounding the library parking lot increasethe usefulness of the library. Accordingly, defendantcontends the trial court correctly determined as a matterof law that section 3-106 immunizes defendant fromplaintiff's claims of negligence based on the alleged failureto maintain and repair the gate and fence.

Generally, when section 3-106 immunity has been appliedto nonrecreational facilities, the nonrecreationalfacilities were actually located on the recreationalproperty itself. See e.g., Conoway v. Hanover Park ParkDistrict, 277 Ill. App. 3d 896 (1996) (a drainage ditch within apark); Annen v. Village of McNabb, 192 Ill. App. 3d 711(1990)(restroom facilities within a park) Unlike in Conowayand Annen, the gate and fence at issue here were locatedoutside of the recreational property. Even assuming,without deciding, that a library is intended or permitted tobe used for recreational purposes, any recreational use ofthe gate and fence surrounding the library parking lot is soincidental that under the Conoway and Annen analysis,section 3-106 does not apply.

Next, defendant contends the immunity should apply toproperty outside of the recreational facility and citesSylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500 (1997)), whereour supreme court applied section 3-106 immunity when aperson tripped over a concrete car stop in a parking lotservicing Soldier Field. Unlike Sylvester, however, theplaintiff here was not injured inside the parking lot; theplaintiff was injured outside the parking lot, on a publicsidewalk when the gate to the parking lot fell upon him.

Next, defendant contends section 3-106 applies herebecause the gate increased the usefulness of the fence,which increased the usefulness of the parking lot, whichincreased the usefulness of the library. However, oursupreme court has cautioned that the use of public propertyfor recreation may be so incidental that section 3-106 doesnot apply. Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33, 43 (2003),citing Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d at 382. Such is the case here, where any alleged recreational use ofthe gate and fence in question was so incidental thatsection 3-106 does not apply. Defendant's interpretation ofsection 3-106 is too expansive with the facts here.

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgmentin favor of defendant and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

REID and HARTIGAN, JJ.'s concur.