JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Kathleen Sullivan and her husband, John Sullivan, were married onJuly 23, 1966. On May 19, 1972, Kathleen and John Sullivan purchased a home inWilmette, Illinois, for $58,000. On October 29, 1996, plaintiff, JudgmentServices Corporation (JSC), obtained a sheriff's deed to the property. Thesheriff's deed conveyed John's interest in his residence to JSC. On October 20,1997, JSC filed its complaint for partition asking to apportion the interests ofJSC and Kathleen Sullivan. On May 6, 1999, after a bench trial, the trial courtheld that John Sullivan never held an ownership interest in the property. In sodoing, the trial court found in favor of Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued that,even though the deed to the property states that title was conveyed to John andKathleen Sullivan as joint tenants, at the time she acquired title, a resultingtrust was created by her parents, the Kanes. JSC now appeals. We reverse andremand.

In 1972, the Sullivans purchased the subject property from Lawrence andAlvera Hass for $58,000. The deed states that title was conveyed to John andKathleen Sullivan as joint tenants.

At the time of the purchase, the Sullivans took out a purchase money mortgagein the original principal amount of $22,000. Although no documentary evidencewas presented, at trial, both Sullivans testified that Kathleen's father,William Kane, gave them a check for approximately $36,000. Kathleen Sullivantestified that her father wanted her and her children to have a house and hewanted to buy it for them. She also testified that she took title as a jointtenant with her husband, John Sullivan, and she wanted John's name on the deed.She also testified that it was not a condition of her receiving the funds fromher father that title be only in her name. The property continued to be theSullivans' residence from May 19, 1972, through the date of trial.

In 1991, a judgment was entered against John Sullivan in favor of the estateof Marie Barrett. A memorandum of judgment was recorded against the subjectproperty. In addition, liens were also recorded by the Internal Revenue Servicefor a joint income tax liability of John and Kathleen Sullivan. John Sullivantestified that the amount of the lien was $54,118.27. This amount representedthe federal taxes owed on their income for certain years.

On November 24, 1992, the Sullivans took out their current mortgage withCentennial Mortgage. The loan proceeds were used to pay off the Internal RevenueService lien, as well as a prior mortgage and a judgment lien obligation of JohnSullivan to LaSalle Management. No payment was made to satisfy the judgment lienof the estate of Marie Barrett.

On October 23, 1993, another judgment was entered against John Sullivan infavor of Marijo Murphy for $123,181.50. A memorandum of judgment was recorded onOctober 27, 1993, and created a lien on the interest of John Sullivan in thesubject property.

John Sullivan was a practicing attorney and testified that his area ofpractice included estates and trusts. John Sullivan was disbarred on May 19,1994, based in part on his conversion of client funds. The Sullivans maintainedtitle to the subject property in both their own names until July 15, 1994, atwhich time John Sullivan recorded a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in theproperty to Kathleen Sullivan. Sometime during 1994, John Sullivan filed forbankruptcy protection and received a discharge of all debts, with the exceptionof perfected liens.

On November 30, 1995, the estate of Marie Barrett caused the sheriff of CookCounty to record a certificate of levy for the purpose of conducting a levy saleto satisfy its judgment. The levy sale occurred on October 29, 1996; thecertificate of sale was recorded on November 6, 1999. Pursuant to section12-132of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-132 (West 1996)), which governsenforcement of judgments and redemption by creditors, Beneficial Systems, Inc.,as assignee of Marijo Murphy, on April 11, 1997, redeemed the subject propertyfrom the estate of Marie Barrett levy sale; the redemption was confirmed onApril 28, 1997. Beneficial Systems, Inc., caused a new certificate of levy to berecorded and noticed a new levy sale. On July 2, 1997, the new levy saleoccurred. JSC, which is owned by the same two individuals who own BeneficialSystems, Inc., was the successful purchaser. A sheriff's deed was recorded onSeptember 16, 1997.

On October 20, 1997, JSC filed the complaint for partition asking toapportion the interests in the subject property of JSC and Kathleen Sullivan,which led to the judgment of May 6, 1999, that is the subject of this appeal.

The standard of review we apply when a challenge is made to the trial court'sruling following a bench trial is whether the trial court's judgment is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207,215, 647 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1995). A judgment is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findingsappear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence. Leonardi v.Loyola University, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995); Rhodes v.Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 242 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1274(1996); Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 215, 647 N.E.2d at 277.

A resulting trust is created by operation of law and has its roots in thepresumed intention of the parties. In re Estate of Wilson 81 Ill. 2d 349,355, 410 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1980). A resulting trust generally arises where oneperson purchases property with his own funds and allows title to be taken in thename of another. In re Estate of Wilson, 81 Ill. 2d at 355, 410 N.E.2d at26. The burden of proof is upon the party seeking to establish a resulting trustand the evidence must be clear, convincing and unmistakable. In re Estate ofWilson, 81 Ill. 2d at 356, 410 N.E.2d at 26.

Since the law surrounding resulting trusts was created to enforce the intentof the parties, certain rebuttable presumptions have evolved based on therelationship of the parties. In re Estate of Wilson, 81 Ill. 2d at 356,410 N.E.2d at 26. For example, when property is transferred from one familymember to another, a presumption arises in favor of a gift which will negate aresulting trust. In re Estate of McCormick, 262 Ill. App. 3d 163, 168-69,634 N.E.2d 341, 345 (1994). A rebuttable presumption of a gift arises where ahusband purchases property and (1) title is taken in the name of his spouse or(2) ownership is taken in joint tenancy with his wife. In re Estate of Wilson,81 Ill. 2d at 356, 410 N.E.2d at 26. The rationale is that it is deemed to havebeen intended by the husband that the wife should have the right to half thebenefits for the life of each and, if she survives him, she should be the fullowner. In re Estate of Wilson, 81 Ill. 2d at 356, 410 N.E.2d at 27.Illinois law also presumes a valid gift when a parent places title in a child,and the party seeking to rebut this presumption bears the burden of producingevidence to the contrary. In re Estate of Defilippis, 289 Ill. App. 3d695, 701, 683 N.E.2d 453, 458 (1997); In re Marriage of Wesselhoft, 228Ill. App. 3d 269, 591 N.E.2d 928 (1992); In re Marriage of Rosen, 126Ill. App. 3d 766, 467 N.E.2d 962 (1984). The presumption of a gift arises, wherea son or daughter is the transferee, because the transferee is the naturalobject of the bounty of the person paying the purchase price. In re Estate ofMcCormick, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 168, 634 N.E.2d at 345. Again, in allinstances, the burden is upon one questioning the gift to overcome thepresumption by clear, convincing, unequivocal and unmistakable evidence. See,e.g., In re Estate of Wilson, 81 Ill. 2d at 356, 410 N.E.2d at 27;In re Estate of Koch, 297 Ill. App. 3d 786, 788, 697 N.E.2d 931, 933 (1998).A resulting trust will not be sustained where the transaction can be construedin any other reasonable fashion. In re Estate of McCormick, 262 Ill. App.3d at 168, 634 N.E.2d at 345.

The dissent ignores these well-settled principles when, citing dictafrom Hofferkamp v. Brehm, 273 Ill. App. 3d 263 (1995) it states that"the mere payment of the consideration raises a prima faciepresumption of a resulting trust." While we agree with this statementgenerally, it is an incomplete statement of the law and inapplicable tosituations where, as here, the parties have a relationship. Indeed, the Hofferkampcourt, in the sentence immediately following this statement, further explained:"Where a husband purchases property and title is taken in his and hiswife's names, as joint tenants, there is a presumption of gift and not apresumption of resulting trust."Hofferkamp, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 272.The court then went on to decide that, as between parties who are "onlyengaged and not actually married" there is no gift presumption.Hofferkamp, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Hofferkamp is totally inapposite.

Because the presumption that applies to the facts of this case is that theconveyance was a gift, the sole issue on appeal is whether Kathleen Sullivanpresented clear and convincing evidence that a resulting trust in her father'sfavor should be imposed on John and Kathleen Sullivan's residence, the subjectproperty. Although factual determinations in this type of case are best left tothe trier of fact, such determinations may be overturned when they are againstthe manifest weight of the evidence or where there is clear and palpable errorin some other respect. In re Estate of McCormick, 262 Ill. App. 3d at168, 634 N.E.2d at 345. Applying the foregoing standards, we agree with JSC thatthe trial court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. JSCnotes that the Sullivans failed to produce any documentary evidence to supporttheir claims of payments made by the Kanes. The testimony offered by theSullivans to rebut the presumption of a gift, was, at times, contradictory and,arguably, was secondary evidence, hearsay and self-serving. Credibilitydeterminations, however, are the province of the trial court. Zeitz v.Village of Glenview, 304 Ill. App. 3d 586, 592, 710 N.E.2d 849, 854 (1999).With its ruling, the trial court apparently resolved any questions pertaining tothe credibility of the Sullivans as against JSC, as is within its province to doas trier of fact. Nonetheless, the trial court's judgment that John Sullivannever had an ownership interest in the subject property, with its implicitdetermination that Kathleen Sullivan rebutted the presumption of a gift by clearand convincing evidence, was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

From our examination of the record, as a matter of law, Kathleen Sullivanfailed to establish her burden by clear, convincing, unequivocal andunmistakable evidence that a resulting trust was intended. This is a heavyburden. As our supreme court has explained:

"Courts have defined 'clear and convincing' evidence most often as the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in question. Although stated in terms of reasonable doubt, courts consider clear and convincing evidence to be more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense." Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1995).

Kathleen Sullivan contended at trial that a resulting trust in favor ofKathleen Sullivan's father or Kathleen Sullivan's parents, now both deceased,was created in 1972 at the time the Sullivans purchased the subject property. Infinding in Kathleen Sullivan's favor, the trial court apparently agreed. JohnSullivan testified that Kathleen's parents, the Kanes, provided $35,800 to applytoward the property's purchase price of $58,000. Kathleen Sullivan concurredwith this testimony. As JSC correctly notes, even the most generousinterpretation of this testimony shows that only a portion of the funds topurchase the property was acquired through the Kanes and the balance jointly bythe Sullivans. The rule is: " '[W]here two persons together advance theprice, and title is taken in the name of one of them, a trust results in favorof the other to such proportion of the property as is equal to the proportion ofthe consideration contributed by him.' [Citation.]" Caudill v. Beil,127 Ill. App. 3d 847, 852, 469 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1984). Here, however, there isno evidence that Mr. Kane intended that his daughter act as a trustee of hisresulting trust when he contributed the initial payment for the property. Therewas no documentary evidence to support an inference that such a trust wasintended. The testimony is devoid of any express direction that a trust wasintended. There was no evidence to show that the payment was anything more thana gift to his daughter, at the least, and a gift to his daughter and hisson-in-law at the most. Although there was evidence that the Kanes stayed in theresidence when they visited the Sullivans, there is nothing in the record whichremotely suggests that the Kanes at any time overtly expressed any ownership inthe property, which both Sullivans unequivocally testified was intended forKathleen and the children.

Furthermore, although the testimony indicated that the Sullivans receivedmoney from the Kanes throughout their entire marriage, there was no evidencethat the Kanes paid for utilities, improvements or the variety of other expenseswhich would demonstrate an ownership interest in the property. Even if suchevidence had been introduced, it would still fall short of establishing theburden required to be met by one claiming a resulting trust exists. It was longago explained, and is still the law today, that where, by or at the direction ofa parent, a deed is executed to his child, the facts that the parent occupiedthe premises, paid taxes and made improvements, although some evidence of theabsence of an intention to make a gift, are neither sufficient to overcome thepresumption of a gift nor inconsistent with the theory of an advancement. Moorev. Moore, 9 Ill. 2d 556, 138 N.E.2d 562 (1956); McCabe v. Hebner,410 Ill. 557, 102 N.E.2d 794 (1951); Houdek v. Ehrenberger 397 Ill. 62,72 N.E.2d 837 (1947); Hartley v. Hartley, 279 Ill. 593, 117 N.E. 69(1917); Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Ill. 154, 58 N.E. 235 (1900); Pool v.Phillips, 167 Ill. 432, 47 N.E. 758 (1897); In re Estate of McCormick,262 Ill. App. 3d 163, 168-69, 634 N.E.2d 341, 345 (1994).

It was undisputed that, at the time the Sullivans purchased the property,Kathleen Sullivan and John Sullivan were both named as joint tenants. KathleenSullivan admitted that there were no conditions made upon her as to the mannerin which title would be held for the property. The fact that John Sullivan wouldbe made a co-owner of the property was of no consequence to the Kanes. Thisstatement is consistent with the understanding that the funds were provided as agift and the Kanes did not intend to have residual ownership rights to theproperty. Kathleen's testimony that it was she who wanted John's name on thedeed does not rebut the presumption of her parents' gift to her. With respect tothe gift presumption that arises when a parent purchases property and title istaken in the name of the child, Illinois case law is not as unequivocal withrespect to the gift presumption in the case of a daughter-in-law or son-in-law.See, e.g., McCormick, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 634 N.E.2d at 346(refusing to find a resulting trust was created since a gift reasonably could beinferred at least with respect to the son, and further noting that therewas no evidence tending to negate a gift to son's wife where the conveyance wasin joint tenancy); but cf. Varap v. Varap, 76 Ill. App. 2d 402,413, 222 N.E.2d 77 (1966) (no presumption of gift to daughter-in-law andevidence of gift was insufficient).

We think the better rule was stated in the Texas case of Somer v. Bogart,749 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). There the court held that the giftpresumption arises in a transfer of property between a father-in-law as payorand a son-in-law as payee. Somer v. Bogart, 749 S.W.2d at 204. The courtexplained that, in such a transfer, it could "perceive no reason why undernormal circumstances a son-in-law should not be treated as the natural object ofhis father-in-law's bounty so as to take by gift." Somer v. Bogart,749 S.W.2d at 204; accord Amador v. Berrospe, 961 S.W.2d 205, 207-08(Tex. Ct. App. 1996).

Nonetheless, it was Kathleen Sullivan's theory at trial that the Kanes didnot intend to give a gift to John Sullivan and since the property was held injoint tenancy from 1972 until the time of the quitclaim deed, she introducedevidence to negate a gift to John from the Kanes. But, at best, the evidenceshows a gift to John from his wife, rather than a gift from his in-laws. Again,none of the evidence shows that the Kanes intended to create a resulting trust.The evidence and testimony showed only that the Kanes made a gift to theirdaughter in 1972. Whether the Kanes originally or actually also intended a giftto John has no bearing upon the fact that the Kanes intended a gift forKathleen, rather than a resulting trust for themselves. Kathleen, in receivingher gift, in turn made a gift to her husband. Whether John's gift came from hisin-laws or from his wife is also irrelevant to the issue of whether the Kanesintended to create a resulting trust. John received the gift. John was named asa joint tenant at the time of the gift. Indeed, he remained a jointtenant for 27 years until he quitclaimed his interest to Kathleen prior to hisfiling bankruptcy. This undisputed evidence, combined with the undisputedevidence that John accepted and retained the homestead exemption on theproperty, only strengthens the presumption that he had a beneficial interest inthe property and indeed was an owner. Thus, John Sullivan clearly had anownership interest, as well as his beneficial interest.

If a reasonable explanation of the evidence adduced may be made upon anytheory other than the existence of a resulting trust, that evidence isinsufficient to establish a resulting trust. Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794 (1963). The evidence here is capable of a reasonableexplanation. From her testimony, Kathleen Sullivan expected, and in factdirected, John Sullivan to have an ownership interest in the property. Thetestimony imputed to the Kanes expresses only a desire that the money be usedfor the benefit of Kathleen Sullivan and her children, not the Kanes. That isexactly how the money was used. Using the monetary gift she received, KathleenSullivan purchased the subject property and intended that she and her husband beput on the title as joint tenants. There was no testimony or any other evidencethat Kathleen Sullivan intended her gift to be used as a resulting trust for herbenefit or anyone else's in the subject property. There was no evidence that shebelieved she was a trustee on behalf of her parents. The unrebutted presumptionis that Kathleen Sullivan received a gift from her parents which was used forher benefit, and was, in turn, a gift to her spouse, John Sullivan, which wasalso used for his benefit.

We reach our conclusion, not, as the dissent asserts by "improperlyreweigh[ing] the evidence," but instead by properly concluding that thetrial court's determination that John Sullivan did not have and never did haveany ownership interest in the subject property was against the manifest weightof the evidence. Because Kathleen Sullivan failed to present clear andconvincing evidence to rebut the gift presumption, the trial court erred inconcluding that a resulting trust existed.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court andremand for additional proceedings relating to any equitable lien that may existon the part of Kathleen Sullivan.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

O'BRIEN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE BUCKLEY, dissenting:

In determining whether a resulting trust exists under these circumstances,courts must ascertain the payor's intent from the facts and circumstances shownby the record. In re Estate of McCormick, 262 Ill. App. 3d 163, 168(1994). Such a factual determination is best left to the trial court and shouldnot be disturbed unless it contradicts the manifest weight of the evidence. McCormick,262 Ill. App. 3d at 168. The trial court's factual determinations are due greatdeference and contradict the manifest weight of the evidence only if an oppositeconclusion is clearly evident. Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the CarbondalePolice Pension Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 538 (1997).

Sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's finding and,therefore, an opposite conclusion is not clearly evident. First, the merepayment of the consideration raises a prima facie presumption of aresulting trust. Hofferkamp v. Brehm, 273 Ill. App. 3d 263, 272 (1995).JSC does not dispute that the Kanes provided the consideration for the purchase.Further, Kathleen testified that the Kanes continued to provide money for themonthly payments. Kathleen's testimony indicated that William Kane wanted to usethis money to provide for his family ("his" meaning himself, his wife,his daughter and his grandchildren). Kathleen's testimony also indicated thatthe Kanes provided money for the property, in part, so that they would have aplace to stay when they visited their daughter and grandchildren. JSC simplyfailed to present evidence sufficiently persuasive to reject the trial court'sfactual findings.

The majority improperly reweighs the evidence to reach a conclusion oppositeto that reached by the trial court. We cannot reweigh the evidence or substituteour judgment for that of the trial court, even if we may have ruled differently.See In re Marriage of Koberlein, 281 Ill. App. 3d 880, 885 (1996); Casev. Forloine, 266 Ill. App. 3d 120, 125 (1993). The evidence in this case wasalmost entirely testimonial. The trial court sat in a superior position tolisten to that testimony, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and judge theircredibility. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 412 (1998). Becausesufficient evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's factualfindings, we should affirm.