| Kaufman, Litwin and Feinstein v.Edgar, No. 1-97-2455 1st Dist. 12-1-98 |
SECOND DIVISION
December 1, 1998
No. 1-97-2455
| KAUFMAN, LITWIN ANDFEINSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Governor of Illinois, andJAMES E. RYAN, Attorney General ofIllinois, Defendants-Appellees (John S. Elson, Intervenor-Defendant andCross-Plaintiff-Appellee). | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable John K. Madden, Judge Presiding. |
JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff, the law firm of Kaufman, Litwin and Feinstein, brought a declaratory judgmentactionalleging that certain 1997 amendments to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Actare unconstitutional. 750 ILCS 5/501, 503, 508 (West 1996). The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of defendants, Governor Jim Edgar and Attorney General of Illinois James E.Ryan and intervenor John S. Elson. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.
Plaintiff is a Chicago law firm, with attorneys practicing in the domestic relations area. OnFebruary 28, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to invalidatesections 508(c), 508(d), and 508(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act(Act)(750 ILCS 5/508(c),(d),(f)(West 1996)) on the ground that the provisions violate theseparation of powers doctrine. Plaintiff named as defendants Governor Jim Edgar, AttorneyGeneral James E. Ryan, and certain judges of the domestic relations division of the circuit courtof Cook County. Plaintiff also claimed that all or certain of these provisions of the Act areunconstitutional because they violate procedural and substantive due process, violate the contractclauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, and constitute special legislation. OnMarch, 31, 1997, plaintiff amended its complaint, claiming that sections 501(c-1)(2),501(c-1))(3), 503(j), 508(b), and 508(e) of the Act also suffered from the same constitutionaldefects asthose sections originally identified in the complaint. 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(2), 501(c-1)(3), 503(j),508(b),(e)(West 1996).
On April 16, 1997, John E. Elson, a lawyer who practices in the domestic relations divisionof thecircuit court of Cook County, filed a motion to intervene as a party in the action. Elson statedthat he had "extensive experience" with the provisions at issue in the case and had played a"major role in the drafting of those provisions."
On May 1, 1997, the trial court granted Elson's motion to intervene. On May 13, 1997, thetrialcourt dismissed the defendant judges of the domestic relations division.
On May 16, 1997, defendants and Elson filed motions for summary judgment. On May 30,1997, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and Elson, finding that theamendments are constitutional. Plaintiff appeals.
Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits showthatno genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law. Benamon v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 85, 689 N.E.2d 366(1997). A reviewingcourt reviews the granting of a motion for summary judgment denovo. Benamon, 294 Ill. App.3d 88, 689 N.E.2d at 369. The court of review also reviews de novo,a circuit court's decisionwith respect to the constitutionality of a statute. Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner,171 Ill. 2d410, 665 N.E.2d 795 (1996).
A strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislative enactments. Best v.TaylorMachine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). The party who challenges astatute'sconstitutionality bears the heavy burden of clearly establishing the violation alleged. People v.Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 646 N.E.2d 587 (1995). Courts are obligated to affirm thevalidity ofstatutes if possible and to construe statutes so as to avoid doubts as to their validity. Rehgv.Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504, 605 N.E.2d 525 (1992).
Plaintiff first claims on appeal that sections 508(b), 508(c)(1), 508(c)(2), 508(c)(3),508(c)(4),508(d) and 508(f) and 503(j)(3) of the Act violate the separation of powers provision containedinthe Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff claims that it is the province of the Illinois Supreme Court, notthe General Assembly, to create supervisory rules for attorneys and that the challengedprovisionspurport to create new supervisory rules, separate and apart from those already existing. ArticleII, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides: [T]he legislative, executive andjudicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill. Const. 1970, art. II,