Nos. 1-99-4417) Cons.
           1-99-4465)

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Gregory Kleen (Gregory) brought this wrongful death and survivalaction under theories of negligence and strict product liability, individuallyand as special administrator of the estate of David Kleen (David), againstdefendants Homak Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Homak), Gander Mountain, Inc., GRS,Inc., and GMO, Inc. (collectively Gander), following the death of his son David.Homak and Gander filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of theIllinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)), arguing thatthe complaint failed to state a cause of action because David's suicideconstituted an intervening cause breaking the line of causation from defendantsto David. The trial court denied Homak's and Gander's motion to dismiss, butcertified a question for interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308. 155 Ill. 2d R.308.

Both Gander and Homak filed interlocutory appeals under Rule 308. Onedivision of this court accepted the certified question in Gander's appeal underNo. 1-99-4465. Another division denied Homak's appeal, yet later allowed theappeal under No. 1-99-4417 after Homak filed a motion to reconsider. Theseappeals were then consolidated.

The certified question we are asked to answer is "whether the act ofsuicide, under the facts alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint, constitutes anindependent intervening act which breaks the chain of causation." We answerthe certified question in the affirmative and reverse the trial court's orderdenying defendants' motion to dismiss.

Gregory alleges the following facts in his complaint. Gregory is David'snatural parent and guardian and the special administrator of David's estate.David died intestate on June 13, 1996. Homak is an Illinois corporation thatsells and distributes safes for the storage of firearms and ammunition. Ganderis a Wisconsin corporation engaged in altering, labeling, selling anddistributing firearm safes. Sometime between June 13, 1986, and June 13, 1996,Homak manufactured and sold model No. 3090 gun safe for the secure storage offirearms and ammunition. At some point during this period, Gregory purchasedthis Homak gun safe from Gander. Gregory stored his firearm and ammunitioninside the Homak model No. 3090 safe. On or before June 13, 1996, David brokeinto the locked safe with a screwdriver and removed the gun. On June 13, 1996,David committed suicide with the gun he procured from the gun safe. Thereafter,Gregory filed this cause of action against Homak and Gander under the theoriesof negligence and strict liability, alleging the gun safe was defective in thatit contained a weak lock which could be easily broken.

Initially, Homak and Gander contend that, in answering the certifiedquestion, there may be a conflict as to whether Illinois or Indiana law applies,arguing that the events surrounding David's suicide occurred in Indiana.However, the case was filed in Illinois and the complaint fails to state whereGregory purchased the gun safe, where the safe was located when David broke intoit, or where David committed suicide. Therefore, we will apply Illinois law.

The certified question we have been asked to answer only requires us toaddress the issue of proximate cause under each theory of recovery. The conceptof proximate cause is the same in negligence and strict liability in tort. Schultzv. Hennessy Industries, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d532, 540, 584 N.E.2d 235, 241 (1991). We make no conclusions as to whetherGregory has pleaded or could prove the other elements of negligence and strictliability. Our analysis is strictly confined to the element of causation.Additionally, we note that the complaint identifies two different plaintiffs,Gregory individually and as special administrator of David's estate, andidentifies two different defendants, the manufacturer and distributor. While theduties owed to each may be distinct, both plaintiffs must satisfy the element ofcausation as to each defendant. Therefore, our analysis of proximate causeapplies to both plaintiffs, both defendants, and both causes of action.

Under both strict liability and negligence, a proximate cause is one thatproduces an injury through a natural and continuous sequence of events unbrokenby any effective intervening cause. Unger v. Eichleay Corp., 244 Ill.App. 3d 445, 451, 614 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (1993). While proximate cause isordinarily a question for the trier of fact, it becomes a question of law wherethere is no material issue of fact regarding the matter or only one conclusionis clearly evident. Williams v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 179 Ill.2d 80, 88, 688 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1997). Here, we believe it is appropriate todetermine the question as a matter of law, for the complaint fails to discloseany allegations that, even if true, would establish proximate cause.

Proximate cause is composed of two distinct requirements: legal cause andcause in fact. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d252, 257-58, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1999), citing Lee v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 605 N.E.2d 493, 502 (1992). "Adefendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury only if thatconduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about theinjury." First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258, 720N.E.2d at 1072; see also Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455, 605 N.E.2d at 502. Thequestion is whether, absent defendant's conduct, the injury would not haveoccurred. First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258, 720N.E.2d at 1072; Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455, 605 N.E.2d at 502-03. Legalcause is a question of foreseeability. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456, 605N.E.2d at 503; Fitzgibbon v. National Broadcasting Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d52, 54, 732 N.E.2d 64, 66 (2000). The inquiry here is "whether the injuryis of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or herconduct." First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258,720 N.E.2d at 1072.

We first address whether Gregory has pleaded facts sufficient to establishlegal cause. While neither party directly discusses this precise issue, bothargue whether David's suicide was foreseeable under these facts. Homak andGander focus on David's suicide and urge us to follow a line of cases whichholds that, as a matter of law, suicide is unforeseeable and is therefore anindependent intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation. See, e.g.,Moss v. Meyer, 117 Ill. App. 3d 862, 454 N.E.2d 48 (1983); Stasiof v.Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 115, 200 N.E.2d 88 (1964), aff'dsub nom. Little v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 32 Ill. 2d 156, 203N.E.2d 902 (1965).

Gregory directs us to cases where suicide has been found to be foreseeable.In Winger v. Franciscan Medical Center, 299 Ill. App. 3d 364, 366,701 N.E.2d 813, 814 (1998), the parents of a patient brought a wrongfuldeath action against a hospital and psychiatrist after the patient committedsuicide while in defendants' care for severe depression. The patient had beenadmitted to defendants' facility five times for suicide attempts in the previousfive months. Winger, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 701 N.E.2d at 814. Inreversing the grant of summary judgment for defendants, the court distinguishedthe earlier cases:

"The crucial problem in the previous cases we have cited and ones like them is that the act of suicide was not reasonably foreseeable and thus liability reasonably could not be placed on the tortfeasor. That is not the case here. Here there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the foreseeability of the suicide. Therefore, we do not find Stasiof, Little or Moss controlling." Winger, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 372, 701 N.E.2d at 818.

Gregory also cites Delasky v. Village of Hinsdale, 109 Ill. App. 3d976, 981, 441 N.E.2d 367, 371 (1982), which summarized cases from otherjurisdictions where courts have looked to "special circumstances"which form the basis of a jailer's liability for a prisoner's act of suicide,including known suicidal tendencies. However, in Delasky, the court foundthat the Hinsdale police officers did not breach their duty to take reasonablecare of their prisoner where it was not unreasonable to conclude from theevidence that the prisoner was not a suicide risk. Delasky, 109 Ill. App.3d at 982, 441 N.E.2d at 371.

Gregory contends that, under the facts of the complaint, David's suicide wasforeseeable. The complaint alleges that defendants manufactured and marketed agun safe, a product that failed to perform its sole purpose--the prevention ofunauthorized access to an inherently dangerous weapon. Gregory argues defendantsshould have foreseen the weapon would be used by a person who was able to breakopen the safe.

The question becomes whether it was reasonably foreseeable that creating anallegedly defective lock on a gun safe would result in a person breaking intothe gun safe with a screwdriver, removing the gun stored inside, and then usingthat gun to kill himself. We find that David's suicide was not foreseeable toHomak or Gander. David's decision to kill himself, albeit tragic, was entirelyof his own making. Gregory has not alleged that David was a minor or mentallyunstable. As a competent adult, we must assume that David knew that a gun wasinside the safe and clearly understood the dangers posed by the weapon. Hepurposefully obtained the gun and intentionally took his own life. Homak andGander did not cause David to make that decision, nor could they reasonably haveanticipated that decision as a likely consequence of their conduct. Thus,Gregory has not adequately alleged legal cause.

Instead, we find that Homak's and Gander's allegedly defective product wasonly a passive condition which allowed David's injury to occur. A plaintiff mustprove that the alleged defect in the product was an actual cause of the injuriesrather than a mere condition. Gilbertson v. Rolscreen Co., 150 Ill. App.3d 192, 197, 501 N.E.2d 954, 957 (1986). In this case, the product at issue isthe gun safe, not the gun. The allegedly defective gun safe did not injure Davidin any way, but merely provided a condition allowing David slightly easieraccess to the gun. Rather, it was David's intentional, voluntary, andindependent act of removing the gun and shooting himself that was the soleproximate cause of his injury and death. Thus, Gregory has not alleged, andcannot prove, under negligence or strict product liability, that Homak's andGander's allegedly defective gun safe was the proximate cause of David's injury.

Where an appeal involves a certified question, a reviewing court must answerthe question, but it also has the authority to "'enter any judgment andmake any order that ought to have been given or made' and to make any otherorders and grant any relief that may be required." Meyers v. Underwood,316 Ill. App. 3d 970, 992 n.7, 738 N.E.2d 118, 134 n.7 (2000), quoting Hayesv. Wilson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1018, 670 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1996). For theforegoing reasons, we find that David's intentional act of suicide was the soleproximate cause of his death. We answer the certified question in theaffirmative and, because we find that Gregory could never establish proximatecause, we reverse the order denying defendants' motion to dismiss.

Certified question answered; order reversed.

GREIMAN and REID, JJ., concur.