A participant may also apply for creditable service for up to 2 years of military service that need not have followedservice as a judge and need not have been served during wartime. However, for this military service not immediatelyfollowing employment as a judge, the applicant must make contributions to the System (1) at the rates provided inSection 18-133 based upon the judge's rate of compensation on the last date as a participating judge prior to suchmilitary service, or on the first date as a participating judge after such military service, whichever is greater, plus (2) ifpayment is made on or after May 1, 1993, an amount determined by the Board to be equal to the employer's normalcost of the benefits accrued for such military service, plus (3) interest at the effective rate from the date of firstmembership in the System to the date of payment." 40 ILCS 5/18--122 (West 1998).

Subsequent to plaintiff's application to purchase creditable service, the System informed him, by letter dated January 26,1998, that the "Board of Trustees of the [System] had established a policy that to purchase up to two years of militaryservice [one] must render service in the military on active duty status." The System further informed plaintiff that, inaccordance with its policy, it would allow him to purchase credit based on his six months of active military service butwould disallow any credit for the remaining period that represented his inactive military service in the Ready Reserves.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing before defendants. In his petition, plaintiff allegedthat he was entitled to exercise his right as a plan participant to purchase up to two years of creditable service relating to thesix years he had served as a member of the Armed Services because the Act gives him an "unqualified" right to purchase upto two years of creditable service relating to military service. Plaintiff argued that federal statutory and case law designatesthe Ready Reserves as part of the armed forces of the United States and its participants as being in military service. Plaintiffalso argued that because the Act is uniquely worded and does not contain the same limiting language concerning eitheractive service or duty requiring leaves of absence or furloughs from state employment, as do 13 other pension systemstatutes, the only way to restrict a judge's right to purchase military service credit for time spent in the Ready Reservescomponent of the military would be to infer that the legislature had intended, but had failed, to add the appropriaterestrictive wording to the statute at issue. Plaintiff further argued, in written arguments presented before defendants, thateven if defendants believed that the legislature erred in not including the requirement of "active" military service in thestatute, defendants should enforce, rather than change, the statute as passed by the General Assembly.

During a hearing before defendants, plaintiff presented the same arguments in support of his request to purchase militaryservice credit for the time that he had spent in reserve military duty with the Armed Services. Plaintiff argued that thedefinition of "military service" as generally used means reserve duty as well as active service. Plaintiff also argued thatsection 18--122 of the Act is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, no extrinsic evidence is permitted to alter or vary thestatute's plain meaning. Subsequent to the hearing, defendants unanimously ruled that the statute allowed plaintiff topurchase credits only for the time he had served on active duty. Defendants issued a written decision on August 25, 1998,reflecting their ruling. In their decision, defendants clarified the issue to be not whether plaintiff was in military service, butwhether he had "participated in the type of military service that is required by Section 18--122 of the Act to entitle [him](and other similarly situated members) to purchase up to two years of military service credit." Defendants noted that section18--122 must be read in its entirety because the term "military service" contained within the statute is not "quite so clear as[plaintiff's] arguments would make it seem." Consequently, looking to the statute in its entirety, and then to the legislativehistory as well as legislative debates to determine the intent of the legislature in allowing for the purchase of creditablemilitary service, defendants concluded that section 18--122 required active military service to purchase up to two years ofmilitary service credit.

In September 1998, pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 1998)), plaintiff filed acomplaint in the trial court for administrative review of defendants' decision, alleging that the plain meaning of the statuteallows military service credit without restriction or consideration of whether the military service was either active orinactive duty. Subsequent to the filing of briefs and the hearing of oral arguments on plaintiff's complaint, the trial courtentered an order reversing defendants' decision. In reaching its decision, the trial court found the statute to be unambiguousand noted that, even if the statute was ambiguous, the legislature had intended inactive service to qualify as military serviceunder the Act. The trial court granted defendants' subsequent motion to stay, and this appeal followed pursuant to section 3--112 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--112 (West 1998)).

On appeal, defendants ask this court to reverse the trial court's decision and reinstate their decision, contending that theyhad correctly denied plaintiff's request to purchase credits toward his pension for the time that he was on inactive duty withthe Ready Reserves because inactive military duty does not constitute "military service" as that term is used in the IllinoisPension Code. In response, plaintiff claims that the decision reached by defendants was erroneous and should not bereinstated because defendants' decision "ignored" the principles of statutory construction. Plaintiff argues that defendantsshould have given the statute its plain meaning without resort to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history. Plaintiffalternatively argues that, even if it were appropriate to consult legislative debates, defendants misinterpreted the statementsmade by the legislators concerning section 18--122 of the Act.

Because the facts of this case are undisputed, the sole issue confronting this court is whether defendants correctlyinterpreted the phrase "military service" in section 18--122 of the Act to bar the purchase of pension credits for time spenton inactive military duty. Accordingly, this case involves a matter of law subject to our de novo review. See Paris v. Feder,179 Ill. 2d 173, 177-78, 688 N.E.2d 137 (1997); Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961(1995). During our review, we accord some deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute. See Van'sMaterial Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 131 Ill. 2d 196, 202-03, 545 N.E.2d 695 (1989); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.Department of Revenue, 295 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 692 N.E.2d 1264 (1998); Davis v. Human Rights Comm'n, 286 Ill. App.3d 508, 518, 676 N.E.2d 315 (1997). A significant reason for this deference is that the judicial system appreciates the factthat administrative agencies, such as the Board, can make informed judgments based on their experience and expertise. SeeDavis, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 518.

The framework for construing a legislative provision, such as section 18--122, is well-established. The primary rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. See Fragakis v. Police & Fire Comm'n of theVillage of Schiller Park, 303 Ill. App. 3d 141, 149, 707 N.E.2d 660 (1999). This inquiry must begin with the statute'slanguage, giving words their plain and ordinary meaning, yet considering each provision in light of all others. See Barnett v.Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996); Van's Material Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 202; In re Liquidationof Coronet Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415, 698 N.E.2d 598 (1998),

Where a statute is ambiguous, the use of extrinsic aids, including the statute's background and the legislative history andremarks made by the legislators during their debates on the legislation, is appropriate to discern the meaning of a statutoryterm. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 533-34, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997); Van's Material Co., 131Ill. 2d at 202; Bowne of Chicago, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 301 Ill. App. 3d 116, 120, 703 N.E.2d 443 (1998).Principles of statutory construction allow an interpretation that qualifies the existing statutory language. See In re IllinoisBell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246, 641 N.E.2d 440 (1994) (a statute must be construed sensibly "eventhough such construction qualifies the universality of its language"). Additionally, it has long been held that "[w]hen theintention [of the legislature] has been thus ascertained from the reading of the statute, words may be modified or altered soas to obviate all inconsistencies with such intention." Smith v. County of Logan, 284 Ill. 163, 165-66, 119 N.E. 932 (1918);see also Burns v. Industrial Comm'n, 356 Ill. 602, 606, 191 N.E. 225 (1934) (words may be altered, modified, or supplied toobviate any inconsistency with legislative intent).

In the case at bar, the term "military service" denoted in section 18--122 is ambiguous because it is susceptible to twoequally reasonable and conflicting interpretations. Defendants reasonably interpret the term "military service" to mean onlytime spent in active military duty, while plaintiff reasonably interprets the same term to encompass time spent in both activeand inactive military service, including reserve duty. Accordingly, we find that defendants, in their administrative decision,not only correctly read section 18--122 in its entirety, but also looked to the statute's background to determine the meaningof "military service."

Defendants first looked to the second paragraph of section 18--122, which states: