SIXTH DIVISION

March 15, 2002

JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioners William Lockhart and Ralph Bellamy appeal the trial court's judgment affirmingthe decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Electoral Board) finding that thenomination papers of respondent Steven Burris, a candidate for the office of Member of the CookCounty Board of Review (Board of Review), were valid and contained a sufficient number ofsignatures to warrant inclusion of his name on the ballot for the March 19, 2002 general primaryelection. Petitioners contend on appeal that Burris' name must be removed from the ballot becausethe Electoral Board erroneously applied section 7-10(c) of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10(c)(West 2000)) to determine the minimum number of signatures required and thus improperlyconcluded that Burris' nomination papers contained a sufficient number of signatures.

Burris filed nomination papers with the Cook County Clerk (Clerk) to be a Democraticcandidate in the March 19, 2002 general primary election for the office of Member of the Board ofReview, Third Board of Review Member District. Petitioners filed a petition objecting to thosenomination papers, alleging that the required number of valid signatures was 7,120, and that Burris'papers contained fewer than 7,120 valid signatures. Burris filed a motion to strike and dismiss thepetition, alleging that pursuant to section 7-10(c) of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10(c) (West2000)), the required number of valid signatures was one-third of 7,120 or 2,374.

On February 4, 2002, the Electoral Board conducted a hearing on Burris' motion. Burrisintroduced a copy of the Clerk's 2002 Election Calendar, which lists various county offices and thenumber of signatures that candidates for those offices must obtain in order to have their namesplaced on the ballot. The Election Calendar states that Democratic candidates for the countywideoffices of County Clerk, Treasurer, Sheriff, Assessor, and President-County Board, must obtain7,120 signatures. However, unlike the signature requirement of 7,120 listed next to the othercountywide offices, the 7,120 figure next to the Board of Review is followed by an asteriskindicating:

"Neither the Revenue Act nor the Election Code contains a specificmethod for calculating a minimum signature requirement for Boardof Review, and no method of calculating the signature requirementhas been subjected to judicial scrutiny. Prospective candidates areadvised to consult legal counsel."

The Electoral Board noted that the registration records summary indicated that Burris hadapproximately 4,769 valid signatures and, on its own motion, adopted this figure as the number ofvalid signatures obtained by Burris. At the conclusion of the hearing, Chairman Daniel Madden, theClerk's representative on the Electoral Board, found that the final sentence of section 7-10(c) of theElection Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2000)) provided the appropriate formula for determining thenumber of signatures that Burris was required to obtain. In applying this formula, Madden divided7,120, the number of required signatures for those seeking countywide offices in the 2002Democratic primary, by 3, the number of Board of Review districts in Cook County, to find thatBurris was required to obtain 2,374 signatures. In support of this finding, Madden noted that thereis a "strong public policy" in the Election Code in favor of having smaller signature requirementsfor offices that run within a district of a larger unit than for offices which run in the entire unit. Madden further noted that the legislation creating the three-member district Board of Review did notaddress this policy, and that nothing in the statutes indicated that in terms of signature requirementsa Board of Review candidate who runs in a district one-third the size of the county should be treatedas if he were running for a countywide position such as Assessor, Sheriff, or County Clerk. Maddenadditionally stated that due to the need for expedition, the Electoral Board's written decision wouldnot recite its analysis in full, but would instead rely upon the analysis in the hearing transcript.

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Electoral Board's decision in the circuitcourt pursuant to section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2000)). Followinga hearing on the petition, the trial court affirmed the Electoral Board's decision to keep Burris' nameon the ballot.

Petitioners contend on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that the Electoral Boardproperly applied section 7-10(c) of the Election Code to determine the number of signatures Burriswas required to obtain in order to have his name placed on the ballot as a candidate for the Boardof Review. Initially, we note that we are required to review the Electoral Board's decision rather thanthe trial court's decision. Calabrese v. Chicago Park District, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1065 (1998). Petitioners argue that the Electoral Board failed to set forth in writing findings in support of itsdecision as required by section 10-10 of the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/10-10 (West 2000)). Wenote, however, that the record contains a four page written decision which references the hearingrecord containing the findings made by the Electoral Board at the conclusion of the hearing. Wereject petitioner's argument that the decision of the Electoral Board was deficient for failure toarticulate written findings. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the complete record,the findings of the Electoral Board were sufficient for purposes of our review.

The issue before us turns on the interpretation of a statute, therefore it is a question of lawsubject to de novo review. Zapolsky v. Cook County Officers Electorial Board, 296 Ill. App. 3d 731,733 (1998). Subsections (a) through (k) of section 7-10 of the Election Code list various categoriesof elective offices as well as specific offices and set forth the requisite number of signatures ormethod for determining that number which candidates running for those offices must obtain on theirpetitions for nomination. 10 ILCS 5/7-10(a)-(k) (West 2000). Section 7-10(c) addresses the numberof signatures which candidates for county offices must obtain on their petitions for nominations. Section 7-10(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:

"Such petitions for nominations shall be signed:

***

(c) If for a county office (including county board member andchairman of the county board where elected from the countyat large), by at least .5% of the qualified electors of his partycast at the last preceding general election in his county." (Emphasis added) 10 ILCS 5/7-10(c) (West 2000).

However, the final sentence of section 7-10(c) states:

"In the case of an election for county board member to be electedfrom a district, for the first primary following a redistricting of countyboard districts or the initial establishment of county board districts,then by at least .5% of the qualified electors of his party in the entirecounty at the last preceding general election, divided by the numberof county board districts, but in any event not less than 25 qualifiedprimary electors of his party in the district." (Emphasis added) 10ILCS 5/7-10(c) (West 2000).

Petitioners contend that the legislature did not expressly articulate in the Election Code themethod for calculating the number of signatures needed for nomination papers for the Board ofReview, but instead delegated to the Clerk the authority for establishing this method. Petitionersfurther contend that the Clerk exercised that authority to interpret section 7-10(c) of the ElectionCode and properly concluded that membership on the Board of Review was a "county office" otherthan "county board member." Thus, petitioners argue, the requisite number of signatures Burris wasrequired to obtain was at least .5% of the votes cast by Democratic electors in the last generalelection or 7,120, the number included in the Clerk's 2002 Election Calendar.

Respondents contend, on the other hand, that under section 7-10(c) "an election for countyboard member to be elected from a district" includes an election for the office of Member of theBoard of Review. Thus, according to respondents, the signature calculation method included in thefinal sentence of section 7-10(c) of the Election Code applied. This method required Burris to obtaina number of signatures equal to "at least .5% of the qualified electors of his party in the entire countyat the last preceding general election, divided by the number of county board districts."

The County of Cook is divided into three Board of Review Districts and the GeneralAssembly redrew these districts following the 2000 census. P.A. 92-462, 10 ILCS 106/1 et seq. The issue is whether under 7-10(c) of the Election Code the number of signatures Burris wasrequired to obtain in order to have his name placed on the ballot as a candidate for the office of theBoard of Review in a redistricting year was the number of signatures required for countywidecandidates, divided by the number of county board districts, here, three. Here, the Clerk expresslyadvised prospective candidates for the Board of Review in its Election Calendar to consult legalcounsel regarding the signature requirement since it had not been subjected to judicial scrutiny.

Petitioners contend that membership on the Board of Review is a "county office" and notmembership on a "county board." In support of this contention, they argue that the language ofsection 7-10(c) is ambiguous, that the Election Code does not define "county board member," andthat the definitions of "county board" and "local assessment officers" contained in the Property TaxCode (35 ILCS 200/1-35, 1-85 (West 2000)), which includes the enabling legislation for the Boardof Review (35 ILCS 200/6-5 to 6-55 (West 2000)), are controlling.

When construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent ofthe legislature. Whelan v. County Officers' Electoral Board of Du Page County, 256 Ill. App. 3d555, 558 (1994). Inquiries into legislative intent begin with the language of the statute, which is "themost reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law." Michigan AvenueNational Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. We must give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,and when the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resorting toadditional aids of statutory construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). When construing a statute, we may consider "the reason and necessity forthe statute and the evils it was intended to remedy," In re Marriage of Beyer and Parkis, 324 Ill.App. 3d 305, 309 (2001), and we presume the legislature did not intend absurdity or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504.

Applying the above principles to the instant case, we find that the language of section 7-10(c)of the Election Code is not ambiguous and conclude that an election for "county board member tobe elected from a district" includes an election for membership on the Board of Review. The firstsentence of the section 7-10(c) requires those running for county office (including county boardmember and chairman of the county board where elected from the county at large) to obtain anumber of signatures on their petitions equal to at least ".5% of the qualified electors of his party castat the last preceding general election in his county." The final sentence of the section requires thoserunning for county board member to be elected from a district, for the first primary following aredistricting of county board districts, to obtain at least ".5% of the qualified electors of his party inthe entire county at the last preceding general election, divided by the number of county boarddistricts."

Here, Burris is running for membership on the Board of Review, a county board, and is tobe elected by voters within a district, rather than by voters within the entire county, in the firstprimary following a redistricting of county board districts. Accordingly, we find that the method forcalculating the requisite number of signatures contained in the final sentence of section 7-10(c) isapplicable in the instant case. We affirm the Electoral Board's finding, pursuant to that method ofcalculation, that Burris was required to obtain at least 2,374 valid signatures. Burris obtained inexcess of 2,374 valid signatures. Therefore, we hold that the nomination papers of Burris containeda sufficient number of signatures and that his name shall not be stricken from the ballot for theMarch 19, 2002 general primary election.

"The primary purpose of the signature requirement is to reduce the electoral process tomanageable proportions by confining ballot positions to a relatively small number of candidates whohave demonstrated initiative and at least a minimal appeal to eligible voters." Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3dat 1118 . Our holding today is consistent with that purpose. Burris is not to be elected from thecounty at large, but rather from the specific district in which he is running. Construing section 7-10(c) to require him to obtain the same number of signatures as those running for offices which areelected by the entire county would not only unfairly penalize Burris, but would also compromise theright of the voters in Burris' district to cast their votes effectively. See Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118(recognizing the right of voters to cast their votes effectively).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

GALLAGHER, P.J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.