Madison Two Assoc v. Pappas

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-04-0911 Rel

Case Date: 02/09/2007

Preview:FIFTH DIVISION February 9, 2007

No. 1-04-0911

MADISON TWO ASSOCIATES, 70 West Madison Street, BANK ONE, Bank One Plaza, REALTY LLC - THE QUAKER OATS CORPORATION, 321 North Clark Street, TH TOWER LEASING, LLC, 233 South Wacker Drive, SHORENSTEIN REALTY ADVISORS, 875 North Michigan Avenue, CITYFRONT HOTEL ASSOCIATES, LP, 301 East North Water Street, 77 WEST WACKER DRIVE, LLC, 77 West Wacker Drive, TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, 200 West Madison, PARKWAY 233 NORTH MICHIGAN, LLC, 233 North Michigan Avenue, KATO INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 151 East Wacker Drive, SHORENSTEIN REALTY SERVICE AS 1 Prudential Plaza/2 Prudential Plaza, BRE/RANDOLPH DRIVE, LLC, 200 East Randolph Drive, CNBC LEASING CORPORATION, 135 South LaSalle Street, TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, 500 West Monroe Street, URBAN SHOPPING CENTERS, INC., 900 North Michigan Avenue, URBAN SHOPPING CENTERS, INC., 875 North Michigan Avenue, EQUITY OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST, 161 North Clark Street, EQUITY OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST, 10 South Wacker Drive/30 South Wacker Drive, PRIME GROUP REALTY TRUST, 330 North Wabash Avenue, HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION - CHICAGO HILTON AND TOWERS, 720 South Michigan Avenue, PALMER HOUSE HILTON, 17 East Monroe Street, TST 55 EAST MONROE, LLC, 55 East Monroe Street, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARIA PAPPAS, Treasurer and ex officio County Collector of Cook County, Defendant-Appellant (The City of Chicago and The Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Petitioners for Intervention-Appellants).

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County

Honorable Alfred J. Paul, Judge Presiding.

1-04-0911

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal involves the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the City) and the Chicago Board of Education (the Board)(collectively, petitioners), as taxing districts, have a right to intervene in tax objection cases involving valuation disputes, as opposed to rate disputes. Petitioners contend that the disposition of such cases could result in a reduction of tax revenue that they receive and they seek intervention of right pursuant to sections 2-408(a)(2) and (a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2002). The circuit court ruled that the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1 et seq. (West 2002)) is a complete and comprehensive statute that enumerates all of the parties who are involved and all of their rights, and, because it does not provide for a right of intervention by taxing bodies in tax objection cases, section 2-408 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply. Petitioners now appeal. We reverse and remand. BACKGROUND On August 26, 2003, petitioners jointly filed petitions to intervene in 30 tax objection cases in which certain Cook County property owners sought refunds of property taxes for the 2001 tax year. Thirteen of those cases are now involved in this appeal.1

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Seven cases were dismissed by the circuit court and there originally were twenty-three

cases involved in this appeal. After this appeal was filed, several of these cases, bearing docket numbers 02 CT 2211, 03 COTO 0330, 03 COTO 0340, 03 COTO 0342, 03 COTO 1104, 03 COTO 1453, 03 COTO 1459, 03 COTO 1479, 03 COTO 1943, and 03 COTO 1944, were 2

1-04-0911 In each case involved in this appeal, the owner of the subject property filed a response opposing intervention in the circuit court. Defendant Maria Pappas, Cook County treasurer and ex officio, Cook County collector (the Collector), also filed a response. The Collector did not object to intervention, provided that, pursuant to section 2-408(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-408(f) (West 2002)) and section 23-30 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/23-30 (West 2002)), any order granting the City and the Board leave to intervene specify that the State's Attorney retained the sole authority to control the defensive aspects of the litigation and/or settle any claims. On February 27, 2004, the circuit court entered an order denying the petitions for leave to intervene. The court also included Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language. 155 Ill. 2d. R. 304(a). On March 25, 2004, the court entered an order consolidating the cases "for purposes of appealing" the February 27, 2004, order denying the petitions to intervene. We reverse and remand. ANALYSIS We first address our standard of review. An order denying leave to appeal as of right is generally reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion as to timeliness, inadequacy of representation, and sufficiency of interest. See, e.g., Citicorp Savings v. First Chicago Trust Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 298 (1995). In the instant case, however, the trial court did not base its decision upon, nor even address, any of these factors. Rather, the trial court denied the petitions to intervene based upon its decision that the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/23-30 (West 2002)) was a complete

resolved and/or dismissed. 3

1-04-0911 and comprehensive statute that enumerates all of the parties who are involved and all of their rights. The trial court concluded that the legislature did not intend to permit taxing bodies to intervene in specific tax objection cases, i.e., cases involving challenges to property assessments (as opposed to rate challenges), because the Property Tax Code does not expressly provide for a right of intervention by taxing bodies in specific tax objection cases. In order to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal criteria in the exercise of its discretion, we must construe the pertinent statutes. Thus, the issue on appeal involves a question of law and our standard of review is de novo. See People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541 (2003). We conclude that the circuit court's interpretation of the relevant statutes was erroneous. Article II of the Code of Civil Procedure is known as the Civil Practice Law. 735 ILCS 5/1-101(b) (West 2002). The legislature has addressed the applicability of the Civil Practice Law in Article I of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically in section 1-108, which provides as follows: "Civil Practice Law applies. (a) The provisions of Article II of this Act apply to all proceedings covered by Articles III through XIX of this Act except as otherwise provided in each of the Articles III through XIX, respectively. (b) In proceedings in which the procedure is regulated by statutes other than those contained in this Act, such other statutes control to the extent to which they regulate procedure but Article II of this Act applies to matters of procedure not regulated by such other statutes." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/1-108 (West 2002).

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1-04-0911 Thus, the Civil Practice Law applies to all proceedings specifically covered in the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as all matters of procedure not regulated by other statutes. Intervention is a matter of procedure not regulated by the Property Tax Code. Thus, in the present case, the Civil Practice Law applies to the matter of procedure, intervention, which is at issue here. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 354, 843 N.E.2d 379, 385 (2006) ("supreme court rules, together with article II of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the Civil Practice Law [citation], apply to all proceedings in the trial court, except to the extent that the procedure in a particular type of action is regulated by a statute other than the Civil Practice Law"); see also In re Petition to Form a New Park District, 247 Ill. App. 3d 702, 708, 617 N.E.2d 464, 468-69 (1993)(noting that "[t]he relevant section of the present Code of Civil Procedure, section 1-108, originally appeared as section 1 of the Civil Practice Act" and explaining that, since its revision in 1955, section 1-108(b) has expressly dealt with the relationship between the Civil Practice Law and separate statutes that only partially prescribe a special procedure). Although the Property Tax Code addresses some procedural matters related to tax objection cases, it only partially prescribes procedure. For example, section 23-5 specifies that taxes must be paid in full to be deemed paid under protest. 35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2002). Section 23-10 sets forth a deadline by which a property owner must file a tax objection complaint. 35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2002). Section 23-15, sets forth additional procedural details and states as follows: "

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