FIFTH DIVISION
June 29, 2001

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, John L. Malevitis, filed an action to recover damagesfrom defendants, Albert Brooks Friedman and Albert Brooks Friedman,Ltd., for alleged defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Thetrial court granted Friedman's motion to dismiss the complaint,finding that the statements were made during the course of a judicialproceeding and were therefore absolutely privileged. The issue onappeal is whether the statements were sufficiently related to thejudicial proceedings to subject them to the absolute privilegedoctrine. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The alleged defamatory statements were made during the pendencyof a breach of contract action that had been filed on behalf of AlbertBrooks Friedman, Ltd., a professional corporation, against attorneysJohn L. Malevitis and James Stamos, formerly doing business as Stamosand Malevitis, Ltd. The breach of contract claim arose afterFriedman's client, Sally Ruecking, discharged Friedman and hiredStamos and Malevitis, Ltd., to represent her in the same matter. After receiving an award in quantum meruit, Friedman sought to recoveradditional attorney fees under an alleged fee-division agreementnegotiated with Stamos. The trial court subsequently grantedplaintiff's motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim and thiscourt affirmed. Albert Brooks Friedman, Ltd. v. Malevitis, 304 Ill.App. 3d 979, 710 N.E.2d 843 (1999). Thereafter, Friedman filed apetition for rehearing in the appellate court, and a petition forleave to appeal to the supreme court.

These petitions are the subject of the current complaint whereinMalevitis alleges that Friedman made the following defamatorystatements: " 'He [Malevitis] knew that he had stolen the file fromFriedman to begin it ***' "; " 'Mr. Malevitis chased an existing casebecause of the personal relationship with Mr. Friedman's client' "; " 'It is embarrassing for legal professionals to have these publicpolicy exceptions carved out to protect perfidious lawyers' "; and " 'Nobody who has read the opinion of the Appellate Court feels theopinion was just, fair or has any relationship to protecting anyoneother than a dishonest lawyer.' " Count I of the complaint allegesthat these statements constitute defamation per se because they arenot relevant to any issue in the case and impute to Malevitisdishonesty and unethical conduct in his profession. Count II of thecomplaint alleges that the statements intend to cast Malevitis in afalse light by stating that he is unethical and dishonest in hisprofession and further alleges that the statements would be highlyoffensive to a reasonable person.

Friedman subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaintpursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code ofCivil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(a)(9) (West1998)), arguing that the statements were made in the context of ajudicial proceeding and were therefore subject to an absoluteprivilege. The trial court agreed and granted Friedman's motion.

Malevitis now contends that the trial court erred in granting themotion to dismiss because the alleged defamatory statements were notpertinent or relevant to the breach of contract action and were notconnected to an important social purpose. Initially, we note that asection 2-619 motion may be granted when the claim asserted is barredby some affirmative matter defeating the claim. 735 ILCS5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998). The absolute privilege is an affirmativedefense that may be raised and determined under section 2-619. Harrisv. News-Sun, 269 Ill. App. 3d 648, 651, 646 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1995). Whether a particular statement is privileged is a question of law tobe reviewed de novo. Barakat v. Matz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 662, 667, 648N.E.2d 1033, 1038-39 (1995).

The scope of the privilege is set forth in section 587 of theRestatement (Second) of Torts, which provides in pertinent part:

"A party to a private litigation *** is absolutelyprivileged to publish defamatory matter concerninganother *** during the course and as a part of, ajudicial proceeding in which he participates, ifthe matter has some relation to the proceeding." Restatement (Second) of Torts