Mashal v. The City of Chicago

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-09-2484 NRel

Case Date: 03/31/2011

Preview:SIXTH DIVISION March 31, 2011

No. 1-09-2484 GAZI H. MASHAL., Indiv., and in a Representative Capacity on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated, ) ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) v. ) ) THE CITY OF CHICAGO; TERRY G. HILLARD, Not ) Indiv., but as Superintendent of the Chicago Police ) Department; CAROLINE O. SHOENBERGER, Not Indiv., ) but as Commissioner of the City of Chicago Department of ) Consumer Services; and BEA REYNA-HICKEY, Not ) Indiv., but as Director of the City of Chicago Department of ) Revenue, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County

No. 00 CH 013396

Honorable Stuart E. Palmer, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Garcia and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION In this appeal, we respond to a supervisory order entered by the supreme court directing us to answer four certified questions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We first set out verbatim the four certified questions contained in the order: "A. What is a `decision on the merits' under [section 2-802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-802 (West 2004))] that would preclude the entry of a class decertification order. B. Whether, in a class action case challenging defendants' practice of

issuing parking or standing violations to taxicab drivers and others by mail and without any personal service on the driver or placement of the citation on the offending vehicle, a prior Judge's ruling that the defendants' `practice of sending a second notice of a parking or standing violation prior to an initial notice being either hand delivered to the driver of the vehicle or affixed to the vehicle is violative of the plain language of the [operative] statute and the ordinances' constitutes a decision on the merits under [section 2-802 of the Code] such that a subsequent Judge presiding in the case lacks the authority to decertify the class. C. Whether, in a class action case challenging defendants' practice of issuing parking or standing violations to taxicab drivers and others by mail and without any personal service on the driver or placement of the citation on the offending vehicle, a prior Judge's ruling that denied the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the application of their affirmative defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, res judicata, the collateral attack doctrine, and the voluntary payment doctrine constitutes a decision on the merits under [section 2-802] such that a subsequent Judge presiding in the case lacks the authority to decertify the class. D. Whether, in a class action case challenging defendants' practice of issuing parking or standing violations to taxicab drivers and others by mail and without any personal service on the driver or placement of the citation on the offending vehicle, a Judge's ruling that granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the application of the statute of limitations constitutes a 2

1-09-2484 decision on the merits under [section 2-802] such that a subsequent Judge presiding in the case lacks the authority to decertify the class." In answering the first question we conclude that for a decision to be "on the merits" under section 2-802 there must be a complete determination of liability on a claim, based on the facts disclosed by the evidence. We answer the second question in the negative: the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff in this case did not completely determine the liability on a claim based on the facts disclosed in evidence. We answer the third question in the negative: the court did not render a "decision on the merits" when it denied defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on their affirmative defenses because the court made no determination of liability. We answer the fourth question in the negative: the partial summary judgment ruling on the statute of limitations was not a decision on the merits because it did not determine liability as to the remaining members of the class. This case arises from a class action lawsuit filed in 2000 by plaintiff Gazi Mashal against the City of Chicago (City). Mashal worked as a Chicago taxi driver and challenged the City's practice of issuing "fly-by" traffic citations to taxicab drivers and others. "Fly-by" traffic citations are described in the pleadings as those allegedly received by mail, without personal service on the driver or placement of the citation on the offending vehicle. The circuit court entered a class certification order in 2002. In March 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the City's liability for issuing the citations. Among other claims, plaintiff argued that the City's practice violated the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(b)(3), (b)(5)(i) (West 2004)) and the Municipal Code 3

1-09-2484 of Chicago (Chicago Municipal Code

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