"The amount recovered in any such action shall be distributedby the court in which the cause is heard or, in the case ofan agreed settlement, by the circuit court, to each of thesurviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person inthe proportion, as determined by the court, that thepercentage of dependency of each such person upon thedeceased person bears to the sum of the percentages ofdependency of all such persons upon the deceased person." 740 ILCS Ann. 180/2 (West Supp. 1998).

While the Act does not define "next of kin," the central issue inthis case, many Illinois courts have addressed the interpretationof the term. Plaintiff relies primarily on the following threecases: Porter v. Klein Construction Co., 162 Ill. App. 3d 1(1987); Maga v. Motorala, Inc., 163 Ill. App. 3d 524 (1987); andRallo v. Crossroads Clinic, Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 676 (1990). In each case, this court applied the appropriate section of theProbate Act to determine the decedent's "next of kin."

In Porter, decedent was survived by a wife and children,therefore, the court found that decedent's mother was not "nextof kin" under the Act. Porter, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 4. In Maga,decedent was survived by a spouse, therefore, the court foundthat, pursuant to section 2-1(c) of the Probate Act, the parentsand siblings were not "next of kin" under the Act. Maga, 163Ill. App. 3d at 526. And in Rallo, decedent left two survivingchildren; therefore, the court found that, pursuant to section 2-1(b) of the Probate Act, decedent's mother and siblings were not"next of kin" under the Act. Rallo, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 680-83. In reaching our conclusion in each of Porter, Maga, and Rallo, wepointed to the case of Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 582 (1928),overruled on other grounds, McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 407(1966), which defined "next of kin" as blood relatives inexistence at the time of decedent's death who would take his orher personal property in the event decedent died intestate. Wealso reviewed the history of the Act. The Act was originallyenacted in 1853 and subsequently amended in 1955. Prior to the1955 amendment, the Act provided that "'the amount recovered inevery such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widowand next of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributedto such widow and next of kin in the proportion provided bylaw.'" Maga, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 527, quoting 1853 Ill. Laws 97. The plaintiffs in Maga argued that the 1955 deletion of thephrase "in the proportion provided by law" evidences the intentof the legislature to eliminate the statutory intestatedistribution scheme as a means of determining beneficiaries ofthe Act. Maga, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 528-30. This is essentiallywhat respondents are asserting here since in order for the adultsiblings to qualify as beneficiaries under the Act we wouldnecessarily have to disregard the rules of descent anddistribution found in the Probate Act which clearly designatedecedent's grandchildren as her "next of kin." However, thiscourt rejected that argument in Maga, pointing to the Porter casewherein our appellate court explicitly stated that only themethod of distribution, not the expansion of the beneficiaryclass, was effected by the 1955 amendment to the Act. Porter,162 Ill. App. 3d at 4. We reinforced this holding once again inRallo. Rallo, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 681-82. In each case, thiscourt stated that since the legislature was aware of Wilcox andits interpretation of "next of kin" when it amended the Act andleft the term unchanged, it must be assumed that the legislatureintended to adopt the court's construction of that term. Maga,163 Ill. App. 3d at 529-30. This court has repeatedly addressedthe issue of the interpretation of "next of kin" and found thatreference to the Probate Act is required.

Nevertheless, respondents argue, that there are "two lines ofcases" in Illinois which address this issue, one of whichrecognizes the ability of siblings to recover under the Act. Respondents argue that the Porter, Maga, and Rallo line of casesis distinguishable because, in each case, decedent was survivedby a spouse, children or both. Indeed, the cases are factuallydistinguishable since, in the instant case, decedent was notsurvived by either a spouse or children. However, while thefacts may be distinguishable, we agree with the underlyinganalysis. In each case, we reached our conclusions as to who wasdecedent's "next of kin" by applying the relevant section of theProbate Act. The fact that the particular circumstances of eachcase were different and led the court to a different section ofthe Probate Act is immaterial.

Respondents also cite the following cases, a "second line ofcases," which they assert hold that adult siblings may recoverunder the Act: Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889 (1979);Sheahan v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 146Ill. App. 3d 116 (1986); Johnson v. Village of Libertyville, 150Ill. App. 3d 971 (1986); and Schmall v. Village of Addison, 171Ill. App. 3d 344 (1988). After a review of each case, we findthat they do not support respondents' position.

First, in Rusher, decedent was survived by his spouse andparents. Rusher, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 891. There were no linealdescendants. The fifth district found that the spouse wasprecluded from recovery under the Act due to her participation indecedent's death; therefore, the court held that decedent'sparents were entitled to be the sole beneficiaries of thewrongful death proceeds. Rusher, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 894.

In Sheahan, decedent was killed by a train and survived by hissiblings. Sheahan, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 117. There was nosurviving spouse or lineal descendants. The trial court struckthe siblings claims under the Act for damages resulting from lossof companionship and loss of inheritance. Sheahan, 117 Ill. App.3d at 117. On appeal, this court held that siblings are notbarred from asserting a claim for loss of companionship under theAct. Sheahan, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 120. The issue was notwhether the siblings qualified as "next of kin." In fact,defendants conceded that the siblings were decedent's "next ofkin." Rather, the argument put forth by the defendants inSheahan and rejected by this court was that the loss of a siblingdecedent's society is not a pecuniary interest and, therefore,not compensable under the Act. Thus, Sheahan stands for theproposition that siblings are not barred from recovery under theAct for loss of society or companionship. We do not disagree;however, in order for siblings to recover, they must firstqualify as "next of kin." That is the issue before us: whetherthe siblings are "next of kin" when there are survivinggrandchildren.

In Schmall, decedent was survived by parents and siblings. Schmall, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 346. The trial court dismissed thesiblings' claims for loss of society. Schmall, 171 Ill. App. 3dat 348. The second district, applying the appropriate section ofthe Probate Act, found that since decedent left neither a spousenor children, his parents and siblings were "next of kin." Schmall, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 351. The court then held that thesiblings, having alleged pecuniary injury from loss of society,must be given an opportunity to prove their losses. Schmall, 171Ill. App. 3d at 354. This case does not aid respondents. Thecourt appropriately utilized the Probate Act and found thatbecause no spouse or children survived decedent, the parents andsiblings were the "next of kin." Schmall, 171 Ill. App. 3d at351.

In Johnson, decedent was survived by a spouse and parents. Johnson, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 973. The parents sought tointervene as plaintiffs in the wrongful death action and thetrial court rejected the parents' attempts. Johnson, 150 Ill.App. 3d at 972-73. On appeal, the second district held that theparents had a right to intervene and prove their loss since thespouse, as representative, was not adequately protecting theirinterests. Johnson, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78.

Only two of the cases cited by respondents, Rusher and Johnson,have departed from the recognized interpretation of "next of kin"which employs the intestate distribution scheme set forth in theProbate Act. The reason for the departure in Rusher resultedfrom the spouse's preclusion from asserting a claim under the Actdue to her participation in decedent's death. In the instantcase, the grandchildren are not similarly precluded. The reasonfor the second district's departure in Johnson is not as evident. However, we note that neither Rusher nor Johnson addresses theprecise issue before us. Moreover, the fifth district's decisionin Rusher and the second district's decision in Johnson were madewithout reference to the history of the Act or to the intent ofthe legislature.

The weight of authority followed by this court interprets "nextof kin" as set forth in the Act as being those persons who wouldqualify as beneficiaries according to the laws of intestatedescent and distribution as provided in the Probate Act. Sincedecedent was not survived by a spouse but was survived bydescendants, according to section 2-1(b) of the Probate Act thedescendants, i.e. the grandchildren, would take as beneficiariesto the exclusion of the adult siblings. 755 ILCS 5/2-1(b) (West1992).

Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in finding thatthe siblings were "next of kin" under the Act. We further findthat petitioner and Joe Louis Ervin, decedent's twograndchildren, are entitled to recover all wrongful deathproceeds to the exclusion of all others and any issue ofdependency is solely between the two grandchildren.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in itsadjudication of Medicare's lien inasmuch as the weight of theevidence was insufficient to support it. Petitioner has failed,however, to cite any authority in support of its argument. Lackof citation of legal authority in briefs before this courtconstitutes a failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)(134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) and results in waiver. People v.Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746 (1991) ("[c]ontentions supportedby some argument but absolutely no authority do not meet therequirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)"); People v. Barlow,188 Ill. App. 3d 393, 405 (1989) ("failure to provide this courtwith any legal argument or citation to supporting authoritywaives this issue for review"). Accordingly, we find theseallegations of error have been waived.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse paragraph 7 of thelaw division's August 12, 1997 order relating to the distributionof the wrongful death proceeds. Further, we hereby reverse thatportion of the probate division's August 21, 1997 orderauthorizing distribution of such wrongful death proceeds. Finally, we hereby remand this cause to the trial court forfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and ZWICK, J., concur.