SIXTH DIVISION
May 20, 2005

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Kenneth M. Neiman, individually and as assignee of Erwin B. Neiman, andJanice K. Neiman (plaintiffs or as named) originally filed suit against defendant EconomyPreferred Insurance Company (defendant) for breach of contract and bad faith in failing to pay aclaim. Arbitration resulted in plaintiffs' favor and defendant paid the award in full some monthslater. Plaintiffs again sued defendant, alleging bad faith for failing to pay a claim. They amendedtheir complaint to include defendant's affiliates: Economy Premiere Assurance Company, St. PaulFire & Marine Insurance Company of Illinois, Economy Fire & Casualty Company, andMetropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, individually and d/b/a The St. Paul andThe Economy Companies (affiliates). Defendant and its affiliates filed a joint motion to dismiss;the trial court granted this motion in part, dismissing the affiliates but retaining the suit againstdefendant. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for the same. The court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiffs' motion. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting several contentions for review. Plaintiffs ask that we reverse the entryof summary judgment in defendant's favor, vacate the order dismissing the affiliates, disqualify acertain law firm and remand this cause for trial before trial court Judge Susan Zwick. For thefollowing reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs obtained an insurance policy from defendant to insure a dwelling and its contentslocated in Deerfield, Illinois. On July 23, 1999, rain water caused damage on the insuredproperty, leading plaintiffs to make a claim under the policy. Over the next months, defendantmade partial payments of the insured amount. Plaintiffs, with Kenneth Neiman proceeding pro seand Edwin Neiman representing himself as well as Janice Neiman, filed suit against defendantasserting breach of contract and damages in the amount of $8,740, the remaining balance underthe policy; plaintiffs also sought damages under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code)(215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2000)) for delayed payment. The cause was set for mandatoryarbitration. On June 12, 2001, arbitrators unanimously held for plaintiffs on the breach ofcontract count, awarding them $8,740 plus costs, and for defendant with respect to the section155 damages count. Neither party rejected the award.

Judgment on this award was entered on August 3, 2001. Defendant's counsel was toappear on this date with a check for plaintiffs in the amount of the judgment, but did not. Plaintiffs filed a citation to discover assets against defendant. On September 6, 2001, defendantreceived a copy of plaintiff's demand for payment. On September 11, 2001, plaintiffs filed anothersuit against defendant, asserting violations of section 155 of the Code due to its "bad faith andvexatious delay" in payment on the August 3, 2001, judgment, with each plaintiff seeking $25,000in damages.

In a letter dated September 17, 2001, defendant asked plaintiffs for Edwin Neiman's taxidentification number or a waiver of attorney lien; defendant stated that it needed this number or awaiver pursuant to federal tax laws before it could issue a check for the August 3, 2001, judgmentto plaintiffs, since Edwin Neiman had acted as counsel for Janice Neiman in the underlyinginsurance suit. A letter dated October 29, 2001, from defendant to plaintiffs referred to anOctober 23, 2001, telephone conversation between the parties wherein plaintiffs refused toprovide defendant with Edwin Neiman's tax identification number or a waiver of lien. Defendantinformed plaintiffs that it would use Edwin Neiman's social security number instead, as obtainedfrom a prior deposition taken during the underlying suit, and was preparing a draft to pay theAugust 3, 2001, judgment, including costs incurred by plaintiffs and interest. On October 20,2001, defendant paid plaintiffs $8,938.72, leaving a balance of $288, which defendant paid onNovember 13, 2001, thereby satisfying the August 3, 2001, judgment in full. The next day,plaintiffs signed a full satisfaction of payment and release.

In May 2002, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against defendant, adding defendant'saffiliates and reasserting violations of section 155 of the Code. Defendant and its affiliates filed ajoint motion to dismiss, and a hearing on this motion was commenced before trial court JudgeSusan Zwick. During the hearing, it was discovered that defendant had failed to properly file andserve plaintiffs, and the hearing was adjourned. When the hearing was reconvened, defendantfiled a motion to substitute judge as of right, and Judge Zwick granted this motion. The case wasreassigned to trial Judge Michael Hogan, who then granted the joint motion in part (dismissing thecause with prejudice as to the affiliates because they were not parties to the underlying August 3,2001, judgment) and denied it in part (retaining defendant as part of the cause).

Later, defendant filed an emergency motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed across-motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing on these motions, trial Judge DonaldDevlin granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. In so holding, JudgeDevlin reviewed section 155 of the Code and stated that its plain language applied to a delay inthe settlement of a claim where the issue of liability has yet to be resolved, not to a delay in thepayment of a judgment where liability has already been determined--the latter of which was thesituation in the instant cause. Thus, Judge Devlin concluded that section 155 was not operationalhere and, since this Code violation was the only basis of plaintiffs' complaint, summary judgmentin favor of defendant was warranted.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs propound several contentions for review on appeal. Their primary argumentscite error on the part of Judge Hogan's order dismissing the affiliates from this suit and JudgeDevlin's order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs make furtherallegations of error regarding Judge Zwick's order permitting defendant to substitute judges afterhearing on its motion to dismiss had begun, and an order by trial Judge Claudia Conlon denyingplaintiff's motion to disqualify the law firm of Condon & Cook. Plaintiffs seek appellate relief onall these allegations of error.

For its part, defendant at the outset makes two procedural threshold arguments. First,defendant urges us to disregard plaintiffs' appellate brief in its entirety and affirm the judgmentbelow due to plaintiffs' "flagrant disregard" for Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(e) (188 Ill. 2d R.341(e)). Specifically, defendant notes that plaintiffs did not include a summary statement of theirpoints and authority (Rule 341(e)(1)), an introductory paragraph stating the nature of the actionand judgment appealed from (Rule 341(e)(2)), a statement of the issues for review (Rule341(e)(3)), the provision verbatim of section 155 involved herein (Rule 341(e)(5)), or anappendix as required by Rule 342 (Rule 341(e)(9)). It is true that plaintiffs did not include someof these items in separately labeled sections of their appellate brief; plaintiffs also failed to provideus with any sort of appendix to the record on review in their initial brief on appeal. However,they did include a page entitled "Points and Authorities," listing statutory and case law citations. Moreover, in reading their brief, we note that the judgments appealed from, the issues theypresent and the involvement of section 155 in this cause are, for the most part, apparent and clear. While we do not condone disregard for Rule 341(e), we choose in our discretion to review theinstant cause despite plaintiff's formulaic failures. See, e.g., Hubbartt v. Frank, 36 Ill. App. 3d529, 532 (1976) (reviewing court may choose to waive strict compliance with Rule 341 upon itsdiscretion).

However, we find that defendant's second threshold argument here is valid. That is,defendant alternatively argues that the only two viable issues for our review are plaintiff's citationsof error regarding Judges Hogan's and Devlin's orders, not Judge Zwick's order allowing forsubstitution of judge or Judge Conlon's refusal to disqualify the law firm of Condon & Cook. Defendant asserts that this is correct because plaintiffs in their notice of appeal referred only tothe former two orders and did not mention the latter two orders. We agree.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2)), when an appeal istaken from a specified judgment, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review otherjudgments or parts of judgments not specified or inferred from the notice of appeal. See, e.g., Inre J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220, 234 (2002). The exception to this rule is when a nonspecifiedjudgment can be said to have been a " 'step in the procedural progression leading' " to thejudgment specified in the notice of appeal; in that instance, a nonspecified judgment may bereviewed because it can be said to relate back to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. See In re D.R., 354 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472 (2004), quoting In re F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d 55, 69(2004), quoting Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 434-35 (1979).

In the instant cause, while plaintiffs stated in their notice of appeal that they wished toappeal from "any and all orders" entered in the cause, they specified that they were appealing from"the judgment entered by the Honorable Donald M. Delvin [sic] on March 18, 2004 grantingSummary Judgment in favor of Defendant and against plaintiffs and denying Plaintiffs' Motion forSummary Judgment and the Dismissal Order entered by the Honorable Michael J. Hogan on June16, 2003." Plaintiffs then declared that they were requesting the reviewing court to "reverse bothjudgments of March 18, 2004 and June 16, 2003 and remand this cause to the Trial Court." Clearly, plaintiffs explicitly specified that they were taking this appeal from Judges Devlin's andHogan's orders, and failed to specify Judges Zwick's and Conlon's orders, which they now arguein their appellate brief. According to Rule 303(b)(2), we do not have jurisdiction to reviewarguments on these latter two orders. Moreover, it cannot be said that these comprise steps in theprocedural progression leading to Judges Devlin's and Hogan's orders specified in the notice ofappeal, as the substitution of judge and refusal to disqualify have no inherent relationship to thedismissal of the affiliates or the grant of summary judgment. They are merely ancillary orders of aprocedural nature which have no impact upon the latter substantive orders. Therefore, we willreview plaintiffs' citations of error with respect to only the orders of Judges Devlin and Hogan,and not those of Judges Zwick and Conlon.

Turning now to substantive matters, we focus first on Judge Hogan's order dismissingdefendant's affiliates from the instant cause. Plaintiffs frame their contention as an error on JudgeHogan's part in finding that the affiliates were not parties to the contract-insurance policy"regardless of whether or not the contract was ambiguous or unambiguous." Essentially, plaintiffsargue that each of the affiliates was properly joined because each was jointly and severally liablefor the following reasons: Economy Premiere Assurance Company's name is stated on theinsurance policy, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Illinois is named on the check thatpaid the underlying judgment and did not provide any evidence to disprove that it was not liableunder the policy, Economy Fire & Casualty Company and The St. Paul are named on the policyand on the check that paid the underlying judgment, and Metropolitan Property and CasualtyInsurance Company acquired the assets of defendant. Plaintiffs claim that because of this, these"parties" should not have been dismissed and Judge Hogan's order should be reversed.

However, Judge Hogan granted the affiliates' (joint) motion to dismiss based on section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), noting that plaintiffs'complaint was not legally sufficient with respect to the allegations against the affiliates. Accordingly, he found that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief from the affiliates because the factsalleged, namely, that the affiliates were liable to plaintiffs under the insurance policy and, thus,could be liable under the Code for a vexatious delay in payment, failed to support this cause ofaction under section 155. See Romanek v. Connelly, 324 Ill. App. 3d 393, 398-99 (2001)(discussing the questions raised by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss). It is precisely in thesecircumstances, i.e., when the facts alleged fail to support a cause of action, that a section 2-615motion to dismiss should be granted. See Romanek, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 398.

Noting that plaintiffs provide us with absolutely no law regarding their argument onreview here, we find no error on the part of Judge Hogan in dismissing the affiliates from thiscause of action. Although plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the section 155 suit to namethe affiliates, it cannot be denied that plaintiffs sought and obtained the underlying judgmentagainst defendant only. That is, the entire insurance case as instigated by plaintiffs and carriedthrough by them until the August 3, 2001, judgment was only asserted against defendant--plaintiffs never once mentioned the affiliates. It is this underlying suit and judgment that was thesingular basis for the instant cause alleging section 155 violations. Having never brought a claimagainst the affiliates in the underlying suit and having recovered a judgment in that suit againstonly one defendant, plaintiffs cannot later seek to hold others liable for what happened ancillary tothat judgment (i.e., a delayed payment of the judgment). Indeed, the consequence for a plaintiff'sfailure to name a party of record is the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint against that party. SeeRhoads v. Board of Trustees of City of Calumet City Policemen's Pension Fund, 348 Ill. App. 3d835, 840 (2004). Accordingly, since the affiliates were never part of the underlying claim orjudgment, Judge Hogan's order dismissing them from the subsequent instant suit allegingvexatious conduct in the payment of that judgment was proper.

Finally, we turn to plaintiffs' last substantive argument on review, focusing on JudgeDevlin's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the instant section 155 causeof action. Relying principally on Estate of Price v. Universal Casualty Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 514(2001), plaintiffs contend that this ruling was improper because their complaint specifically andsufficiently stated a claim for relief under section 155 based on defendant's bad faith and vexatiousconduct in delaying payment of the August 3, 2001, judgment. Plaintiffs assert that defendantdelayed several months in paying out on the judgment without a true or reasonable excuse, whendefendant did pay it did not do so in the full amount at one time, and plaintiffs were forced to filesuit before defendant paid the balance. For its part, defendant contends that Judge Devlin's orderwas proper because section 155's plain language demonstrates that it does not apply to the instantcircumstances and, thus, plaintiffs could not recover thereunder. We agree with defendant.

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions ofrecord, construed strictly against the moving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Morris v.Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001); accord Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-44 (1986); Zakoffv. Chicago Transit Authority, 336 Ill. App. 3d 415, 420 (2002). While this relief has been called a"drastic measure," it is an appropriate tool to employ in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit inwhich " 'the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.' " Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35,quoting Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240. Appellate review of a trial court's grant of summary judgmentis de novo (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992);Zakoff, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 420), and reversal will occur only if we find that a genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists (see Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1988)).

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intentand meaning of the legislature. See Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 22 (2002); accord CountryMutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330 (2001). The best indicationof this intent and meaning, and the first factor to which we turn, is the language of the statuteitself. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34-35 (2004); accord Premier PropertyManagement, Inc. v. Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d 101, 119 (2000). Where the statutory language is plain,ordinary and unambiguous, we are bound to enforce the law as written and may not resort toother tools of statutory construction. See Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,202 Ill. 2d 414, 421-22 (2002); accord Premier Property, 191 Ill. 2d at 119.

Section 155 of the Code states, in pertinent part:

"In any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the liabilityof a company on a policy or policies of insurance or the amount of the loss payablethereunder, or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it appears to thecourt that such action or delay is vexatious and unreasonable, the court may allowas part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees, other costs, plusan amount not to exceed any one of the following amounts:

(a) 25% of the amount which the court or jury finds such party is entitledto recover against the company, exclusive of all costs;

(b) $25,000;

(c) the excess of the amount which the court or jury finds such party isentitled to recover, exclusive of costs, over the amount, if any, which the companyoffered to pay in settlement of the claim prior to the action." 215 ILCS 5/155(West 2000).

The language of this section is entirely plain to us. It directs that in a cause of action where thereremains "in issue" either the liability of a company on an insurance policy or the amount of loss tobe paid under a policy or an unreasonable delay in "settling a claim," a court may award amonetary remedy to an insured, as described in subsection (a), (b) or (c). (Emphasis added.) 215ILCS 5/155 (West 2000). Plaintiffs assert that they had a right to relief under this statutorysection against defendant. However, upon review of this language, they are incorrect.

Judge Devlin noted flatly that section 155 did not apply in the instant case, and we concur,for several reasons. The statute begins by stating that it applies to those insurance cases whereone of three issues remains undecided: the liability of the insurer, the amount owed under thepolicy, or whether a delay in settling a claim has been unreasonable. The first two clearly do notapply here. The underlying judgment entered on August 3, 2001--long before plaintiffs filed thesection 155 suit--already found that defendant, as the insurer, was liable under the policy toplaintiffs in the amount remaining thereunder: $8,740 plus costs.

Thus, the only avenue by which section 155 may have been applicable in the instantcircumstances is by the third option under the statute of "an unreasonable delay in settling aclaim." 215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2000). Plaintiffs assert that this clearly was the situation presentbefore Judge Devlin; it was not. While there may have been some delay in defendant's payment ofits full liability under the policy, and while there could be a question as to whether this delay wasunreasonable, this is irrelevant when the statutory phrase is read as a whole. That is, plaintiffs failto comprehend that in order for this portion of the statute to be operational, there must have beenan unreasonable delay in the "settling of a claim." The record in the instant case demonstratesthat the procedural history of the underlying cause was well beyond the point of a claim, or evenof a settlement, when plaintiffs filed the section 155 suit. In fact, a judgment had already beenentered on the underlying suit--on August 3, 2001, for a sum certain. Defendant paid this sum byNovember 13, 2001, and the next day, plaintiff signed a full satisfaction and release form, therebyreleasing defendant from any further payment or liability under their policy claim. Accordingly, a"claim" was no longer in existence, as necessitated by the statute, but, rather, a judgment had beeninstituted, foreclosing any remaining issues with respect to the underlying cause.

Plaintiffs argue that a "claim" and a "judgment" refer to the same concept and, thus,defendant's failure to pay the judgment until November 2001 fits within the meaning of section155's language. This is wholly mistaken. The plain and ordinary meanings of the words "claim"and "judgment" clearly show that they are not one in the same, particularly in legal terms. See Inre Detention of Bailey, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1085 (2000) (dictionary definitions may beemployed to find meaning of statutory words for construction purposes). The term "claim" isdefined as "[a] cause of action" and, more aptly for our purposes, a "[d]emand for money orproperty as of right, e.g. insurance claim." Black's Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990). Meanwhile, the term "judgment" has a more finite and definitive connotation: "The official andauthentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to anaction or suit therein litigated ***. The final decision of the court resolving the dispute anddetermining the rights and obligations of the parties." Black's Law Dictionary 841-42 (6th ed.1990). A judgment, which is outcome determinative, is entered upon a claim, which is an opencontest of assertions in need of a final resolution. Applying these plain definitions to section 155,it is clear to us that the legislature intended that section to take effect when there is anunreasonable delay in the "settling of a claim"; that is, in reaching a conclusion to the demand orcause of action instigated under the policy. In contrast, as already noted, the arbitrators hadentered judgment on the underlying action before plaintiffs pursued the section 155 suit anddefendant had made full payment upon the claim, which was the sole basis of the section 155 suit. Thus, a "claim" no longer existed, and "settling" had long given way to full payment andsatisfaction. Therefore, section 155 does not apply here.

Price is of no support to plaintiffs, as it is inapposite to the instant case. In Price, theplaintiff's decedent was in a car accident and reported the claim to the defendant-insurer. Thecase was scheduled for arbitration, but the defendant refused to participate and filed a move tostay. The arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay $20,000 pluscosts and interest under the policy. The defendant refused to pay this amount and offered tosettle for a lesser amount. The plaintiff demanded payment and, eventually, the defendant paid aportion but refused to pay interest on the award. The plaintiff filed a complaint to confirm thearbitration award and for section 155 damages. The trial court confirmed the award and orderedthe defendant to pay the remaining balance, but directed a finding for the defendant on the section155 count. The reviewing court reversed this latter portion of the judgment and remanded thecause for a hearing on the section 155 count based upon questions it found with respect to thedefendant's conduct throughout the litigation. See Price, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 520-21.

The difference between Price and the instant case lies in their procedural progression. Thedefendant in Price had been consistently, as Judge Devlin here noted, "horsing around withsettling" the claim; the defendant had refused to participate in arbitration, refused to pay thearbitration award (and offered to settle only at a lesser amount), and then refused to pay interest. After these refusals, the plaintiff filed a complaint with two counts: to confirm the arbitration andthereby enter a formal judgment against the defendant, and to recover section 155 damages. Thus, the section 155 allegations went hand-in-hand with a demand for judgment against thedefendant in the amount of the arbitrator's award--a judgment that had yet to be declared. Thissituation, then, amounted to a delay in the settlement of a claim where the issue of liability had yetto be resolved. Because issues were still open, section 155 was applicable and remand wasappropriate for a determination in this regard. See, e.g., Price, 332 Ill. App. 3d 514.

In contrast, in the instant case, a judgment had been entered pursuant to plaintiffs' claimsunder the policy on August 3, 2001. Defendant never refused to pay out under the policy; rather,the evidence demonstrates that it offered to pay but could not do so until it received EdwinNeiman's tax identification number. When defendant realized it could pay out using his socialsecurity number instead, it did so, in full satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiffs accepted thispayment and released defendant. It was only later that plaintiffs pursued a separate and single-count complaint against defendant for section 155 damages--after judgment had been entered andafter payment and satisfaction of it had been completed. This situation, then, comprised a "delay"in the payment of a judgment where the issue of liability had already been determined. As notedabove, in such an instance, section 155 does not apply.

The difference may be subtle, but upon review of section 155's precise and unambiguouslanguage, this difference is exacting. As Judge Devlin noted, the statute addresses concerns withinsurance companies and their behavior before an insurance claim even gets to court. As heexplained, the legislature sought to warn these companies that if they "horse around" in settling aclaim, then, when the parties actually go to court, the insured would be able to sue the insurer fordamages and collect amounts for the insurer's unreasonable and vexatious delay in the settlementprocess. This is in line with the rationale expressed by the Price court when that case wasreviewed again after remand was completed. See Estate of Price v. Universal Casualty Co., 334Ill. App. 3d 1010 (2002). As we noted, Price was remanded for a determination as to whether thedefendant-insurer's conduct in refusing to arbitrate and settle the claim was vexatious. The trialcourt concluded that it was, and the reviewing court agreed. See Price, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 1016-17. In so holding, that court made clear that section 155's language applied to those situations inwhich the insurer vexatiously delays or rejects legitimate claims; this section of the Code wasmeant to hold insurers responsible for the "expense resulting from the insured's efforts toprosecute the claim," and to discourage them from using their "superior financial position bydelaying payment of legitimate contractual obligations" in an effort to profit at the insured'sexpense. (Emphasis added.) Price, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 1016.

Again, in the instant case, plaintiffs had prosecuted and completed their claim to judgmentand defendant had already paid that judgment before proceeding on their section 155 claim. Thelanguage of section 155 says "an unreasonable delay in settling a claim," not "an unreasonabledelay in paying a judgment." There are other procedures in our body of law and governmentspecifically aimed at collecting on judgments; section 155 of the Code is not one of them. Rather,this section focuses on actions prejudgment. See, e.g., Price, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1010. If thelegislature had intended otherwise, as plaintiffs argue, it would have inserted the words "or inpaying a judgment," or some similar sentiment, after the existing phrase "in settling a claim,"which is the only clause to follow "an unreasonable delay." It did not, and, accordingly, we willnot interpret section 155 in that manner.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both trial Judge Hogan's order dismissing theaffiliates with prejudice from the instant cause and trial Judge Devlin's order granting summaryjudgment in favor of defendant.

Affirmed.

McNULTY and O'MARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.