THIRD DIVISION

March 6, 2002

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an insurance coverage case arising from the botchedsale of 21 cars. It involves transactions between Plaintiff NudiAuto RV & Boat Sales, Inc. (Nudi), a car dealer, and MK AutoSales, Inc. (MK), an automobile broker not a party to thislawsuit.

Between April and May 1997, MK bought several cars from autoauction houses. It earmarked 21 of them for Nudi. MK'sintention was to sell the cars to Nudi, which it did, and thenuse that money to pay its debt with the auction houses. Afterpaying off the debt, MK would deliver the certificates of titleto the cars to Nudi.

Nudi paid for the cars, but MK never did deliver titles tothem. It couldn't, because it never paid the auction houses. Nudi, wanting to keep the cars, ended up paying the auctionhouses $50,000 for the titles to the 21 cars. Then Nudi made aclaim against its insurance company, John Deere Insurance Company(John Deere), for the $50,000 under its "FALSE PRETENSECOVERAGE."

Nudi's "false pretense coverage" applied when it acquired"an 'auto' from a seller who did not have legal title." (Emphasis added.) The issue in this case is whether MK had"legal title" to the 21 cars it sold to Nudi.

The trial court entered summary judgment for the insurancecompany. We reverse the trial court's decision and remand thiscause with directions to enter summary judgment for the insured.

FACTS

The Insurance Company's Policy

John Deere, an Illinois corporation with its principal placeof business in Moline, Illinois, issued an insurance policy and"garage coverage" to Nudi, a Wisconsin corporation with itsprincipal place of business -- a car dealership -- in Kenosha,Wisconsin. Nudi's policy included additional coverage for "falsepretense."

Nudi's false pretense coverage was effective from October 1,1996, to October 1, 1997. The scope of this coverage is now atissue. The pertinent provisions are as follows:

"FALSE PRETENSE COVERAGE

GARAGE COVERAGE FORM

I. SECTION I - COVERED AUTOS is amended, for thisendorsement only, by the following:

Any 'auto' you have acquired is a covered 'auto'under the False Pretense Coverage.

II. SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGE is amended, forthis endorsement only, by the following:

A. The following is added to paragraph A. COVERAGE:

1. False Pretense Coverage.

We will pay for 'loss' to a covered 'auto'caused by:

a. Someone causing you to voluntarily partwith the covered 'auto' by trick,scheme, or under false pretenses.

b. Your acquiring an 'auto' from a sellerwho did not have legal title.

c. Confiscation of an 'auto' by agovernmental or civil authority, foralleged or actual violations of lawsgoverning the distribution, sale, or useof controlled substances." (Emphasisadded.)

The following facts are taken from the pleadings and thedepositions filed with the pleadings. MK and The Auto Auction Houses

In April 1994, Mike Moses and his sister, Karen Moses,opened MK Auto Sales, Inc. MK was an automobile broker/used cardealer located in Mount Prospect, Illinois. It now is defunct. MK specialized in the wholesale selling of used cars to cardealers.

MK bought used cars from auto auctions conducted by GreaterChicago Auto Auction, Metro Milwaukee Auto Auction, Auction WaySales, Inc., and ADT Automotive, Inc. (collectively the "auctionhouses"). MK had financial arrangements with these auctionhouses through their financial services departments. Thesearrangements allowed MK to bid/buy cars on credit, resell them tobuyers/car dealers, then use the money from the sale to pay offits debt. This process occurred as follows:

After MK filled out the appropriate paperwork and executedthe proper documents -- showing it was qualified and licensed tobuy cars from an auction --, the auction houses gave MK a "floorplan" or "bridge loan," i.e., a credit line, to bid or buy carswith. The auction houses accepted checks, cash, and/or floorplans as payment for auctioned cars and they guaranteed thetitles to the auctioned cars were valid and free of anyincumbrance.

Through this financial arrangement, MK went to the auctionhouses and placed cars on its floor plan -- MK had about a$200,000 floor plan limit. If, during the auctions, MK was thesuccessful bidder, the auction houses sold MK the cars. AlthoughMK took possession of the cars it successfully bid on, it did sowithout the certificates of title. The certificates of titleremained in the owner's/seller's name and in the possession ofthe auction houses until MK paid off its debt, i.e., floor plan.

After MK took possession of the cars, it transported them toits car lot in Mount Prospect, Illinois. Once the cars were onits lot, MK stocked, inventoried, and resold them. A majority ofthe cars MK bought on its floor plan were resold wholesale and inbulk to other car dealers.

When MK sold the cars it bought from the auction houses,i.e., the cars on its floor plan, MK could not transfer thetitles of the cars to the buyer/car dealer at the time of thesale; the auction houses still had them. MK filled out theappropriate paperwork, took cash or check from the buyer, gavethe car or cars to the buyer, and deposited the money into itsbank account. MK then went to the auction houses and paid forthe car or cars with its own check.

Once the auction houses were paid, that is, when MK paid offits floor plan, the auction houses gave the certificates of titleto MK -- the certificates were put in MK's name. MK then signedthe certificates, gave them to the buyer to sign, and sent themto the Secretary of State to register the titles in the buyer'sname. After some time, the Secretary of State sent the buyercertificates of title registered in its name.

MK and Nudi

In about December 1996, MK approached Nudi and asked if itcould sell Nudi used cars wholesale. MK wanted to be, inessence, Nudi's "wholesaler." Nudi described a wholesaler as"somebody that would go out and try to place or buy an automobilefor another dealer based on their wants and needs, make a smallprofit in the in between so that they can make a living and buyand sell and place automobiles where they feel that there's aneed."

Nudi agreed. Nudi said he didn't "have time to go out andbuy and sell automobiles." Nudi had dealt with Mike Moses of MKbefore and trusted him.

Between April and May 1997, MK placed several cars on itsfloor plan at the various auction houses. MK then called Nudiand described the cars. Nudi was interested in them so MK tookthe cars to Nudi's car dealership in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Twenty-one of the cars Nudi chose to buy and pay for are at the centerof this lawsuit.

After Nudi chose the cars it wanted, it gave MK a "check onthe spot." The amount was about $179,000. At the time Nudibought the cars, he did not receive the certificates of titlefrom MK. Nudi knew that MK was going to use the money from thesale to pay off its floor plan.

Nudi allowed MK a two-week "grace period" to get thecertificates of title from the auction houses. It expected toget the titles from MK within that time because Nudi and MKusually did business this way -- it was common industry practiceto buy and sell used cars the way Nudi and MK did.

Nudi never received the certificates of title for the 21cars. At the time MK sold the cars to Nudi, MK suffered fromwhat Moses described as "very poor business management." As aresult, MK went out of business and was unable to cover checks itwrote to the auction houses to pay off its floor plan. Theauction houses refused to turn over the certificates of title tothe 21 cars MK sold to Nudi. In fact, because MK did not paythem, the auction houses wanted the cars back.

At his deposition, Mike Moses of MK explained what happened:

"Q. ***. Do you know the circumstances under whichthe auction house was refusing to turn over the title? Doyou know if the auction house was refusing to turn over thetitles?

A. I believe they were, yes.

Q. And do you now why?

A. They claimed they weren't paid for.

Q. Were they, do you know?

A. They had checks for the cars that weren't any goodat that time.

Q. The checks were not --

A. They had checks from MK that weren't any good atthe time.

* * *

Q. Did MK ever pay for the automobiles for whichchecks were given that were not honored by the bank?

* * *

A. That's correct.

Q. And those checks were designed to pay for carswhich were sold to Nudi Suzuki Isuzu; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

A. No, sir.

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. Okay. For those cars that were sold to Nudi, younever went through that scenario where you gave Mannheimchecks and actually got titles for the cars you sold?

A. Correct. I never actually got the titles, that iscorrect.

* * *

Q. Okay. Since you went out of business around the29th of May, did MK Auto Sales have the ability then to payfor and obtain the titles to the cars that were sold to NudiSuzuki?

A. No.

* * *

Q. So, in other words, you never got -- MK Auto Salesnever got title, never paid for those cars directly toobtain the title, and after May 29 was unable to obtaintitle because it was out of business?

A. That's correct."

Nudi and The Auto Auction Houses

The auction houses repossessed the cars MK had bought on itsfloor plan and had not yet sold, that is, the cars that werestill in MK's car lot. After MK discussed its situation withNudi, Nudi moved from its lot the 21 cars it bought from MK. Nudi wanted to avoid the auction houses. It did not want them torepossess the cars it bought from MK. Nudi "decided [to] keepthem out of the way until I got counsel and found out what mylegal recourse was."

Representatives of the auction houses contacted Nudi. Theydemanded the return of the 21 cars sold to Nudi by MK. They madearrangements to repossess the cars from Nudi.

In an effort to keep the cars it bought and paid for, Nudientered into a settlement agreement with the auction houses. According to the settlement agreement, the auction houses gaveNudi the certificates of title for the 21 cars and Nudi gave theauction houses $50,000.

Nudi and Defendant John Deere

On about May 30, 1997, Nudi made a claim for loss under thefalse pretense coverage section of its insurance policy. Nuditold its insurer, John Deere, that it acquired 21 automobilesfrom a seller, MK, who did not have legal title. On about June6, 1997, and again on about August 20, 1997, John Deere notifiedNudi by letter that it was denying coverage for the lossessustained because,

"M.K. Auto Sales was not selling you vehicles with illegaltitles. They were transferring ownership of the vehicleswhen they do not hold the physical title. This is donequite often in the auto market and does not mean that theydo not own the auto or that an illegal title exist[s]. AllM.K. Auto Sales had to do was pay for the vehicles and theywould have received the titles. This is merely a collectionproblem."

In July 1998, Nudi filed this declaratory judgment action,contending "there exists coverage for the losses sustained byNudi under the False Pretense Coverage endorsement of the policyof insurance issued by John Deere to Nudi ***." After aprocedural history that took both parties from the Cook CountyCircuit Court to the federal court and back, Nudi and John Deerefiled separate motions for summary judgment. In April 2001, thetrial court denied Nudi's motion for summary judgment and grantedJohn Deere's motion.

The trial court said, "I do not believe that Nudi hassustained its burden of proof proving that MK Auto Salesillicitly acquired vehicles from the Auctions when the vehicleswere acquired by Nudi from MK Auto Sales. MK auto sales hadlegal title, and therefore I believe there was no coverage underthe policy."

The trial court added that even if MK did not have legaltitle to the cars it sold to Nudi, "Nudi paid for the vehicle[s]it bought from MK Auto Sales, *** it was the bonafide purchaserfor value without notice of any security interest or liens."

This appeal followed.

DECISION

Nudi contends the trial court erred in ruling as a matter oflaw that MK had legal title to the 21 cars it sold to Nudi andthat, even if MK did not have legal title, Nudi was a bonafidepurchaser. We agree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions,and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,reveal there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 735 ILCS5/2-1005(c) (West 1998); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).

We review de novo a trial court's order granting summaryjudgment. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 102. "When allparties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court isinvited to decide the issues presented as a question of law." Container Corp. of America v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1089,1091, 689 N.E.2d 259 (1997). We may affirm summary judgmentbased on any grounds supported by the record. InternationalInsurance Co. v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill.App. 3d 998, 1007, 728 N.E.2d 680 (2000).

FALSE PRETENSE COVERAGE

The false pretense coverage endorsement (the "endorsement")provides, in relevant part, the insurer John Deere will pay forloss to a "covered auto" caused by the insured acquiring an autofrom a seller who did not have "legal title." Under theendorsement, any auto Nudi acquired is a covered auto.

Here, Nudi and John Deere agree "the subject [insurance]policy, specifically, the False Pretense Coverage endorsements,is clear and unambiguous and should be given its plain andordinary meaning."

The construction of an insurance provision, and adetermination of the rights and obligations thereunder, is aquestion of law suitable for summary judgment. See Crum &Forster Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 390-91,620 N.E.2d 1073 (1993).

We construe the insurance policy as a whole, ascertainingthe intent of the parties to the insurance contract, "with dueregard to the risk undertaken, the subject matter that is insuredand the purposes of the entire contract." Outboard Marine Corp.,154 Ill.2d at 108. Where the policy's words are unambiguous,there is no need for construction; the words will be given theirplain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Outboard Marine Corp., 154Ill.2d at 108.

We agree with the parties: there are no ambiguous words inthe insurance policy's false pretense coverage endorsement. Although the key words in the endorsement that are the subject ofthis appeal -- i.e., "legal title" -- are not defined in theinsurance policy, we will apply the words as written, unless theycontravene public policy. See State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, 442, 692 N.E.2d 1196(1998).

John Deere contends "false pretense coverage is meant toprotect the insured from the loss of a vehicle through deception. It is not coverage for poor business practices or an ordinarybusiness risk, such as someone writing a bad check. The veryessence of false pretense coverage is that there is anintentional deceptive act."

Nudi says, "It is evident that coverage exceeds mere loss ofa covered auto by trick, scheme, or false pretense, all of whichimply intent on the part of the perpetrator to defraud or steal. The language in Section II.A.1.b. appears clear on its face, thatacquisition of a covered auto from someone who does not havelegal title is a covered event for which the insurer, defendant,is liable under the terms of its policy."

We agree with Nudi. Whether the seller had "legal title" tothe auto he sold to the insured is the key fact, not whether the"insured accepts a stolen vehicle in trade from someone who didnot have legal title, or from someone who acquired a vehicle byfraud or deception," as John Deere suggests, and as the trialcourt found.

We note that while the title of section II.A.1. is "FalsePretense Coverage," only section II.A.1.a. uses the term "falsepretenses." Section II.A.1.c. clearly is not a false pretenseprovision. It refers to "Confiscation of an 'auto' by agovernmental or civil authority."

Section II.A.1.b. of the endorsement contains no mention ofan intent to defraud. That is, there is no requirement the carssold by MK be stolen or acquired by fraud. As the endorsementsays, "Any 'auto' you have acquired is a covered 'auto' under theFalse Pretense Coverage."

The trial court erred in finding Nudi had a burden to provethat "MK Auto Sales illicitly acquired vehicles from the Auctionswhen the vehicles were acquired by Nudi from MK Auto Sales."

The next question, then, is whether the record demonstratesthe seller, MK, had "legal title" to the cars it sold to Nudi, asthat term is used in the policy.

The record is clear, and as Mike Moses of MK agreed: "MKAuto Sales never got [certificates of] title, never paid forthose cars directly to obtain the [certificates of] title, andafter May 29 was unable to obtain [the certificates of] titlebecause it was out of business."

Black's Law Dictionary 1493 (7th ed. 1999) defines legaltitle: "A title that evidences apparent ownership but does notnecessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficialinterest."

John Deere contends "there is a distinction between acertificate of title and legal title." "While MK did not receivethe actual, physical certificates of title from the auction,"concedes John Deere, "the understanding of the parties was forlegal title to transfer, especially where possession and controlof the vehicles did pass from the auction to MK, and from MK tothe Plaintiff." (Emphasis in original.)

John Deere cites no support for its contention. That isbecause its contention is mistaken -- John Deere attempts toargue the term "legal title," as used in the endorsement, meansownership.

We find John Deere's concession that MK did not receiveactual physical title fatal to its case. Although John Deere iscorrect in saying possession and control of the cars passed fromthe auto auction houses to MK, it clearly is not correct insaying that the understanding of the auction houses was to passto MK legal title. That is because no legal title could betransferred until MK paid for the cars. And MK did not.

A certificate of title to an automobile is "evidence of[legal] title ***." Pekin Insurance Co. v. U.S. Credit Funding,Ltd., 212 Ill. App. 3d 673, 677, 571 N.E.2d 769 (1991), quotingState Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Lucas, 50 Ill. App. 3d 894,898, 365 N.E.2d 1329 (1977). See American States Insurance Co.v. White, 341 Ill. App. 422, 94 N.E.2d 95 (1950) (abstract ofop.) (upon execution of a conditional sales contract, the buyerbecame equitable owner of the automobile and assumed theunconditional obligation to pay for the automobile, but theseller held legal title to secure the payment of the balance ofthe purchase price.)

Our review of the record shows MK never had legal title tothe cars it sold to Nudi, because the auction houses did notintend to transfer legal title to the cars until they were paid. Dan Pilson Auto Center v. DeMarco, 156 Ill. App. 3d 617, 509N.E.2d 159 (1987), supports our conclusion.

In Dan Pilson Auto Center, the plaintiff, Dan Pilson AutoCenter, brought a replevin action seeking to recover possessionof six squad cars from the defendant, the sheriff of SangamonCounty, William DeMarco. Pilson testified he had entered into anoral agreement to sell six used squad cars to Leo Palmeri, abuyer/broker for a car dealership. Dan Pilson Auto Center, 156Ill. App. 3d at 618.

Sometime after the agreement was made, Palmeri told Pilsonhe sold the squad cars to his customer, the Sangamon CountySheriff. Palmeri asked Pilson whether it would be all right ifthe sheriff picked up the squad cars, as the sheriff was anxiousto get the vehicles. Palmeri said he would be arriving shortlyafter the sheriff's men, but that Pilson should allow the sheriffto take the cars. Pilson agreed to the arrangement. Dan PilsonAuto Center, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 619.

Captain Pyle of the Sangamon County Sheriff's Departmentarrived at Pilson's dealership. Pyle signed a "delivery receipt"and took possession of the cars. Pilson kept the certificates oftitle. Dan Pilson Auto Center, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 619.

Palmeri never showed up after the sheriff took possession ofthe squad cars and never paid Pilson, although the sheriff'sdepartment had paid Palmeri. Dan Pilson Auto Center, 156 Ill.App. 3d at 619-20.

In Dan Pilson Auto Center, the court held: "Palmeri, theseller, had no title at all" where the "evidence clearlyestablished that Pilson never transferred the certificates oftitle for the squad cars" and "both parties *** acknowledged thatthe cars were released to Pyle as 'an accommodation to thesheriff' who was in dire need of additional squad cars." 156Ill. App. 3d at 621. "Since Palmeri had nothing to convey, thesheriff never received title to the cars," said the court. DanPilson Auto Center, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 623.

According to the court, "While the failure to transfercertificates of title alone might be insufficient to sustain afinding for Pilson, this fact in conjunction with evidence ofparties' intent, indicates that although possession passed, therewas no concurrent intent to transfer ownership." Dan Pilson AutoCenter, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 621.

Here, the auto auction houses can be read as Pilson; MK asPalmeri; and Nudi as the sheriff.

As in Dan Pilson Auto Center, the record in this case showsthe existence of two separate sales contracts: the first betweenthe auto auction houses and MK, and the second between MK andNudi. Although the auto auction houses gave MK possession of thecars, all parties understood their separate transactions were notyet complete.

MK knew it would not receive title to the cars, andtherefore not own them, until it paid the auction houses forthem. Likewise, Nudi knew it would not receive title to thecars, and therefore not own them, until MK paid the auctionhouses for them.

The trial court erred in finding MK had legal title. MK didnot. We find that under the false pretense coverage endorsementof Nudi's insurance policy, Nudi acquired "an 'auto' from aseller who did not have legal title" and John Deere must coverNudi's losses.

BONA FIDE PURCHASER/BUYER IN THE ORDINARY COURSE

John Deere contends that even if we find MK did not havelegal title to the cars, legal title was transferred because"Nudi was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of anysecurity interest or liens."

This is not a case about who had lawful possession of thecars. Nudi paid an extra amount for the amended coverageendorsement at issue. The endorsement specifically limited the"autos" Nudi acquired to those for which the seller did not havelegal title. As such, there were no additional conditions placedwithin the false pretense endorsement.

John Deere contends the plain, ordinary, and popular meaningof the words "legal title" encompasses, by definition, a sellerlike MK, who is able to transfer legal title to a bona fidepurchaser or a buyer in the ordinary course of business, likeNudi. We do not agree.

The endorsement says, "Your acquiring an 'auto' from aseller who did not have legal title." It does not say, "Youracquiring an 'auto' from a seller who could transfer legal titleto you."

Illinois law defines a vehicle "owner" as "a person whoholds legal documents of ownership of a vehicle." 625 ILCS 5/3-100 (West 1998). With certain inapplicable exceptions, acertificate of title is required for every vehicle owned inIllinois. 625 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 1998). If for some reasonthere is no certificate of title in existence, the owner mustapply to the Secretary of State for a certificate of title. 625ILCS 5/3-101 (West 1998).

The proper way to effectuate a transfer of ownership of amotor vehicle in Illinois is by assignment and warranty of title.625 ILCS 5/3-112, 3-113 (West 1998). Although failure to complywith Section 3-112 or 3-113 does not necessarily affect passageof title to a motor vehicle (State Farm Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 55Ill. App. 3d at 898-99), a purchaser of a motor vehicle cannotreceive any greater title or interest in a motor vehicle than theseller had at the time of the sale. Dan Pilson Auto Center, 156Ill. App. 3d at 621, citing 810 ILCS 5/2-403(1) (West 1998).

Here, MK, the seller, had no title at all. Thus, thestatutory provisions regarding voidable title are inapplicable. See 810 ILCS 5/2-403(1) (West 1998). See also Dan Pilson AutoCenter, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 621.

John Deere also contends the Uniform Commercial Code (the"UCC") additionally provides that if goods are entrusted to a"merchant[, MK,] who deals in goods of that kind," the merchanthas "power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer inordinary course of business[, Nudi]." See 810 ILCS 5/2-403(2)(West 1998).

We find section 2-403(2) of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2-403(2)(West 1998)) does not apply to this case. The UCC does not referto "legal title." The purpose of this provision of the UCC is:"The many particular situations in which a buyer in the ordinarycourse of business from a dealer has been protected againstreservation of property or other hidden interest are gathered bysubsections (2)-(4) into a single principle protecting personswho buy in the ordinary course out of inventory." 810 ILCS 5/2-403, Uniform Commercial Code Comment, at 289 (Smith-Hurd 1993).

Nowhere is it said in the UCC that the merchant who sold theentrusted goods to the buyer in the ordinary course of businessis vested with legal title. As such, whether Nudi qualifies as abuyer of the cars in the ordinary course of business does notmatter. MK still did not have legal title and, by its contracts,could not get legal title until it paid the auction houses forthe cars. It never did. John Deere may not claim non-coverage.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Nudi contends John Deere advanced its coverage position inbad faith. Nudi argues that pursuant to section 155 of theIllinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)), it isentitled to reimbursement of attorney fees, as well as sanctionsagainst John Deere.

Section 155(1) of the Illinois Insurance Code states:

"In any action by or against a company wherein there isin issue the liability of a company on a policy or policiesof insurance or the amount of the loss payable thereunder,or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and itappears to the court that such action or delay is vexatiousand unreasonable, the court may allow as part of the taxablecosts in the action reasonable attorney fees, [and] othercosts * * *[.]" 215 ILCS 5/155 (1) (West 1998).

Nudi contends John Deere engaged in vexatious andunreasonable conduct in denying Nudi's tender. However, "Where abona fide dispute concerning coverage exists, costs and sanctionsare inappropriate." State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 380, 757 N.E.2d 881 (2001).

Here, the trial court determined John Deere correctly reliedon the false pretense coverage endorsement in denying Nudi'stender. Although we hold the trial court erred, we find thereexisted a bona fide dispute concerning John Deere's potentialcoverage in this case. Costs and sanctions are inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court's decision and remand this causewith directions to enter summary judgment for Nudi on the issueof coverage. We deny any grant of costs or fees under section155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)).

Reversed and remanded.

CERDA, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.