FIRST DIVISION
March 10, 2003

Plaintiff-appellant Pamela O'Connor (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court's ordersgranting summary judgment to defendant-appellee County of Cook (defendant) and denying hermotion to reconsider. Plaintiff asks that we reverse and vacate these orders, and remand forfurther proceedings on the merits of her cause. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from depositions included in the record on appeal. OnMarch 8, 1999, plaintiff, who is a Chicago police officer, arrived at the criminal court building at26th Street and California Avenue in Chicago where she was scheduled to testify in a court case. She parked her car on the top floor of the parking garage located across the street from the courtbuilding. As she approached the elevator enclosure to exit the garage, she climbed over a moundof snow that had been plowed and piled near the door to the enclosure. In so doing, she slippedand fell. Plaintiff broke her ankle and was taken to the hospital, where she eventually underwenttwo surgeries.

Plaintiff filed a complaint at law against the City of Chicago, the City of ChicagoBuilding Commission and defendant, alleging that all three entities were negligent in failing tomaintain the parking garage in a reasonably safe condition. The City of Chicago and the City ofChicago Building Commission filed separate motions to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) (Code), both asserting that they did not own,maintain or control the parking garage. By agreed order, the court granted the City of Chicago'smotion, and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the City of Chicago Building Commission from thisaction. The case against defendant continued, and in its amended answer to plaintiff's complaint,defendant admitted that it owns and operates the parking garage.

In his deposition, Lawrence Wozniak testified that he is the head building custodian ofthe criminal court building and that he is employed by the Cook County sheriff (Sheriff). Heaverred that his responsibilities include the supervision of snow removal by his custodial stafffrom the entire court "complex." He described the complex as encompassing the court building,the nearby administrative building, the parking lots and the parking garage across the street. Corroborating this was the deposition testimony of Joseph Martin and Floyd Crumpton, membersof the custodial staff. Martin testified that he is employed by the Sheriff's office under Wozniak,his supervisor. Martin described that his responsibilities as a custodian include snow removal,and that he is the head of the crew of custodians responsible for this task. Martin stated thatwhile his crew removes snow from the criminal court building, the parking lot and the first floorof the parking garage across the street, he is one of two custodians in charge of driving the snowplow truck which removes snow from the top floor of the parking garage. Crumpton testifiedthat he too is employed by the Sheriff's office. He averred that he is the other custodian in chargeof driving the snow plow. Crumpton testified that as an employee of the Sheriff's office, he isresponsible for plowing the "complex" at the criminal court building, which he described asincluding the top floor of the parking garage across the street.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2-1005) (West 1998)), contending in part that it was not the proper defendant in thiscause of action because, although it owns the parking garage, snow removal is the responsibilityof the Sheriff and defendant is not responsible for the actions of the Sheriff's employees. OnSeptember 6, 2001, the trial court issued its memorandum and order granting defendant's motion. The court compared section 3-6017 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-6017 (West 1998)),which charges the Sheriff with the "custody and care of the courthouse and jail," to section 5-1106 (55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 1998)), which charges defendant with keeping "in repair, asuitable courthouse, jail and other necessary county buildings," and determined that snowremoval constitutes "custody and care." Relying on People ex rel. Walsh v. Board ofCommissioners of Cook County, 397 Ill. 293 (1947), and Moy v. County of Cook, 244 Ill. App.3d 1034 (1993), the court concluded that snow removal "does not fall within the scope" ofdefendant's responsibilities but, rather, those of the Sheriff, and accordingly, defendant was not aproper party to this cause of action.

Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the court's order granting summary judgment infavor of defendant. The trial court denied this motion on February 6, 2002.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks the reversal and vacation of both the trial court's order granting summaryjudgment in favor of defendant and its order denying her motion to reconsider. We review hercontentions as to each order separately, beginning with the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code. Under that section, summary judgment is to be granted "without delay if the pleadings,depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000); accord Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001);see also In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410-11 (1993) (court is to construe the pleadings,affidavits, depositions and admissions strictly against moving party and liberally in favor ofopponent of summary judgment motion). While summary judgment has been called a "drasticmeasure," it is an appropriate tool to employ in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit in which" 'the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.' " Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35, quotingPurtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). We review the grant of summary judgment under ade novo standard. See Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35. We also note for purposes of this appeal thatthis cause involves statutory construction and interpretation. These are questions of law and, justas the grant of summary judgment, are subject to de novo review on appeal. See Choi v.Industrial Comm'n, 182 Ill. 2d 387, 392 (1998).

The arguments presented on appeal by both parties bring into contention two statutoryprovisions pertaining to the maintenance of the county courthouse and jail, namely, section 3-6017 dealing with duties of the Sheriff and section 5-1106 dealing with the duties of the county. We include the text of these provisions here at the outset. Section 3-6017 states:

"Sheriff custodian of courthouse and jail. He or she shall have the custody and care of the courthouse and jail of his or her county, except as otherwise provided." 55 ILCS 5/3-6017 (West 1998).

Section 5-1106 states, in relevant part:

"County offices, equipment and expenditures. It shall be the duty of the county board of each county:

*** To erect *** and keep in repair, a suitable court house, jail and other necessary county buildings." 55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 1998).

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant becauseunder the provisions of section 5-1106, defendant county is the proper party to her cause ofaction. Plaintiff argues that, based on a comparison of the plain language of these statutorysections, it is clear that the Sheriff's custodial duties do not extend to the parking garage whereshe was injured. Plaintiff asserts that it is defendant that is responsible for maintaining thegarage based on the language of section 5-1106 and its admission in its answer to her complaintthat it owns and operates the garage. Thus, plaintiff concludes that she appropriately nameddefendant as the proper party in her cause. We disagree and find that the trial court's grant ofsummary judgment was proper.

Under Walsh, upon which the trial court relied, it is clear that the Sheriff, and notdefendant county, would have exclusive custodial control over the courthouse and jail premises. In Walsh, the sheriff sought to prevent the county board from usurping his power to select andappoint a janitorial staff to care for and perform services in those areas "in and about the countycourthouse and the county criminal court building," "such as engineers' services, operatingelevators, sweeping floors, washing windows, and other similar janitorial duties." Walsh, 397 Ill.at 294. In deciding who bore responsibility for the care of these areas and the performance ofthese duties, our supreme court conducted a historical review of case law and statutes to comparethe powers and duties of the sheriff and the county. The court reflected that it had long beenestablished that the sheriff is charged with those custodial duties affecting the county courthouseand jail. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 296-97. These duties had been part of the sheriff's powersassigned to him at common law and codified by early statute using the same words now used insection 3-6017. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 296-97 (referring to section 14 of "An Act to revise thelaw in relation to sheriffs" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 125, par. 14), which tracks the same languageof current section 3-6017). From this, the Walsh court concluded that custodial duties affectingthe courthouse were the exclusive province of the sheriff, including the power to hire a janitorialstaff to assist him in these duties. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 300.

This conclusion is further supported by the Walsh court's references to Dahnke v. People,168 Ill. 102 (1897), and Hardin v. County of Sangamon, 71 Ill. App. 103 (1896). The Walshcourt noted that Dahnke and Hardin resolved any apparent conflict in those statutes that were theprecursors to sections 3-6017 and 5-1106, as both those cases held that any such conflict betweenthe authority of the county and that of the sheriff to exercise custodial power over the courthouseand grounds was to be resolved in favor of the sheriff. See Dahnke, 168 Ill. at 111-12, 114 ("'[a]s real estate, the county board controls the title, and keeps the building and its furniture inrepair. As a court house, the sheriff *** guards and cares for it' "); Hardin, 71 Ill. App. at 114,quoting Dahnke v. People, 57 Ill. App. 619, 626 (1895) (the custodial powers of the county flowonly from its ownership rights over the property, but those of the sheriff to care for the propertyarise from his inherent powers at common law and his traditional role " 'as the attendant upon thecourt and as the court's executive officer' "; this view "harmonizes the two provisions *** givingto the county and to the sheriff, respectively, the care and custody of this property, and allowseach its due effect"); accord County of McDonough v. Thomas, 84 Ill. App. 408, 412 (1899)(sheriff has the power and duty to care for the buildings and grounds, and "there is nothing ***showing a legislative intent to curtail the common law powers of the sheriff as custodian of thecourt house and jail").

Plaintiff, however, contends that Walsh limits the sheriff's custodial authority to thosecounty buildings involved in that case, namely, the county courthouse and the criminal courtbuilding which are specifically designated in section 3-6017, but does not extend to any parkingfacility that exists as a separate structure. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 304. Contrary to plaintiff'sinterpretation of Walsh, that case reflects a broader and more extensive scope of custodial controlto be exercised by the sheriff, encompassing not only the courthouse and jail, but also thegrounds surrounding and belonging to these physical buildings. For example, the Walsh courtspecifically described the sheriff's "janitorial duties" as the performance of services "in and aboutthe county courthouse and the county criminal court building," thus indicating that thesurrounding grounds of those buildings are encompassed under the scope of the sheriff'scustodial duties. (Emphasis added.) Walsh, 397 Ill. at 294. Also indicative of that court'sbroader interpretation of the scope of the sheriff's custodial duties is its reliance on County ofMcDonough, which affirmed the exclusive power of the sheriff to employ someone to performthe "usual duties of a janitor *** for the court house and grounds," including "to keep said courthouse properly cleaned, attend to the heating plant, keep the lawn mowed, [and] ice and snowcleaned from the walks." County of McDonough, 84 Ill. App. at 409; see also Moy v. County ofCook, 244 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038-39 (1993).

Based on the foregoing, it is clear to us that, contrary to plaintiff's contention here, theSheriff's custodial duties involve more than simply the bricks and mortar of the countycourthouse itself. Rather, they extend to a duty of custodial care over those areas "in and about"the courthouse, including its "grounds," which would also encompass structures that subserve theneeds of the courthouse and jail. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 294; County of McDonough, 84 Ill. App.at 409. This interpretation is consistent with the de facto responsibilities that wereunquestionably assumed by the Sheriff's office in the instant case. The record presentedundisputed testimony that the Sheriff assumed responsibility for the custody and care of theparking garage located across the street from the criminal court building, which is the samecomplex encompassed in the Walsh decision. Wozniak, Martin and Crumpton each testified intheir respective depositions that they are custodians employed by the Sheriff, not by defendant,and that they exercise their duties under the authority of the Sheriff's office. Likewise, eachtestified that one of their responsibilities as custodians is the removal of snow from the top floorof the parking garage. In addition, head-custodian Wozniak and Crumpton testified that theSheriff requires them to remove snow from the entire court "complex," which they bothspecifically described as including not only the courthouse and the jail, but also the nearby courtadministrative building, the parking lots and the parking garage.

Furthermore, there is undisputed testimony in the record that the internal staff of theparking garage was comprised of employees of the Sheriff and not of defendant county, and thatthe garage was maintained specifically for use in connection with the courthouse. Crumptontestified that the parking garage subserves the needs of those who have business with the court,including "different officers like State's Attorneys or public defender[s], and [their] drivers." Wozniak corroborated this. Moreover, when posed with the question of what procedure is to befollowed were someone injured on the top floor of the parking garage or were a safety hazard toexist there, Wozniak explained that such an incident is to be reported to the Sheriff's office. Wozniak further testified that he as head custodian employed by the Sheriff, rather than anyemployee of defendant, would then assume control over the situation, including filing an incidentreport and employing his staff to correct the problem. Thus, the evidence in the record isundisputed that it was the Sheriff exclusively who in fact exercised custodial responsibility overthe maintenance and care of this facility as part of the court complex. This undisputed evidenceis fully consistent with and supportive of the interpretation that the Sheriff's custodial care of thecourthouse and jail as dictated in section 3-6017 includes its custodial care of the parking garageas an appurtenance that serves the needs of those buildings and all who enter them.

Having found that custodial responsibility for snow removal from the parking garageresides exclusively with the Sheriff, there is little question that defendant county will not therebybear any vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of the Sheriff and his staff. See Moy, 244Ill. App. 2d at 1038-39. In Moy, the court held that because there is no employment relationshipbetween the sheriff and the county since the sheriff is an elected official, the county could not beheld vicariously liable for the custodial duties of the sheriff even though the county owns theproperty upon which the sheriff performs his custodial duties. See Moy, 244 Ill. App. 3d at1038-39 (sheriff is independent official and as there is no agency relationship between countyand sheriff, county could not be held liable for custodial incident at county jail); accordBiggerstaff v. Moran, 284 Ill. App. 3d 196, 199 (1996) (county "has no authority to control thesheriff's office"); Wade v. County of Pike, 104 Ill. App. 2d 426, 429 (1969) ("custody and care"given to sheriff under section 3-6017 gives him custodial capacity, not the county).

Plaintiff relies heavily on County of DeKalb v. Smith, 213 Ill. App. 3d 775 (1991), for theproposition that because defendant is not required under statute to provide a parking garage forthose using the courthouse and jail, the garage cannot be considered a necessary adjunct to thecourthouse and jail and, thus, the Sheriff's custodial duties cannot extend to the garage. DeKalb,however, does not stand for this proposition and is distinguishable from the instant case. DeKalbwas a condemnation case in which the county sought to exercise its powers of eminent domainover parcels of land owned by private citizens in order to build a parking lot for the countycourthouse complex, which included the courthouse, public safety building and administrationbuilding. The issue was whether the county had the authority to condemn the property under itsstatutory powers, including section 5-1106. See DeKalb, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 777. The court heldthat the county did not have the power to condemn under the particular facts of that case becausethe taking of the property to construct a parking lot was not necessary. However, contrary toplaintiff's contention, the holding in DeKalb is inapplicable to the instant case.

The DeKalb court's determination as to whether the construction of a new parking lot forthe courthouse was necessary was made in a condemnation context. The court reviewed therelationship between the county's powers under section 5-1106 (55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 1992))to "erect *** and keep in repair[] a suitable court house, jail and other necessary countybuildings" and section 5-1005 (55 ILCS 5/5-1005 (West 1992)), which involved the county'spower to purchase and hold real estate. The requirement of "necessary" in a condemnationcontext under the language of section 5-1106 for a county to properly effect a taking, aspresented in DeKalb, is not applicable to the Sheriff's custodial responsibilities under section 3-6017. In fact, section 3-6017, which controls these duties of the Sheriff, does not deploy theword "necessary." Rather, consistent with the reasoning used by our supreme court in Walsh, weare free to look to the general nature and interrelationship between the grounds and variousedifices maintained in the county courthouse and jailhouse complex to determine the context ofthe Sheriff's custodial duties. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 294, 300; see also Dahnke, 168 Ill. at 114;Hardin, 71 Ill. App. at 114; County of McDonough, 84 Ill. App. at 409. Where, as here, theparking garage is maintained as a facility to serve the needs of the courthouse and jail, it can beproperly viewed as an adjunct to those facilities and, consequently, fully within the scope of theSheriff's custodial duties. See Walsh, 397 Ill. at 294, 300; County of McDonough, 84 Ill. App. at409. In that respect, we note that even the court in DeKalb recognized parking facilities as partof the court complex which subserves the county courthouse. See DeKalb, 213 Ill. App. 3d at780 ("[w]e do not disagree that parking seems to be a reasonable adjunct to *** countybuildings"). Accordingly, we find that the trial court's initial grant of summary judgment in favorof defendant was proper.

Finally, plaintiff contends that we should remand this matter to the trial court for theprocedural reason that the court erred by refusing to consider her tender of the opinion in DeKalbfor the first time in her motion to reconsider. Plaintiff contends that the trial court "applied anerroneous standard in evaluating" her motion when it stated that DeKalb was "not new case lawand does not constitute a proper basis for reconsideration."

The purpose of a motion to reconsider is " 'to bring to the court's attention newlydiscovered evidence ***, changes in the law or errors in the court's previous application ofexisting law.' " Sacramento Crushing Corp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 571, 577(2000), quoting Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 622, 627 (1991). Wereview the trial court's application of law to the facts presented before it on a de novo basis. SeeSacramento Crushing Corp., 318 Ill. App. 3d at 577.

We find no error on the part of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider. It is clear from the trial court's memorandum in support of its order that it did in fact reviewplaintiff's arguments with respect to DeKalb, as it stated that it was considering the motion "onthe merits." In so doing, the court examined DeKalb and its application to the instant set of facts,and concluded that DeKalb simply does not assist plaintiff in her argument that defendant isresponsible for the parking garage with respect to those custodial duties charged to the Sheriffunder statute. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the court did not deny her motion based onits belief that her presentation of DeKalb was an improper basis for reconsideration. Rather, itconcluded that DeKalb did not apply to the instant case. Moreover, any question concerning thetrial court's willingness to consider the belated submission of the DeKalb case in plaintiff'smotion for reconsideration would, in any event, be of no consequence based upon our conclusionthat DeKalb is distinguishable from the case at hand and would not change our result. Therefore,we find no error here in the court's denial of her motion to reconsider its prior order grantingsummary judgment to defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

McNulty and O'Malley, J.J., concur.