No. 1-02-0404

JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Brendan O'Loughlin, appeals the trial court'sgrant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Village of RiverForest, Illinois (River Forest), and the denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment. The sole issue raised on appeal iswhat is meant by the term "catastrophic injury" under theIllinois Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS320/10(a)(West 1998)) (the Act). For the reasons that follow, wereverse the decision of the trial court.

THE FACTS

O'Loughlin was employed as a police officer for River Forestin July 1988. On January 16, 1997, O'Loughlin injured his leftshoulder while in the line of duty. The injury occurred when heslipped on ice and fell while approaching a suspected criminal'scar during an investigation. O'Loughlin tore cartilage in hisleft shoulder joint and was required to undergo surgery andphysical therapy. O'Loughlin returned to full duty in November1997.

On January 16, 1998, O'Loughlin injured his left shoulderagain while attempting to restrain a subject who was being placedunder arrest. O'Loughlin again underwent surgery and physicaltherapy. However, as a result of the injury, O'Loughlin wasunable to perform the duties of a police officer and consequentlywas granted a line-of-duty disability pension by the River ForestPolice Pension Board on January 11, 1999.

On November 23, 1999, O'Loughlin filed a complaint whereinhe requested that River Forest pay health insurance premiums forhim and his family pursuant to the Act. O'Loughlin argued thathe suffered a catastrophic injury, which made him eligible toreceive insurance coverage under the Act.

On September 28, 2001, River Forest filed a motion forsummary judgment. In its motion, River Forest argued thatO'Loughlin's shoulder injury was not a catastrophic injury andconsequently he was not entitled to receive benefits under theAct. On October 31, 2002, O'Loughlin filed a cross-motion forsummary judgment wherein he argued that his shoulder injury was acatastrophic injury and that he was entitled to receive benefitsunder the Act. On January 10, 2002, the trial court grantedRiver Forest's motion and denied O'Loughlin's. This appealfollows.

ANALYSIS

O'Loughlin argues that the trial court erred when it deniedhis motion for summary judgment and instead granted RiverForest's motion for summary judgment. O'Loughlin maintains thetrial court erred because the shoulder injury that he sufferedqualifies as a "catastrophic injury" for purposes of benefitsunder the Act.

Although the use of summary judgment aids in the expeditiousdisposition of a lawsuit, it is a drastic measure and should onlybe granted if the movant's right to judgment is clear and freefrom doubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual InsuranceCo., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). A motion for summary judgmentis properly granted, therefore, only when the pleadings,depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that thereis no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). In considering a summary judgment motion,the court has a duty to construe the evidence strictly againstthe movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d278, 292 (2001). In appeals from orders granting summaryjudgment, our review is de novo. Travelers, 197 Ill. 2d at 292.

Statutory construction is a matter of law and review is denovo. People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (2001); Krohev. City of Bloomington, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1135 (2002),citing People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623 (2001). Theprimary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intent of the legislature. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2dat 228. This inquiry appropriately begins with the language ofthe statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). The legislative intent is best ascertained by examining thelanguage of the statute itself. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d452, 457 (1996); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996).

The rules of statutory construction provide that indetermining the intent of the legislature, courts must first look

to the plain language of the statute and interpret the languageaccording to its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Hicks,164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995); Billman v. Crown-Trygg Corp., 205Ill. App. 3d 916, 923 (1990), citing County of Du Page v. Graham,Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143 (1985). A termthat is undefined in a statute must be given its ordinary andproperly understood meaning. Villarreal v. Village ofSchaumberg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 1162 (2001), citing GemElectronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill.2d 470, 477-78 (1998).

Where the words themselves are unambiguous, there is no needto resort to external aids of interpretation. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2dat 222; People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Theappellate court cannot restrict or enlarge the plain meaning ofan unambiguous statute. Stewart v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ill.App. 3d 661, 666 (1985), citing People v. McCray, 116 Ill. App.3d 24, 26 (1983). A court may not declare that the legislaturedid not mean what the plain language imports. Stewart, 135 Ill.App. 3d at 666, citing Hetterman v. Weingart, 120 Ill. App. 3d683, 690 (1983). The court's only function, where the statutorylanguage is unambiguous, is to enforce the law as enacted by thelegislature. Stewart, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 666, citing HarveyFireman's Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (1979). Rules of construction in interpreting a statute are to be usedonly where there is doubt as to the meaning of the statute. Stewart, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 667, citing Sickler v. NationalDairy Products Corp., 67 Ill. 2d 229, 235 (1977).

When the language used is susceptible to more than oneequally reasonable interpretation, the court may look toadditional sources to determine the legislature's intent. Hicks,164 Ill. 2d at 222. Where the language is ambiguous, it isappropriate to examine the legislative history. People v.Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141 (1983), citing People ex rel.Hanrahan v. White, 52 Ill. 2d 70 (1972). "This court haspreviously looked to the debates on the floor of the GeneralAssembly to ascertain the legislative intent underlying specificlegislation." Morel v. Coronet Insurance Co., 117 Ill. 2d 18, 24(1987). Statements of the legislation's sponsor are particularlyhelpful in determining the intent of the statute. Spinelli v.Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, Inc., 144 Ill. App.3d 325, 330 (1986).

The relevant section of the Act provides:

"