FIRST DIVISION
February 23, 2004

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order entered infavor of defendant-appellee, the Village of Palos Park (Village),and against plaintiff-appellant, Eileen O'Malley. In 1981, theVillage and O'Malley entered into an annexation agreement wherecertain property in Palos Park, Illinois, commonly known as thePalos Park County Club (the Property) would be annexed into theVillage. In 1994, the parties, by way of another contract (the1994 agreement), extended the original annexation agreement to theyear 2001, and O'Malley submitted a development concept plan to theVillage for the purpose of developing the Property. The Board ofCommissioners of the Village of Palos Park (Village Board)⁽¹⁾approved the development plan "subject to confirmation that the[1994 agreement] was in order." The Village Board later rejectedthe development plan on the basis that the 1994 agreement wasinvalid because no notice and public hearing were held prior to itsexecution as required by section 11-15.1-3 of the IllinoisMunicipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-3 (West 2000).

O'Malley thereafter brought suit and her original complaintagainst the Village alleged causes of action for declaratory relief(count I), and theories of estoppel (count II), breach of contract(count III), and disconnection (count IV). She then filed anamended complaint which alleged a one-count claim for breach ofcontract (count I). On August 3, 2001, O'Malley filed a secondamended complaint which alleged only that her "vested right" toapproval of the development plan had been violated.

The Village filed an amended motion for summary judgment onO'Malley's second amended complaint. On May 15, 2002, the trialcourt granted that motion finding that the Village Board's vote toapprove the development plan "subject to confirmation that the [1994 agreement] was in order," "was not such an approval as tocreate a vested right."

The following background facts are relevant to our dispositionof the issues. On August 10, 1981, the Village and O'Malleyentered into an annexation agreement (1981 agreement) whichprovided that the Property would be annexed into the Village. The1981 agreement lasted for a term of 10 years, provided for R-1residential zoning, and permitted plaintiff to apply for specialdevelopment district classification zoning upon revision of theVillage's zoning code. Several years later, the Village Boardadopted a zoning ordinance (chapter 1273) to provide for a specialdevelopment district classification known as the "S-1 Planned UnitDevelopment" (S1-PUD) district on February 25, 1985. On May 13,1985, the Village Board voted to rezone the Property as S-1 PUD.

The ordinance, chapter 1273.05(d), states, in relevant part:

(3) Action by Plan Commission. Following theconclusion of the public hearing and itsdeliberations thereof, the commission shallsubmit its findings in a report to Council,⁽²⁾including a recommendation that thedevelopment concept plan be approved, approvedsubject to modification[,] or not approved.

(4) Action by Council. Following receipt ofthe formal recognition of the Commission,Council shall:

A. Refuse to approve thedevelopment concept plan;

B. Refer it back to the commissionfor further consideration ofspecified matters; or

C. By ordinance duly adopted,approve the development conceptplan with or withoutmodifications as a condition ofsuch approval, grant a specialuse for the planned unitdevelopment, assign an S-1zoning classification on theproperty and take suchadditional actions as may benecessary to permit the subjectdevelopment.

(5) Effect of Approval A development conceptplan which has been approved shall not bemodified, revoked or otherwise impaired,and the land use arrangement, intensityof use and other zoning and bulkstandards established by the developmentconcept plan shall remain intact and runwith the land unless modified by furtherordinance pursuant to the required publichearing process as outlined in thissection." Village of Palos Park Planningand Zoning Code ch. 1273.05(d) (1985).

On June 27, 1994, the parties entered into the 1994 agreement,which extended the 1981 agreement to August 9, 2001. The 1994agreement also contained an amendment that stated: "Paragraph 3(c)of the [1981 agreement] is amended by deleting 'eight dwellingunits per acre' and inserting '7 dwelling units per acre.' " Another amendment was that "all other provisions of the [1981agreement] *** shall remain the same."

Paragraph 8 of the 1981 agreement stated, in pertinent part,"[O'Malley] and subsequent owners shall comply and be subject toall ordinances, resolutions, rules and regulations of the VILLAGE,including every governmental body having jurisdiction thereof whichnow or hereafter may be in effect."

On June 26, 1997, O'Malley sought to move forward with herdevelopment plan. The minutes of the Village plan commissionmeeting on June 26, 1997, indicate that O'Malley thought all theVillage development requirements had been satisfied based on the1981 agreement. However, a Village official informed O'Malley thatengineering standards had changed since the Property was annexedand that the documents provided by O'Malley would serve as apreapproval conference, but that she must submit documents incompliance with chapter 1273.

The Village plan commission posted a notice that a publichearing would be held on September 18, 1997, "to consider theproposals of the Palos Park County Club for their Concept Planunder the requirements of Village Code Ch. 1273.05(c), S-1 PlannedUnit Development." The September 19, 1997, public hearing wascontinued until October 16, 1997. After the public hearing onOctober 16, 1997, the Village plan commission met. The minutes ofthe October 16, 1997, plan commission meeting indicate that thecommission would consider approving O'Malley's development plan"contingent upon the submittal of five (5) items listed by theVillage engineer." Ralph Jones III, of the Village plancommission, sent a letter to the Village Board dated October 24,1997, stating the plan commission moved to approve O'Malley'sdevelopment plan contingent upon the Village engineer's recognitionthat the five items had been submitted.

The Village Board met on November 10, 1997, to considerO'Malley's development plan. Peter Downey, an attorney forO'Malley, stated that "he was appearing before the [Village Board]to seek approval of the concept plan, which was the first stage ofdevelopment, and would enable them to move forward to the next stepof the proposed project." At one point during the meeting, acitizen voiced his concerns about the proposed development,including the fact that he was not notified of any public hearingsfor the extension of the 1981 agreement in 1994. The mayor statedthat "he did not believe that a public hearing was necessary toextend an agreement." At the end of the meeting the Village Boardapproved the development plan, "subject to confirmation that the1994 extension to the annexation agreement was in order."

On November 24, 1997, the Village Board met again and themayor stated that an individual indicated at the November 10, 1997, meeting that no public notice had been given and that no publichearing had been held prior to the approval of the 1994 agreement. Because of this individual's concern, the mayor noted that theapproval of the development plan was contingent upon all requiredpublic notices and hearings having been given and held relative tothe 1994 agreement. He then said, based on a review of the Villagerecords, "Village staff *** determined that there was no publicnotice published, and no public hearing held, in regard to" the1994 Agreement. Thus, the Village attorney was directed toresearch the ramifications of this issue on the development reviewprocess with regard to O'Malley's development plan. Becauseapproval of the development plan was contingent upon a publichearing having been held, the development plan was not formallyapproved and further action on the development plan was tableduntil the meeting on January 26, 1998.

On January 26, 1998, the Village Board adopted a motionnullifying the 1994 agreement on the ground that it had beenapproved without a public hearing. The record shows that O'Malleywas given the option of requesting a new public hearing for thepurpose of evaluating the amendment to the 1981 agreement andputting the 1994 agreement back into place.

In lieu of requesting another public hearing, O'Malley fileda four-count complaint against the Village on August 2, 1999. Aspointed out above, the original complaint sought a declaratoryjudgment (count I) and alleged theories of estoppel (count II),breach of contract (count III), and disconnection (count IV).

In subsequent court proceedings counts I, II, and IV of theoriginal complaint were all dismissed. On January 9, 2001,O'Malley filed an amended complaint, which alleged only a breach ofcontract.

On March 12, 2001, a hearing on the Village's amended motionfor judgment on the pleadings was held. The Village argued thatthe 1994 agreement was invalid under section 11-15.1-3 of theIllinois Municipal Code because no notice had been given and nopublic hearing had been held prior to its execution. The trialjudge stated that he was inclined to agree that the 1994 agreementwas invalid because no notice and no public hearing had been heldprior to its execution but the judge continued the matter forfurther briefing on the issue.

Section 11-15.1-3 of the Illinois Municipal Code, whichapplies to annexation agreements and all amendments to annexationagreements, requires municipal authorities to "hold a publichearing upon the proposed annexation agreement or amendment" and to"give notice of the proposed agreement or amendment not more than30 nor less than 15 days before the dated fixed for the hearing." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-3 (West 2000).

Section 11-15.1-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code states thatany "annexation agreement executed prior to October 1, 1973, *** ishereby declared valid and enforceable as to such provisions for theeffective period for such agreement, or for 20 years from the dateof the execution thereof, whichever is shorter." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 2000). It further states that the effective term ofany annexation agreement "executed prior to the effective date ofthis Amendatory Act of 1985 may be extended to a date which is notlater than 20 years from the date of execution of the originalAnnexation Agreement." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 2000). Thisstatutory section has no language requiring a hearing or notice.

On April 9, 2001, the trial court denied the Village's amendedmotion for judgment on the pleadings, but dismissed the firstamended complaint on the basis that the 1994 agreement was invalidand ultra vires.

On June 21, 2001, the trial court granted O'Malley leave tofile a second amended complaint. On August 3, 2001, O'Malley fileda second amended complaint, which alleged only that she had avested right to the approval of her development plan and that shewas entitled to damages. On May 15, 2002, the trial court grantedthe Village's motion for summary judgment on the basis that theapproval of the development plan, which was subject to confirmationthat the 1994 agreement was in order, was not a vested right. O'Malley appeals the orders entered by the trial court on March 12,2001,⁽³⁾ April 9, 2001, and May 15, 2002.

O'Malley seeks review of the trial court's finding that the1994 agreement was invalid, in particular, the April 9, 2001, orderdismissing her amended complaint. She also contends that thesummary judgment order entered May 15, 2002, was in error. Asnoted above, O'Malley alleged a breach of contract claim in heroriginal and amended complaints based on the 1994 agreement. Shethen dropped these claims in her second amended complaint andalleged only that she had obtained a vested right in the approvalof her development plan. The Village argues that any breach ofcontract claim based upon the 1994 agreement has been waivedbecause O'Malley failed to replead this cause of action in hersecond amended complaint.

O'Malley argues that the waiver rule may be relaxed in certaincases, and she relies upon American Federation of State, County &Municipal Employees, Council 31, v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d475, 480, 584 N.E.2d 116 (1991) (AFSCME).

In AFSCME, the plaintiff (AFSCME) appealed a decision by theappellate court which held that the defendant, Cook County, was notrequired to bargain over the effects of an examination requirementimposed by the civil service commission for three incumbentemployees. These employees held "Computer operator I" positions atCook County Hospital and they were hired before the examinationrequirement was established. Under the collective bargainingagreement between AFSCME and Cook County, AFSCME took the positionthat Cook County was required to bargain over whether the threeincumbent employees should be required to take the examination. The basis for this argument was that, because of Cook County'sstatus as a home rule unit, it was not bound by the civil serviceprovisions of the Illinois Counties Code. 55 ILCS 5/1-1001 et seq.(West 2000) (formerly, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 34, par. 1-1001 etseq.). AFSCME also insisted that the employees be "grandfathered"into their positions. In response, Cook County argued that it wasbarred by state law from bargaining on behalf of the employeesunder certain civil service provisions in the Counties Code, citedabove.

AFSCME filed an unfair labor practice charge with theplaintiff, the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (Board), andthe Board found that Cook County had failed to bargain in goodfaith with regard to the impact of the examination requirement uponthe three employees. The Board specifically found that Cook Countyhad violated section 10(a)(4) of the Illinois Public LaborRelations Act by not bargaining over the test requirement, anddeclared it an unfair labor practice for Cook County to refuse tobargain collectively in good faith with a public employee union. 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4)(2000) (formerly, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48,par. 1610). Contrary to the Board's decision, the appellate courtfound that Cook County was not required to bargain over the effectsof the examination requirement and reversed the finding of theBoard.

On review to the supreme court, AFSCME argued that theappellate court ignored legal precedent supporting AFSCME's claimand had erroneously distinguished the supreme court's decision inCity of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, &Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219(1988). That decision required the City of Decatur to bargaincollectively over AFSCME's proposal that the city's employees bepermitted to submit disciplinary grievances to arbitration. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 481-82, citing, City of Decatur, 122 Ill. 2dat 361-62. The City of Decatur decision also set out the Illinoispublic policy that favors public employee bargaining laws over theoptional, rather than mandatory, civil service laws adopted byDecatur. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 482, citing, City of Decatur, 122Ill. 2d at 365-66.

In AFSCME, the plaintiff (AFSCME) specifically claimed thatthe appellate court ignored the policy, established in City ofDecatur, favoring public employee bargaining laws over civilservice laws and erroneously found that City of Decatur was limitedto arbitration issues. The supreme court agreed that the decisionin City of Decatur was squarely on point because it involvedwhether the City of Decatur, under section 7 of the Illinois PublicLabor Relations Act, had a duty to bargain collectively despitelimiting language in section 7 which would supplant certainstatutory civil service provisions. Based on City of Decatur, thesupreme court held that Cook County was required to bargain withAFSCME over the effects of requiring the three incumbent employeesto take the proposed civil service examination. AFSCME, 154 Ill.2d at 482.

We note that the threshold issue in AFSCME was whether theappellate court, on the basis of waiver, had properly refused toconsider AFSCME's argument that Cook County was not bound by thecivil service provisions of the Counties Code because of its statusas a home rule unit. The appellate court held that this argumenthad been waived because AFSCME failed to raise it in the hearingbefore the Board. The supreme court found that, even if AFSCMEwaived the argument, it would consider the claim based upon thecourt's authority to take judicial notice of Cook County's statusas a home rule unit of local government. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at480.

The supreme court noted that it was well established thatcourts may take judicial notice of their state's statutes andconstitutional provisions. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 480. It also observed that the waiver rule was an admonition to litigants, nota limitation upon the jurisdiction of a reviewing court. AFSCME,145 Ill. 2d at 480. Finally, it held that the waiver rule may beoverridden where the need for "a just result and for themaintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent" exists.AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 480.

Based on the decision in AFSCME, O'Malley claims that thewaiver rule should be relaxed in the instant case. She suggeststhat because the validity of the 1994 agreement is intertwined withthe trial court's ruling on summary judgment, we should considerthe issue even if waiver exists. O'Malley, however, does not argueor even suggest how her failure to replead a contract claim hasanything to do with a "just result" or "the maintenance of a soundand uniform body of precedent."

We believe the supreme court relaxed the waiver rule in AFSCMEbecause of the need for and maintenance of a sound body ofprecedent. The primary question posed by that appeal was whetherCook County's civil service system, adopted under the CountiesCode, was mandatory upon the county or whether it could be alteredby the county any time. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 479. As notedabove, the issue, according to the supreme court, had beenpreviously decided by the court in City of Decatur. Because theappellate court had improperly distinguished Decatur, the supremecourt relaxed the waiver rule and reached the merits of the appeal. AFSCME, 145 Ill. 2d at 479-80.

Based upon our reading of AFSCME, we find no reason to relaxthe waiver rule here. Instead, we rely on the general rule that,when an amended pleading is complete in itself and does not referto or adopt the prior pleading, "the earlier pleading ceases to bepart of the record for most purposes and is effectively abandonedand withdrawn." Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378,384, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996). Further, "[a]llegations in a formercomplaint not incorporated in the final amended complaint aredeemed waived." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 384, 665 N.E.2d 808(1996).

Because O'Malley has waived any argument based upon the breachof contract claim she did not replead in her second amendedcomplaint, we will limit our review to the summary judgment rulingentered by the trial court on May 15, 2002.

Summary judgment is proper " 'where the pleadings, affidavits,depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in thelight most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.]" Zekman v.Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374, 695 N.E.2d853 (1998). Although the summary judgment procedure is anefficient means for disposing of certain lawsuits, "it is a drasticmeasure that should be employed only when the right of the movingparty is clear and free from doubt. [Citation.]" O'Banner v.McDonald's Corp., 173 Ill. 2d 208, 211-12, 670 N.E.2d 632 (1996). On a summary judgment motion, our standard of review is de novo. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 374.

The Village first argues that it is immune from liability onO'Malley's vested rights claim under section 2-104 of the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (TortImmunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 2000)). It also relies uponthe decision in U-Haul Co. of Chicago Metroplex v. Town of Cicero,87 Ill. App. 3d 915, 918, 410 N.E.2d 286 (1980), as support.Section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Act states:

"A local public entity is not liable foran injury caused by the issuance, denial,suspension or revocation of, or by the failureor refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke,any permit, license, certificate, approval,order or similar authorization where theentity or its employee is authorized byenactment to determine whether or not suchauthorization should be issued, denied,suspended or revoked." 745 ILCS 10/2-104(West 2000).

O'Malley claims that section 2-104 and the U-Haul decision are inapplicable to her vested rights claim because the Villageactually approved her plan, and therefore lost the discretion todetermine whether or not such authorization should be issued,denied, suspended, or revoked. O'Malley relies upon chapter1273.05(d)(5) of the Village zoning ordinance, which states, amongother things, that once a development plan has been approved, itcannot be modified. Reading section 2-104 and the Village zoningordinance together, O'Malley argues that the Village has noimmunity from liability under section 2-104 because once itapproved the plan it no longer had the discretion to deny her thatapproval and therefore the immunity granted by 2-104 does notapply.

We reject this argument for several reasons.

First, O'Malley does not cite any relevant authority insupport of her argument. Instead, she relies upon United Citizensof Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 338-39, 531 N.E.2d 802 (1988). The mainissue in United Citizens was whether the Illinois Municipal Coderequired an interim election for mayor of the City of Chicago. United Citizens, 125 Ill. 2d at 337. To resolve this question, thesupreme court indicated that it had to analyze provisions in theIllinois Municipal Code and the Election Code because, while theIllinois Municipal Code was more specifically drawn, each of thesecodes shared the common purpose of providing a procedure in theevent of a vacancy in the city's mayoral post. United Citizens,125 Ill. 2d at 338-40. Specifically, the court said that whenconstruing statutes in pari materia, or statutes having a commonpurpose, the court's obligation "is to ascertain and give effect tothe legislative intent." United Citizens, 125 Ill. 2d at 338. Itfurther recognized that statutes in pari materia " 'should beconsidered with reference to one another so that both *** may begiven harmonious effect. [Citations.] *** ' " United Citizens,125 Ill. 2d at 339, quoting People v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87(1985).

Aside from pointing to this general proposition of statutoryconstruction set forth in United Citizens, an Election Code case,O'Malley does not cite any authority that involves section 2-104 ofthe Tort Immunity Act. Further, O'Malley provides no authoritythat section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Act and chapter1273.05(d)(5) of the Village zoning ordinance are statutes in paramateria, like the Election Code and the Illinois Municipal Code inUnited Citizens, which shared the common purpose of providing aprocedure in the event of a vacancy in the city's mayoral post. Inthe instant case, no evidence exists that section 2-104 of the TortImmunity Act, which involves governmental immunity, and chapter1273.05(d)(5) of the Village zoning ordinance, share a commonpurpose.

Further, to the extent that municipal ordinances are inconflict with the Tort Immunity Act, they are invalid. Newsome v.Thompson, 202 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1079, 560 N.E.2d 974 (1990). Ithas also been established that municipal authorities "cannot adoptordinances which infringe the spirit of a State law or arerepugnant to the general policy of the State. [Citation.]" Newsome, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 1079.

Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)(Official Reports Advance SheetNo. 21 (October 17, 2001), R.341(e)(7), eff. October 1, 2001)requires O'Malley to provide this court with relevant authority andfailure to do so results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Roev. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 339 Ill. App. 3d 119, 125,790 N.E.2d 882 (2003). Since she has not done so, we could findthe argument waived.

In any event, O'Malley cannot prevail on the merits of thisclaim. O'Malley is essentially asking this court to carve anexception onto the language of 2-104. However, our supreme courthas held that courts are not at liberty to create or readexceptions into statutes such as the Tort Immunity Act where thelanguage of the enactment is clear and no exception is intended.

For example, in Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises,Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 493, 752 N.E.2d 1090 (2001), the Village ofBloomingdale denied a zoning petition submitted by CDG Enterprises,Inc. (CDG), a developer. CDG petitioned the Bloomingdale planningcommission to annex five parcels of land adjacent to Bloomingdaleso that CDG could build a subdivision. Bloomingdale denied CDG'sproject and later publicly revealed that it planned to acquire agolf course adjacent to the five parcels. Bloomingdale filed suitagainst CDG for failure to pay for Bloomingdale's services inreviewing CDG's petition for rezoning and site plan approval. CDGfiled a counterclaim alleging that Bloomingdale deliberatelyfrustrated CDG's business expectancy by secretly working to forceCDG out of the planned development.

The trial court dismissed the counterclaim againstBloomingdale holding that it was barred by the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 2000). The appellate court reversed andheld that the general grants of immunity afforded by the TortImmunity Act "are limited by the common law exception for 'corruptor malicious motives.' [Citation.]" Village of Bloomingdale, 196Ill. 2d at 488.

On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the common lawexception for corrupt or malicious motives could be imposed ontocertain provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. The court found that,unless the Tort Immunity Act provided for such, it did notimplicitly contemplate the common law exception for corrupt ormalicious motives. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 493. The court stated that when an " 'enactment is clear and unambiguous[,] a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language andmeaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations[,] or conditions that the legislature did not express.'[Citation.]" Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 493. Itconcluded that because the plain language of the Tort ImmunityAct's provisions did not contain an exception for corrupt ormalicious motives, one could not be supplied by the courts. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 493.

The supreme court also found that the appellate court'sholding ignored the plain language of section 2-104 of the TortImmunity Act, which provides that public entities are immune fromliability for injury caused by the denial or by the failure orrefusal to issue any permit. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2dat 495, citing 745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 1998). The court also heldthat the village's denial of the defendant's rezoning petition "isprecisely what the legislature intended to immunize such entitiesfrom." Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 495. It furtherfound that it was immaterial whether the village's denial was basedupon a corrupt or malicious misuse of power because section 2-104contained "no reference to intent whatsoever." Village ofBloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 496.

The court also rejected CDG's argument that Bloomingdale'sdenial was improper because its conduct was a deviation from thecustomary ministerial task of approving a zoning permit. Althoughthe supreme court agreed that a municipality cannot claim immunityfor the improper performance of ministerial tasks it pointed out,"[w]e have never held *** that the grant or denial of a zoningpetition is a ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, taskunder a tort theory of liability." Village of Bloomingdale, 196Ill. 2d at 497. The court then reiterated that section 2-104plainly grants immunity for injury caused by the denial of "any"permit and was, therefore, controlling. Village of Bloomingdale,196 Ill. 2d at 497.

CDG's argument that it was injured by Bloomingdale's denial ofits petition in the form of " 'theft of [CDG's] opportunity,' " wasalso rejected. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 497. Thecourt held that the action of denial of a permit "falls squarelywithin section 2-104 of the [Tort Immunity] Act because[Bloomingdale] and its officials were authorized to either grant ordeny CDG's petition for rezoning and site plan approval." Villageof Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 497. Finally, the court concludedthat the Tort Immunity Act immunized Bloomingdale from liabilityfor any alleged injury resulting from the denial of CDG's petition. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 497.

In the instant case, the plain language of section 2-104 ofthe Tort Immunity Act does not contemplate an exception togovernmental immunity when a development concept plan has beenapproved under chapter 1273.05(d)(5) of the Village zoningordinance and we will not supply one. Village of Bloomingdale, 196Ill. 2d at 493.

Further, we read chapter 1273.05(d)(5) to mean that once theVillage approves a development plan, it cannot be "modified,revoked, or otherwise impaired," unless a public hearing is held. This language does not create an exception to section 2-104 nordoes it supplant the Tort Immunity Act's clear and unambiguouslanguage that "[a] local public entity is not liable for an injurycaused by the issuance, denial *** of, or by the failure *** toissue *** any permit." 745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 2000). Therefore,O'Malley cannot prevail whether the Village Board approved orrefused her development plan. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2dat 497.

O'Malley's reliance upon chapter 1273.05(d)(5) of theordinance, which states, once a "development concept plan has beenapproved," it "shall not be modified, revoked or otherwiseimpaired" is misplaced. Village of Palos Park Planning and ZoningCode ch. 1273.05(d)(5) (1985). For the reasons that we discussbelow, this provision was never triggered because O'Malley'sdevelopment plan was never approved.

O'Malley relies upon the following evidence in support of herclaim that the development plan was approved and that she satisfiedall of the requirements under chapter 1273. First, a letter fromVillage officials dated August 8, 1997, which advised O'Malley thatthe development plan approval process was controlled by chapter1273. Second, the minutes of the Village plan commission meetingdated October 16, 1997, which indicated that the plan commissionrecommended that the Village Board approve the development plan"contingent upon" review and approval of five items by the Villageengineer. Third, a letter from the Village plan commission to theVillage Board dated October 24, 1997, which stated that the plancommission recommended that the Village Board approve thedevelopment plan "contingent upon" the review and approval of fiveitems by the Village engineer. Fourth, statements made at theVillage Board meeting on November 10, 1997, where the Village Boardapproved the development plan "subject to the confirmation that the1994 extension to the annexation agreement was in order." Fifth,a letter to O'Malley from the Village dated November 12, 1997,indicating that O'Malley needed to furnish submittals for the Village plan commission as required by chapter 1273. Sixth, aletter from the Village to a consultant dated November 14, 1997,stating that the development plan was approved by the Village Boardat its November 10, 1997, meeting. Finally, O'Malley contends thatthe testimony of James Madden, the Village commissioner, and DonaldJeans, the Village mayor, establishes that the validity of theannexation agreement and approval of the development plan hadnothing to do with one another so long as O'Malley followed therequirements of the ordinance. In a discovery deposition, Maddentestified that the validity of the 1981 agreement and S-1 zoningwere separate issues. Jeans testified in a discovery depositionthat whether O'Malley had met all the requirements for thedevelopment plan had nothing to do with the 1981 agreement.

We agree with the Village that none of the evidence reliedupon by O'Malley raises a question of material fact that theVillage approved the development plan. In fact, the evidence, atmost, demonstrates that the Village conditionally voted to approvethe development plan only if the 1994 agreement was valid andenforceable. The minutes of the November 10, 1997, Village Boardmeeting clearly establish that the Board approved the developmentplan "subject to the confirmation that the 1994 extension to theannexation agreement was in order." Further, the minutes of theNovember 24, 1997, Board meeting demonstrate that the Board did notapprove the development plan and tabled the approval because areview of the Village records indicated that there was no publicnotice given and no public hearing held with regard to theexecution of the 1994 agreement. In sum, there never was anyapproval of O'Malley's development plan.

Moreover, as pointed out by the Village, "the official acts ofmunicipal corporations must be recorded and the records are theonly lawful evidence of the action to which they refer." WesternSand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Cornwall, 2 Ill. 2d 560, 564, 119N.E.2d 261 (1954). Here, the Village minutes control and thecorrespondence relied upon by O'Malley above and the testimony ofMadden and Jeans, taken more than four years after the Villagemeetings in November, 1997, do not raise questions of material factregarding approval of O'Malley's plan.

Further, in Village of Bloomingdale, the supreme court heldthat liability for detrimental reliance based on assurances made byvillage officials was precluded by the Tort Immunity Act. Thecourt noted that section 2-106 of the Tort Immunity Act providesthat a "local public entity is not liable for an injury caused byan oral promise or misrepresentation of its employee, whether ornot such promise or misrepresentation is negligent or intentional." 745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 2000); Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill.2d at 497. Based on section 2-106, the court found thatBloomingdale was immune from liability for any injury resultingfrom a village official's assurance that the project would beapproved. Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 497. Ittherefore rejected CDG's detrimental reliance argument.

As we set forth above, a public hearing and requisite noticeare required when an annexation agreement is amended under section11-15.1-3 of the Illinois Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-3(West 2000). Unlike section 11-15.1-3, section 11-15.1-5, whichapplies to the extension of existing annexation agreements, doesnot require a public hearing and accompanying notice. 65 ILCS5/11-15.1-5 (West 2000). In her brief, O'Malley asserts thatbecause the 1994 agreement was not an amendment to the originalannexation agreement, it was subject to section 11-15.1-5 and didnot require a public hearing and accompanying notice to be valid.

We find that the 1994 agreement did amend the originalannexation agreement and therefore was an amendment subject tosection 11-15.1-3. The 1994 agreement specifically states:

"The Annexation Agreement heretoforeentered into between OWNER and VILLAGE be andis hereby extended to August 9, 2001 with thefollowing amendments:

Paragraph 3(c) of the AnnexationAgreement is amended by deleting 'eightdwelling units per acre' and inserting 'sevendwelling units per acre.' "

The amendatory language in the 1994 agreement could not be moreclear. We conclude that the 1994 agreement was invalid because itwas an amendment to the original annexation agreement and thusrequired notice and a hearing pursuant to section 11-15.1-3 of theIllinois Municipal Code.

Chapter 1273.05(d)(4)(C) of the village ordinance providesthat if the Village Board does approve a development plan, it shalldo so "by ordinance duly adopted." All the evidence demonstratesthat the Village Board never approved O'Malley's development planand never adopted any ordinance. As pointed out above, theapproval of the plan was "subject to" the 1994 agreement being "inorder." At the Village Board meeting on November 10, 1997, theVillage attorney stated that "if the [Village Board] membersapproved the concept plan ***, there would be a concept approvalordinance adopted at a December meeting." On November 24, 1997,the Village Board "tabled" the development plan because "Villagestaff *** determined that there was no public notice published, andno public hearing held, in regard to the" 1994 agreement. O'Malley's development plan was never approved by ordinance dulyadopted as required by chapter 1273.05(d)(4)(C).

Finally, even if the Village did approve O'Malley'sdevelopment plan or O'Malley had a vested right to the approval(which we do not find), section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Actstill shields a local public entity "for an injury caused by theissuance *** of *** any permit *** where the entity *** isauthorized by enactment to determine whether or not suchauthorization should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked." 745ILCS 10/2-104 (West 2000).

U-Haul Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d at 918, is further support for ourdetermination. In U-Haul, the plaintiff, U-Haul Co. sought aspecial use permit from the defendant, the town of Cicero, to allowthe development of a U-Haul rental business on the subjectpremises. After a hearing, the board of trustees of Cicero deniedU-Haul's permit application. U-Haul then filed a three-countcomplaint in the trial court. Specifically, count III alleged thatU-Haul had an absolute right to have a license issued without aspecial use application. Subsequently, the trial court grantedCicero's motion to dismiss U-Haul's entire complaint and U-Haulappealed.

On review, the appellate court, sua sponte, affirmed the trialcourt's dismissal of count III and found that section 2-104 of theTort Immunity Act rendered the defendant immune from suit regardingthe denial of U-Haul's special use permit. U-Haul, 87 Ill. App. 3dat 918-19.

As in U-Haul, we find that section 2-104 of the Tort ImmunityAct renders the Village immune from suit regarding its rejection ofO'Malley's development plan. O'Malley offers no relevant authoritythat requires the opposite conclusion.

Therefore, we conclude that the Tort Immunity Act precludesany liability against the Village for either the denial, approval,or refusal of O'Malley's development plan. Because of our findingthat the Village is immune from liability in this case, we need notaddress any other issues raised by O'Malley. The trial court'sgrant of summary judgment in favor of the Village is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.

1. The parties use the terms "Village Board," "VillageCouncil," and "Council" interchangeably to describe the sameentity, but we will consistently refer to this entity as theVillage Board.

2. As indicated above, the Council is the same entity as theVillage Board.

3. The record indicates on March 12, 2001, the trial courtcontinued the matter for further review and no final order wasentered that day.