"*** [N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician *** arising out of patient care shall be broughtmore than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should haveknown, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury *** for which damages are sought in the action,whichever of such date occurs first ***." 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996).

Our courts have construed this section and its "discovery rule" to mean the two-year limitations period begins to run whenthe plaintiff "*** knows or reasonably should know of [the] injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it waswrongfully caused." Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156, 421 N.E.2d 896 (1981). The plaintiff has knowledge an injurywas wrongfully caused when she "*** becomes possessed of sufficient information to put a reasonable person on inquiry todetermine whether actionable conduct is involved." Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 430 N.E.2d 976(1981); see Weidman v. Wilkie, 277 Ill. App. 3d 448, 453, 660 N.E.2d 157 (1995).

In Allen v. Thorek Hospital, 275 Ill. App. 3d 695, 656 N.E.2d 227 (1995), the plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy on April10, 1991. Immediately after surgery, she felt numbness in her arm and noticed her fingers were awkwardly curled. Hercondition worsened after she left the hospital, and she visited her surgeon six weeks later. Her surgeon could not examineher, but his colleague recommended physical therapy. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint on April 8, 1993,naming the hospital as a defendant and her surgeon as a respondent in discovery. In a proposed amended complaint attachedto her motion to convert her surgeon to a party-defendant, she claimed she did not discover her arm injury was wrongfullycaused until February or March 1992.

The court briefly discussed the discovery rule in the context of its discussion on respondents in discovery. The court notedthe plaintiff knew of her arm injury before she left the hospital following her hysterectomy. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 702.And she knew her arm injury was wrongfully caused six weeks later when she visited her surgeon and his colleaguerecommended physical therapy. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 702. At this time, said the court, "*** the plaintiff knew, orreasonably should have known, that physical therapy for an arm injury was not a normal or expected consequence of ahysterectomy." Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 702. The court concluded the latest time at which the limitations period began torun was the summer of 1991: "The undisputed facts show that plaintiff's assertion that she did not suspect wrongful conductuntil almost a year later in March of 1992 is unreasonable." Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 702.

In Licka v. William A. Sales, Ltd., 70 Ill. App. 3d 929, 388 N.E.2d 1261 (1979), the plaintiff underwent a spinal-disc fusionoperation in October 1973. His back pain continued after surgery, and his surgeon explained back pain was normal afterback surgery. The plaintiff continued to receive treatment from his surgeon until mid-1974. In May 1975, he learned hewould need further treatment because his surgeon had performed the operation at the wrong location on his spine. He filed amedical malpractice complaint on February 11, 1976, more than two years after his surgery.

The court held the discovery rule rescued the plaintiff's complaint from the limitations period time bar. Licka, 70 Ill. App.3d at 935. "Although plaintiff continued to feel pain from the time of the operation in October of 1973," said the court, "thepain could have been consistent with a non-negligent failure of the operation or with normal post-operative pain." Licka, 70Ill. App. 3d at 935. The court noted the surgeon could not explain the plaintiff's continued pain, and concluded, "*** itwould hardly be reasonable to attribute knowledge of his injury to plaintiff during a time when a specialist in such matterswas unable to discover it." Licka, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 935.

Paige-Myatt's case is closer to Licka than it is to Allen. Like the plaintiff in Allen, Paige-Myatt experienced painimmediately after her hysterectomy, but Paige-Myatt's pain occurred in an anatomical area near the location of her surgery.And like the plaintiff in Licka, she received reasonable reassurances from her surgeon such pain was a normal incident ofsuch surgery.

Paige-Myatt's pain persisted after surgery, and she began an 18-month odyssey through numerous and exhaustive tests insearch of its cause. These tests, primarily focusing on her spine, showed what Paige-Myatt already knew: she had "diffusesensory deficit," "neuropathic pain," and a "decreased area of sensitivity" around her femoral nerve. According to Dr.Pantle-Fisher, as late as March 1997, "The etiology of her pain at that point was never addressed or discussed, nor was anyconnection to the surgical procedure mentioned."

Discovery could have occurred on August 13, 1997, when, according to Paige-Myatt's sworn statement, Dr. Pantle-Fishernoted a possible link between her femoral nerve pain and "some surgical trauma." Or discovery could have occurred onSeptember 30, 1997, when, according to Dr. Pantle-Fisher's report, Paige-Myatt received a confirmatory femoral nerveblock. In seeking the date of discovery, we recognize the exact moment of revelation is not always apparent.

The trial court ignored this evidence, labeling Paige-Myatt's discovery contentions "beyond incredulous" and chargingPaige-Myatt failed to exercise reasonable diligence in determining the cause of her pain. We disagree. We cannot see howPaige-Myatt could have exercised more reasonable diligence beyond 18 months of inconclusive and, likely, frustratingtests. She was addressing her pain, not consulting with lawyers. If, as the record reveals, August 13, 1997, was the earliestdiscovery date, the limitations period did not run until August 13, 1999, well after the court's March 5, 1999, dismissalorder.

Finally, both Mount Sinai and the trial court pointed to the affidavit Paige-Myatt's attorney provided with her complaint asevidence Paige-Myatt discovered the wrongful cause of her injury immediately after surgery. In this affidavit, Paige-Myatt'sattorney asserted the impending time bar of the limitations period prevented consultation with a physician under section 2-622. But neither Mount Sinai nor the trial court cited any authority, and we have found none, to support the proposition thatthis affidavit could dictate when Paige-Myatt discovered the wrongful cause of her injury, and consequently when thelimitations period began running.

A judicial admission is a "deliberate, clear, unequivocal" statement about a concrete fact within the party's knowledge. In reEstate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 406, 692 N.E.2d 1150 (1998); Hack v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d255, 257, 696 N.E.2d 694 (1998). This affidavit contains conclusory speculation about a matter of law. See Franz v.Schneider, 14 Ill. App. 2d 464, 468, 144 N.E.2d 798 (1957)(erroneous "admissions of law" are not binding). It does notresemble a judicial admission.

CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly dismissed Paige-Myatt's complaint against Mount Sinai under Rule 103(b). But, based on theundisputed facts, Paige-Myatt did not discover the wrongful cause of her injury, and the limitations period did not beginrunning, until August 13, 1997, less than two years before the court's March 5, 1999, dismissal. This dismissal should havebeen without prejudice. We reverse that part of the trial court's order dismissing the cause with prejudice, and we amend thetrial court's order of dismissal to be without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to refile.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and modified.

CAHILL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.