Panzella v. River Trails School Dist. 26, No. 1-99-1923
1st District, 18 May 2000
FOURTH DIVISION
| STEVEN PANZELLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIVER TRAILS SCHOOL DISTRICT 26, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; ILLINOIS STATEBOARD OF EDUCATION; HEARING OFFICER VIVIAN GORDON, Defendants-Appellees. | Appeal from the CircuitCourt of Cook County. Honorable JohnMadden, JudgePresiding. |
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Steven Panzella, was a tenured school teacher in River Trails School District 26 (District) until he wasdischarged based on a juvenile court's finding that he sexually abused his child. Panzella contested his termination before anIllinois State Board of Education (State Board) hearing officer, who upheld the dismissal. Panzella then soughtadministrative review before the circuit court, which confirmed the hearing officer's ruling. Panzella filed this timelyappeal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
The District hired Panzella as a special education teacher for the 1968-1969 school year. After Panzella successfullycompleted a two year probationary period, the District's Board of Education (District Board) voted in 1970 to extend hiscontract for the next school year, thereby placing him on contractual continued service, also called tenure. His contractcontinued each year thereafter until the dismissal which led to these proceedings.
On August 23, 1996, the Cook County State's Attorney's office notified the principal of the school to which Panzella wasassigned that he had been charged with abuse of his daughter in a case pending in the juvenile court. When confronted bythe District's superintendent, Panzella responded that his divorce spawned the allegations, which he continues to deny. TheDistrict placed Panzella on leave pending the adjudication of the charges. On October 7, 1997, the juvenile court found,pursuant to section 2-3(2)(iii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(iii) (West 1996)), that Panzellasexually abused his minor child. Panzella's appeal of the juvenile court's order is still pending as of the date of this opinion.The District received a copy of the juvenile court's adjudication order, but postponed taking action. On January 2, 1998,while Panzella was still on leave, Public Act 90-566 became effective. Among other things, Public Act 90-566 amendedsection 10-21.9(c) of the Illinois School Code (the School Code) (105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)), by adding languageprohibiting a school board from knowingly employing a person who has been found by a juvenile court to be the perpetratorof sexual or physical abuse of a minor. Pub. Act 90-566, eff. January 2, 1998 (amending 105 ILCS 5/10-21.9(c) (West1998)).
In a letter dated January 7, 1998, the District superintendent informed Panzella of her intention to recommend histermination to the District Board predicated on the juvenile court's adjudication order and the newly amended section 10-21.9(c) (105 ILCS 5/10-21.9(c) (West 1998)). She indicated that she would communicate the recommendation in a closedsession of the District Board, but informed Panzella that he could be present either personally or through counsel. Panzellachose not to appear before the District Board, instead responding by letter in which he raised certain constitutionalarguments and reserved the right to challenge the superintendent's evidentiary basis for her recommendation. The DistrictBoard voted to dismiss Panzella and served him with a copy of the resolution and bill of particulars pursuant to the SchoolCode (see 105 ILCS 5/10-22.4 and 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998)), which prompted Panzella to file a request for anadministrative hearing (see 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998)).
The parties waived a formal hearing, opting instead only to brief and argue the matter before the hearing officer, Dr. VivianGordon. The parties stipulated to a statement of facts and exhibits, and presented two issues for consideration: (1) whetherthe legislature intended for the amendment to section 10-21.9(c) to apply to teachers who entered into contractual continuedservice prior to its effective date, and who were the subject of a juvenile court adjudication order prior to January 2, 1998;and (2) whether the amendment required dismissal of a teacher in contractual continued service based on a juvenile courtadjudication order for which appeals were not yet exhausted. Apparently misconstruing the plaintiff's argument regardingretroactive application, the hearing officer held that the District Board properly applied the amendment prospectively, ratherthan retroactively, because it waited until after the effective date of the amendment to terminate the plaintiff. She also foundthat, although the amendment to section 10-21.9(c) may be an impairment to contracts, it was justified as reasonable andnecessary to serve an important public purpose. The hearing officer further found that the District Board could dismiss ateacher under section 10-21.9(c) despite the fact that all appeals of the juvenile court order had not been exhausted.Moreover, she indicated that section 10-21.9(c) mandated the District Board to dismiss Panzella once it had knowledge ofthe juvenile court's adjudication order. She therefore concluded that the District Board was correct to dismiss Panzella andaffirmed its decision.
Panzella filed a complaint for administrative review, and the circuit court confirmed the hearing officer's decision. It is fromthe circuit court's order that Panzella appeals, raising three issues for our review: (1) whether the 1998 amendment tosection 10-21.9(c) of the School Code requires dismissal of a teacher in contractual continued service based on a juvenilecourt adjudication order for which appeals are not yet exhausted; (2) whether the amendment takes away or impairsPanzella's vested rights; and (3) whether the amendment impairs his rights under his employment contract in violation ofthe United States and Illinois constitutions. We note that the facts in this case are not in dispute, the parties having raisedpurely legal questions of statutory construction and constitutional law. The interpretation given to a statute by the agencycharged with administering it is considered relevant, but not binding. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247,254, 659 N.E.2d 961 (1995). Accordingly, we review the administrative agency's legal conclusions de novo. Stillo v. StateRetirement Systems, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007, 714 N.E.2d 11 (1999).
We first address Panzella's contention that the amendment at issue does not require dismissal prior to exhaustion of appealsof the juvenile court's adjudication order. Section 10-21.9(c) provides, in relevant part, that:
"no school board shall knowingly employ a person who has been found to be the perpetrator of sexual or physicalabuse of any minor under 18 years of age pursuant to proceedings under Article II of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987[705 ILCS 405/2-1 et seq. (West 1998)]." 105 ILCS 5/10-21.9(c) (West 1998).
Panzella focuses on the use of the word "proceedings," arguing that the term includes the appellate process; whereas, theState Board focuses on the use of the word "found," arguing that a school board must act on a finding of abuse once it ismade. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State Board.
The first rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). Legislativeintent should be ascertained from the language used in the statute. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256N.E.2d 758 (1970). If the language is clear, the court should not resort to extrinsic aids of construction. Calamari v.Drammis, 286 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 676 N.E.2d 281 (1997). In this case, the language of the statute is clear on its face.Section 10-21.9(c) contains two elements: (1) a finding of abuse by the juvenile court; and (2) knowledge of that finding onthe part of a school board. If both elements are met, then the statute prohibits a school board from employing the person.
The court must also look at the statute as a whole when determining legislative intent. Kaszubowski v. Board of Educationof City of Chicago, 248 Ill. App. 3d 451, 457-58, 618 N.E.2d 609 (1993). We take note of the fact that, in addition tosection 10-21.9(c), Public Act 90-566 also amended section 10-21.9(e) of the School Code which now provides that,"[u]pon receipt of the record of a conviction of or a finding of child abuse by a holder of any [teaching] certificate," thesuperintendent must initiate certificate suspension and revocation proceedings. 105 ILCS 5/10-21.9(e) (West 1998). Theword "proceedings" is noticeably absent from section 10-21.9(e). Panzella argues that use of the term "proceedings" insection 10-21.9(c) requires that the appeals process be complete prior to a school board taking action under that section. Thefact that the legislature intended a mere finding to be sufficient to justify the commencement of certificate suspension andrevocation proceedings under section 10-21.9(e) suggests that it also intended a mere finding to be sufficient to justifytermination under section 10-21.9(c).
The legislature's intent is further evidenced by that portion of Public Act 90-566 which amended the Juvenile Court Act of1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-1 et seq. (West 1998)). Section 2-21 of the Act governs "findings and adjudication" withrespect to abused, neglected, and dependent minors. Public Act 90-566 amended section 2-21(1) to provide that once thejuvenile court determines that a person has inflicted physical or sexual abuse on a minor, it must forward the determinationto the Department of the State Police which then includes the information in any criminal background investigation reportrequested by a school district. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1998). This amendment to the Act further demonstrates that thelegislature intended that a finding of abuse serve as the predicate for either disciplinary measures or hiring practices withoutregard to the appellate process.
We next address Panzella's argument that the amendment to section 10-21.9(c) cannot be applied to him because he was oncontractual continued service at the time it became effective. He claims that, prior to the enactment of the amendment, hehad a vested right to the "rights flowing from" his employment contract and that the amendment impermissibly impairedthose rights. In order to explain Panzella's argument more fully, we must summarize the statutory dismissal proceduresapplicable to tenured teachers. Under the School Code, a teacher who completes a probationary period enters uponcontractual continued service, which has the effect of continuing the terms and provisions of the contract pursuant to whichthe teacher was working during the last school term of his probationary period. Those contractual terms and conditions,however, continuously remain subject to the School Code and the employing board's regulations. 105 ILCS 5/24-11 (West1998). The School Code further provides that a tenured teacher may only be discharged for cause. 105 ILCS 5/10-22.4(West 1998); see also Board of Education of Sparta Community Unit School District No. 140 v. Illinois State Board ofEducation, 217 Ill. App. 3d 720, 722, 577 N.E.2d 900 (1991). The legislature failed to define cause, stating only that ateacher may by fired for "incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or other sufficient cause". 105 ILCS 5/10-22.4(West 1998). If a school board seeks to dismiss a teacher, it must approve, by motion, a list of specific charges, and servethe teacher with written notice of those charges, including a bill of particulars, within five days of its adoption of themotion. 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998). The School Code does not require a hearing, unless the teacher requests one inwriting within ten days of receipt of the notice. 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998). The teacher has the right to be present at thehearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present his own evidence and witnesses in defenseof the charges. 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998). Before a school board sets a hearing on charges related to causes which areconsidered remediable, it must give the teacher reasonable warning in writing "stating specifically the causes which, if notremoved, may result in charges." 105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1998). A school board lacks jurisdiction to dismiss a teacher forremediable conduct unless the warning is given. Board of Education of Argo-Summit School District No. 104 v. Hunt, 138Ill. App. 3d 947, 950, 487 N.E.2d 24 (1985). Thus, if a school board does not issue a written warning, it must prove that theteacher's conduct was irremediable in order to dismiss him. Gilliland v. Board of Education of Pleasant View ConsolidatedSchool District No. 622, 67 Ill. 2d 143, 153, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977).
In the instant case, there is no question that the District Board approved, by motion, a charge against Panzella, namely acharge that the juvenile court found that he sexually abused a minor, and served him with written notice of the charge and abill of particulars within five days of its adoption of the motion. Furthermore, there is no question that the District Boardaccorded Panzella a hearing when he requested one. These requirements were in effect both prior to and subsequent to theeffective date of the amendment to section 10-21.9(c) of the School Code, and Panzella does not contend that they were notmet.
Panzella does contend, however, that as a result of the amendment to section 10-21.9(c), the nature of the hearing he wasgranted changed. First, he notes that prior to the effective date of the amendment, if the District Board had wished todischarge him for sexually abusing his daughter, it would have had to file a charge pursuant to section 10-22.4 (governingdismissal for cause). At the hearing, the District Board would have been required to prove that his conduct wasirremediable, since it never issued a written warning that his conduct was unacceptable nor provided him with theopportunity to remediate. Additionally, at the hearing, the District Board would have been required to prove that he actuallyabused his daughter, and he would have been allowed to present evidence to the contrary. If dismissed, he would also havehad the opportunity to seek administrative review of the hearing officer's factual determination that he abused his daughter.After the amendment, Panzella notes, the District Board was able to dismiss him solely on the basis of the juvenile courtfinding, without ever presenting evidence as to whether he actually abused his daughter and without proving that hisconduct was irremediable. Accordingly, he argues, the amendment interfered with the "rights flowing from" hisemployment contract and was, therefore, retroactive as applied to him.
A retroactive law is " 'one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws' ". Chemrex, Inc. v.Pollution Control Board, 257 Ill. App. 3d 274, 278, 628 N.E.2d 963 (1993) (quoting United States Steel Credit Union v.Knight, 32 Ill. 2d 138, 142, 204 N.E.2d 4 (1965)). Vested rights are interests that are protected from legislative interferenceby the due process clause of the United States and Illinois constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,