PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

We are asked to decide whether negligence and trespass claims that arise out of the IllinoisUnderground Utility Facilities Damage Prevention Act (Act) (220 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998))are superseded by section 11 of the Act and subject to the two-year statute of limitations found insection 12 of the Act (220 ILCS 50/11, 12 (West 1998)). We conclude that the two-year statuteof limitations applies only to the statutorily defined acts or omissions set out in section 11, and notthe common law counts of negligence and trespass in the complaints before us. For the reasonsthat follow, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the complaints and remand for furtherproceedings.

This case comes to us as a consolidated appeal taken from three separate lawsuits filed byplaintiff, Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, against defendants, Joel Kennedy ConstructionCorp. (Kennedy Construction), and G&V Construction Company, Inc. (G&V Construction). Thetrial court dismissed plaintiff's negligence and trespass claims in all three cases after finding thembarred by the two-year statute of limitations found in section 12 of the Act. The allegations of allthree complaints are virtually identical.

The first complaint was filed July 9, 2002, against Kennedy Construction. Count I of thecomplaint alleged that on August 18, 1998, Kennedy Construction trespassed on plaintiff's interestin land located at 6633 North Loron Avenue, in Chicago. Plaintiff had a possessory interest in theland for maintaining underground gas facilities. Plaintiff alleged Kennedy Construction damagedits underground gas facility while performing excavation work on the land. Count II allegedKennedy Construction performed the excavation work in a negligent manner. KennedyConstruction moved to dismiss counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint under section 2-619(a)(5)of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1998)). KennedyConstruction argued plaintiff's claims arose under section 11 of the Act and are barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in section 12 of the Act (220 ILCS 50/11, 12 (West 1998)). Thetrial court agreed and dismissed counts I and II. The court later entered judgment for plaintiff onthe remaining counts in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of counts I and IIunder Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303).

Plaintiff brought a second action against Kennedy Construction on July 15, 2002. CountsI and II of the complaint alleged trespass and negligence, respectively, arising from excavationwork performed at 1234 North Lawndale Avenue, in Chicago, on August 20, 1999. The trialcourt dismissed these counts under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code as barred by section 12 of theAct. The trial court entered a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),and plaintiff appeals.

On May 9, 2003, plaintiff filed a similar complaint against G&V Construction. Counts Iand II of plaintiff's complaint alleged negligence and trespass arising from excavation workperformed at 1443 West 41st Street, in Chicago, on October 5, 2000. Counts V and VI of thecomplaint alleged negligence and trespass arising from excavation work performed at 3100 NorthSheridan Road, in Chicago, on November 3, 1999. Counts I, II, V and VI were dismissed undersection 2-619(a)(5) of the Code as barred by section 12 of the Act. Plaintiff appeals under Rule304(a).

The question common to these appeals is whether plaintiff's negligence and trespass claimsare superseded by section 11 of the Act and thereby subject to the two-year statute of limitationsfound in section 12 of the Act. Our review is de novo. See Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209Ill. 2d 376, 413, 808 N.E.2d 957 (2004) (motions to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Codepresent questions of law and are reviewed de novo); People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff,206 Ill. 2d 541, 549, 795 N.E.2d 281 (2002) (issues of statutory construction present questions oflaw and are reviewed de novo).

Section 12 of the Act reads: "[n]o action may be brought under Section 11 of this Actunless commenced within 2 years after the date of violation of this Act." 220 ILCS 50/12 (West1998). Section 11 of the Act reads in part:

"Every person who, while engaging in excavation or demolition, wilfullyfails to comply with the Act by failing to provide the notice to the owners oroperators of the underground facilities or CATS facility near the excavation ordemolition area through the State-Wide One-Call Notice System as required bySection 4 of this Act and damages any underground utility facilities or CATSfacilities, shall be subject to a fine of no more than $200 for each separate offenseand shall be liable for the damage caused to owners or operators of the facility.

Every person who, while engaging in excavation or demolition and hasprovided the notice to the owners or operators of the underground utility facilitiesor CATS facilities in and near the excavation or demolition area through the State-Wide One-Call Notice System as required by Section 4 of this Act but otherwisewilfully fails to comply with this Act and damages any underground utility facilitiesor CATS facilities, shall be subject to a fine of no more than $100 for eachseparate offense and shall be liable for the damage caused to the owners oroperators of the facility.

Every person who, while engaging in excavation or demolition and hasprovided the notice to the owners or operators of the underground utility facilitiesor CATS facilities in and near the excavation or demolition area through the State-Wide One-Call Notice System as required by Section 4 of this Act but otherwise,while acting reasonably, damages any underground utility facilities or CATSfacilities, shall not be subject to a fine but shall be liable for the damage caused tothe owners or operators of the facility provided the underground utility facility orCATS facility is properly marked as provided in Section 10 of this Act." (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 50/11 (West 1998).

The parties have made elaborate arguments concerning the applicability of section 11 to plaintiff'snegligence and trespass claims. We do not address the plethora of arguments raised by the partiesbecause we find the issue to be fairly straightforward.

Section 11 describes what will constitute sanctionable conduct under the Act. The firsttwo paragraphs provide penalties for wilful violations of the Act. The third paragraph explainsthat a person who, "while acting reasonably" and in compliance with the Act, damages anunderground utility facility will not be subject to a penalty but will be liable for the damage causedto the underground utility facility. By definition, negligent conduct does not fall within theconduct described in section 11.

"Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent andcareful person would use under similar circumstances ***.

*** [Negligence] is characterized chiefly by inadvertence, thoughtlessness,inattention[] and the like, while 'wantonness' or 'recklessness' is characterized bywillfulness. The law of negligence is founded on reasonable conduct or reasonablecare ***." Black's Law Dictionary 1032 (6th ed. 1990).

A wilful act, on the other hand,

"may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly[] and purposely *** asdistinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly[] orinadvertently. A willful act differs essentially from a negligent act. The one ispositive and the other negative." Black's Law Dictionary 1599 (6th ed. 1990).

Plaintiff's negligence claims alleged defendants were guilty of negligent conduct and not theconduct described by section 11 of the Act. The allegations included:

"Defendant[s] had a duty *** to refrain from using any excavatingequipment in a manner which would damage [p]laintiff's *** gas facility.

Nothwithstanding [this] duty, [d]efendant[s] [were] guilty of one or moreof the following acts and/or omissions:

a. Violated the [Act] through [their] excavation activities;

b. Carelessly, negligently and improperly operatedexcavating equipment at the [property] over, upon and against[p]laintiff[']s *** gas facility;

c. Carelessly, negligently and improperly failed to conductadequate inspection tests or examinations to properly inform itselfof the location of the [p]laintiff's *** gas facility, even though suchinspections[,] tests or examinations were reasonably necessary toprevent injury to [p]laintiff's said gas facility;

d. Carelessly, negligently and improperly failed to handexpose [p]laintiff's *** gas facility so as to discover and preventinjury to said gas facility;

e. Carelessly, negligently and improperly failed to locate theplaintiff's *** gas facility;

f. Carelessly, negligently and improperly disregarded thelocation marks provided by [p]laintiff;

g. Carelessly, negligently and improperly disregarded theoral warning of [p]laintiff's agent regarding how to proceed withthe excavation;

h. Carelessly, negligently and improperly failed to inform[p]laintiff of its operations at the [property] and request [p]laintiffto locate the *** gas facility;

i. Carelessly and/or negligently failed to engage in properexcavation methods under the circumstances; and

j. Was otherwise careless and negligent in failing to regardand avoid damage to [p]laintiff's *** gas facility."

Although plaintiff alleged violations of the Act, the complaint is devoid of allegations involving wilfulness, or for that matter, reasonableness. The complaint alleges negligence.

Nor do plaintiff's trespass claims contain such allegations. A trespass is an invasion of theinterest in the exclusive possession of land. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 204,680 N.E.2d 265 (1997). It is an intentional tort. See Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 81 Ill. 2d 548, 553,411 N.E.2d 217 (1980). Plaintiff's complaints allege defendants, despite knowledge "to asubstantial certainty that operation of excavation equipment would result in intrusion orinterference with *** [p]laintiff's facilities," operated excavating equipment so as to interfere withand invade plaintiff's interest in the property. There is no allegation that defendants failed toprovide notice or otherwise wilfully failed to comply with a specific provision of the Act.

As pled in the complaints, the allegations that form the basis of plaintiff's negligence andtrespass claims do not fall within the conduct described by section of 11 of the Act. Becauseplaintiff's claims do not arise under section 11, the trial court erred in finding them barred by thetwo-year statute of limitations found in section 12 of the Act. The judgment of the circuit court inall three cases is reversed and the causes are remanded for further proceedings consistent with thisorder.

Reversed and remanded.

GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.