People v. Amigon

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People v. Amigon

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-06-3528 Rel

Case Date: 02/18/2009

Preview:FIRST DIVISION February 18, 2009

No. 1-06-3528

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE AMIGON, Defendant-Appellant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 02 CR 01722 The Honorable Rickey Jones, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant, Rene Amigon, was convicted of the murder of Alphonso Ruiz, who died of pneumonia more than five years after he was shot and paralyzed by the defendant. The defendant

contends (1) his nonelectronically recorded custodial statement should not have been admitted at trial, and (2) the State failed to prove causation. We affirm. BACKGROUND At a prior trial, the defendant was convicted of the murder of Enson Rodriguez and the aggravated battery with a firearm of Alphonso Ruiz. There, the State proved that on October 20, 1995,

the defendant, an 18-year-old member of the Latin Kings street

No. 1-06-3528 gang, shot at Rodriguez and Ruiz, both members of the Two-Six, a rival gang. The State's evidence included testimony from Ruiz

and the court-reported statement the defendant made on October 27, 1995. The defendant received a 30-year sentence for The

aggravated battery with a firearm for the Ruiz shooting. record does not reveal his murder sentence.

Although Ruiz survived the shooting, a bullet severed his spinal cord, rendering him quadriplegic. In early 2001, he was

living with family members, taking college classes, and learning to drive a handicap-modified car. into cardiac arrest. On March 13, 2001, Ruiz went

He was taken to the hospital, where he died He was 22 years old.

the following day of pneumonia.

Upon learning of Ruiz's death, the State charged the defendant with Ruiz's murder pursuant to sections 9-1(a)(1) and 9-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)).1 Prior to his murder trial, the defendant moved to suppress his 1995 court-reported statement on the basis that it did not comply with section 103-2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006)) because it was not electronically recorded. The court denied the motion.

The defendant's murder trial commenced on September 26,

1

A codefendant who was not part of his trial and is not

party to this appeal was charged with the defendant. 2

No. 1-06-3528 2006.2 Two eyewitnesses--a nurse who had been on her way to work

and a Two-Six gang member--identified the defendant as Ruiz's shooter, who was wearing a sweatshirt at the time. The State

introduced Ruiz's testimony from the prior trial that established that while Ruiz was talking to Rodriguez on October 20, 1995, he saw a Hispanic male wearing a hooded sweatshirt pull out a gun and fire five shots at them. The State also introduced the

defendant's 1995 statement in which he admitted he shot Ruiz because he knew Ruiz was a Two-Six member and Two-Six members had recently vandalized the defendant's car. To establish Ruiz's 2001 death was caused by the 1995 shooting, the State presented expert forensic pathology testimony from Dr. Nancy Jones, the assistant medical examiner that conducted an autopsy of Ruiz. Dr. Jones explained that pneumonia is an infection in the lungs that reduces a person's ability to exchange air. Ruiz's

pneumonia was caused by a "community acquired" bacteria, meaning Ruiz contracted the bacteria prior to being admitted to the hospital on March 13, 2001. There was no way for Dr. Jones to

determine how Ruiz contracted the pneumonia-causing bacteria. In Dr. Jones's opinion, Ruiz "died as a result of pneumonia due to quadriplegia due to a gunshot wound to the neck." Her

opinion was not altered by the fact that Ruiz's spinal cord

2

Facts regarding Rodriguez's murder were omitted at trial. 3

No. 1-06-3528 injury occurred more than five years before his death. Dr. Jones

explained how the prior gunshot wound was significant to the pneumonia: "Well, the reason it's significant to the pneumonia is, we need an intact nervous system in order to breath adequately and to prevent ourselves from developing pneumonia or infections. We need to be able to take And we need

deep breaths, filling our lungs.

to be able to expel that air completely because any time we can't completely empty out the lungs, it allows for secretions, mucosa, saliva to accumulate in the lungs, typically in the lower lungs, and it becomes a growth media for bacteria. So anything

that can compromise your ability to breath is going to increase [y]our risk for developing pneumonia. The other thing about it is, that individual who has paralysis or quadriplegia or paraplegic from injuries to their spinal column also begin to undergo medical wasting. They become thinner and their immune systems become compromised because of that muscle wasting, that inability to move and get 4

No. 1-06-3528 around adequately. So individuals with

damage to the spinal cords are compromised [respiratory]-wise because they can't breath as adequately, but they're also compromised because their immune system isn't as strong as it would normally be in an individual who didn't have those problems." Dr. Jones also explained the nerves in Ruiz's third, fourth, and fifth vertebrae that controlled his diaphragm for breathing had been damaged in the shooting. Thus, "Ruiz's

ability to expand his lungs regularly or completely and fully for normal pulmonary toilet" was reduced. Essentially, "Ruiz acquired a bacterial pneumonia in the community *** because he was a quadriplegic, had atrophy and muscle wasting and his respi[ra]tory capabilities were compromised because the gunshot wound made him more susceptible [to pneumonia] than a normal 22 year old would be." In her

opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the manner of Ruiz's death was homicide. On cross-examination, Dr. Jones acknowledged the pneumonia "probably" was not connected with anything the defendant did or did not do. She also testified that several of the defendant's

organs, including his heart, kidneys, and pancreas, were harvested for transplant. His lungs were not.

After the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, the 5

No. 1-06-3528 trial court sentenced him to a mandatory term of natural life in prison. This timely appeal followed. ANALYSIS I. Electronically Recorded Statement

The defendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting his 1995 court-reported statement at trial. According

to the defendant, his statement should have been presumed inadmissible because it was not electronically recorded as required by section 103-2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006)). Section 103-2.1(b) provides: "An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 9-1 *** of the Criminal Code of 1961 *** unless: (1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and (2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered." 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006). 6

No. 1-06-3528 An electronic recording "includes motion picture, audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording." 2006). 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(a) (West

There are numerous exceptions to the electronic recording 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(e) (West 2006).

requirement.

Section 103-2.1, approved in 2003, became effective on July 18, 2005, almost 10 years after the defendant's court-reported statement was taken, but more than one year before this murder trial commenced. We understand the defendant to claim that the

date of this murder trial triggers the application of section 103-2.1. We understand the State to claim that section 103-2.1

has no application here because the date of the defendant's custodial interrogation predates the passage of the section. Because this issue involves whether section 103-2.1(b) initially bars the admission of the defendant's statement, a legal challenge, our review is de novo. People v. Sutherland,

223 Ill. 2d 187, 197, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006) (the ultimate issue of a defendant's "legal challenge" to the denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo). "Where, as here, a case implicates a statute enacted after the events giving rise to the litigation, Illinois courts evaluate the temporal reach of the new law in accordance with the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994)." 866 N.E.2d 1163 (2007). People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 201, Where the legislature expressly provides 7

No. 1-06-3528 for the delayed implementation of a statute, the legislature expresses its intent that the statute apply prospectively only. People v. Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111, 882 N.E.2d 1140 (2008), citing Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 201. The defendant argues the legislature's use of the phrase "in any criminal proceeding" indicates the legislature intended section 103-2.1(b) to apply in all murder cases tried after the section's effective date, even those like his where the statement was taken prior to the date the statute went into effect. He

points to People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 859 N.E.2d 153 (2006), that, in his view, requires this court "to analyze the admissibility of the statement under the statute" even where the statement is made prior to the statute's effective date. The defendant in Johnson was a juvenile indicted in May 2003 as an adult for murder. The juvenile gave an inculpatory

statement after he was confronted with a videotaped statement of a co-arrestee. While the co-arrestee's statement was videotaped,

it is unclear whether the juvenile's statement was electronically recorded. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1076-78. The defendant

challenged the admission of his statement as involuntary prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion.

The reviewing court found no error in admitting the juvenile's inculpatory statement based on the totality of the circumstances, including in part, that the duration of the interrogation was relatively short. 8 Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at

No. 1-06-3528 1087. In so finding, the court rejected the defendant's numerous

contentions of involuntariness, including that the statement was the result of police trickery and that the statement was not reduced to writing. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1091. The only

mention the court made to the electronic recording requirement of section 103-2.1 was in the footnote explaining that the defendant's statement was made prior to the effective date of section 103-2.1 and a similar provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-401.5 (West 2004)). App. 3d at 1078 n.1. Based on our reading of Johnson, we disagree with the defendant's contention that Johnson requires us "to analyze the admissibility of the statement under the statute" where the statement was made prior to the statute's effective date. is nothing in Johnson that dictates that analysis here. There The Johnson, 368 Ill.

defendant presents no authority to support his claim that section 103-2.1(b) applies in his case where the complained-of statement was taken prior to the effective date of the section. In the

absence of such authority, we hold the statute's electronic recording requirement only applies as of the effective date of the statute. We so hold for two reasons.

First, we find support that the statute applies only to custodial interrogations that take place on or after the effective date of the statute based on the holding in People v. Buck, 361 Ill. App. 3d 923, 942-43, 838 N.E.2d 187 (2005). 9 In

No. 1-06-3528 Buck, the defendant challenged the reliability and credibility of his interrogation statement before the jury. To guide the jury

in assessing the reliability of his statement, the defendant tendered modified versions of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.06-3.07 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07), based on section 103-2.1(b), which was not in effect at the time of his interrogation. at 941-42. Buck, 361 Ill. App. 3d

The trial court rejected the tendered instructions This court held the defendant was not entitled

and we affirmed.

to jury instructions, which according to the defendant shared " 'commonality of purpose [with] section [103-2.1(b)].' " 361 Ill. App. 3d at 942. We upheld use of the unmodified Buck,

versions of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 because the "essence of the refused instructions [was] covered" by the instructions given. Buck, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 943. We also noted that

"recommendation 58 of the Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, ch.9, at 133-34 (April 2002), which recommends the addition to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 of language regarding the reliability of electronically recorded confessions" had not been approved. 945. Buck, 361 Ill. App. 3d at

Because section 103-2.1(b) was not in effect and the

recommendation to modify IPI instructions had not been adopted, we accepted the State's argument "that the trial court gave the jury the only instruction required by law, i.e., the unmodified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07." 10 Buck, 361 Ill. App.

No. 1-06-3528 3d at 942. Buck is consistent with our holding that section 103-

2.1(b) did not impose responsibility on a police agency regarding the recording of police interrogations until the statute became law. Second, the legislature enacted section 103-2.1(b) in 2003 but did not make it effective until 2005. This delayed

implementation demonstrates not only that it was the intent of the legislature that the statute apply prospectively (Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 111, citing Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 201), but that police agencies needed time to arrange for electronic devices to comply with the statute. If a police agency was not

mandated to use an electronic device to record a custodial interrogation in a murder case immediately upon passage of the statute and, according to the defendant's claim here, the custodial interrogation statement would not be presumptively inadmissible if such a murder trial took place before the effective date, we fail to see how such a requirement could reasonably be imposed regarding a custodial interrogation that took place years before. We reject the defendant's broad reading of the phrase "in any criminal proceeding" in section 103-2.1(b) as support for his argument that the presumption of inadmissibility arises under the section as of the date of the trial proceedings. For a variety

of reasons, the trial of an accused charged with murder may be delayed long after his police interrogation, this case is one 11

No. 1-06-3528 such example. The section's clear aim is to encourage the

electronic recording of custodial interrogations by police in murder cases, beginning with the effective date of the statute. We conclude the legislature intended to have the statute apply only to nonelectronically recorded confessions taken on or after the statute's effective date. The plain language of the

statute expresses the legislature's intent that the rebuttable presumption of the inadmissibility of custodial interrogations in murder cases did not arise until July 18, 2005. Accordingly, the

trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his confession. II. Causation Evidence

The defendant next contends the State failed to prove he caused Ruiz's death. The defendant argues the remoteness in time

and place between his act of shooting Ruiz in 1995 and Ruiz's death of pneumonia in 2001 breaks the causal chain. asserts Ruiz's death of pneumonia was unforeseeable. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, " 'the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). 12 He also

No. 1-06-3528 One element the State must prove in a murder case is causation. People v. Gulliford, 86 Ill. App. 3d 237, 240, 407 Causation is ordinarily determined by the

N.E.2d 1094 (1980). fact finder.

People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 176, 510

N.E.2d 877 (1987), citing People v. Martin, 112 Ill. App. 3d 486, 500, 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983). We will only disturb this finding

where the evidence "is so unreasonable, improbable and unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt." Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 177; People v. Lara, 289 Ill.

App. 3d 675, 679, 683 N.E.2d 480 (1997). While the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions caused the victim's death (Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 176; Lara, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 680), it need not prove the defendant's acts were the "sole and immediate cause of death" (Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 176; People v. Reader, 26 Ill. 2d 210, 213, 186 N.E.2d 298 (1962)). Rather, the State must only prove

the defendant's criminal acts proximately contributed to the victim's death. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 176; Gulliford, 86 Ill. Stated

App. 3d at 240; Lara, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 680.

differently, a defendant will be found criminally liable where his or her criminal acts "set in motion a chain of events" culminating in the victim's death. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 176.

However, "an intervening cause completely unrelated to the acts of the defendant" will relieve the defendant of criminal liability. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 176; Gulliford, 86 Ill. App. 13

No. 1-06-3528 3d at 241; see also People v. Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 531, 373 N.E.2d 459 (1978) ("The State's burden is not to prove that the defendant's act is the sole and immediate cause of death, but that the defendant's act was, beyond a reasonable doubt, a contributing cause to a death such that the death did not result from a source unconnected with the defendant's act"). In cases where the causal chain is not readily apparent, expert medical testimony may assist the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant's acts contributed to the victim's death. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 177. In Brackett, for

example, our supreme court held the State sufficiently proved the defendant's acts of raping and beating the 85-year-old victim contributed to her choking death five days later. Expert

testimony established the victim choked because her ability to dislodge food from her trachea had been compromised by a broken rib she suffered during the attack, which affected her ability to breathe deeply. Further, the victim could not be fed in a manner

to avoid the possibility of choking, such as through a nasal feeding tube, because of the significant facial injuries she suffered in the attack. Expert medical testimony established

that "the victim's depressed, weakened, debilitated state was the direct result of the trauma associated with the attack upon her." Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 178. The court noted that "so long as

the defendant's acts contributed to the death there is still sufficient proof of causation, despite the preexisting health 14

No. 1-06-3528 condition." Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 178. The defendant's

murder conviction was affirmed. In Brown, on the other hand, the defendant's murder conviction was reversed where the medical evidence failed to establish the defendant's stabbing caused the victim's death. that case, the victim was hospitalized shortly after the stabbing. She was released a week later. Three days after her In

release, she was readmitted to the hospital after a wound opened. That night, she died. At trial, her treating physician testified

the cause of death was a pulmonary embolism--the lodging of a blood clot in the main artery of her lung. Because the victim

did not suffer other risk factors associated with blood clots, the doctor concluded the clot originated from the victim's stab wound site and traveled to her lung, causing her death. The reviewing court held the State failed to prove the "essential causative relationship between" the defendant's act and the victim's death. Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 532. The

court reasoned there was no factual support for the doctor's opinion that the blood clot originated at the wound site, such as evidence from an autopsy, a relationship between the victim's death and the defendant's acts, or "explanations of the reasons underlying the cause of death." Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 533.

Without such facts, the relationship between the defendant's actions and the victim's death was purely speculative. Ill. App. 3d at 532. 15 Brown, 57

No. 1-06-3528 In this case, Dr. Jones opined that Ruiz's death resulted from "pneumonia due to quadriplegia due to a gunshot wound to the neck." In her expert opinion, Ruiz's quadriplegia, a direct

result of the shooting, weakened his immune system and compromised his ability to expel air, thereby increasing his risk for pneumonia. Her testimony established a direct relationship

between the gunshot wound and the pneumonia that ultimately took his life. Ruiz's paralyzed state made it difficult for him to

breathe completely and weakened his immune system, thereby making him more susceptible to the pneumonia that a "normal" 22 year old would have survived. Here, as in Brackett, the evidence

established the defendant, through his criminal acts, "set in motion a chain of events" culminating in Ruiz's death. 117 Ill. 2d at 176. Unlike in Brown, there is no evidentiary gap between the cause of death and the defendant's criminal act. The defendant's Brackett,

act of shooting the victim rendered the victim a quadriplegic. Dr. Jones's opinion, taken in the light most favorable to the State, established that but for the victim's quadriplegia, the victim would not have succumbed to pneumonia. At autopsy, Dr.

Jones viewed Ruiz's gunshot wound and the resulting damage to his spinal column, including the area that controlled his breathing. She also observed that Ruiz experienced muscle wasting due to his quadriplegia. Her testimony was not speculative as to the link

between the quadriplegia and the community-acquired pneumonia. 16

No. 1-06-3528 Notably, other courts in this state have affirmed murder convictions where medical evidence shows the victim died of subsequently acquired pneumonia. See Gulliford, 86 Ill. App. 3d

at 239, 242 (holding the defendants' actions of striking the victim on the head with a metal pipe set in motion a chain of events eventually culminating in the victim's death of pneumonia five days later while recovering from brain surgery where expert medical testimony established the pneumonia was "probably" caused by the victim's comatose state that resulted from his head wound); see also Reader, 26 Ill. 2d at 213 (affirming the defendant's murder conviction where medical evidence showed he died of pneumonia that he contracted while recovering in the hospital from a gunshot wound). The defendant emphasizes the prolonged time period between Ruiz's shooting in 1995 and his death in 2001 to challenge the proof of causation. While this case differs substantially from

the above cases based on the length of time between the defendant's criminal acts and the victim's death, we know of no authority holding that a lengthy passage of time, standing alone, breaks the causal chain. See People v. Kennedy, 150 Ill. App. 3d

319, 324, 501 N.E.2d 1004 (1986) (a 5

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