SECOND DIVISION
April 17, 2001

No. 1-98-2473

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Andrew Ball was foundguilty of first degree murder and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Defendantnow appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in denying his pretrialmotions to suppress statements and to quash arrest, and applied an incorrectstandard in deciding his motion to quash arrest. Defendant also maintains thatthe mittimus should be corrected to reflect an additional two days of credit fortime served in pretrial custody.

One-year-old Jasmine Williams died on July 15, 1995. Anautopsy was performed the following morning. The autopsy revealed that thevictim had extensive internal injuries. Her liver had been torn in two, heradrenal gland had been torn, and there were contusions or hemorrhages of thesoft tissue around the kidney. There was also internal bruising on the victim'shead. The medical examiner found the injuries were consistent with someonepunching the victim in the stomach in a violent manner with "a lot offorce." It was determined that the victim had died as a result of internalbleeding caused by the blunt trauma.

20-year-old Takesha Williams was the victim's mother anddefendant's girlfriend. Defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of themurder, was not the victim's father. After learning from the autopsy that thevictim had sustained her injuries sometime in the 24 hours preceding theautopsy, the police contacted Takesha's aunt and asked that Takesha come down tothe police station at 8 p.m. on July 16. The police did not request thatdefendant come to the police station. Takesha, however, wanted defendant toaccompany her and he eventually agreed to do so. At 4:30 a.m. on July 17,defendant was arrested for first degree murder after making incriminatingstatements to police.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest andsuppress evidence and a motion to suppress statements. Hearings were held on themotions and the motions were denied. A bench trial was then held and defendantwas found guilty of first degree murder.

The evidence presented at the hearings on defendant'spretrial motions and at trial established the following.

Chicago police detective Greg Pittatsis testified that onJuly 16, 1995, defendant and Takesha Williams came into the police station atapproximately 8 p.m. Pittatsis did not ask defendant to come to the policestation. Pittatsis stated that, upon arriving at the station, defendant and theothers were placed in a conference room. Defendant and Takesha were thenseparated so they could be interviewed. Between 8 p.m. and 4:30 a.m., defendantwas moved between the conference room and a "regular office" in theviolent crimes area of the station. Detective Pittatsis spoke with defendant sixtimes during that time period. He also spoke separately with Takesha six timesduring that same period. According to Pittatsis, Takesha told him that she hadspanked the victim approximately seven times on the arm and five times on theleg in quick succession and that when the victim continued to cry, Takesha tookthe victim by the arms, shook her and yelled "shut up" approximatelyfive times. Takesha was then arrested at approximately 11:30 p.m.

Detective Pittatsis testified that his first interview withdefendant lasted approximately one hour and his second interview lastedapproximately 30 minutes. According to Pittatsis, Assistant State's Attorney (ASA)Susan Miller arrived at about 11:40 that evening, following the arrest ofTakesha, and was present for all but the first two interviews with defendant. Atabout 4:30 a.m. on July 17, ASA Miller was about to take a statement fromdefendant as a witness when defendant asked what was happening with Takesha.When he was advised that she was under arrest for murder, defendant respondedthat he now wanted to tell the truth about what had happened. At that time,Pittatsis testified, questioning was stopped and he left the office to calldefendant's mother. Detective Pittatsis reached defendant's mother by telephonebut she declined to come down to the station. Pittatsis then requested a youthofficer. Shortly before 5 a.m., youth officer McCluskey arrived. After beingtold defendant's mother would not come to the station, youth officer McCluskeycalled her himself and was told that she would not come to the station.Pittatsis, McCluskey, Miller, and Pittatsis' partner, Detective Schorsch, thenspoke with defendant, who was not handcuffed. Miller orally advised defendant ofhis Miranda rights. Miller advised defendant that due to the type ofcrime he was involved in he could be charged and tried as an adult. Defendantindicated he understood and then proceeded to give an oral statement confessingto striking the victim with his fist a number of times because she would notstop crying. That statement was subsequently reduced to writing and signed bydefendant.

According to Detective Pittatsis, defendant was treated as awitness rather than a suspect until 4:30 a.m. when he made incriminatingstatements. Defendant was not handcuffed at any time and was always in unlockedrooms. Defendant never asked to use the telephone. Detective Pittatsis knew thatdefendant was 15 years old but did not ask defendant if he wanted to call hismother. Pittatsis testified that defendant was not offered food or drink becausehe was being interviewed as a witness and witnesses were not offered suchthings. According to Pittatsis, defendant was free to leave at any time prior tomaking his incriminating remarks at 4:30 a.m. Pittatsis never informed defendantthat he was free to leave because defendant was there voluntarily. Pittatsisacknowledged that, sometime during the evening, he asked defendant if he wouldbe willing to take a lie detector test to verify the information that he wasgiving about Takesha.

ASA Miller testified that on July 16, 1995, at around 11:30p.m., she responded to a call from the area three detective division. Afterspeaking with Detectives Schorsch and Pittatsis, she spoke with Takesha anddefendant separately. She was informed that defendant was being treated as awitness. Although Miller was unable to recall the length of her firstconversation with defendant, she testified that her second conversation withdefendant lasted only 15 to 20 minutes. Miller spoke with defendant three timesas a witness from the time of her arrival until about 4:30 a.m. At about 4:30a.m., she was preparing to take a handwritten witness statement from defendantwhen she and the detectives noticed some inconsistencies between defendant'sstatement and the statement of Takesha and began to question defendant aboutthose inconsistencies. Defendant asked what was going on with Takesha and wastold that she had been arrested for murder. Defendant then stated that Takesha"wasn't the one" and that he wanted to tell the truth. At that pointMiller and the detectives terminated the interview.

Youth officer McCluskey then arrived. When asked whetherMcCluskey had an opportunity to speak with defendant outside her presence,Miller responded "I don't recall. I left him in the room with him. I don'trecall." Shortly after 5 a.m., Miller, the detectives and youth officerMcCluskey went back in to talk to defendant. Miller advised defendant of his Mirandarights and told him that, even though he was a juvenile, he could be tried andsentenced as an adult for this crime. Defendant indicated to her that heunderstood his rights. After giving an oral statement, defendant chose to give ahandwritten statement. Miller wrote out the statement in the presence ofdefendant. Defendant indicated to Miller that he had been treated"fine" by the police. Miller testified that she had offered defendantfood and drink throughout the night and that he had not wanted anything. Millerhad defendant read the first typed paragraph out loud to confirm that heunderstood how to read and write English. She then read the remainder of thestatement to him out loud. Miller made any changes requested by defendant anddefendant then signed each page of the statement. According to Miller, defendantwas able to respond appropriately to her questions, never indicated he did notunderstand what she was saying or talking about, and gave intelligent answers toher questions that she was able to understand.

Dr. Michael Rabin testified on behalf of defendant at thehearing on the motion to suppress statements as an expert in the field offorensic psychology. Dr. Rabin had interviewed defendant in October 1996 todetermine his IQ, reading ability, and ability to understand and waive his Mirandarights. Defendant had a verbal IQ score of 66, a performance score of 77, and afull scale IQ score of 69. The score of 69 placed defendant in the bottom 2% ofthe population in terms of intelligence. Dr. Rabin did not believe thatdefendant would have been able to understand written Miranda warningsbecause he was in the bottom 1% of the population in terms of readingcomprehension. Defendant scored in the average range for verbal comprehension.Dr. Rabin believed that defendant appeared to be average in intelligence but hada borderline intelligence score due to his poor vocabulary and poor educationalbackground. Defendant scored poorly on tests influenced by education,information, and vocabulary, and scored best on tests that focused on practicalknowledge, social judgment, and reasoning. On cross-examination, Dr. Rabintestified that he had reviewed a report prepared by a social worker employed inhis office that detailed an interview with defendant's mother. The report statedthat defendant's mother believed defendant was able to waive his Mirandarights. Dr. Rabin also testified on cross-examination that he ultimatelyconcluded defendant was competent to waive his Miranda rights and was fitto stand trial.

Laura Ball testified that she was defendant's mother.According to Ball, she received a telephone call at approximately 4:45 a.m. onJuly 17, in which a police officer told her that defendant had confessed tomurdering the victim. The officer who called her did not ask her to come down tothe police station. Ball subsequently called the police station back and wastold that defendant was going to be transferred out of the station and would notbe there if she came down. Ms. Ball did not recall telling a social worker inDr. Rabin's office that she believed defendant was able to understand and waivehis Miranda warnings.

Defendant testified that he had accompanied Takesha and twoother women to the police station on July 16. They arrived at 7:30 or 8 p.m.After meeting Detective Pittatsis, they were seated in a conference room forabout 30 minutes. Defendant asked to use the bathroom and was escorted to thebathroom. He was then escorted to a room that contained nothing but two chairs.He sat by himself for awhile and then tried the door and found it locked. After30 to 45 minutes, he was brought back to the conference room where he spoke withtwo detectives. After speaking with detectives, he was brought back to the roomwith the two chairs and waited for about 30 or 45 more minutes. The pattern thenrepeated itself. He was brought back to the conference room and then back to thesmall room more times than he could count.

Defendant told the police that he had not touched the victimand that he had seen Takesha striking the victim.

Eventually, the officers questioning him began to"curse" at him and told him he was going to take a lie detector test.Defendant testified that the officers told him to "tell the f---ingtruth" or they would beat him and to "tell the truth before they beat[him] like [he] beat that baby." At one point, defendant was lying on thefloor by himself in a room because he was tired and detectives came in and begankicking him in the ribs. When he stood up, they began to hit him in the chest sohe fell back down. Defendant acknowledged that he was never handcuffed while atthe police station.

Defendant testified that when ASA Miller first questionedhim, she did not identify herself as an assistant State's Attorney and heassumed she was with the police. According to defendant, ASA Miller was"cursing" at him along with the police detectives.

According to defendant, the detectives returned 30 minutesafter they had been kicking and hitting him and told him they had something forhim to sign and if he signed it he could go home. He was seated in a room withASA Miller, who told him the same thing and showed him a statement that hadalready been written out. She also told him his mother was on her way. Defendanttestified that he had also asked to call his mother about two hours afterarriving at the station and was told by a detective that she had been called andwas on her way. According to defendant, he asked ASA Miller to read thestatement she was asking him to sign but she refused and told him to sign it.ASA Miller did not identify herself as an assistant State's Attorney untildefendant had signed the statement and was told he was charged with murder.

Prior to being interviewed by the detectives, defendant didnot speak with a youth officer or receive Miranda warnings. According todefendant, he was never given his Miranda rights or told he could betried as an adult. Defendant acknowledged that he had been arrested "plentyof times" in the past. He estimated that his actual number of arrests couldbe 20 or 30. He had been informed of his Miranda rights on some of thoseprevious occasions.

Dr. Roni Seltzberg, a psychiatrist for the forensic clinicalservices in Cook County, testified that she had interviewed defendant onNovember 7, 1996. During their conversation, defendant told her that he had notasked for a lawyer during questioning at the police station because he did notfeel he had been arrested and that if he had thought he was in trouble he wouldhave asked for his mother. Defendant, on appeal, also discusses a November 12,1996, letter in the record from Dr. Seltzberg to the judge who heard thepretrial motions. In the letter, Dr. Seltzberg concluded that defendant was fitto stand trial and would have been able to knowingly, intelligently, andvoluntarily waive his rights at the time of his statement to police if Mirandawarnings had been given to him verbally. The letter also notes that at the timeof Dr. Seltzberg's November 7, 1996, examination of defendant, he was able toread the Miranda warning paragraph "only with encouragement tofigure out a couple of the longer words." Dr. Seltzberg notes in the letterthat defendant's ability to read the warnings with such limited assistance wasdue to reading tutorials received while incarcerated.

At trial, Takesha testified regarding the circumstancesleading to the victim's death. She testified that, on the afternoon of July 15,she and defendant were in defendant's mother's apartment. The victim was crying.In an effort to get the victim to stop crying, she spanked the victim with anopen hand a number of times. The victim continued to cry and Takesha grasped herby the arms and asked her what was wrong. Defendant then offered to put thevictim to sleep while Takesha watched television in another room. Takesha heardthe victim scream loudly five times while defendant was in the other room alonewith her. The screams were unlike any Takesha had heard the victim make before.Takesha did not, however, get up to investigate because when she yelled todefendant to ask what was wrong, defendant assured her everything was fine.Defendant subsequently brought the victim to her and told her the victim hadfallen off the bed. The victim's eyes were wandering and she was havingdifficulty breathing. An ambulance was called. Defendant attempted to performcardiopulmonary resuscitation on the victim while they waited for the ambulanceto arrive.

Takesha, in addition to testifying regarding the eventsleading to the victim's death, testified that she had gone to the police stationon the day following the victim's death. According to Takesha, defendant had notreally wanted to go to the police station with her but had ultimately ended upaccompanying her to the station. Takesha acknowledged she had told the policethat she had "spanked" the victim in order to get her to stop cryingbut denied telling the police that she had shaken the baby and yelled "shutup" when she continued to cry. Takesha acknowledged that, after beingquestioned, she was arrested at approximately 11:30 p.m. on July 16.

Defendant's testimony at trial regarding the events leadingto the victim's death differed from Takesha's in some respects. He testifiedthat Takesha was yelling at the victim to "shut up" and that he sawTakesha shaking and striking the victim. Defendant subsequently put the victimin a bed and then noticed she was not breathing. He brought the victim toTakesha and demanded that she call an ambulance. He then tried to revive thevictim using CPR. Defendant denied ever striking the victim.

The written statement signed by defendant was made part ofthe record at trial. In it, defendant first acknowledged that he was aware ofand understood his Miranda rights and that he could be tried andsentenced as an adult but wished to give a statement. The statement furtherstated that on July 15, the victim would not stop crying. Takesha was indefendant's room after failing in her attempts to sooth the victim. The victimwas in another room when the defendant picked her up and took her to hisbrother's bedroom. According to defendant's statement, the victim's loud cryingwas making him angry because he was unable to get any sleep. When defendantattempted to quiet the victim, she began to cry louder. He then hit her on theleft side of her face with his hand half open. She did not stop crying. He thenstruck her in the stomach with a closed fist. The victim continued to cry.Defendant struck her on the other side of her stomach with a closed fist and,when she continued to cry, struck her with his fist in the stomach are twicemore. Defendant was now "real angry." The victim continued to cry.Defendant then struck her in the back of her head and she fell off of the bedonto the tile floor. When her head hit the floor, it made "a nice loudsound." The victim stopped crying and defendant put her into the bed.Defendant looked back as he was leaving the room and saw that the victim'sstomach was not moving. He picked the victim up and brought her to the roomwhere Takesha was lying down. He told Takesha that the victim had fallen off thebed and that something was wrong with her. He then attempted to perform CPR butthe victim began to cough up liquid and water was coming out of her nose. Thevictim then turned green. When paramedics arrived, they attempted to get a pulseon the victim but could not.

The statement signed by defendant also stated that the policeand ASA Miller had treated him "good" and that he had been offeredwater and soda but had not wanted any. Defendant acknowledged in the statementthat he was giving the statement freely and voluntarily and that he had come tothe station of his own free will and turned himself in because he wanted to"get it off his chest" and "didn't want to run from theproblem." Finally, the statement noted that ASA Miller had read the entirestatement out loud to him and he had been allowed to make any changes orcorrections he wanted.

Following the trial, defendant was found guilty of firstdegree murder and was sentenced to 35 years in prison.

On appeal, defendant first contends that his limitedintelligence, age, lack of food and drink, extended isolation from hisgirlfriend, the length and intensity of his interrogation, and the failures ofthe police to provide him with Miranda warnings and access to an adultinterested in his welfare combined to make it improbable that he voluntarily,knowingly, and intelligently confessed. The circuit court, defendant contends,therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession.

On review, great deference will be given to the lower court'sfactual findings, and those findings will be reversed only if they are againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50, 727N.E.2d 1003 (2000). The ultimate question of the voluntariness of defendant'sconfession will, however, be reviewed de novo. In re G.O.,191 Ill. 2d at 50.

The test of voluntariness is whether, under the totality ofthe circumstances, a statement was freely made, without compulsion orinducement, with consideration given to both the characteristics of the accusedand the details of the interrogation. People v. Fuller, 292 Ill. App. 3d651, 664, 686 N.E.2d 6 (1997); In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545,550, 672 N.E.2d 331 (1996). Voluntariness turns on several factors, includingthe age, education and intelligence of the accused; the length of the detentionand the duration of the questioning; previous experience with the criminaljustice system; falsely aroused sympathy; offers of leniency or other promisesto induce a confession; whether the accused was advised of his constitutionalrights; and whether the accused was subjected to any physical mistreatment. Peoplev. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 376, 566 N.E.2d 259 (1990); In re L.L.,295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 600, 693 N.E.2d 908 (1998). Where juveniles are involved,additional factors must be considered, including the time the questioningoccurred and whether a parent or other adult concerned with the juvenile'swelfare was present either before or during interrogation. In re L.L.,295 Ill. App. 3d at 600. When reviewing the ruling on a motion to suppress, acourt of review is to consider both the evidence submitted at the suppressionhearing and evidence submitted at trial. See People v. Caballero, 102Ill. 2d 23, 34-36, 464 N.E.2d 223 (1984).

We note briefly that defendant, in arguing that the circuitcourt erred in denying his motion to suppress, explicitly states that, with theexception of one subissue, he is conceding the truth of the State's evidence andcredibility of its witnesses.

Defendant argues that his age, intelligence, and experiencecontributed to the coercive circumstances that made his statement involuntary.We first note that defendant, although only 15 years old at the time of hisarrest, had extensive experience with the police. Defendant himself testifiedthat he had been arrested "plenty of times" and that he had been readhis Miranda rights on prior occasions. Defendant acknowledges these priorexperiences, but cautions that we should be skeptical of the ability of personswith low IQs to learn from experience.

Dr. Rabin, called as a witness by defendant, testifiedregarding defendant's verbal, performance, and full-scale IQs. Dr. Rabinconcluded that defendant would have been unable to understand written Mirandawarnings due to his poor reading comprehension, which ranked in the bottom 1% ofthe population. Dr. Rabin, however, also testified that defendant scored in theaverage range for verbal comprehension. Dr. Rabin believed that defendant wasaverage in intelligence but had a poor educational background and vocabulary. Oncross-examination, Dr. Rabin acknowledged that he ultimately concluded defendanthad been competent to waive his Miranda rights. Dr. Rabin also testifiedon cross-examination that he had reviewed a report prepared by a social workerin his office following an interview with defendant's mother. According to thereport, defendant's mother had stated that she believed defendant was able towaive his Miranda rights.

Defendant, as support for his arguments on appeal, discussesa letter in the record from Dr. Seltzberg to the court. In the letter, Dr.Seltzberg stated that when she examined defendant more than a year after hisarrest, he was able to read the Miranda warnings with some assistance andthat his ability to read the warnings at that time was due in part to readingtutorials he received since being incarcerated. Dr. Seltzberg also concluded inthe letter, however, that defendant would have been able to knowingly,intelligently and voluntarily waive his rights at the time of his arrest if thewarnings were given verbally.

The circuit court judge who denied defendant's motion tosuppress stated:

"One of the things I noted about the defendant's testimony was he was not in any way inarticulate in any particular way. He sounded like a young man who perhaps has not had a lot of education, but he didn't seem to have any difficulty understanding the questions that were put to him nor did he seem to have any difficulty in responding appropriately to the questions that were put to him. He testified just fine.

But for the allegation in the motion that says he has an IQ of 69, I don't know that it would have ever occurred to me at least for purposes of these proceedings of some marginal mental capacity. I didn't get the feeling that the defendant didn't know what was going on in this courtroom, and I suspect that he understood pretty well what was going on in the courtroom."

Defendant argues that this court should not defer to theabove observations of the judge who denied the motion to suppress because adifferent judge heard the trial and, at sentencing, stated: "I don't doubt[defendant] has a low I.Q., and he is not intelligent as that term is defined.And that by any objective intelligence test he is probably well belowaverage." We first note that the observations of the sentencing judge weregeneral in nature and were not made for the purpose of determining defendant'sability to understand his Miranda warnings, while the comments of thefirst judge were in the specific context of ruling on defendant's motion tosuppress. In addition, defendant ignores the fact that the same judge who madethe quoted observation at sentencing also found the testimony and evidencepresented at trial had made it "quite clear" that defendant had givena voluntary statement.

Defendant also maintains that any observations made by thejudges should be discounted because those observations "apparently"failed to take into account the fact that defendant's "intellectualabilities" had increased as a result of education he received whileincarcerated. Defendant points out that he received his psychological testingabout 15 months after his arrest and had presumably received even more schoolingprior to trial.

Defendant's argument that his education while incarceratedhad improved his overall "intellectual ability" amounts to speculationand runs contrary to defendant's argument that his previous experiences with thepolice should be ignored due to his inability to learn from experience.Moreover, the court, when ruling on the motion to suppress, was aware from Dr.Seltzberg's letter that Dr. Seltzberg believed reading tutorials defendantreceived while incarcerated had improved his ability to read the Mirandawarnings. Both Dr. Seltzberg and Dr. Rabin had concluded, however, thatdefendant would have been able to understand and waive verbal Mirandawarnings at the time of his arrest. There is absolutely no evidence that thecircuit court ignored the fact that defendant's reading had improved since hisincarceration when it denied the motion to suppress. Instead, the recordindicates that the court relied upon its own observations, and, presumably thetestimony, evidence, and conclusions of Dr. Rabin and Dr. Seltzberg, includingdefendant's improved reading ability since being incarcerated, in determiningthat defendant was capable of making a knowing waiver of his Mirandarights and had given a voluntary statement.

Finally, we note that the circuit court, in denyingdefendant's motion to suppress statements, correctly noted that it had "theadvantage of watching and listening to the defendant testify" in making itsdetermination that defendant understood what was going on in court and had theintellectual ability to waive his Miranda rights. We cannot say that thecourt's findings regarding defendant's intellectual ability to understand andwaive his rights were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendant argues that his interrogation occurred at "themost coercive time possible: late night and early morning." We first notein this regard that all parties agree that defendant came to the police stationvoluntarily on the evening of July 16. There was nothing to prevent him fromcoming the following morning instead or even not coming at all. The defendanttherefore chose the time of his interaction with the police. Further, we notethat defendant has explicitly conceded, for purposes of this issue, the truth ofthe State's evidence and credibility of its witnesses. Detective Pittatsistestified that defendant was free to leave at any time prior to his arrest atapproximately 4:30 a.m. Defendant could thus have left as it got late or hebecame hungry or tired. He failed to do so. In light of the above, it cannot besaid that the lateness of defendant's interview was inherently coercive.

Defendant maintains that the absence of an adult interestedin his welfare contributed to the coercive circumstances. Although a juvenilehas no per se right to consult with an adult (In re L.L.,295 Ill. App. 3d at 601), the presence or absence of a parent or youth officeris relevant in determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession (Fuller,292 Ill. App. 3d at 665).

The State's evidence established that defendant informed hismother he was going to the police station. The evidence also shows thatdefendant's mother was called on two occasions but refused to come to the policestation. After defendant's mother's initial refusal to come to the station, thepolice contacted a youth officer, who in turn called defendant's mother again.Even though it is not essential to voluntariness that a defendant confer with ayouth officer or other adult prior to giving a statement (see People v.McNeal, 298 Ill. App. 3d 379, 391, 698 N.E.2d 652 (1998) (noting that it isnot required that a minor see a youth officer prior to questioning)), there issome evidence in the record that defendant did confer with youth officerMcCluskey prior to giving his statement. ASA Miller's testimony suggested thatshe may have left defendant alone with youth officer McCluskey. Further,although it is unclear whether the youth officer conferred alone with defendantbefore defendant gave his statement, there is no question that the youth officerwas present when defendant gave his oral statement and when the statement wasreduced to writing. The presence of a youth officer, although a significantfactor, will not per se make a juvenile's confession voluntary. Fuller,292 Ill. App. 3d at 665. However, the call by the youth officer to defendant'smother, and the presence of some evidence that the youth officer conferred withdefendant privately prior to the time defendant gave his statement,distinguishes this case from cases where there was no evidence that the youthofficer took any action or acted in a manner antagonistic to the defendant'srights. See e.g., In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 603 (noting thatthe record indicated the youth officer failed to demonstrate any interest in theminor's welfare and was instead adversarial and antagonistic toward therespondent).

Defendant next contends that the length and intensity of hisinterrogation contributed to the coercive circumstances making his confessioninvoluntary. According to the State's witnesses, the credibility of whomdefendant does not dispute, defendant was treated as a witness untilapproximately 4:30 a.m. on July 17. Although he had been at the police stationfor approximately eight hours by that point, he was questioned onlyintermittently. See People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 452-53, 599 N.E.2d941 (1992) (noting that while the period of defendant's detention was lengthy,the fact that the questioning was not incessant over the course of that periodwas favorable on the issue of voluntariness). The testimony of DetectivePittatsis appears to indicate that defendant was only interviewed for a total ofabout 90 minutes in the four hours he was present at the station prior tomidnight. According to ASA Miller, one of the interviews after midnight was only15 to 20 minutes long. Moreover, although defendant contends on appeal that hisinterrogation "was clearly intense," the record does not indicate thatthis was necessarily so.

Defendant next argues that his lack of food during the eighthours he spent at the police station contributed to the coercive circumstancesmaking his statement involuntary. Detective Pittatsis testified that whiledefendant was being treated as a witness, he was offered neither food nor drinkper police policy. ASA Miller testified that defendant refused offers of foodand drink. The statement signed by defendant indicates that he was offered sodaand water but refused. Although there is no evidence that defendant either ateor drank anything while at the police station, there was evidence, albeitconflicting, that offers of food and drink were made.

Defendant next argues that his extended isolation from hisgirlfriend contributed to the coercive circumstances. The police asked Takeshato come to the police station and testified that she was the focus of theirinvestigation. It was therefore reasonable for the police to separate defendantfrom Takesha and compare her version of the facts to his.

Defendant maintains that the failure of the authorities toprovide any Miranda warnings prior to his making incriminating statementscontributed to the coercive circumstances making his statement involuntary. Itis, however, undisputed that defendant was at the station voluntarily as awitness until 4:30 a.m. when he made incriminating statements and was taken intocustody. Miranda warnings were given at that time and were not requiredto have been given before that point.

Finally, defendant contends that the police acted deceptivelyby misleading him into believing he was a witness when he was actually asuspect. To the extent the circuit court found the testimony of the State'switnesses credible on this issue, defendant maintains, that ruling wasmanifestly erroneous. Defendant first maintains that police testimony thatTakesha was their only suspect makes no sense in light of the other evidence andcalls into doubt Detective Pittatsis' testimony that, prior to defendant'sconfession, he did not find defendant's story to be unbelievable. Defendant alsocontends that Detective Pittatsis informed defendant that Takesha had beenarrested in an effort to falsely arouse his sympathy for Takesha.

We find the arguments of defendant to be without merit. Thepolice requested that Takesha, not defendant, come to the police station. Thepolice had good reason to consider Takesha a suspect because she admitted to thepolice that she had "spanked" the victim because the victim would notstop crying. Defendant testified that he told the police he had seen Takeshastriking the victim. Simply because the victim's injuries did not match upexactly with Takesha's statements did not, as implied by defendant on appeal,make defendant an automatic suspect. Nor is the repeated questioning about theevents surrounding the victim's death or the request to take a lie detector testto verify the information defendant was giving them about Takesha necessarilyindicative that the police considered defendant anything more than a witness.Finally, where Takesha was arrested at 11:30 p.m. on July 16 and defendant wasfinally told of her arrest when he inquired about her status at approximately4:30 a.m., we find that her arrest was clearly not made for the purpose ofarousing defendant's sympathy. Takesha was asked at trial whether she wasarrested as a potential offender pursuant to the police investigation. We failto see how Takesha's answer of "[t]hat's correct" establishes, asargued by defendant, that her arrest was "a sham arrest creating a tool tocause [defendant] to break down." The circuit court's credibility findingsin favor of the State were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We do not find any of the circuit court's factual findings tobe against the manifest weight of the evidence and, considering the totality ofthe circumstances under de novo review, find the circuit court didnot err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession.

Defendant maintains that the circuit court erred in denyinghis motion to quash arrest. Both the United States and Illinois Constitutionsprotect the right of an individual to be free of unreasonable searches andseizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,