People v. Beauchamp

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People v. Beauchamp

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-07-2247 Rel

Case Date: 03/09/2009

Preview:FIRST DIVISION MARCH 09, 2009

No. 1-07-2247 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT BEAUCHAMP, Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 07 CR 3606 Honorable Lawrence P. Fox, Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court: After a bench trial, defendant Albert Beauchamp appeals from his conviction for burglary. He contends the State failed to

prove the element of entry and that we must reverse or, alternatively, reduce the conviction to theft. We modify the

judgment to reflect a conviction for theft and remand for resentencing. Pamela Little testified that she parked her 2004 Chevrolet Trailblazer sport utility vehicle (SUV) in a Metra parking lot on the morning of January 29, 2007. She went to pay for her parking

spot and noticed a white vehicle had pulled in behind her SUV. When she pushed her vehicle alarm button on its remote control, instead of activating lights and beeps, nothing happened. She

No. 1-07-2247 then observed a man standing at the hood of her vehicle. Little

started screaming and ran across the street to a fire station where she told a police officer someone was trying to steal her SUV. When Little returned to her vehicle, she saw that the lock to open the hatchback was gone, as well as the hatchback window. On cross-examination, Little explained that with the push of a button on the back of the SUV, the window could be "lifted" up and "held" up by two hydraulic arms. outward, away from the SUV. Police officer Freddy Frazier testified that he was directed to the Metra parking lot, where flashing lights from the SUV caught his attention. Two men, later identified as defendant and The window could only open

Michael Jones, were entering a vehicle next to the SUV and attempting to start it. police vehicle. Frazier blocked the vehicle with his

He saw a window in the vehicle's backseat.

Looking at the SUV, Frazier noted the back window was missing. One hydraulic arm was on the ground, and one hydraulic arm was dangling from the vehicle, and the door lock was punched. Frazier concluded that the window in defendant's vehicle was the window from the back of the SUV. that window belonged to her SUV. At the end of the State's case, defendant moved for a 2 Later, Little confirmed that

No. 1-07-2247 directed finding, arguing that the State failed to prove an "entry" into the SUV, a necessary element of burglary. Defendant

contended there was no evidence that anyone needed to access the interior of the vehicle to remove the window. Defendant

specifically argued that the State failed to prove that the hydraulic arms were attached to the interior of the window. The

State countered that defendant must have reached into the SUV to remove the window from the frame, without any elaboration as to why that was the case. After a break, the parties presented additional argument. The State drew the court's attention to authorities holding that reaching under the hood of a vehicle to take its battery constituted an entry, as did reaching into the open flatbed of a truck to take an object lying in it. The State suggested that the instant case was similar, in that defendant and Jones would have had to reach into the vehicle to remove the window, even if the window had already opened out. The State argued that this had to

have been the case, because Frazier testified that the arms were attached inside the SUV. Defendant responded that Frazier merely testified that a hydraulic arm was dangling, without specifying whether from inside or outside of the SUV. He further argued that the window,

in fact, would have been outside of the SUV at the time of its 3

No. 1-07-2247 removal, because the button on the back of the vehicle moved the window away from the SUV's frame. In ruling on defendant's motion, the court appeared to detect a frontal challenge as to whether the removal of a vehicle's window would ever constitute a burglary. The court

concluded that removing a vehicle's window must generally constitute an entry because the object removed has both "an inside and an outside." The court further, independently,

determined that the punching of the door lock constituted an entry. Finally, the court ruled that the evidence showed the

hydraulic arms were on the inside of the vehicle, so that an entry must have occurred to remove the window. denied defendant's motion. Following closing arguments, the court convicted defendant of burglary and sentenced him to three years of incarceration. On appeal, defendant repeats his arguments from his motion for a directed finding: that no evidence directly demonstrates or allows an inference of an entry into Little's SUV, as required for a burglary conviction. The State, however, contends that we The court then

may infer an entry into the SUV by the short amount of time between the commission of the offense and police intervention, but defendant's possession of the window, and by the damage to the SUV. We find defendant's argument persuasive. 4

No. 1-07-2247 To determine whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and then determine if a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State proved the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001). People v. Green, A

reviewing court will not retry the defendant. 322 Ill. App. 3d 747, 754 (2001). judge serves as the trier of fact,

In a bench trial, the trial determining the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony and resolving any conflicts in the evidence presented. People v.

Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989). Although the determinations of the trier of fact are not conclusive, they are entitled to great deference, so that a conviction will only be overturned where the evidence "is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). "A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters *** [a] motor vehicle *** or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft." 1(a) (West 2006). 720 ILCS 5/19People v.

Thus, "[t]he offense of burglary is complete

when the illegal entry is made with the requisite intent." People v. Moore, 375 Ill. App. 3d 234, 239 (2007). 5 Unlawful

No. 1-07-2247 entry is "the essence of the crime" (People v. Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d 738, 739 (1972)), and distinguishes the offense of burglary from theft which does not require an entry (People v. Poe, 385 Ill. App. 3d 763, 766, (2008)). An "entry" may occur in one of two ways. First, any

insertion of any body part by the offender into a statutorily designated area will constitute an entry. 83 Ill. App. 3d 732, 736 (1980). See People v. Palmer,

Second, the insertion of an

instrument into the designated space may constitute an entry, but only if the instrument is inserted "for the immediate purpose of committing the [intended] felony or aiding in its commission and not merely for the purpose of making an opening to admit the hand or body, or in other words, for the sole purpose of breaking." Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 740. "[W]hether an entry is made Davis, 3 Ill.

depends upon the facts of an individual case." App. 3d at 739.

In our view, the facts of this case parallel the facts of Davis. In Davis, police observed the defendant and two other men The

pounding a hole through the wall of a television store.

perpetrators then attempted to leave, but were stopped and arrested. Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 739. In setting out our

analytical framework for the defendant's burglary conviction, we stressed "[i]t is not the size of the hole [made in a building 6

No. 1-07-2247 wall] that is determinative [in proving burglary] but *** whether a hand or instrument was actually inserted into the hole for the purpose of committing the felony." Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 739.

We vacated the burglary conviction and imposed a conviction for a lesser offense because the evidence showed no insertion of any part of the body, or an instrument for the purpose of committing a felony, through the hole in the store wall by any of the three men. Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 740. In the case at bar, the

evidence only shows the creation of means by which a body part or instrument might pass, not any actual passage. There is no direct evidence that any part of defendant's person entered the interior of the vehicle while removing the window or that any tool wielded by defendant entered the SUV where his objective was to deprive Little of her possession of the vehicle's window. Further, what circumstantial evidence

there is allows for no reasonable inference of such intrusion by defendant's body or a tool he employed into the interior of the vehicle during the removal of the window. Neither Little's nor

Frazier's trial testimony established that the window's hydraulic arms were attached to the interior of the vehicle. Little's testimony suggested the opposite. In fact,

She stated that the

arms "lifted" the window up, implying an exterior hinging, as opposed to if the arms "pushed" the window up. 7 If the hydraulic

No. 1-07-2247 arms were on the exterior of the vehicle, then defendant would not have needed to enter the SUV to separate the window from the frame. Defendant could have pulled the window away from the Moreover, if defendant

SUV's frame by manipulating the arms.

could utilize the button on the back of the SUV after popping the lock, then, again, defendant would not have had to cross the threshold of the SUV's frame to remove the window. While a fact finder would be free to draw different inferences from different facts and reject the inferences discussed above, the State provides no evidence allowing for contrary inferences that defendant must have passed a part of his body through the frame of the SUV to remove the window. On the

evidence presented, any such determination could only be based on conjecture, which is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 415, 421 (1981) ("where the permissive inference stands unsupported by corroborating circumstances, the leap from the proved fact to the presumed element must satisfy the higher standard - proof beyond a reasonable doubt"); Oldenstedt v. Marshall Erdman & Associates, Inc., 381 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2008) (holding to infer negligence based on circumstantial evidence, " `the circumstances [must be] of a nature and so related to each other that it is the only conclusion that can be drawn therefrom, and mere conjecture, 8 See

No. 1-07-2247 guess or suspicion is insufficient,' [Citation.]"); In re Keith C., 378 Ill. App. 3d 252, 260 (2007) (" The State must present sufficient evidence from which an inference of knowledge can be made, and any inference must be based upon established facts and not pyramided on intervening inferences,' [Citation.]"). There is a similar failure of proof with respect to the punching of the door lock. There is neither direct proof that

any part of defendant's body went into the interior of the SUV while punching the lock nor are there any circumstances that suggest a bodily entry. Further, there is neither direct nor

circumstantial evidence to support that defendant utilized an intruding tool for more than creating an opening when punching the lock. Our determinations are consistent with factually close decisions in our sister jurisdictions. For example, in People v.

Jacob, 55 A.2d 961,391 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1977), the New York Supreme Court dismissed a burglary indictment against a defendant where someone entered a church through removing louvers from a window and the defendant's fingerprints were found on the louvers. Among other defects in the grand jury testimony supporting the indictment, the Jacob court observed that no evidence established whether the fingerprints were on the inside or outside surfaces of the louvers. Similarly, in State v. Mitchell, 332 S.C. 619, 9

No. 1-07-2247 506 S.E.2d 523 (S.C. App. 1998), the Court of Appeals of South Carolina reversed a burglary conviction for insufficient proof of entry where its defendant's thumbprint was detected on the exterior of a window screen apparently removed during the offense. The Mitchell court stressed that "the state's evidence

did not disclose how the screen was removed, i.e. from the inside or out." Mitchell, 332 S.C. at 623, 506 S.E.2d at 525.1

Finally, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed a burglary conviction in Blevins v. State, 6 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App. 1999), noting, where there was no other evidence tying the defendant to a residential burglary with an entry through a window, "[w]ithout testimony that [fingerprints were] found on the inside of the window, there is no evidence placing [the defendant] inside the habitation." Ga. App. 289, 556 S.E.2d 191 (2001). Each of these cases confirms the venerable principle of Davis that we apply in this case: there must be some evidence Accord Ruffin v. State, 252

beyond the mere breaking, alteration, or removal of a means of entry into a statutorily protected space, like a window or screen

1

We note that Mitchell would counter the circuit court's

reasoning that whenever an object with an inside and outside surface was removed an entry necessarily occurred. 10

No. 1-07-2247 door, to allow an inference that a defendant made an entry. See

also State v. McCall, 4 Ala. 643 (1843) (holding there to be no entry where a defendant broke a home's outer blinds, but made no intrusion with a body part or instrument beyond the home's window); M. Wingersky, Clark & Marshall on Crimes

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