People v. Bonds

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People v. Bonds

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-07-1629 Rel

Case Date: 04/24/2009

Preview:FIFTH DIVISION April 24, 2009

1-07-1629

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHANIE BONDS, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 05 CR 15498 Honorable Lon William Shultz, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TOOMIN delivered the opinion of the court: In the present appeal we encounter the contentions of the defendant that the rule barring hearsay testimony was improperly invoked so as to preclude her defense at trial. Following a jury trial, Stephanie Bonds was convicted of first degree murder of her 10-week-old son and sentenced to a term of 45 years' imprisonment. On appeal, she contends that the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings precluded her from offering prior inconsistent statements of her own witness as impeachment and as declarations against penal interest. She also requests that the mittimus be corrected to reflect only one conviction for first degree murder. No challenge is asserted to the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm and order the mittimus corrected. BACKGROUND On June 1, 2005, Nyshon Johnson, defendant's 10-week-old son, suffered injuries ultimately causing his death. The following day, defendant confessed to inflicting the injuries in a

1-07-1629 videotaped statement. This statement was played for the jury at trial. Defendant claimed the initial injuries occurred when she tripped on a toy while carrying Nyshon through their apartment. The toy was left on the floor by her then-six-year-old son Chino. Nyshon then began to cry. As she carried Nyshon and cautioned him to be quiet, he hit his head on a wall between the two rooms. Nyshon was inconsolable and continued to cry despite defendant's pleas for him to be quiet. Defendant sat down on the couch with Nyshon on her lap and began to shake him "hard" using her hands and one leg and began hitting him in the head with her hand. The crying continued and defendant took Nyshon with both hands and threw him forcefully to the floor, which was covered with an unpadded and worn carpet. The back of Nyshon's head impacted the floor and he cried more vocally. Defendant retrieved Nyshon from the floor and returned to the couch where she shook him again and begged him to stop crying. It continued and she, once more, threw him to the floor. The side of his head again struck the floor. The tone of the cries changed, Nyshon continued to move his limbs, and the crying continued. Defendant then grabbed one of his arms and one of his legs and "flung" Nyshon onto the couch where he struck the wooden portion of the couch with his head. On examining Nyshon, defendant observed that his eyes "were rolling around." Nyshon then closed his eyes and stopped crying. She then walked outside. Defendant's sister Stacy discovered Nyshon and brought him outside and gave him to defendant, who shook him but received no response. Nyshon was not breathing. A neighbor who heard the commotion came over and assisted defendant in performing cardiopulmonary

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1-07-1629 resuscitation (CPR) on Nyshon. Defendant never told anyone on the scene what she had done. The fire department and then paramedics arrived to treat and transport Nyshon to the hospital. Defendant rode along to West Suburban Hospital where Nyshon was initially treated. He was later transported to Loyola University Medical Center by ambulance. Defendant never informed any of the paramedics or medical personnel what she did to Nyshon. While she was at Loyola, defendant called her sister and father to tell them to clean up the house before the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) came. When defendant later spoke with detectives, she lied to them about what she had done to Nyshon. Assistant Medical Examiner Wendy Lavezzi conducted the autopsy of Nyshon. She was apprised of some of the facts of the case prior to conducting the post-mortem, but did not recall if she was aware of defendant's confession or if she learned of its contents shortly thereafter. She recalled being told Nyshon had been thrown. The external examination revealed indications of Nyshon's hospitalization as well as several areas of bruising on the outside of his forehead, outside of his eye, and above his eyebrow. These bruises appeared to have been recently formed. There was bruising on his legs and one of his feet, though it was not clear whether they were due to traumatic injury, treatment, or organ failure while he was on the respirator. No cuts or lacerations were observed. Dr. Lavezzi's also performed an internal examination, particularly of Nyshon's cranial cavity and brain. Diffuse hemorrhage was found "all over the top of the head" in the form of a subgaleal hemorrhage, which typically occurs at the focal point directly beneath the point of external injury. Signs of impacts were present on either side of his head. The amount of bleeding

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1-07-1629 seen could have been worsened by the treatment and resulting bleeding disorder. The left side of Nyshon's skull sustained a comminuted or branching fracture of the parietal portion of the cranium. The primary branch was four inches long with two downward branches measuring two-and-one-half inches. Similar fractures were observed on the right side. This indicated at least one impact on either side of the skull, but it was more likely that there were multiple impacts on each side. Fractures of this sort are not typical in children Nyshon's age due to the pliability of infant skulls. The nature of the fractures indicated that they were caused by "significant, directed force." There was also diffuse subdural hemorrhaging. The brain was extensively swollen, from the injuries and was likely exacerbated by the treatment at the hospital, including the time on the respirator. This swelling was evident in the external profile photograph depicting Nyshon's misshapen head. There was also hemorrhage around the optic nerves due to the impacts. Dr. Lavezzi opined that the injuries were caused by blunt force trauma. The injuries were consistent with Nyshon's head hitting a wall. Of the approximately 15 autopsies she had conducted on infants who suffered blunt force trauma to the head, Nyshon's injuries were the worst she had ever seen. The injuries were not consistent with Nyshon having been dropped or accidentally struck. Instead, they were indicative of multiple instances of directed blunt force trauma to the head, specifically being struck against a large flat object several times. Likewise, Nyshon's presentation was consistent with more than one blow to the head, rather than a single blow or stomp to the head. Injuries to one side of the head can cause reciprocal injuries on the other side of the brain or tissue, but not to the skull itself.

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1-07-1629 The cause of Nyshon's death was "craniocerebral injuries due to blunt trauma," regardless of any other information or police reports. Likewise, the manner of death was homicide. Dr. Lavezzi opined that the injuries would not have been inflicted by a child because of the degree of force required to inflict these injuries. However, "anyone the size of an adult could inflict these injuries." The State presented additional evidence not germane to the issues raised on appeal. Thereafter, the State rested its case-in-chief. Defendant took the stand and testified the she did not tell anyone what she had done until she gave her statement. She did so after voluntarily accompanying detectives to the station. She initially denied knowing how Nyshon was injured, but later acknowledged that she had lied. Defendant testified that she did not hurt Nyshon and that she was never alone with him during the time period he was injured. Instead, she maintained that she made the videotaped statement only after she was threatened with the loss of her children and her sister to DCFS custody. She was willing to say anything to keep that from happening. The detective told her what happened to Nyshon, what she should say in her statement, and that it would look good to the jury to give a statement. Defendant's son, Chino, who was eight years old at the time of trial and six years old at the time of the occurrence, was called by the defense. On initially being sworn by the court clerk, Chino indicated that he did not understand what was asked of him. The trial judge asked him, "All right, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're going to give here today will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God[?]" Chino responded

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1-07-1629 nonverbally and was told he had to do so aloud and then said, "Yes." When asked if he understood what the judge said to him, he again responded nonverbally. He ultimately stated that he did understand. Chino remembered his brother going to the hospital, but lacked any other way to remember the day of the events. He knew he went to school that day, was picked up by defendant, taken home, did his homework, and then went outside. While he was inside the house with Nyshon, he did not recall picking him up or dropping him. Likewise, Chino did not recall telling his aunt, Salina, he was sorry for hurting Nyshon and how Nyshon slipped out of his hands. While he remembered telling his maternal grandmother that he picked up Nyshon because he was crying, he did not recall telling her he dropped Nyshon. Chino also did not recall meeting with a woman from DCFS named Karen Wilson or telling anyone from DCFS that he "dropped Nyshon on Friday and Nyshon is now in heaven." Chino admitted to having lied and told varying stories about what happened to his brother and denied being told to lie by any grown-ups. When asked to tell the "really, really truth," Chino said he spent the entire day outside riding his bike. On further examination, Chino said he went home to start his homework right after school and that he had not been on his bike all day long. Again, no adult told him what to say. After Chino testified, defense counsel advised the court of his intent to call three additional witnesses to introduce Chino's prior inconsistent statements thereby impeaching his trial testimony. The trial judge observed that Chino appeared "very youthful" and that "the demeanor of the statements of Chino Johnson first even taking the oath [sic] the Court is not

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1-07-1629 satisfied that he understood or fully understands the difference between a truth [sic] and a lie or the moral obligation to testify truthfully." Neither side ever challenged Chino's competency to testify and the court did not perceive it was its function to do so. The trial judge indicated that his observations supported his belief that Chino "did not have any ability to recognize his obligation as the oath requires to testify truthfully in this case." When faced with the defense request to call witnesses to impeach its own witness, the trial judge observed that it would have to be limited to his credibility. In turn, the judge expressed uncertainty as to why Chino was called and what was to be gained by impeaching his credibility. Furthermore, this was clearly a situation where "Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 3.11" would come into play and would limit the consideration of any prior inconsistent statement to the issue of credibility and could not be considered substantively. To do so would be legally improper. As such, he asked the defense what was accomplished through Chino's testimony and what the defense perceived would be accomplished by permitting impeachment. Defense counsel responded that Chino was called in hopes that he would "tell what we believed to be the truth." The truth, according to defense counsel, was "That he actually did drop the child." Defense counsel agreed with the trial judge's assessment of Chino's credibility, but the key point for the defense was Chino's credibility stemming from his denial that he actually dropped Nyshon. According to the trial judge, it was clear that the purpose of calling Chino was to obtain an admission that he dropped or otherwise harmed Nyshon. However, Chino denied doing so and the defense was now planning to call three witnesses that would say Chino told them various

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1-07-1629 things acknowledging that he somehow injured Nyshon. The judge then surmised that this purported impeachment evidence was actually going to be offered substantively, for the truth of the alleged statements. Defense counsel claimed the testimony was supportive of the theory that they did not know what happened to Nyshon where Chino and several other people were potentially alone with him. Yet, rather incongruously they were not planning to argue that Nyshon "did it." In sum, the judge observed that it was still unclear what the defense was trying to accomplish by the impeachment other than that he was being truthful now or was lying now based on the prior statements. Otherwise, the trial judge did not see that Chino's testimony contributed to the proceedings. Perceiving that the defense was attempting to treat these statements substantively, the judge prophylactically forbade the parties from improperly arguing Chino's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. The State indicated they would be making a motion in limine as to the contemplated testimony on the basis of relevance. The trial judge said he saw no legitimate purpose for calling these witnesses. Defense counsel responded that the State's motion was an unfair tactic that would put him in a "very difficult position" with jury since he set up the impeachment of Chino. The trial judge indicated that the defense could argue that defendant was not present when the injuries were inflicted, if they thought Chino was truthful on that point. However, this fact did not open the door to impeachment of Chino to "subtly" say that Chino is the one who did it. Otherwise, the proposed impeachment did not appear to be about Chino's credibility, but rather was to place his inculpatory statements before the jury.

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1-07-1629 The State's motion in limine was granted with the court reasoning the testimony would "unduly and unfairly cloud the legitimate issues before this jury" and the out-of-court statements could not possibly be used as substantive evidence. However, the parties were permitted to argue whether to believe Chino's testimony that defendant was not present when Nyshon was injured. The trial judge also raised and discussed, at length, whether Chino's statements would qualify as an exception to hearsay as a declaration or statement against penal interest. He interpreted relevant case law and applied it to the facts in the case at bar, concluding that Chino's statements to others lacked "any indicia of trustworthiness." Hence, none of the proffered statements made by Chino to others were properly admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule. The defense then rested and the parties delivered their closing arguments. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Evidentiary rulings are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and ought not be reversed barring a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 281, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1162 (1990). This is equally true for rulings on motions in limine. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392, 813 N.E.2d 181, 196 (2004). Trial courts must determine whether proffered evidence "fairly tends to prove or disprove the offense charged and whether that evidence is relevant in that it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable." People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 132, 871 N.E.2d 728, 750 (2007). Trial courts can reject offered evidence as irrelevant for lacking probative value due to its remote nature, uncertainty, or

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1-07-1629 potential for unfair prejudice. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d at 392, 813 N.E.2d at 196. Evidentiary rulings will only be found to constitute abuses of discretion when they are "arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1188 (2001). Evidence is deemed admissible where its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 323, 362 N.E.2d 295, 297 (1977). On review, we are mindful that evidentiary rulings are not made in isolation; instead, they involve the consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case before the court. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 89-90, 792 N.E.2d at 1188. Perfecting the Purported Impeachment of Chino's Testimony Here, as in Wheeler, defendant refers to her right to present a defense as the cornerstone of her appeal. See also People v. Molsby, 66 Ill. App. 3d 647, 657, 383 N.E.2d 1336, 1344 (1978). Although we are mindful of the fundamental underpinnings of this claim, we note nonetheless that this right is not limitless; "it is also true that defining the precise limits controlling the admission of such evidence is difficult and if the evidence is too remote in time or too speculative to shed light on the fact to be found, it should be excluded." Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 132, 871 N.E.2d at 750. Manifestly, we must remain focused on the relevance of the proffered evidence. See Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 132, 871 N.E.2d at 750. Thus, we observe, as did our supreme court in People v. McLaurin: "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is, in plain terms, the right to present a defense. [Citation.] *** However, more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to establish a

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1-07-1629 violation of the right to compulsory process that the sixth amendment guarantees. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193, 1202, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982). *** The defendant must make at least some plausible showing of how the testimony of the witness would have been both material and favorable to his defense. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1202, 102 S. Ct. at 3446; People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1064 (1993). Evidence is material when it tends to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (1995). The pertinent inquiry with respect to materiality is not whether the evidence might have helped the defense but whether it is reasonably likely that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the case. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d at 507; see Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868-69, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1203-04, 102 S. Ct. at 3447." People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, 88-89, 703 N.E.2d 11, 25-26 (1998). Yet, concomitantly the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are "not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973). We likewise discern that Supreme Court Rule 238(a) provides that a witness can be impeached by any party (188 Ill. 2d R. 238(a)) within certain limits: "[T]o do so, a party must show that the witnesses' testimony has damaged rather than failed to support the position of the impeaching party. People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d

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1-07-1629 545, 563(1982). It is only when the witness testimony is more damaging than his complete failure to testify would have been that impeachment is useful. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 563-64. The effect of evidence admitted for impeachment is that it tends to (1) discredit the witness (People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 359 (1994)), and (2) cancel the witness' damaging testimony (Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 563)." People v. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d 598, 610, 673 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (1996). Damaging testimony is that which is actually helpful to the opposing party's case. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 360, 643 N.E.2d 646, 658 (1994). In Weaver, our supreme court concisely explained the necessity and rationale for allowing impeachment by prior inconsistent statements only under very narrow circumstances: "A court's witness, or any witness for that matter, cannot be impeached by prior inconsistent statements unless his testimony has damaged, rather than failed to support the position of the impeaching party. The reason for this is simple: No possible reason exists to impeach a witness who has not contradicted any of the impeaching party's evidence, except to bring inadmissible hearsay to the attention of the jury. Impeachment is supposed to cancel out the witness' testimony. It is only when the witness' testimony is more damaging than his complete failure to testify would have been that impeachment is useful. See People v. Johnson (1929), 333 Ill. 469; People v. Chitwood (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 1017; McCormick, Evidence sec. 36 (2d ed. 1972)." People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 563-64, 442 N.E.2d 255, 262-63 (1982).

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1-07-1629 We are further mindful that there is a potential risk in using prior inconsistent statements as impeachment wherein a jury could consider them as evidence of the truth of the impeaching words. People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 252, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1161 (1988). The interplay of impeachment and substantive evidence was succinctly described in People v. Barton, where the court explained: "It is black-letter law that a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only to attack his credibility and cannot be admitted as proof of the substance of the statement. [Citation.] The purpose of impeachment is to destroy credibility, not to prove the facts stated in the impeaching statement, and what a witness says out of court and out of the presence of defendant is pure hearsay and incompetent. [Citation.]" People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 954, 961, 677 N.E.2d 476, 481 (1997). See also Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 359, 643 N.E.2d at 657. Impeachment by prior inconsistent statements similarly presents a problem for juries when called upon to compartmentalize the testimony as regarding credibility, rather than substantively. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 364, 643 N.E.2d at 660; see People v. Paradise , 30 Ill. 2d 381, 384, 196 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1964) (discussing the challenge to jurors to differentiate between impeachment of credibility and substantive evidence when faced with statements witnesses "will not affirm *** in a public proceeding"). Initially, we must agree with the State's position that Chino's testimony did not damage defendant's case, though it plainly did not support her theory of the case. See Sims, 285 Ill. App.

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1-07-1629 3d at 610, 673 N.E.2d at 1127. The record establishes that there were several people, including Chino, who were alone with Nyshon at some point near the time he was injured. Additionally, Chino testified, in part, that defendant was not in the apartment at the time when Nyshon was hurt. This assertion certainly does not damage defendant's case. Nothing about Chino's testimony, most particularly his denials of having harmed Nyshon, does violence to defendant's theory of an unknown perpetrator or that of accidental injuries. Likewise, the line of questions resulting in Chino's denials may just have easily created this precise inference apparently sought by defendant. Yet, significance necessarily attaches to the fact that Chino's testimony did not actually inculpate defendant. Given the guidepost provided in Sims, we fail to perceive Chino's testimony as more damaging to defendant than if he had never been called. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 673 N.E.2d at 1127. In contrast, the prior statement of the witness sought to be elicited in Chambers actually incriminated the witness and tended to exculpate the defendant. That is plainly not the case here. We cannot conclude that the proposed testimony would have been useful to the proceedings. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 673 N.E.2d at 1127. Manifestly, the import of such testimony would have exceeded the proper purpose of impeachment and tended to lead the jury to believe the truth of the impeaching statement rather than calling into question Chino's credibility. See Barton, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 961, 677 N.E.2d at 481. The Curative Effect of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, 4th No. 3.11 Defendant contends the use of Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (hererinafter IPI Criminal 4th), limiting the scope of consideration of prior inconsistent

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1-07-1629 statements, was a safeguard against the jury improperly considering the proposed testimony substantively. Likewise, her counsel's assurances that the closing argument would not urge the jury to consider such testimony substantively provided another safeguard to make way this desired line of impeachment. In nearly the same breath, she claims the defense "should have been given the opportunity to cast doubt on Chino's credibility where he testified that he did not hurt his brother." We disagree on each point and observe that courts have deemed reversals appropriate even where such limiting jury instructions were given. See Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 366, 643 N.E.2d at 661. The record establishes that doubt was cast on Chino's credibility by his own words and pattern of lying and admitting to it on the stand. It is difficult to imagine what more could be accomplished by permitting the other three witnesses to testify. The inference the defense sought was already in play, i.e., that Chino might have been the one to hurt his brother. Submitting additional testimony that he said he hurt his brother, despite his denials at trial, in our view exceeds the bounds of proper impeachment by a wide measure and poses a serious risk that any such testimony would be considered substantively by the jury. See Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 252, 522 N.E.2d at 1161. Considered against this record, we cannot conclude that instructing the jury pursuant to IPI Criminal 4th No.3.11 was sufficient to insulate the proposed testimony against improper consideration by the jury. The Trial Court's Consideration of Chino's Competency Defendant boldly claims the trial court erred when it considered Chino's competence as a witness in determining whether to allow the proposed impeachment as evidence. Specifically,

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1-07-1629 defendant claims the trial court found Chino incompetent to testify and then erred in "doing nothing" in the wake of that determination. Even more incongruously, defendant asserts the trial judge "was prohibited from doing nothing about Chino's competency, and by his inaction, denied Stephanie the right to present a defense." (Emphasis added.) Defendant fails to cite to any authority to support such novel and peculiar arguments. Moreover, a careful review of this portion of the record conclusively undermines this claim and its supporting logic. The trial judge's comments about Chino's testimony were not in our view a finding of incompetency. He said, "frankly, I don't believe Chino is a competent witness to testify." His comments are more properly classified as either thinking aloud or playing the devil's advocate in the context of considering the proposed witnesses. Notably, the parties chose to forego a competency hearing earlier and there was nothing to accomplish in conducting such a hearing at this stage. While defendant now faults the trial judge for "doing nothing," we note that neither party suggested striking Chino's testimony. Moreover, the defense benefitted by his testimony

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