SIXTH DIVISION
August 27, 2004

Defendant, Andre Carroll, appeals the trial court's summary denial of his habeas corpuspetition. He contends that the court improperly treated his petition as a postconviction petition. For the following reasons, we affirm.

In September 1989, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to anextended term of 60 years' imprisonment and 3 years' mandatory supervision. This conviction andsentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. Carroll, 257 Ill. App. 3d 663, 628 N.E.2d1036 (1993). Thereafter, defendant filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was dismissedon November 13, 1997. Defendant's appeal to the Seventh Circuit was denied in December 1988. On October 9, 2002, defendant filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief in the circuit courtof Cook County pursuant to section 10-101 et seq. of the Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS5/10-101 et seq. (West 2002)). In that petition, defendant argued that his extended-term sentencewas unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct.2348 (2000), because the factors used to extend his sentence were not alleged in the indictment orproven beyond a reasonable doubt. On December 6, 2002, the trial court entered an order holdingthat the defendant's claim was of a nonjurisdictional nature; thus, a habeas corpus petition wasnot the proper avenue for relief. The trial court did find that the defendant's claim was cognizableunder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)), and addressedthe petition as such. See People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 292 N.E. 2d 379(1973). The trial court then summarily denied the petition, finding that Apprendi was notapplicable. Defendant filed this timely appeal.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his pleading as if itwere a postconviction petition. Defendant argues that the habeas corpus statute does not providefor the summary dismissal of a petition. Defendant further contends that he was prejudiced by thecourt treating his petition as a postconviction petition as the trial court put him at risk of waivinghis opportunity to file a postconviction petition.

We recognize a dispute among the districts of this court concerning whether a trial courtmay summarily dismiss a defendant's habeas corpus petition. The Second District has addressedthe issue involving a habeas corpus petition as well as petitions for relief from judgment filedpursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)) andmandamus actions. The Second District holds that a trial court commits reversible error bydismissing a habeas corpus petition without giving defendant notice and an opportunity torespond to the trial court's action and this court cannot look beyond this error to assess the meritsof the petition. People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d 987, 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist. 2004);see also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill. App. 3d 191, 193-99, 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill. 2d 549, 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill. App.3d 292, 295-97, 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist. 2002)(holding that a trial court cannotsummarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); see also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d 175,176-79, 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist. 2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill. 2d 552, 809 N.E.2d1291 (2004) (relying on Gaines and holding that a trial court is not authorized to summarilydismiss a mandamus complaint).

However, the Fourth District reached the opposite conclusion and holds that a trial courthas the inherent authority to strike a section 2-1401 petition sua sponte if the court finds thepetition is frivolous and without merit. People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (4th Dist. 2004). See also Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 839-43,774 N.E.2d 457, 461-64 (4th Dist. 2002) (holding that a trial court may evaluate mandamuspetitions to determine their sufficiency and has inherent authority to strike those petitions suasponte).

This district has not addressed the issue in the context of a habeas corpus petition,however, we have been in agreement with the Fourth District in related contexts. See Owens v.Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 811 N.E.2d 738 (1st Dist., 2004) (agreeing with the holding inMason and Bramlett that a trial court has the authority to sua sponte dismiss a mandamuscomplaint and finding no prejudice to defendant where his complaint was frivolous); People v.Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 718 812 N.E.2d 581(1st Dist., 2004) (disagreeing with Pearson andholding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing a section 2-1401 petition suasponte where the issue presented was a pure question of law, the claim was frivolous and withoutmerit and no prejudice to the defendant resulted).

In Taylor, the defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). In the petition, thedefendant argued that his extended-term sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The trial court summarilydenied this petition without prior notice to the defendant, finding that Apprendi did not applyretroactively. On appeal, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itsummarily dismissed the defendant's petition sua sponte. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 720, 812N.E.2d at 583. The court explained that it could look beyond any alleged procedural defectwhere the defendant's petition raised a pure question of law, was frivolous and completely withoutmerit and no prejudice resulted from the trial court's dismissal. The court found that defendant'spetition presented a purely legal issue to the trial court: whether his extended-term sentence wasvoid, or whether Apprendi applied to his 60-year extended-term sentence which was imposed in1979. The court stated that pursuant to People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 791 N.E.2d 489(2003), Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Thus, the court helddefendant's claim was frivolous and without merit. The Taylor court further explained that noprejudice to defendant resulted from the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petitionbecause nothing could cure the inherent defect of his petition. Taylor 349 Ill. App. 3d at 720-21,812 N.E.2d at 584.

In Winfrey, the State argued that the trial court may evaluate the sufficiency of a habeascorpus petition and dismiss that petition sua sponte. The Winfrey court, however, rejected thisargument and applied the reasoning in Gaines and Shellstrom. The court explained that thehabeas corpus statute does not authorize the trial court to summarily deny a habeas corpuspetition. The court further reasoned that even if the petition failed to state a cognizable claim, thecourt erred because the defendant was given neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard on theissues upon which the trial court based its dismissal. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 989.

We disagree with this holding in Winfrey and decline to follow it here. Rather, we adhereto the reasoning in Taylor and hold that in this case, based on the specific allegations of thisdefendant's habeas corpus petition, the trial court properly dismissed the petition.

We first find that the trial court did not err in treating the petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)). If the trial court determinesthat a pro se petition, however labeled, and however inartfully drawn, alleges violations of thepetitioner's rights cognizable in a post conviction proceeding, the court may treat the petitionunder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 292N.E. 2d 379 (1973). Here, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that hisextended-term sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi. The trial court properly found thatthis claim was not jurisdictional in nature and that a petition for habeas corpus was not theappropriate avenue for relief. Pursuant to Twomey, since the defendant's claim was cognizableunder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the court may address it as such.

Next, we find the trial court properly dismissed the petition without an evidentiaryhearing. We note that defendant does not raise any legal argument or cite legal authority tosupport the substantive merit of his claim. This is most assuredly because there is none. Defendant argues that his extended-term sentence violates Apprendi. Defendant's claim is withoutmerit because Apprendi does not apply retroactively to this case. See People v. De La Paz, 204Ill. 2d at 428. Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to an extended term based on a priorconviction for armed robbery. The prior conviction is an enhancing factor that does not have tobe proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed.2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

Finally, we find no prejudice to defendant resulted from the trial court's order treating thepetition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The defendant argues that he may haveunwillingly waived his right to file a postconviction petition. We disagree. We acknowledge thatthe Act contemplates the filing of only one such petition and that any claims not raised in thatpetition are waived. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has allowed successive postconvictionpetitions "where fundamental fairness so requires." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274, 606N.E.2d 1078 (1992). Thus, defendant may file a successive postconviction petition where he canestablish good cause for failing to raise the claimed error in prior proceedings and actual prejudiceresulting from the error. See People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449, 749 N.E.2d 932 (2001);Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 278-79. We find defendant's claim of potential prejudice to be insufficient.

For the reasons stated, we find that the trial court did not err in treating the defendant'shabeas corpus petition as a postconviction petition. We further find that the court properlydismissed the petition without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

O'MARA FROSSARD, P.J., and FITZGERALD SMITH, J., concur.