THIRD DIVISION
March 19, 2003

This appeal arises from defendant's convictions for first degree murder and aggravateddischarge of a firearm following a simultaneous, severed jury trial with codefendants BrettonHolman and Raul Negrete, who were both tried to the bench. Codefendant Holman wasacquitted, while codefendant Negrete was convicted and sentenced to a 20-year prison term. Codefendant Negrete is not a party to this appeal.⁽¹⁾ Defendant was sentenced to concurrentsentences of 40 years' imprisonment for murder and 10 years' imprisonment for aggravateddischarge of a firearm.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession. In that motion, healleged that before he made an inculpatory statement, he was falsely promised a reduction in thecharge if he admitted his participation in the shooting. Defendant further alleged that theassistant State's Attorney added to the psychological coercion by falsely informing him that hemay be charged with manslaughter. Defendant concluded that because his confession waspsychologically coerced and involuntary, it should have been suppressed at trial.

Detective Joe Belmonte testified that he worked for the Village of Mount Prospect andwas assigned to investigate the shooting death of Dareth Womack on April 24, 1999. As part ofthat investigation, he interviewed defendant at the Mount Prospect police department. Alsopresent for the interview was Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Mary Beth Kinnerk. Prior to theinterview, defendant was advised of his Miranda warnings by ASA Kinnerk from a preprintedform, which was provided by the Mount Prospect police department. After stating that heunderstood his rights, defendant agreed to make a statement, and the interview lastedapproximately 30 minutes. At the conclusion of that interview, defendant requested to speak tohis cousin, Ashor Jajou. Both Detective Belmonte and ASA Kinnerk left the room, andarrangements were made to accommodate defendant's request. Approximately one hour later,Detective Belmonte and ASA Kinnerk returned with Ashor Jajou. Jajou told defendant, "Bro,you have to do the right thing, this sh-- has got to stop. Somebody's dead now." Shortly afterthat statement was made, Detective Belmonte escorted Jajou out of the interview room. WhenDetective Belmonte returned, ASA Kinnerk met him at the door and requested that he get waterand tissue for defendant, which he did. ASA Kinnerk then informed him that defendant wantedto speak to her alone. Aside from those conversations, neither Detective Belmonte nor any otherpolice personnel spoke with defendant. Detective Belmonte testified that neither he nor anyoneelse made false promises to defendant in exchange for his confession. Detective Belmonte wasthen questioned as to whether ASA Kinnerk informed defendant that he may be charged withmanslaughter, to which Detective Belmonte responded, "Yes."

On cross-examination, Detective Belmonte testified that defendant had been brought tothe station at about noon and was not questioned prior to 8 p.m. At that time, defendant initiallydenied his involvement in the shooting. Detective Belmonte spoke with Jajou before he spokewith defendant. Defense counsel then questioned Detective Belmonte as to whether he saidanything to defendant regarding his cooperation with the police, to which he responded, "No." Defense counsel's questions concerning whether there was any discussion between DetectiveBelmonte and ASA Kinnerk concerning the charges to be brought against defendant wereobjected to by the State, and those objections were sustained by the trial court. DetectiveBelmonte further testified that Jajou was at the station because he had been detained for anunrelated matter by another department.

ASA Mary Beth Kinnerk testified for the State that on April 24, 1999, she was assignedto an in-progress investigation with the Mount Prospect police department regarding thehomicide of Dareth Womack. At 8 p.m. she and Detective Belmonte interviewed defendant. Prior to the interview, ASA Kinnerk advised defendant that she was not his lawyer, and she alsoadvised him of his Miranda rights from a preprinted form, which was supplied by the MountProspect police department and which defendant subsequently signed. Defendant then agreed tospeak with her, and the subsequent conversation lasted approximately 30 minutes. At theconclusion of that conversation, defendant asked to speak with his cousin, Jajou, and Kinnerkand Detective Belmonte went to locate Jajou. They returned with Jajou at approximately 9 p.m. Jajou initially spoke to defendant in what ASA Kinnerk believed was Spanish, but DetectiveBelmonte told him to speak English. At that point, Jajou told defendant, "Look, somebody'sdead. This has gotta stop. You've got to tell the truth." Immediately thereafter, DetectiveBelmonte escorted Jajou from the interview room. ASA Kinnerk was left alone with defendant,and he began to cry. Defendant then indicated that he wanted a glass of water, and whenDetective Belmonte returned to the room, ASA Kinnerk asked him to get defendant a glass ofwater and some tissue. When Detective Belmonte returned with those items, ASA Kinnerkinformed him that defendant wanted to speak to her alone and that he did not want any policeofficers in the room. ASA Kinnerk and defendant subsequently had an hour-long conversation,after which she asked defendant whether he would agree to have his statement memorialized ineither a handwritten or a court-reported statement, and she explained the difference between thetwo. Defendant indicated that he did not want anyone else present and that he wanted ahandwritten statement. ASA Kinnerk began to write defendant's statement at approximately10:30 p.m. while he ate dinner. It took her about an hour to write the statement, after which shewent over the entire statement with defendant. Defendant was sitting next to ASA Kinnerk asshe read the statement out loud to him. Defendant made corrections to the statement as she read. After all corrections had been made, both she and defendant signed the statement, a copy ofwhich she identified at the hearing. ASA Kinnerk denied that she or anyone else made anypromises to defendant if he admitted to participating in the shooting. She also denied tellingdefendant that he would be or may be charged with manslaughter.

On cross-examination, ASA Kinnerk testified that she arrived at the station at 7 p.m., atwhich time she learned that defendant had been in custody at another police department on adifferent matter prior to being brought to the Mount Prospect police station. When she firstspoke with defendant at 8 p.m. in Detective Belmonte's presence, defendant denied anyinvolvement in the shooting. After that initial conversation, she and Detective Belmonte left theroom and did not return until defendant's cousin was available to speak with him. ASA Kinnerkindicated that during her second conversation with defendant, there was a discussion of possiblecharges for the shooting, but that she told defendant involuntary manslaughter was not a possiblecharge. Defendant asked her what the shooter would be looking at and she told him first degreemurder. He then asked about second degree murder, to which she responded that there was nosecond degree murder charge in Illinois and that one can only be found guilty of second degreemurder after first being found guilty of first degree murder with some mitigating circumstances. Defendant then asked about manslaughter, to which she responded that involuntary manslaughterdid not apply to a gang-related, drive-by shooting. ASA Kinnerk then showed defendant in herstatute book that drive-by shootings were under the first degree murder heading. Defensecounsel then asked ASA Kinnerk whether "it seemed to [her] as though Mr. Jajou was suggestingto [defendant] that he should take responsibility for the shooting which occurred." An objectionto that question was sustained by the court. ASA Kinnerk testified that they never discussed thecharges after that initial inquiry by defendant.

On redirect, ASA Kinnerk testified that prior to her interview with defendant, she wasaware of statements that had been made by the two codefendants, both of which implicateddefendant as the shooter. She also testified that it was defendant's questioning which led to herexplanation of the various charges of first degree murder, second degree murder andmanslaughter.

Defendant then testified on his own behalf that after he denied shooting the victim,Detective Belmonte came into the interview room and told him that he was being charged withmurder and said, "your boys ratted on you." ASA Kinnerk then arrived and introduced herself. They talked, and then Jajou was brought in. Defendant testified that Jajou was his cousin butwas not involved with any gang. Detective Belmonte and ASA Kinnerk were both present whiledefendant and Jajou talked. Afterwards, ASA Kinnerk told defendant she would try to chargehim with involuntary manslaughter if he changed his story. Defendant and ASA Kinnerk thenhad a private conversation, during which they discussed the facts of the victim's shooting, afterwhich, defendant agreed to sign a statement. Defendant testified that ASA Kinnerk helped himmake the statement seem like involuntary manslaughter and that her statements gave him hope,which is why he signed the statement.

On cross-examination, defendant testified that he thought his cousin was telling him totake the rap. He could not remember whether ASA Kinnerk explained to him the differencebetween first and second degree murder but did remember looking at the statute book with her. Defendant did not recall whether he was given a choice of having a handwritten or court-reportedstatement but did recall choosing a handwritten one. He testified that he read the statementbefore signing it in several places and acknowledged that the statement indicated that it wasfreely and voluntarily given, and that no promises had been made in connection with it.

At the close of the evidence, the court found that defendant's statement was not theproduct of psychological or any other type of coercion and that defendant's will was notoverborne in any way. The trial court also found that there were no promises made to defendantregarding involuntary manslaughter and denied defendant's motion to suppress the statement.

The first State witness to testify was Stephanie Griffin. On April 24, 1999, atapproximately 12:30 a.m., she was a front-seat passenger in a white Lincoln that was en route toan Amoco gas station. Dareth Womack, the victim, was driving. She knew that Dareth was amember of the Gangster Disciples. At some point, a red pickup truck containing three peoplepulled up beside them. The driver of this truck, his front seat passenger and the passenger in thebed of the truck all appeared to be male Hispanics. The individual in the bed of the truck threwup a Latin Kings sign. At that time, according to Griffin, the Latin Kings and the GangsterDisciples were rivals.

Dareth continued driving until they reached the gas station, and the red pickup truckfollowed them. Dareth told her he was not going to do anything because she was in the car, so heturned to his left and waved to the men in the truck. Stephanie described this wave as"sarcastic." Within 30 seconds three shots were fired from the truck into their car, one of whichstruck and killed Dareth. Stephanie jumped out of the car and ran into the mini-mart at the gasstation and informed the clerk that her friend had just been shot. The police were notified andcame to the gas station. Although Stephanie viewed a lineup, she was unable to identify anyone.

Officer Paul Settecase of the Glenview police department testified as an expert witness ongang crimes. In April of 1999, the Latin Kings and the Gangster Disciples were rivals. OfficerSettecase testified that based upon his experience, defendant was a member of the Latin Kings atthe time of the shooting, and the victim was a member of the Gangster Disciples.

Detective Belmonte's trial testimony was substantially the same as his testimony at thepretrial hearing. On April 24, 1999, he was contacted by the Glenview police department, whichinformed him that they had a suspect in mind who might have some connection to the shooting. After speaking with that suspect, Detective Belmonte began searching for two other suspects, oneof whom was defendant. Later that evening, Detective Belmonte and ASA Kinnerk had a 30-minute conversation with defendant, after which, defendant wanted to know with what crime theshooter could be charged. When ASA Kinnerk told him first degree murder, defendant askedabout second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. ASA Kinnerk then informeddefendant that a person could not be charged with second degree murder unless he was firstconvicted of first degree murder and that involuntary manslaughter did not apply. ASA Kinnerkthen pulled out her Illinois Compiled Statutes book and circled the section related to drive-byshootings, which was under the first degree murder section of the statute. Defendant then askedto speak to his cousin, Jajou. Subsequent to that conversation with Jajou, defendant spoke withASA Kinnerk alone, and Detective Belmonte had no further conversation with defendant.

On cross-examination, Detective Belmonte testified that although he knew Jajou to bedefendant's fellow Latin Kings gang member, he did not know whether he was the "head" of theLatin Kings on the north shore. He also testified that prior to the initial interview with defendant,he and ASA Kinnerk had discussed interviews he had with the codefendants who were incustody, and that he told defendant what his codefendants had said about his involvement in theshooting. He testified that he heard ASA Kinnerk explain the charge of involuntarymanslaughter after defendant inquired about it.

ASA Kinnerk's trial testimony was consistent with her pretrial testimony. Initially, whenshe first spoke with defendant at 8 p.m., he denied involvement in the shooting. Defendant theninquired about the charges the shooter would be looking at, and ASA Kinnerk explained them tohim. Defendant then asked to speak to his cousin, Jajou. After his cousin spoke to him and leftthe room, defendant began to cry. Defendant then stated that he would tell ASA Kinnerk whathappened, but that he did not want to talk to any policemen. ASA Kinnerk relayed thatinformation to Detective Belmonte, and he left her alone with defendant. They spoke forapproximately one hour, after which ASA Kinnerk asked defendant if he wanted to memorializehis statement in handwritten or court-reported form. Defendant chose a handwritten statement,and ASA Kinnerk subsequently wrote out the statement, which she reviewed with defendant. After having the opportunity to make corrections to the statement, defendant signed the statementon each page.

On cross-examination, ASA Kinnerk denied telling defendant that she would help him orthat she would charge him with manslaughter.

Defendant's statement was then published to the jury as follows: On April 23, 1999,defendant was a member of the Latin Kings gang as a soldier and he had gotten a gun from afellow Latin Kings. Codefendants Negrete and Holman, who were also Latin Kings, knew thathe had the gun, and the three of them decided to ride around their neighborhood in Holman's redtruck. Defendant was working security and sat in the bed area of the truck. They drove aroundtheir neighborhood, and when they did not find any rival gang members, they decided to driveinto rival gang (Gangster Disciples) territory. Defendant then saw a white Lincoln automobiledriven by a member of the Gangster Disciples that he knew as Mashod (Dareth MashodWomack) pulling into a gas station. Defendant saw Mashod throw up the pitchfork, which was asign of disrespect to defendant, who responded by throwing down the pitchfork. Mashodresponded by dropping the crown, which meant "king killer," and defendant represented backwith a crown up. Holman then pulled the truck around the corner and Mashod pulled his cartowards one of the pumps at the gas station. Defendant assumed that Mashod was "strapping,"meaning carrying a gun, so defendant fired three shots in the direction of Mashod's car. Defendant never saw Mashod with a gun but assumed that the passenger in Mashod's car was amale and Mashod's fellow gang member; if he had known there was a girl in the car, he wouldnever have shot at Mashod. Defendant and his codefendants then drove away, and defendantgave the gun to codefendant Negrete and did not know what he did with it.

Defendant testified on his own behalf that he was a member of the Latin Kings gang withan entry-level position as a soldier. Jajou was the chief of the gang who gave orders. If thechief's orders were not obeyed, a violation would occur, meaning that the offender could getbeaten up. On April 23, 1999, defendant and several other members of the gang were drinkingalcohol at Jajou's house in the Michael Todd Apartments. He left with codefendants Negrete andHolman and went to Negrete's uncle's house in the Boxwood apartments. They were in Holman'sred truck, Negrete was in the passenger seat, and defendant was in the bed of the truck. Afterfinding that Negrete's uncle was not at home, they headed back to Jajou's house. They turnedonto Euclid Avenue, where they saw Mashod's white Lincoln. They pulled alongside of theLincoln, and he, defendant, exchanged gang signs with Mashod. Mashod then turned into anearby gas station, and Holman turned the truck around. Defendant heard a gunshot and duckeddown before hearing two more gunshots. Defendant was unsure where the shots came from butthought that they came from the cab of the truck. Holman then drove back to Jajou's house. Thenext afternoon, defendant was taken to the Mount Prospect police station and placed in aninterview room with Detective Belmonte and ASA Kinnerk. When defendant deniedinvolvement in the shooting, Detective Belmonte told him that his friends ratted on him. Defendant then asked what the shooter would get, and ASA Kinnerk brought out her statute bookand said that since this was a drive-by shooting, the shooter would be charged with first degreemurder. ASA Kinnerk then told him that she could try and get manslaughter for him, dependingupon what he said. Detective Belmonte left the room and returned with Jajou. Jajou sat downnext to defendant and told him in Assyrian to take the rap. After saying that, Jajou said, inEnglish, "Do the right thing, bro. This has got to stop." Defendant testified that he thought hehad been given an order by his gang's chief to cooperate with the police and the ASA. AfterDetective Belmonte escorted Jajou from the room, defendant began crying and ASA Kinnerkasked him if he needed a napkin and some water. She then asked him whether he wished tospeak to her alone, and he said that he would. ASA Kinnerk then told defendant the facts thatshe already knew. Defendant thought she was going to help him because she seemed nice. ASAKinnerk never asked defendant whether he wanted a court-reported statement but started to writethe statement out herself based on what she already knew. At this point in his testimony,defendant fainted, and court was adjourned until the next morning. When the trial resumed,defendant testified that ASA Kinnerk talked with him and took notes. She then left the room andreturned with the statement fully written out, which they reviewed and he signed. He signed thestatement because he had a direct order from his chief, and he was scared that if he did not followit, he would suffer consequences. He thought ASA Kinnerk was helping him because she wrotein the statement that defendant assumed the victim had a gun but that he never actually saw a gunin the victim's hands.

After closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder andaggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied.

Defendant has raised four issues on appeal. He first contends that the trial court erred indenying his motion to suppress his statement because he was in a vulnerable mental state at thetime the statement was given and was led to believe that he would only be charged withmanslaughter if he confessed. Alternatively, defendant contends that the trial court denied him afair hearing on his motion to suppress because the court did not allow defense counsel to elicitrelevant evidence from the witnesses or make an offer of proof regarding the circumstances thatwould have supported his allegation that his confession was involuntary. Defendant nextcontends that because a juror was excused for fear of gang intimidation and mentioned that otherjurors had expressed similar concerns, the trial court erred by not making further inquiry orinvestigation. Defendant also contends that the portion of the reenacted truth-in-sentencing lawthat bars good-time credit for first degree murder defendants is unconstitutional because itdefeats the constitutional requirement that all penalties shall be determined both according to"the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to usefulcitizenship," and because it classifies all persons convicted of first degree murder as similarlysituated with respect to their qualifications for good-time credit. Finally, defendant contends thatthe trial court's reliance on improper sentencing factors denied him a fair sentencing hearing andrequires that his sentence be reduced or that the cause be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress hisstatement because he was in a vulnerable mental state at the time the statement was given and was led to believe that he would only be charged with manslaughter if he confessed. He arguesthat Detective Belmonte admitted at the pretrial hearing that ASA Kinnerk made such a promise.

In determining whether a confession was voluntary, we must consider the totality of thecircumstances. People v. Arroyo, 328 Ill. App. 3d 277, 286 (2002). Factors to consider includethe defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, andphysical condition at the time of the questioning; the legality and duration of the questioning; andany physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises. People v.Morales, 329 Ill. App. 3d 97, 111 (2002). No single factor is dispositive. Morales, 329 Ill. App.3d at 111. The test of voluntariness is "whether the defendant made the statement freely,voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant's willwas overcome at the time he or she confessed." People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996).

When reviewing whether defendant's statement was voluntary, we accord great deferenceto the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against themanifest weight of the evidence. Arroyo, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 287. However, we apply the denovo standard of review when analyzing the ultimate question of whether defendant's confessionwas voluntary. Morales, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 111.

Here, the trial court specifically found that defendant's statement was not the product ofpsychological or any other type of coercion and that his will was not overborne in any way. Thetrial court also found that there were no promises made to defendant regarding involuntarymanslaughter. When presented with a motion to suppress, the trial court must resolve conflictsin the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 289(1990). Here, the trial court was in a better position to assess the credibility and demeanor of thewitnesses who testified at the hearing and assess the relevant facts. The trial court resolved allconflicts in the evidence against defendant. After reviewing the testimony at the suppressionhearing, we conclude that the trial court's finding that defendant's confession was voluntary wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Alternatively, defendant contends that the trial court prevented him from developingadditional grounds to support his argument that his statement was involuntary. Specifically,defendant argues that the court prevented him from showing that his two codefendants namedhim as the shooter and that his cousin, the gang chief, ordered him to confess. However, therecord contradicts defendant's assertions. Detective Belmonte testified that after his interviewwith codefendant Holman, he began looking for defendant and codefendant Negrete. DetectiveBelmonte and ASA Kinnerk also testified that both codefendants implicated defendant as theshooter. Furthermore, defendant testified that it was his impression and belief that his cousin hadordered him to confess. Thus, we find defendant's argument to lack merit.

Defendant next contends that because a juror was excused due to his fear of gangintimidation and had "mentioned" that other jurors had expressed similar concerns, the trial courterred in sua sponte barring that juror from stating that other jurors had expressed similar fearsand who those jurors were and their comments.

On the second day of defendant's trial testimony, one of the jurors, Mr. DeGioia, approached one of the assistant State's Attorneys and asked if he could speak to her. She did notallow the juror to speak with her. The juror then contacted Deputy Sheriff Samuels and statedthat he had something important to talk to the judge about. The trial court then questioned Mr.DeGioia outside the presence of the jury. Mr. DeGioia stated that he was fearful becausemembers of defendant's family and various gang members present in the courtroom werefollowing the jurors to their cars. He was afraid that he had been followed home and feared forhis safety and that of his family. The following colloquy then took place:

"THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Have you spoken toany other jurors about this?

MR. DEGIOIA: No.

THE COURT: Not one word?

MR. DEGIOIA: Not - - I mean people have said something,not just me.

THE COURT: I'm asking have you spoken to any jurorsabout what you just told us now?

MR. DEGIOIA: I haven't - - I haven't said anything that I'mafraid or nothing. I just - - We have talked and the people havesaid, boy, you know, this is kind of weird and - -

THE COURT: I'm not asking you what all yourconversations were.

MR. DEGIOIA: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: I don't want you to tell me that. Wait for myquestion.

MR. DEGIOIA: We have - -

THE COURT: Wait for my question. My question to youis this: Did you talk to any other jurors about what you have justsaid to this Court now, yes or no?

MR. DEGIOIA: No, not - -

THE COURT: Okay. That's all I need. Mr. Sheppard, doyou have any questions?

MR. SHEPPARD: Your Honor, may I inquire? One thatconcerns me is what Mr. DeGioia said with reference to the otherjurors at this point.

THE COURT: Well, I'm a little hesitant because I don'twant to get into any matters that are not proper for us to hear. So ifyou keep them specifically to what he said here and his ability tobe fair to other jurors, yes; but I don't want you to delve into anyconversations, not that there were any conversations aboutevidence, but I don't want to delve into that.

MR. SHEPPARD: I won't address evidence, just in terms ofthe general fear that Mr. DeGioia has. I just want to know if he hastainted the other jurors. I think I am duty bound to ask thatquestion if you permit me to.

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MR. SHEPPARD: Based on any comments andconversations and things you have uttered out of your mouth toother jurors do you think you have made an impact on other jurors'ability to be composed and fair with regard to deliberating on theevidence and facts in this case?

MR. DEGIOIA: No, I don't think so.

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MR. SHEPPARD: By allowing that question to the Juror, Ithink I satisfied my duty to my client to insure that he didn't taintthe other jurors and he answered forthrightly that he did not believethat is the case, therefore I believe we can go forward in thismatter."

Based on the above colloquy, defendant argues that the trial court should haveinterrogated the entire jury for possible taint arising from their contact with jurorDeGioia.

As a rule, it is improper for jurors to discuss among themselves the case or any subjectconnected to the case until all the evidence has been presented and after receiving finalinstructions. People v. Aleman, 313 Ill. App. 3d 51, 63 (2000). However, it was within thesound discretion of the trial court whether to reopen voir dire of the jury. People v. Flowers, 52Ill. App. 3d 430, 436 (1977). It is only the improper abuse of that discretion by the trial courtthat is error, not the refusal to interrogate the jury. Flowers, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 436.

Here, immediately after the trial court was alerted of juror DeGioia's attempts to makecontact with the State's Attorney and his actual contact with Deputy Samuels, DeGioia wassummoned and questioned. Defendant's attorneys and the State's Attorneys were all present, anddefense counsel was permitted to further question DeGioia concerning his contact with the otherjurors. DeGioia stated that he had not expressed his concerns to the other jurors, and defensecounsel stated on the record that he was satisfied that the jury had not been tainted. Defendantnever requested that the entire jury be questioned, and the trial court's refusal not to sua spontequestion the entire jury did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d113, 134-35 (1988); Aleman, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 64; Flowers, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 437.

Defendant's third contention is that the recently reenacted truth-in-sentencing law, section3-6-3(a)(2)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2000)), whichbars first degree murder defendants from receiving "good conduct credit," is unconstitutionalbecause: (1) it defeats the Illinois constitutional requirement that "all penalties shall bedetermined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoringthe offender to useful citizenship"; and (2) it unconstitutionally classifies all persons convicted offirst degree murder as similarly situated with respect to their qualifications for good-conductcredit. He argues that the law defeats prisoner rehabilitation by depriving first degree murderdefendants of any incentive to rehabilitate themselves. Defendant also contends that the law"creates an unreasonable classification by consigning all defendants convicted of first degreemurder to the same bleak prospect of getting no credit for good conduct, despite the fact thatthere are (a) great differences in the culpability of various first degree murders, and (b)substantial differences between the potential for rehabilitation of different defendants."

While this issue was not raised in a post-trial motion, we find it is not waived because aconstitutional challenge to a statute may be made at any time. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448,454 (1989).

The original truth-in-sentencing law, enacted in 1994, was held unconstitutional by thesupreme court in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1999), which stated that the provisions wereenacted as part of a statute that violated the single-subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,