FOURTH DIVISION
January 24, 2002

Fifteen-year old defendant Terrence Griffin was tried andconvicted as an adult of first-degree murder and sentenced to 45years' imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that his confession wasinvoluntary and the trial court erred in denying his motion tosuppress. On appeal, we found that the trial court's consideration ofall of the factors under the totality of the circumstances test wasincomplete. We then remanded the case for the limited purpose of anew hearing on the voluntariness of defendant's statement,specifically addressing the presence or absence of defendant's parentsand any evidence of police conduct frustrating his parents' attemptsto confer with defendant. People v. Griffin, No. 1-97-0315 (1998)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We also retainedjurisdiction to allow review of the court's decision at the newhearing.

Following a new suppression hearing on remand, the trial courtagain denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding the statementvoluntary. Defendant now appeals from that decision and argues thathis confession was involuntary where the police (1) preventeddefendant's parents from conferring with him prior to making astatement, (2) interrogated defendant in the absence of an adultconcerned for his welfare, and (3) held him at the police station forover 18 hours before he confessed. For the following reasons, wereverse.

During the second suppression hearing, the parties agreed tostipulate to and include the testimony from defendant's first motion-to-suppress hearing. At that hearing in April 1994, youth officerBegeske testified that at approximately 11 p.m. or midnight on January25, 1993, he was called to the Calumet City police station in hiscapacity as a youth officer. He identified himself at defendant'sfirst interview at 3 a.m., which lasted about 30 minutes. Defendantwas read his Miranda rights, indicated that he understood thoserights, and waived them. After the interview, defendant remained in ajuvenile holding cell with a bed and toilet during the day and wouldhave been fed breakfast and lunch.

Begeske next spoke with defendant at 5:10 p.m. At thatinterview, Investigator Glumac and Assistant State's AttorneyDanielian were also present. Defendant was again "Mirandized" beforeDanielian conducted the interview, which ended at approximately 8 p.m. Begeske was present when defendant made a statement, which was thenreduced to writing. Danielian reviewed defendant's two-page statementwith him, allowing him to make any changes before signing it.

On cross-examination, Begeske stated that defendant's parentswere not at the police station when he arrived. He acknowledged thatdefendant's father, Mr. Willie Griffin, came to the station that day,but stated that no one advised him that defendant's mother, Mrs.Pearlie Griffin, was there. While Begeske spoke with Mr. Griffinduring the day, he did not notify defendant's parents that defendantwas at the station for questioning. Begeske testified that defendantnever asked to speak to his parents.

Defendant testified that he was 15 years old at the time of thearrest and was a freshman in high school. He stated that Begeske waspresent during the 3 a.m. interview, but defendant thought that he wasan investigator, not a youth officer. Defendant had previous contactwith the police and other youth officers. He denied that anyoneexplained his rights to him and testified that he asked to speak tohis parents constantly. Defendant stated that he received breakfastand lunch and was able to sleep in his cell.

Mrs. Griffin testified that, about one-half hour after the policecame to her house on January 24 looking for her younger son Frank, sheproceeded to the police station to see defendant. She stated that shespent at least five or six hours at the station, but the woman at thefront desk would not allow her to see her son.

Danielian testified that he first interviewed defendant duringthe 5 p.m. interview and explained his role as an assistant State'sAttorney. The conversation lasted approximately one hour beforeDanielian asked defendant if he would be willing to give a writtenstatement. Defendant then read a portion of the statement to confirmthat he could read English. They read through the statement togetherand defendant was allowed to make corrections.

The second motion-to-suppress hearing in April 2000 contained thefollowing testimony. Officer Begeske testified that, when he arrivedat the Calumet City police station around midnight on January 25,1993, defendant's father was present. Mr. Griffin had arrived withhis other son, Frank, and Chief Rhodes. Begeske spoke with Mr.Griffin and told him that defendant was a suspect in a shooting andthat Frank was a witness. He stated he was present when defendant'soral and handwritten statements were made and that at no time duringeither interview did defendant request to see his parents. Begeskestated he was there "to make sure that everything was running smoothly*** if the defendant needed anything, you know, water, pop, *** makesure that he was taken care of." He checked on defendant in hisholding cell during the day, but did not know how many times he didso.

Begeske again spoke with Mr. Griffin sometime that afternoonbefore defendant's confession, where they talked about the progress ofthe case. However, later in his testimony, Begeske stated that he didnot remember if he spoke with Mr. Griffin before or after defendantmade his statement. Begeske testified that Mr. Griffin was aware thatdefendant was a suspect but did not indicate that he wanted to speakwith him. On cross-examination, Begeske stated that he did not adviseMr. Griffin that his role as a youth officer was to protect theinterests of his sons or that Mr. Griffin could be present duringdefendant's questioning. Begeske never told defendant that his fatherwas in the lobby or that his father could speak with him. When hespoke with Mr. Griffin, it was through the glass window in the lobby. He did not recall seeing Mrs. Griffin at the station.

Begeske stated that he was the only youth officer at the stationthat day for several juvenile suspects and witnesses. Further,Begeske admitted that he was active in the investigation of this case. At 2:40 a.m., he "Mirandized" Frank and questioned him about theshooting. He then "Mirandized" and spoke with another witness, LandryWilliams, about his knowledge of the crime. Begeske stated thateither he or another investigator "Mirandized" defendant at the 3 a.m.interview. Begeske also testified that he was involved in and presentfor the "Mirandizing" of three juvenile codefendants at 6:53 a.m.,11:20 a.m., and 4:30 p.m. Begeske agreed that he left the station toinvestigate this crime from approximately 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. When hereturned to the station, he again interviewed Frank. During thatconversation, Begeske learned the location of the weapons used in theshooting, and he and another officer proceeded to codefendant DearloTerry's grandmother's house, where they retrieved several guns. Begeske returned to the station with the weapons and Terry and againquestioned Frank.

Begeske initially denied that he and Danielian left the interviewroom during defendant's second interview from 5:10 p.m. until 8 p.m.,but later admitted that he left defendant's presence for thestatements of two other juveniles. Codefendant Terry's writtenstatement contained Begeske's and Danielian's signatures and indicatedan interview start time of 5:34 p.m. and an end time of 6:45 p.m. Terrence Hodges' written statement indicated an end time of 7:10 p.m. Begeske stated that, while he was present for the statements of Terryand Hodges, he did not conduct the interviews. Further, Begeskestated that he and the other officers confronted defendant with otherwitnesses' statements and may have shown defendant the recoveredweapons.

Mr. Griffin testified that around midnight of January 25, 1993,he and Frank accompanied the police to the station. His wife arrivedabout an hour or two later and told Mr. Griffin that defendant was incustody. Mr. Griffin stated that he and his wife repeatedly asked theuniformed woman at the front desk to see their sons but were neverallowed to see them. They stayed at the station all night but left inthe morning to care for their other children and returned to thestation around noon. At that time, he and his wife spoke with ChiefRhodes, who said that defendant and Frank were being held and refusedthem access to their sons. The Griffins then left the station. Oncross-examination, Mr. Griffin denied that he spoke with a youthofficer that day.

Mrs. Griffin testified that she went to the police station afterlearning from her daughter that defendant was in custody. At thestation, she and her husband asked the woman at the front desk to seetheir sons several times, but she refused. They left the stationearly in the morning and returned approximately five hours later whenthey again repeatedly asked to see their sons. At one point, theyspoke with Chief Rhodes in his office. Rhodes explained thatdefendant was involved in a shooting and that he signed a confession. Mrs. Griffin asked Rhodes to see defendant, but he told them she couldnot see him because he had already confessed.

Lieutenant Patrick O'Meara testified that there were no femalepolice officers or civilians assigned to the police station front deskduring the early morning of January 25, 1993. Between 11 p.m. onJanuary 24 and 7 a.m. on January 25, only one female police officerwas on duty and she was assigned to street duty.

Danielian next testified that he introduced himself when heinterviewed defendant. He stated that the 5 p.m. interview lastedapproximately one-half hour before defendant was taken out of theroom. When defendant was brought back into the office at 7:30 p.m.,Danielian asked him if he would like to make a written statement anddefendant agreed. Danielian stated that defendant never asked for hisparents and never indicated that he had been treated poorly. Oncross-examination, Danielian stated that he interviewed all sevenjuvenile suspects and witnesses at the station that day. At somepoint, Danielian asked Begeske if someone had contacted defendant'sparents and, after that conversation, Danielian understood that theGriffins knew that their sons were at the station. Danielian himselfdid not contact defendant's parents, nor did he direct Begeske to findthem.

The trial court then made the following factual findings. Thecourt found that defendant was arrested and brought to the CalumetCity police station at approximately 11 p.m. on January 24, 1993. Defendant's parents arrived at the station shortly after midnight,with Mrs. Griffin arriving about one hour after her husband. Begeske,in his capacity as a youth officer, arrived at the station aroundmidnight and met with Mr. Griffin, telling him that defendant was asuspect and Frank was a witness to a shooting. Defendant wasquestioned twice during his time in custody, and on both occasionsBegeske was present. Defendant was given his Miranda warnings. Except for the time that he was being questioned, defendant was fed,kept in a holding cell with a bed and allowed to use the washroom. The court noted that defendant displayed average intelligence and hadbeen involved in the criminal justice system on prior occasions. Although defendant claimed to have asked for his parents constantly,both Begeske and Danielian testified that he did not and the courtfound Begeske credible in this regard. While defendant was detainedfor 18 hours before making a statement, the court found he was onlyquestioned for a 30-minute period prior to that time. There was noassertion of mistreatment or coercion.

The court did not believe Mr. and Mrs. Griffin's testimony thatthey asked a woman at the front desk to see their sons and furtherstated that the evidence showed no women were working in the stationduring the time in question. However, the court found their testimonythat Chief Rhodes refused to let them see defendant was "unequivocaland uncontroverted." The court then weighed the factors delineated inIn re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000), and founddefendant's statement voluntary.

At defendant's trial in 1996, Terrence Hodges testified that hewitnessed the crime and that defendant was the shooter. While Franktestified that he could not identify defendant as the shooter, andLandry Williams testified that he did not see the actual shooting,both boys had given prior written statements to the police detailingthe crime and identifying defendant as the shooter. These priorinconsistent statements, as well as defendant's statement, were allintroduced into evidence. After deliberating, the jury convicteddefendant of first-degree murder and the court sentenced defendant to45 years' imprisonment.

For this appeal, we need only address the trial court's denial ofthe motion to suppress defendant's statement. When reviewing whetherdefendant's statement was voluntary, we accord great deference to thetrial court's factual findings and will reverse those findings only ifthey are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191Ill. 2d 37, 50, 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1010 (2000). However, we apply thede novo standard of review when reviewing the ultimate question ofwhether defendant's confession was voluntary. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2dat 50, 727 N.E.2d at 1010. The State bears the burden of showing by apreponderance of the evidence that a confession was knowingly andintelligently made. In re R.T., 313 Ill. App. 3d 422, 428, 729 N.E.2d889, 894 (2000).

The taking of a juvenile's confession is "'a sensitive concern.'" In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012, quoting People v.Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 363 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1977). In analyzingthe voluntariness of a juvenile's confession, courts must take greatcare to assure that these statements were neither suggested or coercednor a product of fright or despair. People v. Kolakowski, 319 Ill.App. 3d 200, 213, 745 N.E.2d 62, 74 (2001). Courts look to thetotality of the circumstances and consider factors includingdefendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mentalcapacity, education, and physical condition at the time ofquestioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the durationof the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police,including any threats or promises. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727N.E.2d at 1012. Additional factors to consider when assessing theconfession of a juvenile include the time of day when questioningoccurred and the presence or absence of a parent or other adultinterested in the minor's welfare. People v. Plummer, 306 Ill. App.3d 574, 584, 714 N.E.2d 63, 70-71 (1999). No single factor isdispositive. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012. Because a minor is "'an easy victim of the law,'" his confession willbe found involuntary if the facts reveal that it was "'a confessionwrung from a child by means which the law should not sanction.'" Inre V.L.T., 292 Ill. App. 3d 728, 736, 686 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1997),quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 601, 92 L. Ed. 224, 228-29,68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948).

Defendant argues that three circumstances during his detention atthe police station created an overall coercive atmosphere, renderinghis statement involuntary. He first contends that the policeimproperly prevented his parents from conferring with him prior tomaking a statement. The State responds that this is only one factorto consider and that the remainder of the totality of thecircumstances analysis weighs in favor of admitting defendant'sstatement.

Our supreme court has found that the "concerned adult" factor,whether the juvenile had an opportunity to speak with a parent oradult interested in his welfare before or during interrogation, is animportant element in determining the voluntariness of defendant'sconfession. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55, 727 N.E.2d at 1012. While there is no per se rule that juveniles must be allowed toconsult with their parents prior to questioning, courts haverepeatedly held that police conduct which frustrates parents' attemptsto confer with their child is particularly relevant and a significantfactor in the totality of the circumstances analysis. In re G.O., 191Ill. 2d at 55, 727 N.E.2d at 1013; People v. McDaniel, No. 1-98-4719(December 5, 2001); People v. Golden, 323 Ill. App. 3d 892, 900, 753N.E.2d 475, 482 (2001); Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 214, 745N.E.2d at 75; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 235, 689 N.E.2d1172, 1179 (1998); In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545, 553, 672N.E.2d 331, 336 (1996). "It suggests that, at worst, the police weretrying to coerce a confession and at best that they were conductingthe interrogation without due regard for the suspect's age." In reR.T., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 729 N.E.2d at 895, citing In re V.L.T.,292 Ill. App. 3d at 737, 686 N.E.2d at 55; In re Lashun H., 284 Ill.App. 3d at 554-55, 672 N.E.2d at 337; People v. R.B., 232 Ill. App. 3d583, 595, 597 N.E.2d 879, 887 (1992).

When a juvenile's parents are present, request to see theirchild, and are prevented from doing so by the police, the presumptionarises that the juvenile's will was overborne. In re J.J.C., 294 Ill.App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180. The relevant inquiry is whetherthe absence of a parent or other adult interested in the minor'swelfare contributed to the coercive atmosphere of the interview. People v. Smith, No. 1-00-1341 (December 7, 2001).

In the present case, the police clearly frustrated the attemptsof defendant's parents to see him. While the trial court did notbelieve the Griffins that they repeatedly asked a woman at the frontdesk to see defendant, it specifically found that the evidence thatChief Rhodes of the Calumet City police department refused to allowthem to see their son was "unequivocal and uncontroverted." Bothparents spent most of the night at the police station, leaving in themorning only to tend to younger children at home. Both returned tothe station at noon and spoke with Chief Rhodes, who told the Griffinsthat defendant had already confessed and they could not see him. Infact, defendant did not make or sign a statement until after 5 p.m.that evening. Begeske knew Mr. Griffin was at the station and spokewith him repeatedly, but never allowed him to see defendant. TheGriffins, by their presence at the police station, indicated aninterest in their son and the police had an affirmative duty to stopquestioning and allow his parents to confer with him. McDaniel, slipop. at 24; In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 602, 693 N.E.2d 908, 914(1998); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974, 675 N.E.2d 156, 163(1996). The fact that defendant never requested to confer with hisparents is irrelevant and "'blatantly disregards the interest of theparents in wishing to confer with their child before questioning.'" McDaniel, slip op. at 24, quoting In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at237, 689 N.E.2d at 1180. Therefore, we find that the policefrustrated defendant's parents' attempts to see him "so that theycould create an intimidating atmosphere and obtain a confession." Inre Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 555, 672 N.E.2d at 338. While thisfactor alone does not tip the scales in favor of suppressingdefendant's confession, we find it contributed significantly to acoercive atmosphere and strongly weighs against a finding thatdefendant's statement was voluntary.

Defendant next argues that he was denied the presence of an adultconcerned for his welfare. He asserts that, although Officer Begeskewas acting as a youth officer during defendant's interviews, he wasactively involved in the investigation of defendant's case andgathered evidence against defendant. Begeske's actions, defendantargues, significantly contributed to the coercive atmospheresurrounding his statement. The State responds that Begeske waspresent during the questioning of defendant, ensured that he wastreated properly, and there was no coercion.

While there is no requirement that a youth officer be presentwhen a minor is questioned, it is a significant factor in the totalityof the circumstances analysis. Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 213,745 N.E.2d at 74; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at1180. Just as the absence of a parent does not per se make aconfession involuntary, the presence of a youth officer does not perse make a juvenile's confession voluntary. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill.App. 3d at 555, 672 N.E.2d at 338. However, in Illinois, even whenyouth officers are present, their role is unclear. One line of casesholds that a youth officer's role is to verify that minors' parentshave been notified, ensure that the minors have been given Mirandarights, and see to it that minors are properly treated, that they arefed, given access to washroom facilities, and allowed to rest, andthat they are not coerced in any way. People v. Williams, 324 Ill.App. 3d 419, 429-30, 753 N.E.2d 1089, 1098 (2001); Kolakowski, 319Ill. App. 3d at 213-14, 745 N.E.2d at 74-75; Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3dat 588, 714 N.E.2d at 73; In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 976-77, 675N.E.2d at 165. Other cases find that a youth officer may not merelybe present and remain silent, but must demonstrate an interest in theminors' welfare and affirmatively protect their rights. People v.McDaniel, slip op. at 25; In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 693N.E.2d at 915; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 689 N.E.2d at1180. These cases are fact specific and each case must be evaluatedon its own particular set of circumstances. Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3dat 587, 714 N.E.2d at 73.

In the present case, while the court made no factual findings asto Begeske's role as a youth officer, we find that Begeske failed tofulfill his duties under either of the above standards. Begeske didnot remain a neutral observer but, rather, worked against defendant'sinterests. While an investigator's role is to interrogate witnessesand collect evidence, it is clear that the role of a youth officer isto act as a concerned adult interested in the juvenile's welfare. Ayouth officer cannot be adversarial or antagonistic toward thejuvenile. In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 693 N.E.2d at 915. Thus, these roles are inherently incompatible. Youth officers cannotact in their role as a concerned adult while at the same time activelycompiling evidence against that juvenile.

Here, Begeske admitted that, while he was acting as the onlyyouth officer to seven juveniles including defendant, he activelyinvestigated this case. He "Mirandized" and interrogated severalwitnesses, continued his investigation of the shooting outside thestation, and executed a search at a codefendant's relative's house forthe murder weapons. Accordingly, we hold that Begeske was not anadult concerned for defendant's welfare. Rather, he contributed tothe coercive atmosphere surrounding defendant's confession. We notethat, with this holding, we do not mean to suggest that youth officersmust act solely in that capacity and cannot also investigate crimes. They may continue their investigations on other, unrelated matterswhile acting as youth officers.

While the State argues that In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 727N.E.2d 1003 (2000), and People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 758 N.E.2d813 (2001), dictate that defendant's confession was voluntary, bothcases are distinguishable from the case before us. In In re G.O. andMorgan, the presence of a concerned adult was but one factor in thetotality of the circumstances analysis. In both cases, our supremecourt found defendants' statements voluntary, based in part on thefact that the police did not prevent the juveniles' parents or otherconcerned adult from speaking with the minors. People v. Morgan, 197Ill. 2d 404, 440-41, 758 N.E.2d 813, 834-35 (2001); In re G.O, 191Ill. 2d at 55-56, 727 N.E.2d at 1013. In In re G.O., defendant'smother was initially reluctant to go to the station, finally arrivingafter defendant confessed, and was then brought to see defendant. Inre G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50-56, 727 N.E.2d at 1010-13. In Morgan, thepolice reasonably believed that the victims, defendant's grandparents,were his legal guardians and, therefore, did not contact defendant'smother in Virginia for several hours. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 440-41,758 N.E.2d at 834.

Here, however, both of defendant's parents remained at the policestation for several hours and repeatedly asked to see defendant. Thetrial court specifically held that the chief of police frustrateddefendant's parents from conferring with him prior to or duringinterrogation. Further, neither In re G.O. nor Morgan involved ayouth officer who actively investigated defendant's case and compiledevidence against him while serving as a youth officer. Therefore, Inre G.O. and Morgan are distinguishable from the case at bar.

Instead, the present case is similar to People v. McDaniel, No.1-98-4719. McDaniel involved a 14-year-old minor with little priorpolice contact charged as an adult with first-degree murder andaggravated battery with a firearm. The appellate court found that,despite defendant's mother's numerous requests to see her son, thepolice frustrated her attempts to confer with defendant prior to hisinterrogation. Moreover, while a youth officer was present during thequestioning of defendant, the court noted that the youth officershowed no interest in protecting defendant's rights. Based mainly onthese two factors, the court held that defendant's statement wasinvoluntary. The facts of the present case are more egregious thanthose in McDaniel and warrant the suppression of defendant'sconfession.

Lastly, defendant contends that his 18-hour detention before hemade a statement also contributed to the coercive atmospheresurrounding his confession. As stated above, the length ofquestioning and duration of the detention, as well as the time of daythe juvenile was questioned, are factors in the totality of thecircumstances analysis, but are not dispositive of the issue ofvoluntariness. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, 727 N.E.2d at 1012. The facts reveal that defendant was taken into custody about 11 p.m.,held in a juvenile holding cell for 18 hours, and questioned for 30minutes at 3 a.m. before confessing sometime after 5 p.m. While thisconduct is not condoned, this factor alone does not render defendant'sconfession involuntary. However, it did contribute to the coercivenature of defendant's confession and weighs against its admission.

We conclude that the totality of the circumstances dictates thatdefendant's confession was involuntary. Weighing in favor of theadmission of his statement are that he was of average intelligence andhad two previous contacts with the police. He was "Mirandized" beforequestioning and responded that he understood those rights. There wasno physical abuse and defendant was allowed food, a place to rest, andaccess to washroom facilities.

However, the other factors weigh against admission. Defendantwas just a week past his fifteenth birthday at the time of his arrest. Further, the chief of police frustrated the attempts of his parents toconfer with him either before or during questioning. Significantly,defendant was also deprived of any concerned adult because his youthofficer actively investigated and gathered evidence against defendant. Defendant was taken into custody at 11 p.m., interrogated during theearly morning hours and the next day before making a statement 18hours later. Thus, we find that the coercive atmosphere created bythese circumstances rendered defendant's statement involuntary anddefendant's motion to suppress his statement should have been granted.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial ofdefendant's motion to suppress, remand for a new trial, and vacatedefendant's conviction and sentence.

Reversed and remanded; conviction and sentence vacated.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.