FOURTH DIVISION
January 24, 2002

Defendant Isaiah Gunartt was found guilty of first degree murderand sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment. On direct appeal, this courtaffirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on February 1, 1996. People v. Gunartt, No. 1-93-4486 (1996) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). Defendant filed a petition for leave toappeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was denied on June 5,1996. People v. Gunartt, 167 Ill. 2d 561, 667 N.E.2d 1060 (1996). OnDecember 28, 1998, defendant, through his attorney, filed a petitionfor postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act(the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)). The State filed amotion to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was not timely filed. The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss and heardarguments on the merits of defendant's claims. Thereafter, the trialcourt denied defendant's postconviction petition. Defendant nowappeals from that ruling and argues that the trial court must holdevidentiary hearings on the ineffective assistance of counsel claimscontained in his petition. We find that the petition should have beendismissed for failure to comply with the time period required in theAct and affirm the denial of defendant's petition.

On appeal, the State renews its argument that defendant'spetition should have been dismissed on limitations grounds. In hisreply brief, defendant admits that his petition was untimely, butargues that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. Thestatute of limitations applicable to the filing of defendant'spostconviction petition was the statute in effect at the time he filedhis petition. People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 85-86, 529 N.E.2d 227,229 (1988); People v. Huffman, 315 Ill. App. 3d 611, 613, 734 N.E.2d479, 481 (2000). When defendant filed his petition on December 28,1998, section 122-1(c) of the Act provided:

"No proceedings under this Article shall becommenced more than 6 months after the denial of apetition for leave to appeal *** or 3 years fromthe date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unlessthe petitioner alleges facts showing that the delaywas not due to his or her culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1998).

Defendant's petition for leave to appeal to our supreme court wasdenied on June 5, 1996, and the six-month statutory period followingthat date expired on December 5, 1996. The date of defendant'sconviction is the date that final judgment, including sentence, wasentered. People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 489, 739 N.E.2d 493, 496(2000). Here, defendant was sentenced on October 6, 1993, and hismotion to reduce his sentence was denied on November 17, 1993; thus,the three-year period following that date expired on November 17,1996. Therefore, defendant's postconviction petition was due onNovember 17, 1996, the earlier of the two dates. As defendantconcedes, his postconviction petition, filed through his attorney onDecember 28, 1998, was filed over two years beyond the statute oflimitations. Thus, his petition is untimely and warrants dismissalunless he alleged facts showing that the delay in filing was not dueto his culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1998); Peoplev. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 197, 730 N.E.2d 26, 28 (2000).

In his petition, defendant alleged that his attorney wasineffective for failing to discover the existence of two witnesses,whose affidavits were attached, and for not conducting a reasonableinvestigation into defendant's mental history to be used atsentencing. The only allegation regarding the petition's late filingwas the statement: "Said petition is being filed at this time becausesaid information contained within was not fully known within theapplicable deadline." An attached affidavit from Rosalind Gunartt,defendant's mother, stated that, prior to the date of defendant'sconviction, she was not aware of the existence of the two potentialwitnesses. Defendant did not move to amend his postconvictionpetition to allege any further facts regarding the late filing. However, in his response to the State's motion to dismiss, defendantcontended that he did not become aware of the extent of theineffective assistance of his counsel until after the limitationsperiod had expired. It was only within the past year, defendantalleged, that he became aware of the additional witnesses and hiscounsel's inadequate investigation.

Lack of culpable negligence is very difficult to establish. People v. Rissley, No. 82536 (March 15, 2001). A defendant bears aheavy burden to affirmatively show why the exception to the statute oflimitations applies to his case. People v. Lopez, 317 Ill. App. 3d1047, 1054, 740 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (2000). He cannot merely make vagueor conclusory assertions, but must "show clearly through factualallegations that he previously made diligent attempts to uncovermatters he now purports entitle him to judicial relief or otherwisedemonstrate in significant detail how he could not have obtained suchinformation before the limitations period expired." People v.Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349, 726 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (2000),appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 690, 734 N.E.2d 895 (2000).

Here, defendant did not allege sufficient facts in his petitionor his response to the State's motion to dismiss which show a lack ofculpable negligence to justify the late filing. His statement thatthis information was not fully known within the time limit is vagueand conclusory and thus is insufficient to meet his burden. Further,while he alleges that the delay was justified by the discovery of newwitnesses and his counsel's inadequate investigation, defendant failedto allege any specific dates of when he learned of the allegedly newevidence or that he made diligent attempts to uncover thisinformation. Nor does defendant explain why he could not have broughtthis petition earlier than two years beyond the statute oflimitations. Additionally, defendant alleged no facts showing why hedid not discover his attorney's failure to investigate and introducedefendant's mental health history at sentencing within the Act'slimitations period. Therefore, we must conclude that he failed toallege sufficient facts demonstrating that the delay was not due tohis culpable negligence. People v. Parham, 318 Ill. App. 3d 818, 829,743 N.E.2d 697, 706 (2001); Huffman, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 614, 734N.E.2d at 482.

Because defendant's petition did not comply with the statute oflimitations provision in the Act, the trial court should havedismissed the petition and should not have heard arguments on itsmerits. However, we can affirm the trial court's ruling on any groundwarranted in the record, regardless of the reasons relied upon by thecourt. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211, 688 N.E.2d 658, 661(1997). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial ofdefendant's postconviction petition.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.