People v. Hansen, No. 1-95-4033 and 1-98-2295 (cons.)

1st District, 18 May 2000

FOURTH DIVISION

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 18, 1955, the unclothed bodies of 11-year old Tony Schuessler, 13-year old John Schuessler, and 13-year oldRobert Peterson were found in the Cook County forest preserves located near Lawrence Avenue and River Road. InSeptember 1995, following a jury trial, the defendant, Kenneth Hansen, was convicted of the first degree murders of thethree boys and, having elected to be sentenced under the Unified Code of Corrections of 1973 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38,par 1001-1-1 et seq.), was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of not less than 200 years and not more than 300 years. Inthese consolidated appeals, the defendant appeals from his convictions and from the trial court's subsequent denial of hispost-conviction petition.

At trial, the State presented evidence establishing that the three victims left the Monte Cristo Bowling Alley around 8 p.m.on October 16, 1955, all wearing jeans and baseball jackets. Between 8:30 and 9 p.m., Ralph Helm saw a boy he lateridentified as Tony Schuessler standing on Milwaukee Avenue, just south of Lawrence Avenue, with his thumb extended asif he were hitchhiking. Two other boys, who were dressed in jeans and "sports jackets" and who appeared to be older thanTony Schuessler, were standing in a doorway 8 to 10 feet away. Between 9 and 10 p.m. that same night, Hettie Salernoheard two screams coming from the direction of the Idle Hours Stable, which was located near the forest preserves wherethe victims' bodies were discovered two days later.

Dr. Edmond Donoghue was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology. Although Dr. Donoghue had notperformed the autopsies on the victims, he had reviewed the crime scene photographs, the autopsy photographs, and theautopsy reports. He testified that Tony Schuessler had been manually strangled, John Schuessler had been strangled in amanner consistent with a choke hold, and Robert Peterson had been strangled with an item such as a belt or rope. On cross-examination, Dr. Donoghue testified that he found no evidence of hay, horse manure, oats, barley, or horse feed on thevictims' bodies. He also acknowledged that two reports he reviewed regarding the murders stated that there was no evidencethat the victims had been sexually molested. On re-direct examination, Dr. Donoghue testified that, if oral sex had beenperformed upon a homicide victim, there would not likely be any evidence of it. The assistant State's Attorney then askedDr. Donoghue: "Can you yourself draw any inference of sexual molestation in your opinion in this case?" Dr. Donoghueresponded affirmatively and stated that, in his opinion, there was "at least evidence that's suggestive of a sexual nature ofthis attack because the deceased were found without any clothing." On re-cross examination, Dr. Donoghue admitted thatthe fact that the victims' clothing had been removed might not have anything to do with sex.

Judith Anderson testified that she met the defendant at the Idle Hours Stable in August 1955, at which time the defendanttold her that he had worked at the stable on and off for one year. Donna Ewing testified that she took a horseback ridinglesson from the defendant at the Idle Hours Stable in 1955 or 1956. When Ewing met the defendant at another stable in1971 or 1972, he did not remember her but did acknowledge that he had given riding lessons at the Idle Hours Stable.

Roger Spry testified that he began living with the defendant's family in 1960 or 1961 when he was 11 or 12 years old.Initially, he was allowed to sleep in the house with the defendant's family but, after spurning the defendant's sexualadvances, he was forced to sleep in the dog kennel. One night when Spry was 11 or 12, the defendant performed oral sex onhim, following which the two had a sexual relationship which lasted until Spry was 18. In total, Spry lived with thedefendant on and off for 20 years. According to Spry, the defendant picked up male hitchhikers between the ages of 11 and16 and offered them lodging at the stables in exchange for work. Spry was sometimes with the defendant when thedefendant did so. On many occasions, the defendant told Spry he had sex with these boys.

Spry testified that, when he was about 15, the defendant told him that he once picked up three boys who were hitchhikingand took them to a barn. According to the defendant, he was in the barn having sex with the two younger boys when theolder boy walked in on them. When one of the boys threatened to report what he had done, the defendant grabbed the boyand held him by the throat. According to the defendant, he accidentally strangled the boy and then had no choice but to killthe other two boys. After the defendant killed the boys, a friend of his arrived and helped him take the bodies to the forestpreserves. According to Spry, the defendant referred to one of the boys as Peterson. Spry testified that, on another occasion,the defendant caught him pocketing money from riders at the stable and told him "you're going to end up just like thatPeterson kid." Spry stated that he did not report these events to the police because he was scared, but he did later tellColleen Quinn and William Wemette. Spry acknowledged that he first told law enforcement officials about the defendant'sstatements in August 1994 while facing prosecution for arson and that, in exchange for his testimony in this case, hissentence in the arson case was being reduced.

Colleen Quinn testified that, in August 1992, Spry told her that the defendant once caught him stealing money and said tohim "if you ever do that again you will end up like the Peterson boy."

Herb Hollatz testified that, in 1952 or 1953, when he was 21 years old, he lived and worked at the Park Ridge Stable fortwo to four months, during which time he had consensual sexual relations with the defendant. The defendant went into theservice in late 1953. When Hollatz next saw the defendant, in October 1955, they engaged in sexual activity. At that time,the defendant told Hollatz that he had "just killed" three boys he had picked up hitchhiking. The defendant said thatsomeone told him to kill the boys and threatened that, if Hollatz told anyone, the defendant's brother, Curtis, "would takecare of things". Hollatz took the threat to mean that Curtis would kill him. Hollatz testified that this conversation took placeapproximately one week after the victims' bodies were found. Nonetheless, he did not tell his father, a Chicago policeofficer, about the conversation because he did not want his father to know about his homosexual relationship with thedefendant. Although his father died in 1980, Hollatz first told the authorities about the incident when he was approached byan assistant State's Attorney in April 1995.

Robert Stitt testified that he began working at the High Hopes Stables, owned by the defendant, in 1963, when he was about11 years old. When Stitt was 12 years old, the defendant made sexual advances, which Stitt rejected. When Stitt was 13 or14 years old, he moved in with the defendant's family. He later went into the service but returned to live at the stable whenhe was discharged, living there until about 1979. Stitt testified that, "periodically throughout the years", he and thedefendant "talked about hitchhikers, bringing them in for stable hands." On one occasion, in 1974, Stitt called the defendantfrom Alabama to tell the defendant that he had found two 15-year old boys who needed jobs. The defendant told Stitt tobring the boys to the stable. Later, the defendant told Stitt to bring one of the boys to the defendant's apartment because hewanted "to do" the boy. Stitt testified that, during the years, he picked up 30 or more boys who were hitchhiking and tookthem to the defendant's stables "for that purpose".

Joe Plemmons testified that he met the defendant in 1970 or 1971 and subsequently began leasing part of the Sky HighStables from him. Plemmons and the defendant were driving home from a party together in May 1972 when the defendantsaid that his brother Curt "held those boys over his head like a club." In April 1976, the defendant commented that "it waseither the boys or him" because "in 1955 to be gay was unacceptable." On another occasion, in 1988, the defendantacknowledged to Plemmons that he worried about being caught for the murders of the three boys. Plemmons admitted thathe had been convicted of fraud in 1992, that he was on probation for that offense, and that he has been known by three orfour aliases.

Lance Williamson testified that he met the defendant in 1974 and began working for him at the Sky High Stables. A shorttime later, the defendant told Williamson that he often picked up young boys hitchhiking in order to have sex with them.The defendant also told Williamson that he had worked at the Idle Hours Stable in the 1950s.

Patrick Mason testified that in 1956, when he was 11 years old, he worked at the Bro-Ken H Stables on the weekends. Oneday he walked into a barn and saw the defendant performing oral sex on a 15-year old boy. The defendant later approachedMason and told him that, if he told anyone what he had seen, he would "wind up in the woods like those other boys."

William Wemette testified that he lived at the Sky High Stables off and on between the years of 1968 and 1973. Wemettedrove the defendant around quite a bit because the defendant did not have a driver's license. They often picked up malehitchhikers between the ages of 12 and 16. On one occasion in 1968, Wemette and the defendant had a conversation "abouta very famous case, the Peterson boys." The defendant told Wemette he had picked up the three boys hitchhiking, takenthem to the Idle Hours Stable, and strangled them. The defendant also stated that his brother Curt had injured one of theboys with a blunt instrument. During another conversation that took place several weeks later, the defendant told Wemettethat he sent the older two boys out riding in the arena and took the younger boy into the barn, where he performed oral sexon the boy. When he finished, the defendant sent the younger boy out to the arena and took the middle boy into the barn.The older boy and the younger boy interrupted them and threatened to call the police or their parents. The defendant toldWemette that there was then "kind of a scramble-type situation and he asked for assistance from his brother". Wemettetestified that, during another conversation, the date of which he could not recall, the defendant said that his brother had"botched the job" when he disposed of the bodies, leaving behind a piece of evidence which could connect the defendant tothe murders. According to Wemette, the defendant told him that a forest preserve employee had also been involved. Thedefendant also told Wemette that, in order to protect himself from being caught, he had moved to the south side of Chicagoand that someone had burned down the Idle Hours Stable for him. Wemette admitted that he had been a "mole" for theFederal Bureau of Investigations from 1971 through 1989.

Chicago police officer John Farrell testified that, after the defendant was arrested, he told Farrell that, from the 1950sthrough 1974, he picked up male hitchhikers between the ages of 12 and 22 for the purpose of having oral sex with them.The defendant denied any personal knowledge of the victims' murders. He initially denied having ever been to the IdleHours Stable but later stated he had been there two or three times.

Assistant State's Attorney Barbara Riley testified that, when she questioned the defendant, he denied any knowledge of thevictims' murders and of the Idle Hours Stable. The defendant did tell her that he often picked up "throw-a-way" boys, boyswith problems, who were hitchhiking and offered them work and lodging at the stables. He described having casual sexwith these boys.

The State also presented a stipulation that, if called, Park Ridge Deputy Fire Chief John Lamar would testify that the ParkRidge fire department responded to a call at the Idle Hours Stable on May 15, 1956. The State then rested.

On the defendant's behalf, Frank Jayne testified that, from 1950 to 1960, his brother Silas owned the Idle Hours Stable andthat the defendant, who Jayne met in the early 1960s, did not work there. Jayne further testified that, in 1955, the Idle HoursStable was patrolled at night by a watchman and dogs.

Barbara Beitzel Ashbough testified that she worked at the Idle Hours Stable in the summer of 1954 and began teachingthere full-time in 1955. She never saw the defendant, a former neighbor of hers, at the stable during the years 1954, 1955, or1956. According to Ashbough, there was a night-watchman at the stable and the gates and doors to the barns were locked atnight. She testified that there was a fire in one of the barns in May 1956.

Edwin Thomas testified that he first met the defendant at the Bro-Ken H Stable in 1957 or 1958 when Thomas was abouteight years old. Thomas later began doing chores around the stable in exchange for being allowed to ride the horses.Although Thomas arrived at the stable early in the morning, before school, he never saw Spry sleeping in a dog kennel.When Thomas arrived, Spry would either be outside or in the house. Thomas also testified that Spry had a poor reputationfor truthfulness. The defendant's son, Mark Hansen, testified that Spry lived with his family in their house and that he neversaw Spry sleep in a dog kennel.

Dan Strong testified that he served in the military with the defendant. After the defendant was discharged from the militaryin 1955, he and his wife visited Strong in Texas. Strong believed this was in October 1955, but he could not recall the exactdates. After Strong's testimony, the defendant rested.

The jury found the defendant guilty of the first degree murders of all three boys. After he was sentenced, the defendant fileda direct appeal (docket no. 1-95-4033) in which he argues that: (1) the search warrant issued for his home was invalid; (2)the trial court erred in denying him a continuance of the trial date; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the medicalexaminer to offer opinion testimony that the victims had been sexually molested; (4) the trial court improperly admittedevidence that the defendant had consensual homosexual relations with Herb Hollatz; (5) the trial court improperly admittedevidence that the defendant routinely picked up young male hitchhikers and sexually molested them; and (6) the defendantwas not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While his direct appeal was pending, the defendant filed a petition forpost-conviction relief, seeking a new trial on the grounds that newly discovered evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to hisguilt and that the State's failure to disclose certain evidence to him violated his right to due process. Following anevidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the defendant's post-conviction petition. The defendant filed atimely appeal from that order (docket no. 1-98-2295). The defendant's direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of hispost-conviction petition have been consolidated for purposes of review. We turn first to the issues raised in the defendant'sdirect appeal.

We first address the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Donoghue to testify that, in his opinion,the fact that the victims' bodies were found unclothed was "suggestive of a sexual nature of this attack." The defendantargues that, in the absence of any physical evidence of sexual molestation, such an opinion was beyond the pathologist'sexpertise.

A witness is allowed to testify as an expert on a particular subject if, due to his experience and qualifications, his knowledgeof the subject is beyond that of the average citizen. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 186, 670 N.E.2d 721 (1996). Havingbeen qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology, Dr. Donoghue was qualified to offer an opinion as to whetherany physical evidence discovered during an examination of the victims' bodies indicated that sexual molestation hadoccurred. Dr. Donoghue acknowledged that there was no physical evidence of sexual molestation. There is, in fact, no basisin the record for concluding that Dr. Donoghue's opinion that the victims were sexually molested was formulated based onhis knowledge and experience as a forensic pathologist. Our supreme court, however, has noted that the fact that a murdervictim is found unclothed is "consistent with a sexual assault." People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 43, 662 N.E.2d 1168 (1995).Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in allowing his testimony. Furthermore, we note that Dr. Donoghueadmitted on cross-examination that the fact that the victims' clothing had been removed might not have anything to do withsex.

We now turn to the central issue in this case, the question of whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that, over atime-period spanning 20 years, the defendant routinely picked up young male hitchhikers and sexually molested them. Thetrial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to bar this evidence and overruled numerous objections to the evidence attrial. The defendant contends that these rulings were in error.

Before addressing this issue, we find it necessary to draw a distinction between evidence that the defendant engaged insexual relations with young male hitchhikers and evidence that the defendant engaged in, or attempted to engage in, sexualrelations with certain trial witnesses. Roger Spry testified that, as a minor, he had a continuing sexual relationship with thedefendant. The defendant does not contend that this evidence was improperly admitted, nor could he do so successfully.The testimony regarding the defendant's sexual relationship with Spry was relevant as it established the defendant's closerelationship with that witness, making it more likely that the defendant would make inculpatory statements to him. Hollatz'stestimony regarding his consensual sexual relations with the defendant was relevant for the same reason, and accordingly,we reject the defendant's contention that it was admitted in error. Finally, we address the testimony of two other witnesses.Stitt testified that, when he was 12 years old, the defendant made sexual advances toward him, which he rejected. Althoughthis evidence seems to be of questionable relevance as Stitt did not actually engage in a sexual relationship with thedefendant, the defendant has not challenged the evidence. Nor has the defendant raised any allegations of error regardingPatrick Mason's testimony that, on one occasion in 1956, he saw the defendant performing oral sex on a 15-year old boy.This testimony was relevant as it tended to establish why the defendant later approached Mason and threatened that hewould "wind up in the woods like those other boys."

Having clarified that our discussion of "other-crimes evidence" does not encompass any of the above-mentioned testimony,we will now specify what testimony is encompassed. Spry testified that, during the 20 years that he lived on and off withthe defendant, the defendant picked up 11 to 16-year old hitchhiking boys and offered them jobs at the stables, often tellingSpry he had sex with these boys. Stitt testified that he and the defendant discussed bringing hitchhiking boys to the stablesto work, that on one occasion the defendant instructed Stitt to bring one of these boys to his apartment because he wanted"to do" the boy, and that Stitt picked up 30 or more boys and took them to the stables "for that purpose." Williamsontestified that, in 1974, the defendant told him that he often picked up young boys hitchhiking in order to have sex withthem. Wemette testified that, from 1968 to 1973, the defendant frequently picked up male hitchhikers between the ages of12 and 16. Officer Farrell testified that the defendant admitted that, from the 1950s through 1974, he picked up malehitchhikers between the ages of 12 and 22 for the purpose of having oral sex with them. Finally, Assistant State's AttorneyRiley testified that the defendant told her he had casual sex with boys he had picked up hitchhiking and given work at hisstables.

Having defined the testimony to which the defendant objects, we now turn our attention to the task of determining whetherit was properly admitted. The law distrusts the inference that a defendant who has committed other crimes is more likely tohave committed the crime with which he stands charged. People v. Pitts, 299 Ill. App. 3d 469, 474, 701 N.E.2d 198 (1998).Accordingly, evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by a defendant is inadmissible where relevant only toestablish that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. People v. Banks, 161 Ill. 2d 119, 136-37, 641 N.E.2d 331(1994); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364-65, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991). Such evidence, however, may be admitted if it isrelevant for any other purpose, such as to establish motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or accident, the existence ofa common plan or design, or modus operandi. Banks, 161 Ill. 2d at 137. Even where a proper purpose exists, however, othercrimes evidence may not be admitted unless the party offering it presents evidence that the other crime actually occurredand that the defendant participated in its commission. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 486, 603 N.E.2d 460 (1992); Peoplev. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 455, 584 N.E.2d 89 (1991). These facts need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt butmust be by more than a mere suspicion. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 456. Additionally, even where relevant for a proper purpose,other-crimes evidence should be excluded if the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs its probativevalue. People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 385, 704 N.E.2d 393 (1998). The decision as to whether to admit other-crimesevidence lies within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will not reverse its decision absent a clear abuse of thatdiscretion. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 63, 656 N.E.2d 1090 (1995).

We initially note that, although the defendant was charged only with murder, the State introduced evidence, not of othermurders committed by the defendant, but of the defendant's alleged sexual assault of other young boys. Clearly, evidencethat the defendant routinely picked up young boys hitchhiking and sexually assaulted them could not be used to directlyestablish that the defendant killed the victims. Rather, it is apparent that the State sought to establish, through the use of thispedophilia evidence, that the defendant was the person who picked up the victims and sexually assaulted them. In doing so,the State could establish that the defendant was more likely than not also the person who killed the victims, having had boththe opportunity and the motive to do so.

The defendant first argues that, because there is no physical evidence that the victims were sexually assaulted, any evidencethat the defendant sexually assaulted other boys is irrelevant. The State does not dispute the fact that other-crimes evidenceof pedophilia is only arguably relevant in this case if the victims were sexually assaulted. The State, however, asserts thatthe defendant's statements to Spry and Wemette and the fact that the victims' bodies were unclothed when found establishesthat the victims were, in fact, sexually assaulted. We must determine whether this evidence alone was sufficient to establish,for our purposes, that the victims were sexually assaulted. There is evidence, independent of the defendant's ownstatements, that the victims in the instant case were last seen hitchhiking and that their unclothed bodies were discovered inthe forest preserves three days later. We note that this evidence tends, to some degree, to suggest that a sexual offenseoccurred, although we recognize that other possible explanations exist. See People v. Montes, 192 Ill. App. 3d 874, 881,549 N.E.2d 700 (1989). We also note that there is independent evidence corroborating certain details of the defendant'sstatements, in which he acknowledged committing both sexual assault and murder. The defendant stated that he picked upthe boys hitchhiking, that one of the boys was named Peterson, and that he left the bodies in the forest preserves.Additionally, medical evidence that one of the boys was strangled in a manner consistent with a choke hold corroboratedthe defendant's statement that he accidentally strangled one of the boys while holding him by the neck. Thus, we find thatthe defendant's statements were corroborated to such a degree as to ensure their reliability and that the statements, whenconsidered in conjunction with the admittedly slight independent evidence suggesting that the victims had been sexuallyassaulted, supports, for our purposes, the inference that the victims had been sexually assaulted. See People v. Howard, 147Ill. 2d 103, 588 N.E.2d 1044 (1991); People v. Prince, 288 Ill. App. 3d 265, 681 N.E.2d 521 (1997); People v. Montes, 192Ill. App. 3d 874, 549 N.E.2d 700 (1989); People v. Bell, 233 Ill. App. 3d 40, 598 N.E.2d 256 (1992). Compare People v.Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 501 N.E.2d 207 (1986); People v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 3d 456, 677 N.E.2d 494 (1996).

Having concluded that the other-crimes evidence of pedophilia was not barred by an absence of evidence that the victimswere sexually assaulted, we turn to the defendant's contention that the evidence was improperly admitted because it was notrelevant to the issues of motive, intent, or common design, the purposes for which the trial court instructed the jury it couldconsider the evidence. As stated earlier, before other-crimes evidence can be admitted for even a proper purpose, there mustbe a showing that the other crime actually occurred and that the defendant committed it. For purposes of the followinganalysis, we will assume arguendo that there was such a showing.

The State argues that it "cannot seriously be challenged" that the pedophilia evidence is relevant to the issues of motive andintent. According to the State, the fact that the victims threatened to report the defendant to their parents or the police afterhe molested them established the defendant's motive and criminal intent to kill the victims. However, to the extent that theState can be understood to argue that the pedophilia evidence is relevant because the defendant's motive in killing thevictims was not only to prevent the police from discovering what he had done to them but also to prevent the discovery ofnumerous other acts of pedophilia which the defendant had committed, we must reject the argument. Most of the evidencein question pertains to incidents which occurred well after the victims' murders. The defendant can hardly be said to havebeen motivated to kill the victims in 1955 to prevent the discovery of acts of pedophilia he committed in the 1960s and1970s. Officer Farrell did testify that the defendant admitted picking up and having sex with young male hitchhikers fromthe 1950s through 1974. This vague testimony, however, is insufficient to establish that the defendant's motive for killingthe victims was to prevent the discovery of acts committed prior to October 1955. We conclude, therefore, that the trialcourt erred in allowing evidence of the other acts of pedophilia to establish the defendant's motive or criminal intent incommitting the murders charged in this case.

In addition to motive and intent, the trial court also instructed the jury that it could consider the pedophilia evidence asbeing relevant to the defendant's design, which is also referred to as common design, common scheme, or common plan.Our supreme court has stated that " '[c]ommon design refers to a criminal scheme of which the crime charged is only a part.'" People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 239, 620 N.E.2d 325 (1993), quoting People v. Rose, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 555 N.E.2d414 (1990). The State argues that sufficient similarities exist between the sexual molestation of the victims in this case andthe numerous acts of pedophilia the defendant committed over a 20-year period from which it can be inferred that all of theacts were committed as part of the defendant's "common plan to gain access to young boys for sexual purposes." In supportof this contention, the State relies on People v. Partin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 365, 509 N.E.2d 662 (1987) and People v. Davis,260 Ill. App. 3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 392 (1994).

In Partin, the defendant was charged with offenses relating to his sexual molestation of a teenage boy who worked for him.At trial, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that the defendant had sexually molested two other teenage boys whoalso worked for him. Noting similarities in the circumstances surrounding the incidents of molestation, the Partin courtconcluded that the testimony of the other two boys was properly admissible as evidence of modus operandi and as evidenceof a common design or scheme "to hire male adolescents *** and to lure them to his room to engage in lewd acts." Partin,156 Ill. App. 3d at 371. In Davis, the defendant, the head pastor of a church, was on trial for offenses connected to varioussexual activities in which he had engaged with two boys who were members of his church. In addition to introducingevidence regarding the defendant's sexual activities with the minor boys, the State introduced evidence that the defendanthad engaged in homosexual relations with various adult church members. Noting the similarities between the defendant'ssexual activities with the boys and his sexual activities with adult church members, this court concluded that the evidence ofthe latter was relevant to establish the defendant's common design, scheme, or plan, although it never defined the nature ofthat scheme. Davis, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 178-88, 190-91.

It appears that the courts in both Partin and Davis, as well as courts in a number of other Illinois cases, subscribe to thetheory that the existence of sufficient factual similarities between crimes justifies an inference that the crimes werecommitted pursuant to a common design, scheme, or plan. See People v. Soler, 228 Ill. App. 3d 183, 592 N.E.2d 517(1992) (common scheme to use "nicing" as a pretext to sexual abuse); People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 650 N.E.2d 558(1995) (evidence that defendant and accomplice assumed similar roles in a prior robbery established common scheme). InPeople v. Brown, 26 Ill. 2d 308, 316, 186 N.E.2d 321 (1962), our supreme court explained the rationale involved in suchcases as follows: