Following a bench trial, defendant Charles J. Likar was found guilty of criminal trespassto property and sentenced to one year of supervision. As part of his supervision, defendant wasordered to avoid contact with the complainants, complete a mental health examination and followall treatment recommendations. On appeal, defendant contends that the order of supervisionentered against him should be vacated because he was found guilty of an uncharged offense. Inthe alternative, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

The record demonstrates that a complaint was filed against defendant for the offense ofcriminal trespass to real property in violation of section 5/21-3(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code of1961 (Code). 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a) (West 2000). Although section 5/21-3(a) contains severalsubsections, the complaint failed to cite to any of the subsections specifically. However, thedescription of the offense set forth in the complaint utilized the language of 5/21-3(a)(3)(subsection (a)(3)) of the statute, and alleged that defendant "knowingly remained upon the landof Sergio Parisi, 1221 Meadowcrest, LaGrange Park, Cook County, IL., after receiving verbalnotice from the owner Sergio Parisi to depart."

At trial, the evidence in this case established that, on May 13, 2000, defendant, whoresided at 1209 Meadowcrest in LaGrange Park, received a letter from the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) concerning a complaint he made against his neighbor,Rose Parisi (Rose), alleging that Rose was operating an "unlicenced daycare" in her home. Atabout 12:10 p.m., defendant walked to the Parisi's property located at 1221 Meadowcrest with theletter in hand in order to discuss the situation with the Parisis.

Sergio Parisi (Parisi), the complainant in this case, was outside mowing the lawn whendefendant arrived and stood on the sidewalk in front of the Parisi residence. Parisi testified thathe was wearing ear protectors and could not hear defendant, but saw that defendant was signalingthat he wanted to have a conversation. Parisi told defendant, "I have nothing to say to you. Getaway from me" and defendant walked back towards his house. Parisi asserted that, prior to hisinitial May 13, 2000, visit, defendant had been given written and verbal notice to stay off theParisi property.

Within five minutes of his departure, defendant returned to the Parisi residence on hisbicycle. Defendant was standing on the "edge" of the Parisi's driveway, "[o]n the driveway partjust right in front of the sidewalk," and was holding "papers" and an envelope in his hands. Defendant stated that he needed to show the papers to Parisi, but Parisi refused to have aconversation with defendant. Specifically, Parisi told defendant, "[g]et away from me. I havenothing to say to you. If you step foot on my property, I will have you arrested" and reiteratedthis statement six times. Defendant did not leave the property, but instead, threw the "papers" onthe Parisi's property. He then walked about "ten feet off the front driveway *** onto [the] frontlawn" in order to retrieve them. Once defendant walked on the lawn, Parisi told his wife to call911. Defendant then returned to the sidewalk, apologized for entering the property and left.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Parisi if defendant entered his property priorto walking onto the lawn to retrieve his papers, and Parisi testified that defendant had not. Thistestimony was significant because, on direct examination, Parisi asserted that defendant stood onhis driveway prior to throwing the papers on the lawn. On redirect examination, however, Parisiclarified his testimony regarding this issue and twice stated that defendant was standing on thedriveway during his second attempt to speak with Parisi prior to entering the lawn area.

Detective Rompa of the LaGrange Park Police Department testified that he was called tothe Parisi residence on the date in question. When he arrived, he saw defendant standing in hisown driveway, which was two doors down from the Parisi's house. Detective Rompa spoke todefendant and learned that defendant went to the Parisi residence earlier that day on twooccasions because he wanted to show the Parisi's the DCFS letter. Defendant maintained that hestood on the public sidewalk in front of the Parisi's property during both visits until the wind blewthe DCFS envelope out of his hands onto the Parisi's front lawn. Defendant then walked onto theParisi's lawn to retrieve the DCFS envelope. Defendant admitted that, prior to entering the Parisiproperty, he had received a verbal warning not to enter.

Richard Mike testified that he lives at 1217 Meadowcrest. On May 13, 2000, he andParisi were standing in their respective backyards having a conversation over the hedges. Parisithen began yelling "[g]et off my property." At that point, Mike noticed defendant, whom hecould see "very clearly," standing in front of the Parisi's property on "a little corner of grass"which was located "next to the walk that goes to the front door." Mike stated that Parisi ordereddefendant off his property five or six times. Mike subsequently heard Parisi tell his wife to call911, but was not aware of defendant's whereabouts at that time.

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant made a motion for a directed finding,arguing that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove the elements of thecrime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also argued that his presence on the Parisi'sproperty was lawful under the emergency exception to the criminal trespass to property statute. See 725 ILCS 5/21-3(f) (West 2000). The trial court rejected these arguments and denieddefendant's motion.

Defendant then testified on his own behalf. He explained that he went to the Parisiresidence the first time on May 13, 2000, in order to tell the Parisi's that DCFS was investigatingRose's "unlicenced daycare" and that he was the individual who spurred the investigation. As hestood on the sidewalk near the Parisi's front lawn, defendant noticed that Parisi was mowing thelawn and wearing ear muffs. When he realized that Parisi would not be able to hear anything hesaid, he went back to his own residence.

Defendant testified that he returned to the Parisi residence approximately 15 minutes later. He saw Parisi in the rear of his house. Defendant stood on the sidewalk "three feet to the left ofthe driveway" and told Parisi that he would like to speak with him. When Parisi did not respond,defendant removed the DCFS letter from the envelope and held it up for Parisi to see. A gust ofwind then caused defendant to drop the envelope, which no longer held the letter, and the emptyenvelope fluttered into the Parisi's front lawn. Defendant asserted that he made a "reflexivemovement" to retrieve the envelope which brought him into the lawn as well. As soon as heretrieved the envelope, he returned to the sidewalk. During this time, Parisi was yelling, "[i]f youdon't leave I am going to call the police and have you arrested *** for trespassing." Defendantreported that he apologized to Parisi for stepping onto the lawn and explained that it was anaccident, but Parisi nevertheless told his wife to call 911. Defendant denied standing on Parisi'sdriveway and denied that he had previously been told to stay off the property prior to May 13,2000.

At the close of evidence, the trial court determined that "the issue is whether Defendanthad received notice from Mr. Parisi not to enter his land or upon his land prior to him doing so." After considering the facts of the case and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, thecourt found defendant guilty of criminal trespass to property because the court believed thatdefendant "did go onto the land with notice that he was not supposed to be there." The trial courtrejected defendant's argument that his entry onto the land was lawful under the emergencyexception to the statute, stating:

" I don't think there was really any reasonable beliefthat this *** envelope was in imminent danger ofdamage or destruction, and I don't believe theenvelope is the type of property that the exceptioncontemplated."

Defendant now appeals the trial court's judgment.

ANALYSIS

Found Guilty of an Uncharged Offense

Defendant was found guilty of the offense of criminal trespass to real property under astatute which provides as follows:

"