FIRST DIVISION
April 14, 2003

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Ronnie Lloyd entered a negotiated guilty plea toburglary and was sentenced, based on his criminal history, to aClass X term of six years in prison. Defendant failed to file awritten motion to withdraw his guilty plea as required by SupremeCourt Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), but he subsequentlyfiled a motion in this court, pro se, seeking leave to file amotion for late notice of appeal and appointment of counsel. This court allowed defendant to file a late notice of appeal andappointed counsel to represent him. On appeal, defendantcontends he was not admonished pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(188 Ill. 2d R. 605) as to the availability of appointed counselfor postplea proceedings or the consequences of withdrawing hisguilty plea and seeks remand for proper admonishment. For thereasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

In April 2001, defendant was arrested and charged with twocounts of burglary for entering a garage and a motor vehiclewherein he committed theft. In the proceedings before the trialcourt, defendant was represented by private counsel who filed amotion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

On October 9, 2001, the trial court heard defendant'smotion. The evidence presented at the hearing established thattwo Chicago police officers saw defendant exit a garage in theearly morning, carrying a shopping bag which contained tools anda coach light. The tools and the light were taken from a carthat was parked inside the garage. The court denied defendant'smotion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence.

Following the ruling, defense counsel sought a pleaconference pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402. 177 Ill. 2d R.402. After the conference, in response to defendant's expresseddesire for a sentence of probation, the court informed defendanthe was a Class X offender and no longer eligible for probation. The court further informed defendant that he was charged withburglary, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2000)), buthe was subject to a Class X sentence of 6 to 30 years in prison(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2000)). Based on defendant'sdemeanor and his failure to sign the jury waiver, the courtinitially refused to accept defendant's plea. After furtherdiscussion, the court ascertained that defendant understood thepossible penalties resulting from a guilty plea. Defendant thenpleaded guilty to burglary.

Before accepting defendant's plea, the court admonisheddefendant pursuant to Rule 402. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. Among otherthings, the court specifically advised defendant that he wouldgive up his "right to make the State prove [him] guilty beyond areasonable doubt, to confront the witnesses against [him], and topresent a defense." After ascertaining that defendantrelinquished his rights voluntarily, the court found there was afactual basis for defendant's guilty plea. The court indicatedit would concur with the agreement to sentence defendant on onecount of burglary, imposed the minimum Class X sentence of sixyears in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000)), and enteredjudgment on the finding.

Finally, the court admonished defendant of his appellaterights pursuant to Rule 605 (188 Ill. 2d R. 605) in the followingmanner:

"Mr. Lloyd, you have the right toappeal. But before you can appeal, you mustfirst file in this court within 30 days awritten motion asking to withdraw your pleaof guilty. You would have to set forth inthat motion valid legal reasons why you'reasking to withdraw your plea of guilty. Anyreason you fail to set forth in your motion,you would give up for purposes of appealingthat issue.

Do you understand your appeal rights?"

Defendant answered that he understood.

The court entered an order sentencing defendant to six yearsin prison which defendant now appeals.

Defendant did not timely file any motion challenging hissentence or seeking to withdraw his plea and vacate his sentence. In his pro se late notice of appeal, defendant stated he wasindigent and sought appointed counsel, and he believed his appealhad merit because the "State failed to meet its burden of proofin finding him guilty and his counsel was ineffective." Defendant also asserted the failure to timely file the notice ofappeal was not due to his culpable negligence, claiming that hisprivate counsel failed to file a notice of appeal for him and hedid not know how to do so on his own.

Defendant contends that his case must be remanded for properRule 605 admonishments. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 605.

Initially, we must determine if defendant's appeal isproperly before this court. The State contends that we lackjurisdiction in this matter because defendant failed to file anypostplea motion within 30 days as required by Rule 604(d). 188Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides that "[n]o appeal shallbe taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging thesentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of theimposition of sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea ofguilty and vacate the judgment." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

In the instant case, it is uncontested that defendantentered a negotiated plea of guilty. Although Rule 604(d) hadbeen amended prior to defendant's sentencing to address appealsfrom negotiated guilty pleas (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d) (amendedOctober 5, 2000, effective November 1, 2000)), the requirementthat a defendant file a postplea motion within 30 days of theimposition of the sentence was not changed by the amendment. Defendant concedes that he failed to file any motion within therequisite time period after the imposition of his sentence.

The State seeks dismissal of this appeal based on thisadmitted noncompliance with the written-motion requirement ofRule 604(d). The State relies primarily on People v. Wilk, 124Ill. 2d 93, 529 N.E. 2d 218 (1988), in which our supreme courtheld that a defendant's compliance with Rule 604(d) is acondition precedent to a defendant's appeal from a plea ofguilty. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105.

While recognizing that strict compliance with Rule 604(d) isrequired and a defendant's failure to file a Rule 604(d) motionis a jurisdictional defect that generally precludes a reviewingcourt from considering the defendant's appeal, the supreme courthas adopted an admonition exception to such requirement. Peoplev. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 473, 665 N.E. 2d 823 (1996). Thecourt has held that Rule 605(b) is a necessary corollary to Rule604(d) and, where a trial court failed to issue Rule 605(b)admonishments, the appellate court may entertain an appealdespite the defendant's noncompliance with the Rule 604(d)written-motion requirement. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 472-73.

Supreme Court Rule 605 provides that the trial court mustgive the following specific advice to a defendant where ajudgment and sentence are entered upon a negotiated plea ofguilty:

"[T]he trial court shall advise thedefendant substantially as follows:

(1) that the defendant has a right toappeal;

(2) that prior to taking an appeal thedefendant must file in the trial court,within 30 days of the date on which sentenceis imposed, a written motion asking to havethe judgment vacated and for leave towithdraw the plea of guilty, setting forththe grounds for the motion;

(3) that if the motion is allowed, theplea of guilty, sentence and judgment will bevacated and a trial date will be set on thecharges to which the plea of guilty was made;

(4) that upon the request of the Stateany charges that may have been dismissed as apart of a plea agreement will be reinstatedand will also be set for trial;

(5) that if the defendant is indigent, acopy of the transcript of the proceedings atthe time of the defendant's plea of guiltyand sentence will be provided without cost tothe defendant and counsel will be appointedto assist the defendant with the preparationof the motions; and

(6) that in any appeal taken from thejudgment on the plea of guilty any issue orclaim of error not raised in the motion tovacate the judgment and to withdraw the pleaof guilty shall be deemed waived." 188 Ill.2d R. 605(c) (amended October 5, 2000,effective November 1, 2000).

The admonitions contained in the amended Rule 605(c) areessentially identical to the admonitions contained in subsection(b) of the rule, which previously applied to all cases in which adefendant entered a guilty plea. 145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b). Werecognize that the admonition exception set forth in Fosterconcerned admonishments given under Rule 605(b). Foster, 171Ill. 2d at 473. Because the admonitions in Rule 605(c) that areat issue here, concerning the availability of appointed counselfor postplea proceedings and the consequences of withdrawing aguilty plea, are essentially identical to those in Rule 605(b),we find the admonition exception applies here as well. SeePeople v. Munoz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824, 746 N.E. 2d 903(2001) (amended admonitions contained in Rule 605(c) areconsistent with admonition requirements under Rule 605(b)). Therefore, we find this court has jurisdiction to entertaindefendant's appeal. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 473.

We consider therefore whether the trial court complied withRule 605(c). Because the issue concerns compliance with asupreme court rule, our review is de novo. People v. Hayes, 336Ill. App. 3d 145, 147, 782 N.E. 2d 787 (2002).

The issuance of Rule 605 admonitions is mandatory and anecessary antecedent to the defendant's compliance with thewritten-motion requirement of Rule 604(d). People v. Jamison,181 Ill. 2d 24, 29, 690 N.E. 2d 995 (1998). Trial courts areheld to strict compliance with the admonition requirements ofRule 605. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d at 31. Where the trial courtfails to provide such admonitions, the appellate court isrequired, despite the defendant's noncompliance with Rule 604(d),to remand the cause to the trial court for proper admonishment. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d at 29-30.

In the instant case, it is uncontested that the trial courtfailed to give defendant all six admonitions required by Rule605(c). Yet the State argues that the court substantiallycomplied with Rule 605(c) because defendant was informed that hewas required to act within 30 days. The court properly informeddefendant of his right to appeal, the necessity of filing of awritten motion to withdraw the plea within 30 days of sentencing,and waiver of any issues not raised in such motion. See 188 Ill.2d Rs. 605(c)(1),(c)(2),(c)(6). However, unlike the trial courtin People v. Ahlstrand, 113 Ill. App. 3d 363, 447 N.E. 2d 517(1983), upon which the State relies, the court here did notmention appointing counsel for postplea proceedings. Defendantargues that the prejudice from the failure to be so informed isevidenced by his claim that he did not know how to file an appealby himself.

The trial court is required to substantially admonish thedefendant of all subsections of Rule 605(c). See People v.Castillo, 243 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822, 612 N.E. 2d 533 (1993)(trial court has duty to substantially admonish the defendant asto all subsections of Rule 605(b)). In the instant case,defendant was not advised that: if he filed a motion to withdrawhis guilty plea and such motion were allowed, the sentence andjudgment would be vacated and a trial date set on the burglarycharge; the State could then request that any charges that mayhave been dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement be reinstatedand also set for trial; or that, if defendant was indigent, acopy of the transcript of the plea proceedings would be providedto him without cost and counsel would be appointed to assist himwith the preparation of the motions. See 188 Ill. 2d Rs.605(c)(3),(c)(4),(c)(5).

In this case, defendant was represented by private counselwhen he entered his plea of guilty. The trial court thereforemay have considered it superfluous to admonish defendant of hisright to appointed counsel if he were indigent. Howeverreasonable the omission may have seemed under the circumstances,it is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's right to assistanceof counsel is fundamental. See People v. Massa, 271 Ill. App. 3d75, 82, 648 N.E. 2d 123 (1995).

The State argues that word-for-word recitation of the ruleis not required. Such argument has no merit in this instance. We recognize that recitation of the rule is not necessarilyrequired for substantial admonishment. Castillo, 243 Ill. App.3d at 822. Here, however, it is not the precise wording usedthat is at issue, but the lack of any wording at all. Regardlessof any possible suggestion that may have been made before thetrial court concerning continued representation by defendant'sprivate counsel, defendant was still entitled to be informed ofthe availability of appointed counsel for postplea proceedingsand his right to receive a transcript of the plea proceedings. 188 Ill. 2d R. 605(c)(5). Where it is undisputed that defendantwas not so informed, there could not be substantial admonishmentunder Rule 605(c). Rather, the failure to substantially admonishdefendant pursuant to Rule 605(c) excuses defendant's lack ofcompliance with Rule 604(d). See Castillo, 243 Ill. App. 3d at821. Therefore, we must remand the cause to the trial court forstrict compliance with Rule 605(c). See Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d at31; Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 474.

We note that defendant also argues he was "especiallyprejudic[ed]" by the court's failure to inform him that, if hewere allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, he might facereinstated charges based on the second count of burglary at atrial. Here, too, the trial court may have reasoned itunnecessary to admonish defendant of the potential forreinstatement of other charges upon withdrawal of his plea, whenthe court had already informed defendant that a Class X term wasmandatory and defendant was given the minimum sentence available. Defendant's argument of prejudice would seem to stem from a lackof recognition that he could not receive a shorter prison term,given his criminal history, were he convicted at trial. Nonetheless, defendant was entitled to be told the potentialconsequences of withdrawing his plea. Accordingly, we direct thetrial court upon remand to admonish defendant as to the possibleconsequences of withdrawing his guilty plea (188 Ill. 2d Rs.605(c)(3),(c)(4)) and the availability of appointed counsel (188Ill. R. 605(c)(5)) and provide defendant with 30 days to file anappropriate postplea motion.

Finally, we note defendant also claimed prejudice based onhis belief that the State failed to prove his guilt. Because ourreview is limited to compliance with Rule 605(c) admonitions, weneed not address this concern. Moreover, the record establishesthat defendant was thoroughly admonished as to the trial rightshe relinquished.

For the reasons stated above, we reverse and remand thiscause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with thisopinion.

Reversed and cause remanded.

McNULTY and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.