People v. Molina

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People v. Molina

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-06-2610 Rel

Case Date: 02/05/2008

Preview:SECOND DIVISION February 5, 2008

No. 1-06-2610

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN MOLINA, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 96 CR 11502 Honorable Thomas R. Sumner, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court: On September 19, 1997, defendant entered a plea of guilty for his role in the murder of Aaron Love in exchange for a 25-year sentence of imprisonment. Although the plea was fully negotiated, during the proceedings the trial court did not advise defendant that he would be subject to a three-year period of mandatory supervised release (MSR) following his 25-year sentence. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea nor did he file a direct appeal.

1-06-2610 On July 18, 2005, defendant filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2004)) seeking relief from judgment. In this petition, defendant alleged that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 604(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) certificate; and (2) the trial court failed to properly admonish petitioner regarding the procedure for appealing a sentence imposed on a guilty plea. The trial court denied defendant's petition on September 12, 2005. On April 12, 2006, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief. Defendant alleged that although he entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement, he was never advised that in addition to his 25-year sentence for first degree murder, he would be required to serve a 3-year period of MSR. Citing the recent supreme court decision of People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), defendant argued that he did not receive the "benefit of the bargain" as he understood it and requested that his 25-year sentence be modified to 22 years' of imprisonment with a 3-year period of MSR. The trial court docketed the petition and appointed the public defender to represent defendant. On August 4, 2006, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition. The State asserted that the petition was untimely filed because it was filed almost six years beyond the statutory limitations period for filing postconviction challenges. The State also argued that the recent decision in Whitfield did not excuse the untimely petition because the Whitfield decision did not change the law applicable to defendant's claim. Furthermore, the State argued that Whitfield was distinguishable from the instant case

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1-06-2610 because the defendant in Whitfield had filed a timely postconviction petition. At a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss on August 8, 2006, the State reiterated its position that the petition should be dismissed because it was untimely. However, during the postconviction proceedings, defense counsel argued that the untimeliness of defendant's petition should be excused because he filed his "postconviction relief after he became aware of the possibility of the remedy based on the decision in Whitfield." Furthermore, defense counsel stated "Had he filed his petition in a timely manner in 1998, it would have been denied because without the precedent in Whitfield, we think it extrememly unlikely that he would have been granted relief." The trial court agreed with defense counsel stating, "[H]ad he [defendant] filed a timely petition, he more than likely would not have been granted relief because at that time, Whitfield was not the law." After hearing arguments on the motion, the trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss and granted defendant the relief requested and reduced his sentence from 25 years' imprisonment to 22 years' imprisonment. In granting relief, the trial court stated that "the issue goes further than whether or not the petition was timely filed" and "the fact that he did not file a timely petition in my opinion would be irrelevant." The court further stated that, "I agree with counsel that had he filed a timely petition, he more than likely would not have been granted relief because at that time, Whitfield was not the law." It is from this order that the State now appeals.

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1-06-2610 Analysis In the appeal presently before this court, the State argues that the trial court improperly granted defendant postconviction relief because defendant's petition was untimely and he failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence.

A. Post-Conviction Hearing Act The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2004)), allows a criminal defendant a procedure for determining whether he was convicted in substantial violation of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2004); People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 243-44, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001). Where defendant is not sentenced to death, the Act sets forth a three-stage process for adjudicating a defendant's request for collateral relief. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102 (1996). At the first stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition before it alleges the " 'gist of a constitutional claim.' " Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418, 675 N.E.2d 102. Taking all well-pleaded facts as true, the court must determine whether the petition alleges a constitutional infirmity that, if proven, would demonstrate a deprivation of petitioner's constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2004); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). If the trial court determines that a petitioner has stated the "gist of a

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1-06-2610 constitutional claim," the petition is advanced to the second stage and counsel is appointed, if necessary, in accordance with sections 122-4 through 122-6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2004). At the second stage, the State is required to either answer the postconviction petition or move to dismiss. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2004). As the State in this case moved for dismissal, the trial court was required to rule on the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained in the petition, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 , 718 N.E.2d 117 (1999). When a postconviction petition is advanced to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing, and when fact-finding and credibility determinations are involved, this court will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473, 861 N.E.2d 999 (2006). However, if no new evidence is presented and the issues presented are based on pure questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review, unless the judge presiding over the proceedings had some special familiarity with the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that had some bearing on the disposition of the post-conviction petition. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473, 861 N.E.2d 999 . In the instant case, the trial court granted relief to defendant after an evidentiary hearing, where no new evidence was presented. Consequently, we apply de novo review. B. People v. Whitfield

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1-06-2610 Defendant relied on the holding in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), as support for his argument that the circuit court should reduce his 25-year sentence to a 22-year sentence with 3 years of MSR. The trial court found that pursuant to the holding in Whitfield, it was required to reduce defendant's sentence to 22 years' imprisonment. In Whitfield, the defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea. In exchange for his pleas of guilty to felony murder and armed robbery, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years and a concurrent 6-year sentence of imprisonment. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 179, 840 N.E.2d 658 . The defendant was never notified by the prosecutor or the court that he would be subject to a 3-year period of MSR after his 25year sentence. The defendant did not appeal. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 180, 840 N.E.2d 658 . While serving his prison sentence, the defendant learned that he would be required to serve a 3-year period of MSR after serving his 25-year sentence. Thereafter, the defendant filed a pro se motion for relief from judgment, which was treated as a postconviction petition, contending that his fourteenth amendment due process rights were violated because he was never advised of the period of MSR that "had been added to his negotiated sentence and resulted in a `more onerous' sentence than the one he had agreed to when he pled guilty." Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 180, 840 N.E.2d 658 . Rather than seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant sought specific performance of the plea agreement and asked the court to eliminate the MSR

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1-06-2610 term or to reduce his sentence by the length of the MSR term. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 181, 840 N.E.2d 658 . The circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 182, 840 N.E.2d 658. People v. Whitfield, No. 1-02-0314 (October 29, 2003) ( unpublished decision pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that due process clauses of the Illinois (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

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