THIRD DIVISION
January 21, 2004

JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from defendant's conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon(UUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2000)) following a jury trial. Defendant wassentenced to Cook County boot camp.

At trial, Chicago police officer Alan Hadac testified that for the past three years he had beenassigned to the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and worked at a police building located at 365West Oak Street, which is part of the Cabrini Green housing complex. He described the duties of aChicago police officer assigned to CHA public housing as being "strictly assigned to patrol housing sitesfederally funded throughout *** Chicago, whether it be Cabrini Green, Rockwell Gardens, RobertTaylor."

In the early morning hours of July 30, 2001, Officer Hadac was standing in a large parking lotbehind 365 West Oak, commonly referred to as the "Blacktop," where police officers often parkedtheir vehicles. The Blacktop was bordered by four buildings and a youth center. Two of the buildings,911-23 Sedgwick Avenue and 929-939 Hudson Avenue, are CHA buildings. According to OfficerHadac, the CHA had recently installed new lighting in the area. As he conversed with Officers Simon,McCormick and Carroll, Officer Hadac heard gunfire and turned to look in the direction of where theshots had been fired. He saw defendant standing at the rear of 929 Hudson with his right arm extendedand a gun in his hand. Defendant fired the weapon several times. Officer Hadac ran towardsdefendant, who went into 929 Hudson, while Officers McCormick and Carroll entered a nearbyvehicle.

A chase ensued when defendant ran through the building at 929 Hudson and out onto thestreet. As defendant and Officer Hadac turned the corner onto Locust Street, Officer Hadac observeddefendant toss the gun over a nearby fence. Hadac alerted Officers McCormick and Carroll that hehad seen defendant throw the weapon to the ground and continued his pursuit until he apprehended himas he was attempting to enter an apartment on the seventh floor of the CHA building at 939 HudsonAvenue.

Chicago police officer Thomas Carroll testified that he also worked out of the CHA policedistrict at 365 West Oak. He corroborated Officer Hadac's testimony regarding the eventssurrounding the firing of the gun and the subsequent apprehension of defendant.

Chicago police officer Brennan McCormick testified that on the morning of July 30, 2001, hewas in the CHA parking lot behind 365 West Oak with two CHA police officers when he heardgunshots. He observed defendant "with a gun in his hand outside of the housing project [at] *** 929." Officer McCormick identified defendant as the shooter and subsequently recovered a 9-millimeterautomatic weapon that defendant had thrown to the ground.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated UUW and he wassentenced to Cook County boot camp.

On appeal, defendant has raised the following issues for our review: (1) whether he was provenguilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the penalty for aggravated UUW isunconstitutionally disproportionate to the penalty for UUW; (3) whether the aggravated UUW statuteviolates due process by allowing a felony conviction based upon innocent conduct; and (4) whether theaggravated UUW statute violates due process and equal protection in the absence of a rational basis todifferentiate between property owners and renters.

Defendant initially contends that his conviction for aggravated UUW must be reversed becausethe State failed to prove an essential element of the offense, i.e., that he was not on his own land at thetime that he possessed the firearm.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the question on review is whether,after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could havefound the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d532, 541 (1999). A court of review may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact and willnot reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as tothe defendant's guilt. People v. Lundy, 334 Ill. App. 3d 819, 825 (2002).

The aggravated UUW statute provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful useof a weapon when he or she knowingly:

(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle orconcealed on or about his or her person except when on his or herland or in his or her abode or fixed place of business any pistol,revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; ***

***; and

(3) One of the following factors is present:

(A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded andimmediately accessible at the time of the offense[.]" (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2000).

As the above-italicized exception exists as part of the body of this offense, the State bears theburden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of this exception in order to sustain thedefendant's conviction. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1998). In meeting this burden, theState may rely upon circumstantial evidence if it provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant was not on his land or in his abode or fixed place of business at the time of the offense. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 335. However, there must be some evidence to create a reasonableinference that the exception exists as the State may not leave essential elements of the offense toconjecture or assumption. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 335-36.

In Laubscher, a case relied upon by defendant, the complainant and defendant resided indifferent units of the same apartment building. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 333. The defendant, who hada gun on his person, had an argument with two men on the lawn area of the apartment complex. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 333-34. The complainant intervened and seized a handgun from thedefendant's waistband, the police were called, and defendant was arrested. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at333-34. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the defendant's UUW convictionafter concluding that there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court to infer that the defendant did nothave an ownership interest in the premises. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336. Although the complainantloosely referred to occupants of the building as " 'tenants,' " the only evidence offered by the State ofthe defendant's connection with the property was that he " 'lived in the building.' " Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336. That evidence was insufficient to establishbeyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's particular interest in the premises. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at336. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's finding that "although it was not unreasonable forthe trial court to assume defendant had no ownership interest in the premises, permitting such aninference without any evidentiary basis would effectively shift the burden to defendant to prove that hewas on his land." Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336.

Applying the principles set forth above, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence toestablish that defendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense. Officers Hadac and Carroll,both assigned to the CHA for a period of years, testified that defendant was standing at 929 Hudsonwhen he fired several shots from a gun. Defendant subsequently ran through 929 Hudson with the gunin his hand and was ultimately apprehended when he attempted to gain access to an apartment on theseventh floor of the CHA building located at 939 Hudson. Unlike in Laubscher, Officer Hadacspecifically identified the premises at 929 and 939 Hudson as CHA buildings. Officer Hadac furthertestified that he was assigned to a nearby police station which was part of a CHA public housingcomplex and described for the jury the duties of a CHA police officer as being responsible for "strictlypatrolling federally funded housing sites." Moreover, Officer McCormick testified that defendant wasstanding with a gun in his hand outside of the housing project at 929 Hudson. Viewing the evidence inthe light most favorable to the State, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have inferred thatdefendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense.

Next, defendant contends that the penalty for aggravated UUW, based on the conductdescribed in sections 24.1.6(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A) of the aggravated UUW statute, is unconstitutionallydisproportionate to the penalty for UUW.

Although defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court, he has the right to challenge theconstitutionality of a statute for the first time on appeal. People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 176 (1990). It is well settled that statutes are presumed to be constitutional and that the party challenging the statutehas the burden of clearly showing the alleged constitutional violation. People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503,519-20 (2003). It is our responsibility to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity andconstitutionality if it can reasonably be done. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 520. Here, we will only considerthose sections of the aggravated UUW statute that apply to this defendant, and not those that mightapply to others in different circumstances. See People v. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1032(2003).

Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, commonly referred to as the proportionatepenalties clause, provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined *** according tothe seriousness of the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,