FOURTH DIVISION
May 26, 2005

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Marco Sole was foundguilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was sentencedto 14 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that theaggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute (the aggravated UUWstatute) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2002)) is unconstitutionalbecause it violates his right to due process of law and theproportionate penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution.He further contends that his sentence was excessive.⁽¹⁾

Defendant was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a .22-caliber weapon and a .44-caliber weapon.

At trial, Officer Tyrone Pendarvis testified that on May 21,2002, he was on patrol with his partner Philip Armstrong when acitizen on a bicycle informed them that someone was in the middleof the street a few blocks away pointing weapons at cars. Theofficers proceeded to the street indicated by the biker and sawtwo men in the street holding guns. One of the men wasidentified as defendant. The other man was identified as DeonteBlair. Defendant was holding a nickel-plated silver gun. Whenthey saw the officers, defendant and Blair ran into a nearbyhouse. The officers followed them into the house. In the house,Officer Pendarvis saw Blair in the hallway holding the nickel-plated silver gun. Blair complied with Officer Pendarvis' orderto drop the gun and get on the floor. Officer Pendarvis couldhear defendant in another room of the house and ordered him todrop any weapons and get on the floor. Defendant complied. Theofficers recovered the nickel-plated .44-caliber revolver thatPendarvis had seen Blair drop and a .22-caliber revolver that wasfound on the floor near defendant. During the State's rebuttal,Officer Armstrong corroborated Officer Pendarvis' testimony.

At the close of the State's case in chief, defendant movedfor a directed verdict as to the charges of aggravated unlawfuluse of a .22-caliber weapon and a .44-caliber weapon. The trialcourt granted defendant's motion as to the .22-caliber weapon anddenied the motion as to the .44-caliber weapon.

Joanne Coleman, the mother of defendant's children,testified on defendant's behalf that she was sitting in a caroutside the house when defendant was arrested. Earlier that day,Blair had come to the house with a silver gun. When the officersarrived at the house, defendant was sitting on the porch withouta gun. Blair ran into the house, followed by the officers. Defendant then followed the officers into the house.

The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravatedunlawful use of the .44-caliber weapon. The court denied theState's motion to revoke defendant's bond, warning defendant thatif he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, the trialcourt would sentence him in his absence. The court stated that"[p]eople who don't show up I usually sentence to the maximumsentence." The trial court subsequently denied defendant'smotion for a new trial.

Due to defendant's failure to appear for a presentencinginterview and for sentencing, the sentencing hearing wascontinued four times. Finally, the court held a sentencinghearing in defendant's absence. At the hearing, the State reliedon the facts adduced at trial and the presentencing investigationreport (PSI) in aggravation and requested that the court sentencedefendant to 10 years in prison. In mitigation, defense counselargued that defendant was the father of four children who wouldbe disadvantaged if defendant were to be sentenced to a longprison term, that defendant was employed before being arrestedand that the crime was nonviolent.

In sentencing the defendant to 14 years in prison, the trialjudge considered the facts that were adduced at trial, the PSI,which indicated that defendant had been convicted of possessionof a controlled substance in 1993, delivery of a controlledsubstance in 1993, unlawful use of a weapon in 1995 andmisdemeanor battery in 1998, and defendant's absence from thesentencing hearing. The trial court also considered the need toimpose a sentence that would deter others from committing thesame crime.

Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider defendant'ssentence in which he emphasized the nonviolent nature ofdefendant's crime. The trial court denied defendant's motion onMarch 7, 2003, stating that the primary factor it considered insentencing defendant was the need to deter others from committingthe same crime. The record is unclear as to when defendant wassubsequently arrested pursuant to the warrant issued for hisfailure to appear.

On appeal, defendant originally contended that the trialcourt had failed to ensure that the waiver of his right to a jurywas knowing and voluntary. In light of the supplemental recordfiled by the State, defendant now concedes this argument.

Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the aggravatedUUW statute on two grounds. Although defendant did not raise theissue at trial, he may challenge the constitutionality of the UUWstatute for the first time on appeal. People v. Pulley, 345 Ill.App. 3d 916, 922 (2004). Because we assume that a statute isconstitutional, defendant bears the burden of showing theconstitutional violation. People v. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792,803 (2003). "Our duty is to construe a statute in a manner thatupholds its validity and constitutionality if it can reasonablybe done." People v. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1032 (2003).

Defendant first contends that the aggravated UUW statutedeprives him of his constitutional right of due process because,though it requires a defendant to act "knowingly," it requires noculpable mental state and therefore may punish innocent conduct.

In Grant, the defendant raised this exact argument. Wenoted:

"When legislation is being challenged asfailing to comply with substantive dueprocess requirements, as in this case, andthat legislation does not involve afundamental constitutional right, we mustdetermine whether the statute bears arational relationship to a legitimate stategoal." Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 803.

The defendant in Grant contended, as does defendant here,that the aggravated UUW statute is similar to those statutes thatwere held unconstitutional in People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62(1985), People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994), and People v.Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1 (2000), because it requires only a"knowing" mental state without requiring a culpable mental state. "In Grant, this court held that the aggravated UUW statute does,in fact, contain a sufficient mental state, i.e., knowledge." People v. Washington, 343 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894 (2003). Wefurther found that the purpose of the statute,

"is to allow the State to seek a harsherpenalty for any person in the State ofIllinois who does not fall under a specificexemption from carrying a loaded weapon on orabout his person or in any vehicle because ofthe inherent dangers to police officers andthe general public, even if the personcarrying the weapon has no criminalobjective." Pulley, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 925,citing Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 806.

The aggravated UUW statute does not violate a defendant's dueprocess rights because it is rationally related to thislegitimate state purpose. Grant 339 Ill. App. 3d at 807.

We have repeatedly followed our holding in Grant, rejectingcontentions that the aggravated UUW statute violates adefendant's due process rights. See Pulley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 916;Washington, 343 Ill. App. 3d 889; People v. Marin, 342 Ill. App.3d 716 (2003); McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1029; People v. Spivey,351 Ill. App. 3d 763 (2004). We continue to adhere to theholding that the aggravated UUW statute is constitutional andsimilarly reject defendant's arguments.

Defendant next contends that the aggravated UUW statuteviolates the proportionate penalties clause of the IllinoisConstitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,