SECOND DIVISION
March 30, 2001

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Kalman Urr pleaded guilty to theft on December 11, 1996, andreceived a 30-month term of probation. On December 9, 1997, defendant againpleaded guilty to theft, which also resulted in a violation of probation fromhis 1996 conviction. Defendant was sentenced to 32 months in prison for bothcounts of theft. Defendant subsequently filed motions to withdraw his guiltyplea and the resulting admission to the probation violation. Both were denied.Defendant contends on appeal that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that thetrial court erred when it refused to allow him to withdraw the plea because heinformed the court that he was pleading guilty under duress due to conditions inthe Cook County Department of Corrections.

According to the transcript of the hearing, the trial court noted thatdefendant's signature on his request for a Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2dR. 402) conference indicated he was signing the request under duress. The courtexplained to defendant that he did not have to have a Rule 402 conference if he did notwant one. Defendant responded that he wanted the conference and to plead guiltyin order to be transferred from the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC),where he was physically threatened on a daily basis. The conference proceeded,but at its conclusion the court explained that it would not accept defendant'sguilty plea if it was given under duress. Defendant then requested a jury trial,and the court explained that defendant could not have a jury trial for aviolation of probation charge. Defendant responded that he could only pleadguilty under duress, and the court responded that it would set the case fortrial. The State offered to begin trial immediately as most of its witnesseswere present, but after conferring with his attorney, defendant again decided toplead guilty.

The court admonished defendant by explaining the offense with which he wascharged, the minimum and maximum sentences, and the rights defendant was waivingby pleading guilty. The court also asked defendant whether he was pleadingguilty of his own free will. Defendant responded that he understood theadmonishments and confirmed that he was pleading guilty voluntarily. In hisstatement in allocution, however, defendant explained that the only reason hewas pleading guilty was because he had been sexually assaulted in the CCDOC. Hestated that the prison offered to put him in protective custody, but he refusedbecause he "can't stand" cigarette smoke and needs to be in anon-smoking area. Defendant then told the court that he was pleading guilty eventhough he did nothing wrong. Again, the court explained that defendant had aright to go to trial and asked if he wished to plead guilty. Defendantresponded, "Yes, I wish to plead guilty because I have no other choice. ***I don't want to die at this point." The court accepted the plea andinstructed defendant on his right to withdraw the plea and appeal. Whendefendant showed interest in appealing, the court offered to vacate the guiltyplea immediately and proceed to trial, but defendant declined.

Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea,alleging he was under duress when he entered the plea. The court noted thatdefendant was not present at the hearing, as he was in the custody of theImmigration and Naturalization Service. The court denied the motion, statingthat the witnesses were in court on several occasions when defendant wouldrequest a negotiated plea agreement. Once in jail, defendant would again ask fora trial. The court stated that on the day of the plea, the witnesses werepresent and the court informed defendant that the case would not be continuedagain. Defendant was advised of his rights and said he understood them. Thecourt concluded,

"I believe, as the state pointed out, both cases that [defendant] had were ones that he was conning people out of money. I believe at this point that this is another way of what Mr. Kalman Urr was doing. He's now found that his deal was not as good as he thought it was going to be, and that's the only reason he's asking to withdraw his plea of guilty. I believe he made the conscious effort to plead guilty in what he thought was going to be the deal that he wished, and at this point, I'm going to deny his request to withdraw the plea of guilty."

Defendant appeals the denial of the motion, contending that the transcript ofthe plea proceeding showed he was only entering a guilty plea because he hadbeen threatened and physically assaulted in the CCDOC.

It is within the trial court's discretion whether to allow the withdrawal ofa guilty plea, and its judgment will not be overturned absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. People v. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d 914, 918 (2000). For aguilty plea to be constitutionally valid, there must be an affirmative showingthat the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. People v. St. Pierre,146 Ill. 2d 494, 506 (1992). To determine whether a plea is voluntarily andintelligently entered, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Supreme Court Rule402, which requires the court to admonish defendant on the nature of the crimecharged, the sentencing range, and the rights defendant forfeits as a result ofpleading guilty. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. When a defendant claims that he onlypleaded guilty due to prison conditions, it does not necessarily follow that hisplea was involuntary. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d at 507. Defendant mustallege a specific instance of abuse, which caused him to plead guilty, and hemust sufficiently establish a nexus between the alleged violence and his guiltyplea. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d at 508.

In arguing defendant's plea was intelligent and voluntary, the State cites St.Pierre, People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (1992), and Peoplev. Stokes, 21 Ill. App. 3d 754, 757 (1974). These cases, however, aredistinguishable from the instant case. In St. Pierre, the defendantstated that he wanted to plead guilty because of poor conditions in the CCDOC.The trial court specifically stated that it would not accept the defendant'sguilty plea if it was being entered for the sole purpose of being transferredfrom the CCDOC. The court further stated that if the defendant maintained hisinnocence, the case would have to go to trial. The defendant responded that hewanted to plead guilty primarily because he committed the crime with which hewas being charged, and secondarily to be transferred out of the CCDOC. As aresult, the court accepted his plea. In Stokes and Strickland, thedefendants did not even complain about prison conditions until after the pleaproceeding had been conducted. Both defendants argued for the first time intheir motions to withdraw their guilty pleas that they pled guilty due to prisonconditions.

In this case, defendant maintained throughout the proceeding that he wasinnocent. In his statement in allocution he stated, "[I]n my heart I know Idid nothing wrong. I hurt nobody. The bank gave me the money voluntarily. Theynever told me the checks are bad." He also consistently told the courtthroughout the proceeding that the only reason he was pleading guilty wasbecause he had been sexually assaulted in jail and was receiving "dailythreats." When the court asked him at the end of the proceeding if hewished to plead guilty, defendant responded, "I wish to plead guiltybecause I have no other choice." The court then asked him if he waspleading guilty of his own free will, and defendant responded, "I don'twant to die at this point." Defendant stated that he was only pleadingguilty to get out of the CCDOC, and the trial court was well aware of the factthat defendant maintained his innocence throughout.

The State also argues that St. Pierre, Strickland and Stokesrequire defendant to establish that the alleged threats and/or violence weredirected at him specifically to force him to plead guilty or that prisonpersonnel persuaded him to plead guilty. In St. Pierre, the court statedthat the defendant must "allege any specific instance of abuse *** orcoercion which would have caused him to plead guilty." St. Pierre,146 Ill. 2d at 508. In Stokes, this court held that the defendant failedto demonstrate how jail conditions influenced his guilty plea because he did notallege that any conditions were specifically directed at him to force him toplead guilty. Stokes, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 757. In Strickland, thecourt required the defendant to show a connection between his alleged fears forhis personal safety and his decision to waive trial. Strickland, 154 Ill.2d at 519.

We do not agree that these cases require defendant to show that the allegedsexual assault committed against him was intended specifically to force him toplead guilty. The cases merely require defendant to allege a specific act ofviolence committed against him, and show a connection between the violence andthe reason he pleaded guilty. Defendant alleged specific acts of violence inclaiming he was sexually assaulted, urine was thrown at him, and his life wasthreatened. At the plea proceeding, he specifically told the court that theseincidences were the reason he was pleading guilty. As a result, he hasestablished the nexus required by these cases.

We also note that although the trial judge observed the requirements ofportions of Supreme Court Rule 402(a) and (b), he did not substantially complywith section(b). Supreme Court Rule(b) provides:

"The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary, if the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court shall confirm the terms of that agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any force or threats or promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea."  177 Ill. 2dR.402(b).

In this case a plea conference was held. However, there is no indication onthe record whether the guilty plea was the result of a plea agreement. Because aconference took place the trial judge must according to the rule confirm theterms of that agreement or state that there is no agreement.

The rule also provides that the "trial judge shall also determinewhether any force or threats or any promises, apart from the plea agreement,were used to obtain the plea". 177 Ill.2d S.Ct.R.402(b). In this case, thedefendant stated several times that the reason he was pleading guilty was notbecause he committed the offense but because of numerous abusive incidents atthe Cook County Jail. Whether or not any of these allegations were true, therecord still suggests that the allegations were used to obtain the plea.

We realize that the defendant had pled guilty before on the first informationand that the plea of guilty had been withdrawn before sentencing. We are alsoaware that the defendant eventually pled guilty to the theft charge and wassentenced to 30 months felony probation. We also realize that the case had beenpending for some period of time. And, we recognize that there is no requirementthat the defendant admit his guilt in order for a plea to be voluntarily andknowingly made. However, where a defendant persists that he is not guilty andpersists that he is pleading guilty because he has been sexually assaulted,abused by other inmates, or for any other oppressive reason, we believe the endsof justice will be better served by submitting the case to a trial or a hearingon the violation of probation charge.

Finally, we note that the trial court offered to allow defendant to withdrawhis guilty plea at the end of the plea proceeding. After the court accepteddefendant's guilty plea, defendant expressed his desire to appeal. The courttold defendant that it would allow him to withdraw the guilty plea immediatelyand proceed to trial if he wished. Defendant declined the offer, stating hewould rather go to prison and appeal later. Although defendant refused thecourt's offer, we see no reason why the court would offer to allow defendant towithdraw the plea immediately, but subsequently deny a timely filed motion towithdraw.

Due to the unique facts of this case - that defendant made clear at the plea proceeding that he was only pleading guilty because ofspecific acts of violence committed against him in jail, and the trial court'sprevious offer to withdraw the plea- we find that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying defendant's motions to withdraw the guilty plea and theresulting admission to the probation violation.

Accordingly, the judgments of the circuit court are reversed, and the causesare remanded for further processing.

Reverse and remanded.

COUSINS and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.