SECOND DIVISION
June 24, 2003

No. 1-01-3698

Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 10 yearsin prison. He argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court improperly barred a psychologist andpsychiatrist from testifying; (2) unsupported insinuations during cross-examination denied him afair trial; (3) the State made improper remarks during closing argument; and (4) the cumulativeeffect of the claimed errors warrants a new trial. We affirm.

Roy Hok and his wife Emily Ou have two children, a daughter and a son. The childrenwere three and seven, respectively, in 1999. Sim Wood, defendant's wife and Emily's sister, tookcare of the Hok children while the parents were at work. Roy picked up his children just before 5p.m. each day. Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his three-year-old niece, Hok'sdaughter, on January 5, 1999.

Roy testified at trial that he picked up his children at 4:40 p.m. on January 5, 1999. Hisson Jeremy told Roy that his sister had a secret. Roy asked his daughter what the secret was. She said that defendant told her not to tell. Roy demanded to know what the secret was. Hisdaughter then said that defendant let her "suck his doing-doing." Roy took his daughter to adoctor that night. Roy admitted that his wife Emily left the children with her sister the next day,January 6. Emily and her sister did not discuss what happened the day before. Roy explainedthat there was no other babysitter for the children. Roy said that Emily picked up the childrenafter only half a day. Roy explained that Emily's employer told her to pick up her children afterlearning what had happened the day before. Emily did not testify at trial. Roy made a policereport on January 7, 1999.

Detective Joseph Licari testified that he interviewed defendant on January 8. Licari tolddefendant about his Miranda rights. Defendant said he understood his rights and signed a waiverform. Defendant first denied having sexual contact with his niece. But he later confessed in awritten statement that his niece performed oral sex on him. Defendant said that he wasmasturbating in his office while watching a pornographic slide show. He told his niece not totell anyone what had happened. Defendant's signed statement was published to the jury. He alsoconsented to a search of his home and seizure of his computer.

Defendant was then interviewed by Assistant State's Attorney Peter Karlovics. Defendantagain confessed to having sexual contact with his niece. In a written statement, defendant said hewas masturbating as he watched a pornographic slide show that depicted a woman performingoral sex on a man. Defendant's niece entered the room and asked what the woman on thecomputer was doing. Defendant had his niece come by his side and mimic the action on thecomputer. Defendant told his niece not to tell anyone about what had happened. Defendant'sstatement also said that he had been treated well by the police and that he gave his statementfreely and voluntarily.

Meghan McGrath works for the Children's Advocacy Center. McGrath testified that sheinterviewed defendant's niece on January 11, 1999. McGrath asked the child who takes care ofher when her mother is at work. The child responded that defendant made her "suck a doing-doing." The child told McGrath that she saw a picture on the computer of one woman and twoboys. The woman was nude and was performing oral sex. The child showed McGrath where a"doing-doing" was by pointing between her legs. She told McGrath that defendant made her dowhat the woman on the computer was doing. The child also mentioned a person named Danielduring the interview in response to McGrath's question if anyone else had touched her. McGrathsaid that she had no trouble communicating with or understanding the child.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant said he came home at 3 p.m. onJanuary 5, 1999. He went into his office and checked his email. Defendant then opened apornographic slide show on his computer. Defendant was watching the slide show when histhree-year-old niece came into the office. Defendant did not notice his niece until she asked whatthe woman on the computer was doing. The slide show depicted a woman performing oral sexon a man. Defendant turned off the show when he noticed his niece was in the room. Defendanttold his niece not to tell anyone what she had seen. Defendant denied that he was masturbating.

Defendant testified that he was interviewed by Licari and Karlovics on January 8. Licariasked defendant what happened on January 5. Defendant said Licari immediately read hisMiranda rights and that he understood and waived those rights. Defendant denied having sexualcontact with his niece. Licari interrupted defendant, called him a liar and told him that he wasnot telling the truth. Defendant said that Licari screamed at him and told defendant to confess orface "the maximum penalty." Defendant started to cry. He continued to deny having sexualcontact with his niece. Licari told defendant that it would be in his interest to say what Licariwanted to hear. Defendant believed Licari and then confessed.

Defendant testified that he was crying when he was interviewed by Assistant State'sAttorney Karlovics. Defendant said that he did not tell Karlovics about the discrepancies in hisconfession because Licari had warned him against changing his story. Defendant said hisconfessions were false and that he did not sexually abuse his niece.

During cross-examination, the State asked defendant if he had child pornography on hiscomputer. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the question was beyond the scope ofdirect examination. The trial court sustained the objection.

The State had filed a motion in limine before trial to bar testimony about defendant's stateof mind, depression and susceptibility to coercion. Defendant intended to present experttestimony by Drs. Sheldon Greenberg and Tricia Porter on these issues. Drs. Greenberg andPorter had testified at an earlier hearing on a motion to change the conditions of defendant's bondpending trial. The purpose of the bond hearing was to determine whether defendant, who wasnot in custody, could return home to his wife and two small children. Subsequently, the trialcourt granted the State's motion in limine in part as to state of mind, depression and susceptibilityto coercion, but said that the motion would be revisited during trial.

The State again objected at trial when defendant tried to call Dr. Greenberg as a witness. The trial court sustained the State's objection and barred Dr. Greenberg from testifying. Noruling was made as to Dr. Porter.

During closing argument, the State asked the jurors to imagine themselves in the shoes ofthe victim and her family. Defendant did not object to this remark. The jury found defendantguilty.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in barring Dr. Greenwood and Dr. Porterfrom testifying about the involuntary nature of his confession. Defendant reasons that thisevidence was "directly relevant" to a defense that his confession was the result of his being"susceptible to suggestion and coercion." Defendant claims that this defense requires experttestimony and he concludes that, absent this evidence, the jury did not have the chance toconsider or evaluate his defense. We disagree.

We first note that defendant's argument is not relevant to the proposed testimony of Dr.Porter. Porter tested defendant for the limited purpose of determining his sexual preferences. But Porter did not conduct a full evaluation. Porter's report was limited to her interpretation ofthe test results. Porter found defendant was disturbed but did not share cognitive disordersgenerally present in child molesters. This testimony and report were used by the court indeciding whether to allow defendant to live with his wife and children pending trial. Porter neverassessed defendant's alleged susceptibility to suggestion or coercion. The trial court properlygranted the State's motion in limine barring Porter's testimony at trial.

Defendant's argument as to Dr. Greenberg is waived for failure to make an adequate offerof proof. An offer of proof allows a reviewing court to determine whether evidence was properlyexcluded. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 155, 700 N.E.2d 960 (1998). When evidence isrefused, no appealable issue remains unless a formal offer of proof is made. People v. Peeples,155 Ill. 2d 422, 457, 616 N.E.2d 294 (1993). An adequate offer of proof is made if counselreveals, with particularity, the substance of the witness's anticipated answer. People v. Andrews,146 Ill. 2d 413, 421, 588 N.E.2d 1126 (1992). The offer serves no purpose if it does notestablish to both the trial and reviewing courts the admissibility of the testimony. Andrews, 146Ill. 2d at 421.

The record here shows that defense counsel was less than forthcoming when asked by thetrial court to state the purpose for which Dr. Greenberg would be called:

"THE COURT: Let's stop the ultimate speculation. What are they going tobe testifying to?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: They are going to be testifying to the tests they*** conducted on the defendant.

THE COURT: For what purpose?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: For what purpose? All right, for his mentalposture while in custody.

THE COURT: Which would be a state of mind?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Could be a state of mind, Judge.

THE COURT: That is not going to be admissible. So what else?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It could be.

THE COURT: It's not going to be admissible-state of mind.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It could be with regard to his personality, Judge.

THE COURT: Why-are you saying that he was insane at the time?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: No.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just trying to see where you are going.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, as an expert this man is allowed to testifyon any issue that will aid the jury in coming to their conclusion.

THE COURT: Only if it's relevant. It has to be relevant here.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, I will have an opportunity to show therelevance of his testimony.

THE COURT: I'll tell you what, I'm going to ask you right now to make anoffer of proof as to what they will testify to.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right, Dr. Greenberg is going to testify in hiscapacity as a psychiatrist as to the tests he conducted on thedefendant-psychological-or had conducted on the defendant. Okay, the results ofthose tests-he's going to testify as to the propensity of a child of tender years togive accurate recollection of an event. He's going to testify as to articles inexistence that bear on the credibility of a child of tender years recalling events.

THE COURT: So that would be in the nature of rebuttal.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Of course.

THE COURT: So they are only rebuttal witnesses?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: They may be, Judge, yes. You know when youlist witnesses you have to list them for any purpose.

THE COURT: I understand but I'm just trying to get a handle on what thestate is seeking to exclude, and some of which may be excludable and some ofwhich may not. Do you want to comment on that Ms. State's Attorney.

PROSECUTOR: Well, Judge, so I'm assuming based on counsel'sresponse to the Court, first of all he's said that they will talk about the propensity. Now is that with respect to the defendant? Because in the reports, Judge, that thedoctors prepared, they basically state unequivocally that this defendant could nothave committed the crime because he's not a pedophile. Now, obviously, Judge,that is the ultimate issue of fact that the jury is being asked to determine.

THE COURT: They are not going to be able to testify to-any ultimateissues.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I understand that, Judge. But you know, Judge, Ihave no idea what evidence the state is going to bring in or who they're going tocall, so I have to be ready to rebut any and all of it. And the state coming in andsaying well, he can't call this witness, he can't call that witness because it mayprejudice their case, then they shouldn't call any witnesses because it's going toprejudice mine.

THE COURT: No, there are certain things that they can't testify to. Obviously ultimate issues, which you know. ***

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Understood, Judge. ***

THE COURT: I'm trying to get a handle on-I'm not sure you are talkingabout the same things they excluded-I'm not sure counsel really knows what hewants to call them for as of yet or if he's even going to call them because he issaying they might just be rebuttal witnesses.

Let's exclude those things that are excludable. They can't be called forultimate issues, they can't be called for anything that would give a conclusion ofsomething that wasn't alleged as an affirmative defense so they couldn't testify tohis sanity or insanity at the time.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Granted."

The trial court granted the State's motion in part and said that it would be revisited. TheState later objected to defendant's attempt to allude to Dr. Greenberg during trial:

"PROSECUTOR: Judge, again we're getting into the motion in limine,which was granted last week, regarding expert testimony. Again, there has beenno affirmative defense filed by counsel and for him to ask in front of the jury afterthe motion in limine whether or not he saw a treating physician is totallyimproper.

THE COURT: He didn't ask him if he saw him. He just asked if he knewhim and I presume he is going to get to that point.

PROSECUTOR: He is playing games. He knows exactly what he is doingwhich is why we filed the motion in limine. Obviously once it's out there, theJury has heard it.

THE COURT: Offer of proof as to where you are going with thistestimony.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. I'm going to offer that he did, in fact, seeArthur Himes, who is a psychologist, that he went there for the purpose of, A,getting back into his house and for treatment to find out what was going on withhim at this time, okay? He will not say, you know, any conclusions that weredone. He would just say he went to this man and for these problems, boom,boom, boom.

PROSECUTOR: And that is not relevant at trial, Judge. Maybe forsentencing purposes.

THE COURT: That's totally irrelevant to this trial. That's totally irrelevantto this.

***

What's the other point?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: He was treated for depression and he was treatedfor-you know, it's in Greenberg's report.

THE COURT: Who is Greenberg?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: He is the treating psychiatrist that Himes referred[defendant] to.

PROSECUTOR: It was one of the doctors that was the subject of mymotion in limine, Judge.

THE COURT: I just don't see the relevancy of it to-that the fact that hewas depressed or treated for depression other than the prejudicial effect it wouldhave on the Jury. I'm not going to allow you to go into it, not with him. I don'tknow what your doctors are going to testify to but not with this testimony. Okay."

The State objected again when defendant tried to call Dr. Greenberg:

"PROSECUTOR: Judge, I believe Dr. Greenberg is about to be callednow. There has been a motion in limine as to his testimony. I have the reports ofDr. Greenberg. Our objection to his testimony was basically that he's going to betestifying to a lack of propensity on the part of the defendant to commit a crimeand the involuntariness of his confession.

THE COURT: Did this doctor testify-just refresh my memory. Was therea question of understanding Miranda and did this doctor testify with regard to hisability to make knowing and voluntary statements?

PROSECUTOR: No. This doctor testified in a separate hearing to modifythe defendant's bond and allow him to return to the home with his wife and twosmall children.

THE COURT: Well, that would have nothing to do with this. Let's get anoffer of proof from counsel. Maybe this is premature.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, my offer of proof is that after the incident[defendant] went for-to a psychologist who referred him to Dr. Greenberg who isa psychiatrist. Doctor Greenberg has treated him. In order to treat him he orderedcertain tests on him.

THE COURT: Did he do those tests?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. He had them done by an expert and returnedto him, Okay?

THE COURT: So those tests are hearsay. Go ahead.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And he used those tests in his treatment of himand that's what he's going to testify.

THE COURT: Treatment for what?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Treatment for depression, treatment for-

THE COURT: You can't get into that. We've already made thatdetermination. We're not going to get into that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Because of this incident, okay, my guy soughthelp immediately not for the things he did but because of the things that happenedto him in the police station.

THE COURT: That is totally inflaming the jury and it would not berelevant or admissible in this case. *** [Y]ou know that. It's not admissible. I'mnot going to allow it for those purposes. Okay. Anything else you want to puthim in for?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, but I'm not going to mention those." (Emphasis added.)

These excerpts reveal the trial court's repeated efforts to uncover the intended nature andpurpose of Greenberg's testimony. The issue was revisited several times, with the trial courtasking counsel for an offer of proof each time. Defense counsel instead gave ambiguous answersabout the proposed testimony of his experts and never claimed that the testimony would supporta defense of coercion. Counsel told the court that Dr. Greenberg would be used as a rebuttalwitness to challenge the accuracy of the child's testimony. Counsel also said Dr. Greenbergwould testify about defendant's depression and the results of the psychological tests ordered. Thetrial court accepted the possibility of Dr. Greenberg as a rebuttal witness, depending on theState's evidence. But the trial court repeatedly told counsel that defendant's state of mind was notat issue and that evidence of it would not be admitted.

Counsel never made an adequate offer of proof to preserve the argument he now makes:that Dr. Greenberg's testimony was relevant and admissible to show that defendant's confessionwas not voluntary. When given a chance to make this alternate argument, defense counselrefused. But in his brief on appeal, defendant argues with specificity and reference toGreenberg's report, that Greenberg would have testified that defendant is easily intimidated andthat intimidation caused him to confess to a crime he did not commit.

An offer of proof must be specific. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 457. The lack of an offer ofproof waives the issue. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d at 421. Waiver aside, defendant's argument isunpersuasive.

Even though the trial court here denied defendant's motion to suppress his confession,finding it was made voluntarily, defendant still had the right to present evidence relevant to thecredibility or weight of the confession. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 512-13, 670 N.E.2d606 (1996). But the admission of evidence remains within the discretion of the trial court andwill not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 513. Expert testimonyis proper where such testimony is needed to explain matters beyond the common knowledge ofordinary persons and helps the fact finder in reaching a conclusion. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 513.

Dr. Greenberg's testimony that defendant was easily coerced and susceptible tointimidation is not beyond the understanding of ordinary citizens, nor is the concept difficult tounderstand. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 513. The jury could have reached the same conclusion as Dr.Greenberg based on defendant's testimony. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 513.

Defendant's reliance on United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7^th Cir. 1996), is inapposite. Hall's acceptance of expert testimony on the defendant's alleged false confession was based on adiagnosed personality disorder. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1341. The court held that expert testimony onthis issue was relevant because "juries are unlikely to know that social scientists andpsychologists have identified a personality disorder that will cause individuals to make falseconfessions." Hall, 93 F.3d at 1345. Defendant here was not diagnosed with a personalitydisorder. Dr. Greenberg merely opined, based on the personal history defendant related to him,that defendant was easily coerced. Dr. Greenberg's testimony was properly barred. Ourconclusion makes it unnecessary to consider defendant's other two claims of error relating toexclusion of the expert testimony.

Defendant next argues that the State's repeated insinuations that defendant kept childpornography on his computer were designed to inflame the passions of the jury and denied himthe right to a fair trial. Defendant claims that the insinuation suggested that he was a pedophileand was guilty of the charged offense.

Defendant testified on direct examination that he was viewing a pornographic slide showon his computer when his niece came into the office. Defendant testified that he immediatelyturned off the slide show. Defendant denied he sexually abused his niece. He admitted tellingher not to tell anyone about what she had seen on the slide show. The State asked the followingquestions on cross-examination:

"PROSECUTOR: Were there any children in this pornographic slide showyou were watching?

DEFENDANT: No.

PROSECUTOR: You had no pornographic slides of children performingsexual acts?

DEFENDANT: No.

PROSECUTOR: And this pornographic slide show that was downloadedfrom your hard drive?

DEFENDANT: Downloaded from the Internet.

PROSECUTOR: That slide show and those pornographic slides were inyour computer in the hard drive that day?

DEFENDANT: Correct.

PROSECUTOR: And they're still there, aren't they?

DEFENDANT: I wouldn't know. I don't have my computers.

PROSECUTOR: Well, they were in the computer that Detective Licaritook from your home after you signed a consent to search, correct?

DEFENDANT: Right. I'm sure I was-had deleted that material.

PROSECUTOR: So are you saying, Sir, that you had no pornographicslides of children in your hard drive?

DEFENDANT: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I'm going to object to this line ofquestioning. It's beyond the scope of any direct content.

THE COURT: I'll sustain it as to that question.

PROSECUTOR: And you indicated earlier that the slide show you wereviewing only pictured adults?

DEFENDANT: Correct.

PROSECUTOR: Did it picture any-did it picture any adolescents?

DEFENDANT: No.

PROSECUTOR: Did it picture any children?

DEFENDANT: No.

PROSECUTOR: Did you have any pornographic slide show picturingchildren?

DEFENDANT: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I'm going to object.

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection unless you want the answer of 'no'to stand. Do you want to withdraw the objection, or do you want me to strike it?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think it should be stricken.

THE COURT: Strike the question, strike the answer, disregard it."

Defendant claims that this exchange implies that, through rebuttal evidence, the State wasgoing to impeach defendant's testimony that he did not keep child pornography on his computer. This impeachment would not only establish possession of child pornography, an unchargedoffense, but also insinuate that defendant had a sexual interest in minors and that he was guiltybecause of this deviant sexual interest. Defendant concludes that he was prejudiced by the State'sfailure to perfect its impeachment. We disagree.

Defendant overlooks that his defense counsel's objections to questions relating to childpornography were sustained by the trial court. The jury was instructed to disregard questionswhere the objections had been sustained or answers stricken. The claimed error was cured by thetrial court's ruling and later instruction to the jury. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 345-46, 743N.E.2d 521 (2001) (error cured when trial court sustains objection and instructs jury todisregard).

Defendant also overlooks that his attorney's objection at trial was that the question wasbeyond the scope of direct examination. Counsel did not object on the ground argued here-thatthe question raised prejudicial insinuations. A specific objection to the admission of evidencewaives all grounds not specified. People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 114, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996). Waiver aside, defendant's reliance on People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d 375, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969),People v. Davidson, 235 Ill. App. 3d 605, 601 N.E.2d 1146 (1992), and People v. Robinson, 189Ill. App. 3d 323, 545 N.E.2d 268 (1989), is misplaced.

Nuccio is inapposite. In Nuccio, the defendant was a police officer convicted of murder. A self-defense theory was challenged on cross-examination by the State's insinuations that thedefendant and his fellow officers engaged in misconduct. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d at 381. The impliedaccusations of misconduct were denied by all the police officers who testified on the defendant'sbehalf. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d at 384-92. On appeal to our supreme court, the defendant argued thatthe insinuations, unsupported by rebuttal evidence, denied him his right to a fair trial. Nuccio, 43Ill. 2d at 381. The court agreed and rejected the State's waiver argument:

"But there are, it seems to us, limits to the immunity to improper and prejudicialinsinuations which judges are presumed to possess. Stripped of the haze createdby the innuendoes, the shooting here was either done by an officer who was thetarget of a knife being thrown at him by decedent *** or it was the wanton killingtestified to by the State's witnesses. Where, as here, the guilt of the accused is notmanifest, but is dependent upon the degree of credibility accorded by the trier offact to his testimony and that of the witnesses who testify on his behalf, and thereappear in the record substantial numbers of unsupported insinuations which, ifconsidered, could have seriously impeached the credibility of the defendant andhis witnesses, and there is no indication of the court's awareness of thisimpropriety even though it is brought to his attention, it is our opinion that justiceand fundamental fairness demand that the defendant be afforded a new trial freefrom such prejudicial misconduct." Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d at 396.

Unlike Nuccio, evidence of defendant's guilt here is manifest and does not turn on thecredibility of witnesses. Defendant twice confessed to the predatory criminal sexual assaultcharge. There is no prejudicial misconduct here that requires a new trial.

In Davidson, we found that the prosecutor implied that the defendant committed crimesother than those for which he was on trial. Davidson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 611. But we noted thatthis prosecutorial error standing alone did not warrant reversal. Instead, it was the combinedeffect of all the instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the case that required a new trial. Davidson, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 613.

Like Davidson, a new trial was required in Robinson where the combined effect of aseries of errors denied the defendant a fair trial. We found that the trial court first erred inadmitting evidence about an unrelated collateral threat the defendant made. Robinson, 189 Ill.App. 3d at 332. The error was compounded by using the inadmissible evidence to establish thedefendant's state of mind for a murder that happened more than five hours after the collateralthreat was made. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 332. The State capitalized on these errors duringclosing argument. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 334. We next found that the State improperlyinsinuated that a witness had identified the defendant's voice as the victim's attacker when therewas no evidence that the witness had made such an identification. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at338. The State compounded the error by relying on the voice identification as actual evidenceduring closing argument. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 338-39. The State also erred when itimplied, during cross-examination of a defense witness, that the defense attorney had destroyed aset of notes of witness interviews. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 346. We found this conductwas designed to disparage the defense attorney in front of the jury. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at347. We also found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d at351. Unlike Robinson and Davidson, there is no cascade of errors here, the combined effect ofwhich requires a new trial. The questions did not capitalize on the erroneous admission ofevidence nor were they analogous to the prosecutorial misconduct present in Robinson andDavidson.

Defendant next claims that the State made improper remarks during closing argument. Defendant argues that these remarks: (1) shifted the burden of proof; (2) misstated facts inevidence; and (3) improperly asked the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place.

Defendant failed to object to these remarks at trial and include the issues in his motion fora new trial. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Plain error does notapply.

The plain error rule is invoked where the evidence is closely balanced or where the erroris of such magnitude that there is a substantial risk that the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 297, 718 N.E.2d 131 (1999). There can be no plain errorabsent reversible error. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 349, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000).

Comments made in closing argument are considered in context in their entirety. Peoplev. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154, 705 N.E.2d 850 (1998). Prosecutors are given wide latitude inmaking closing arguments and may argue facts and make reasonable inferences drawn from theevidence. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488, 727 N.E.2d 302 (2000); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at151. A jury verdict will be reversed only when improper comments cause substantial prejudiceto a defendant. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488. A trial court is in the best position to determinewhether improper comments caused prejudice. We will not reverse a trial court's determinationabsent an abuse of discretion. Emerson, 199 Ill. 2d at 488.

Defendant first claims that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof when theprosecutor commented on defendant's failure to call certain witnesses. Defendant overlooks thatthe prosecutor's comments were invited by his attorney's remarks. Defense counsel argued:

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think the fact that the parents returned this childto [defendant's] home is the most significant evidence that you have that at thetime the parents believed that this incident was over. Talk about evidence notthere. Counsel argues the mother was in denial. Where is the mother? There's nodenial evidence on the mother. The mother brought the child there. But then withthe wheels turning, somebody talked to somebody, she comes back and gets thechildren and it's downhill from there.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have we heard from Dr. Chin? No. Have weheard from her mother? No. Have we heard of any treatment? No.

And they bring her back. Ladies and gentlemen, they bring her back. Does that sound logical? I submit to you that rather than denial as counsel says,they brought her back because they knew this did not happen. But then *** theystart getting contacted ***.

All of a sudden, outside influences are there. And they come back and getthe kids, trying to comply with whatever rules and what everybody is saying."

The prosecutor responded:

"You also won't get an instruction saying you need physical evidence, youneed harm. Look for it. It won't be there because we don't have to show that. Counsel is telling you, 'Well, they didn't bring [the mother in]. And they didn'tbring in Dr. Chin.' Well, you know what, you won't get an instruction saying theState has to parade in here every witness. Counsel has the same subpoena powersas the State.

He makes a big deal about [the mother] taking [the child] back there thenext day. Well, you heard Roy Hok. She took her there for a few hours. Shewent to work. This is her child's care taker, her sister. Working mothers face thisdilemma every day. You just can't not go to work. She comes home. [Themother] is scheduled to go to work the next morning. What? Who's going tokeep her? She goes to work. And her boss-I mean, 'Are you nuts, go get yourchildren. Don't worry about work today.' And you heard Roy, she went back andshe got them.

Stay focused on the fact. The fact she took her there the other day justsays she's a *** working mother and she had a big dilemma. But that is not yourfocus.

Your focus is the elements of the crime ***."

These remarks did not shift the burden of proof onto defendant to produce a witness. Thecomments instead redirected the jury's attention to the elements of the offense, which the Stateargued it had proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's reliance on People v. Armstead,322 Ill. App. 3d 1, 748 N.E.2d 691 (2001), is misplaced.

In Armstead, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to produce alibiwitnesses. We found the comment improper because it suggested that the defendant had aburden to produce witnesses to support an alibi defense, which burden is contrary to law. Armstead, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 16. These are not the facts here.

Defense counsel's comments here suggested that the State's failure to call certainwitnesses prevented it from proving every element of the offense. The State's response correctedthis impression and told the jury that the State was only required to call those witnesses thatsatisfied its burden. Unlike Armstead, the State's remarks here did not imply that defendant wasrequired to prove anything. The remarks here were clearly invited by defense counsel. Kliner,185 Ill. 2d at 154.

Defendant also argues that the State's remarks about Emily and her reason for picking upher daughter after only half a day improperly relied on hearsay evidence. We disagree.

Defendant complains that hearsay evidence about what Emily was told that caused her toleave work and pick up her daughter was elicited during Roy's testimony. Defendant overlooksthat his attorney elicited this evidence on Roy's cross-examination and is now barred fromcomplaining that the State referred to the evidence in closing argument. People v. Payne, 98 Ill.2d 45, 50, 456 N.E.2d 44 (1983). Since the remark was based on evidence in the record,comment on it was proper. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 487.

Defendant next argues that the State improperly told the jury to place itself in the shoes ofthe victim in this case. We agree with defendant that these comments were improper because theState is not free to "invite the jurors to enter into some sort of empathetic identification with" thevictim. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 38, 525 N.E.2d 30 (1988). Although improper,reversal is not warranted because the remarks were not so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of afair trial. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 38; People v. Billups, 318 Ill. App. 3d 948, 960, 742 N.E.2d1261 (2001). The case on which defendant relies also declined to reverse a conviction based ona similar remark. In People v. Fortson, 110 Ill. App. 2d 206, 249 N.E.2d 260 (1969), we foundimproper a State comment telling the jury to identify with the victim. We affirmed theconviction despite the error because of a lack of prejudice to the defendant. Fortson, 110 Ill.App. 2d at 216. The evidence of guilt here was overwhelming. The State's comments,although improper, did not cause substantial prejudice to defendant. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488. But we do add our voice to the appellate concern about the tactics and oratory of prosecutors inrecent years. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 126-34, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000). We know theState's Attorney of Cook County has continuing legal education programs aimed at reducingprosecutorial error. But we are often left with the impression that prosecutors are filching trialoratory techniques from television melodramas. The solution may be for prosecutors to spendless time imitating television lawyers and more time studying transcripts of model prosecutorsfrom the State's Attorney's archives.

Defendant last argues that the cumulative effect of the claimed errors warrants a new trial. We disagree. "The whole can be no greater than the sum of its parts ***." People v. Albanese,102 Ill. 2d 54, 82-83, 464 N.E.2d 206 (1984). Generally, there is no cumulative error where noneof the alleged errors amounts to reversible error. People v. Doyle, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15, 765N.E.2d 85 (2002).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BURKE and GARCIA, JJ., concur.