Defendant, Jorge Lozada, appeals from a sentence imposed in absentia following his pleaof guilty to a felony offense. Defendant pled guilty to the offense of residential burglary pursuantto a plea agreement in which he was to receive a nine-year sentence. Subsequent to itsacceptance of defendant's plea on December 9, 1997, the trial court granted defendant's requestthat the sentencing hearing be continued to January 6, 1998. The court warned defendant that hispresence at the hearing was mandatory, and that, should he fail to appear, he would be sentencedto the maximum statutory term of 30 years. The following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: "As to Mr. Lazado [sic], the matter will be continued order of

the court to January 6th for sentencing hearing at which time as you've indicated,

sir, that the - your request to have the matter continued until January 6th *** of

next year is granted so that you can have time with your family under two conditions.

I'm sure your attorney told you. I want to make sure we understand each other.

I will grant the request. First of all that you are here on January 6th at 9:30 ready to beremanded and secondly that you understand that this assumes that there are

no other violations of law between now and then.

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you're arrested for anything, that means that all bets are off

and I'll reevaluate the situation based on that. If you fail to appear what will

happen you've already pled guilty so you'll - You'll be sentenced in your absence.

Based on your absence I'll assume that you are not a good candidate for

rehabilitation. *** However, if you fail to appear, then I will assume that doesn't

hold true and I'll sentence you to 30 years. Once you are apprehended you will

be sent to the penitentiary on a 30 year sentence. Fair enough?

DEFENDANT: Yes."

Defendant was not present in court on January 6, nor was he present on January 7, thedate to which the matter was continued. On January 7, 1998, the court recalled that defendanthad been admonished with respect to the consequences of his failure to appear. The Statethereupon presented evidence of defendant's criminal background, which included two felonyconvictions in 1987 for residential burglary and, in 1993, two additional convictions forresidential burglary. The court then sentenced defendant in absentia to 20 years in the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections.

Defendant was later arrested on a warrant and was brought before the court on April 20,1999. Defense counsel's oral motion to reconsider sentence was denied on that date.⁽¹⁾

On May 13, 1999, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thismotion was denied on July 7, 1999, because the court found that the motion was untimely filed.

On July 21, 1999, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal in which he purported toappeal from the judgment of July 7, 1999, and requested that the office of the State AppellateDefender be appointed to represent him.

The State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which has been taken with the case.

We are asked to consider the following issues: (1) whether the trial court's failure toafford defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea as provided in Rule 402(d)(2) (177 Ill. 2dR. 402(d)(2)), requires that his sentence and conviction be vacated and the cause remanded forcompliance with the Rule; (2) whether defendant's waiver of a presentence investigation reportwas invalid where the court ultimately imposed a sentence in absentia that was greater than thesentence to which the parties had earlier agreed, necessitating remand for a new sentencinghearing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to withdraw hisguilty plea and vacate his sentence on the basis that it was not timely filed.

We turn first to the question whether the trial court's failure to afford defendant theopportunity to withdraw his guilty plea as provided in Rule 402(d)(2) requires that his convictionand sentence be vacated and the cause remanded for compliance with the rule. Whether asupreme court rule has been violated is a question of law, for which the standard of review is denovo. People v. Walker, 308 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438 (1999).

Rule 402(d)(2) sets forth the procedures to be followed when a trial judge concurs orconditionally concurs in a plea agreement. Under the rule, if a defendant pleads guilty and thetrial court later withdraws its concurrence or conditional concurrence, the court must advise theparties and call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the guilty plea. (177 Ill. 2d. R.402(d)(2). In this case, after admonishing defendant pursuant to Rules 402(a), (b) and (c), thetrial court accepted defendant's plea, and agreed to the imposition of a nine year prison sentence. Subsequently, the court heard defendant's request that the sentencing hearing be continued to alater date, so that he could spend the Christmas holidays with his family. The court granted thisrequest with the understanding that if defendant failed to appear at the January 6th sentencinghearing, or committed any crimes in the interim, he would receive the maximum penaltyallowable by statute (30 years). Defendant indicated his understanding and agreement with thoseconditions to his release on bond, but did not appear on January 6. On January 7, he wassentenced in absentia to a term of 20 years, although he'd pled guilty in exchange for a sentenceof nine years.

Defendant relies heavily on People v. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d 662 (2000), in support ofhis request for remand. In Rossman, this court found that the trial court must specifically stateany conditions to its acceptance of a guilty plea agreement prior to the entry of that agreement. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 669; People v. Culp, 127 Ill. App. 3d 916, 926-27 (1984). Thedefendant in that case entered a negotiated plea of guilty in exchange for a specific sentence. Subsequent to accepting that plea, the court admonished the defendant that her presence at thesentencing hearing was required and that if she failed to appear she risked receiving a longersentence than the one stipulated in the plea agreement. The defendant failed to appear and wasgiven a sentence greater than the one negotiated. She filed a motion to reconsider the sentence,which was denied. On appeal, this court found that the trial court's condition was merely acondition on its acceptance and not a condition on the agreement itself. Rossman, 309 Ill. App.3d at 668.

This court held that before a plea agreement is entered, the defendant must understandany conditions to the court's concurrence, to what extent those conditions limit the court'sconcurrence, and must consent to the condition being made part of the agreement. Rossman, 309Ill. App. 3d at 669. If these requirements are not met, the condition is not made part of thenegotiated plea agreement and any change in sentence due to the violation of a condition isconsidered a withdrawal of the court's concurrence. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668.

If the court withdraws its concurrence, it has only two options pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 402(d)(2): (1) to impose the agreed upon sentence, or (2) to continue the hearing and allowdefendant to affirm or withdraw his guilty plea. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(2).

As in Rossman, the plea in the instant case was clearly accepted prior to the court'swarning with respect to defendant's return for the sentencing hearing.⁽²⁾ Defendant does not, norcould he dispute that the trial court had the authority to impose a lengthier sentence followingdefendant's absence (see, e.g., People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308, 313 (1997); People v.Russell, 237 Ill. App. 3d 310, 312 (1992)). Nevertheless, he asserts, since the trial court renegedon its part of the "bargain," the court was required by Rule 402 to honor its own admonition that"all bets [would be] off," i.e., the court should have allowed defendant to withdraw his plea. SeePeople v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996) (contract law principles dictate the nature of pleaagreements, and "the guilty plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand' as material elements of theplea bargain").

The State argues that defendant's appeal should be dismissed because notice of the appealwas untimely filed.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d), a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty mayfile in the trial court a motion to reconsider sentence and to withdraw his guilty plea. In the eventthat a Rule 604(d) motion is denied, a defendant has 30 days from the date of that denial in whichto file an appeal. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

The State directs our attention to People v. Woolridge, 292 Ill. App. 3d 788 (1997). InWoolridge, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence, then failed to appear at hissentencing hearing. Months later, he was arrested on a warrant and brought before the court. Woolridge, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 791. On that date, he was advised by the court that a motion towithdraw or vacate his guilty plea or to reconsider sentence would have had to have been filedwithin 30 days of the imposition of his sentence (pursuant to Rule 604(d)). Defense counselargued that, because defendant had not been so admonished at his sentencing hearing (as requiredunder Rule 605(b)),⁽³⁾ the time limit in which a motion to reconsider could be filed should notbegin to run until the date on which defendant first appeared in court following sentencing. Amotion to reconsider sentence was then filed and was denied as untimely. Woolridge, 292 Ill.App. 3d at 789-90.

On appeal, this court affirmed, ruling that a defendant who fails to appear for sentencing,is arrested on a warrant, and is brought before the court several months after sentence has beenimposed is not entitled to have the 30-day appeal period begin to run anew. Woolridge, 292 Ill.App. 3d at 791. We concluded that a defendant who is sentenced in absentia and fails to complywith the requirements of Rule 604(d) is limited to the mechanism contained in 725 ILCS 5/114-4.1(e) (West 1998) to obtain review of the sentence.

We conclude that the language contained in Rule 604(d), coupled with the holding inWoolridge, requires this court to find that defendant has failed to comply with Rule 604(d), andthus his pro se motion to reconsider sentence (filed May 13, 1999) was properly dismissed by thetrial court as having been untimely filed Therefore this court is not vested with jurisdiction overthis appeal by virtue of Rule 604(d).

The holding in Rossman does not suggest a different result. In Rossman, the defendantwas sentenced on July 20, 1998, and a motion to reconsider that sentence was filed on July 31. Hence, compliance with Rule 604(d) was not an issue.

We next consider whether this court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to

section 115.4.1(e).

That statute provides, in relevant part:

"(e) When a defendant who in his absence has been either convicted or sentenced

or both convicted and sentenced appears before the court, he must be granted a

new trial or sentencing hearing if the defendant can establish that his failure to

appear in court was both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his

control. A hearing with notice to the State's Attorney on the defendant's request

for a new trial or a new sentencing hearing must be held before any such request may

be granted. At any such hearing both the defendant and the State may present

evidence." 725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(e) (West 1998).

Although defendant does not specifically argue that section 115-4 forms a basis forjurisdiction in this case, in light of the fact that relief under Rule 604(d) is precluded, his onlyrecourse, for purposes of this appeal, lies there. Section 115-4.1 allows a defendant to besentenced in absentia (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(c) (West 1998)). It also creates a mechanism for himto obtain review of his sentence, despite the expiration of the 30-day appeal period under Rule604(d), if he "can establish that his failure to appear in court was both without his fault and dueto circumstances beyond his control." 725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(e)(West 1998).

As the language of subsection (e) indicates, the time for presenting a motion invoking itsprovisions is when a defendant who has absented himself "appears before the court." In thiscase, that date was April 20, 1999, and on that date, defense counsel made an oral motion toreconsider sentence. Counsel added, without explicit reliance on section 115-4.1, that defendanthad been absent for his sentencing hearing due to "family difficulties." The trial court denied themotion to reconsider, thus triggering the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appealtherefrom. See People v. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1995); 725 ILCS 5/115.4.1(g)(West 1998); 166 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). Thus, even assuming the April 20 motion was broughtpursuant to section 115-4.1(e), defendant was required to file a notice of appeal from its denialon or before May 20, 1999.

Instead, defendant filed, on May 13, 1999, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Therefore, because defendant failed to file an appeal from the ruling denying his section115-4.1(e) motion within 30 days of its entry, that section cannot form the jurisdictional basis forthis appeal.

Conclusion

Rule 604(d) allows a defendant 30 days from the imposition of a final judgment (thesentence, in a criminal case) in which to appeal. Defendant did not appear in court until nearly1