Piagentini v. Ford Motor Company

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 1st District Appellate » 2009 » Piagentini v. Ford Motor Company

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-04-3800 Rel

Case Date: 01/15/2009

Preview:FOURTH DIVISION January 15, 2009

No. 1-04-3800 RONALD PIAGENTINI and ANNETTE PIAGENTINI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County

Honorable Bill Taylor, Judge Presiding.

MODIFIED PURSUANT TO SUPERVISORY ORDER JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs, Ronald Piagentini and Annette Piagentini, appealed from an order of the trial court granting defendant Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment based upon res judicata. We issued an opinion reversing and remanding the case on May 12, 2006, and modified our opinion upon denial of rehearing on June 23, 2006 (Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 395, 852 N.E.2d 356 (2006), vacated, 228 Ill. 2d 552, 886 N.E.2d 1025 (2008)). The Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order on July 8, 2008, directing us to vacate our judgment and reconsider this case in light of Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 889 N.E.2d 210 (2008), to determine whether a different result is warranted. We have examined our judgment and have determined that Hudson does not change the result. We reverse and remand. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs' claims against defendant, Ford Motor Company (Ford), arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff Ronald Piagentini was driving a 1987

1-04-3800 Ford Bronco II that collided with another vehicle. Plaintiffs originally filed suit on November 10, 1994, against the alleged driver1 of the other vehicle claiming that the driver sped through a red light. This case was numbered 94 L 14330 and will be referred to as Piagentini I. On March 2, 1995, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Ford as a defendant. Plaintiffs' eight-count amended complaint contained four counts against Ford. Counts I and II were brought by Ronald Piagentini. Count I sounded in strict liability in tort. Count II sounded in negligence. Both counts contained, in subparagraphs a, b, and c, allegations that the Bronco was designed with insufficient stability in swerving maneuvers and was unreasonably susceptible to rolling over. Additionally, both counts contained, in subparagraphs d, e, and f, allegations that the Bronco lacked an adequate seatbelt/occupant protection system. Counts V and VI were brought by Annette Piagentini for loss of consortium and repeated the allegations in counts I and II. On February 19, 1999, based upon plaintiffs' failure to disclose any expert witness testimony substantiating the allegations of stability and rollover defects, the trial court entered an agreed order for partial summary judgment on the stability and rollover allegations contained in subparagraphs a, b, and c. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and granted plaintiffs leave to replead only those claims pertaining to allegations of a defective driver's seatbelt.2

1

There were two individuals in the other vehicle and plaintiffs alleged that one of the two

was the driver.
2

In its motion for partial summary judgment, Ford had conceded that plaintiffs had

disclosed expert witness testimony to substantiate the allegations of a seatbelt defect. 2

1-04-3800 Neither plaintiffs nor Ford requested Rule 304(a) language (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On March 19, 1999, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint and omitted the allegations pertaining to vehicle stability that were the subject of the partial summary judgment. Subsequently, on November 5, 1999, pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2000)), plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims. The trial court granted the motion without prejudice and without costs. At no point in time did plaintiffs appeal the February 19,1999, order granting partial summary judgment. On October 20, 2000, within one year of the voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs refiled this cause of action. The case was assigned a number of 00 L 12145 and will be referred to as Piagentini II. All previous allegations, including those related to the vehicle stability and rollover tendency, as well as its seatbelt/occupant protection system, were included. On January 2, 2001, apparently after realizing this error, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that did not contain any allegations related to the stability or rollover claims, but instead only contained allegations relating to a defective seatbelt/occupant protection system. Three and a half years later, on May 13, 2004, which was also three months prior to the trial date, Ford filed a motion for summary judgment in which it invoked the equitable doctrine of res judicata. Ford argued that the February 19, 1999, court order granting partial summary judgment in Piagentini I, which disposed of only those allegations relating to the stability and rollover claims, operated as a bar to any and all causes of action filed after plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal taken on November 5, 1999. On July 27, after full briefing and argument, the trial court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiffs'

3

1-04-3800 motion for reconsideration on November 29, 2004. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. City of Rockford v. Unit Six of the Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 556, 560, 840 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (2005). ANALYSIS Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (1996). Res judicata is an equitable doctrine that is designed to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits between the same parties where the facts and issues are the same. Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1363 (1997). "Res judicata promotes judicial economy by preventing repetitive litigation and [additionally] protects parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating essentially the same case." Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 533, 809 N.E.2d 88, 97 (2004). Equity dictates that the doctrine of res judicata will not be technically applied if to do so would create inequitable and unjust results. Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 638, 650, 545 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989). Res judicata should not be applied by this court where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 757 N.E.2d 471, 477 (2001). The doctrine should only be applied as fairness and justice require. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 650, 545 N.E.2d at 489.

4

1-04-3800 Illinois courts also adhere, as a matter of public policy, to a general rule against the splitting of claims or causes of action. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 545 N.E.2d at 493. Under the rule against claim-splitting, where a cause of action is in its nature entire and indivisible, a plaintiff cannot divide it in order to maintain separate lawsuits. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 545 N.E.2d at 493. That is, a plaintiff is not permitted to sue for part of a claim in one action and then sue for the remainder in another action. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 340, 665 N.E.2d at 1206. Rather, the law requires that a plaintiff must assert all the grounds of recovery he may have against the defendant, arising from a single cause of action, in one lawsuit. Handley v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 56, 66, 463 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (1984); see also Morris v. Union Oil Co. of California, 96 Ill. App. 3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 1011 (1981) (a party must set out in his pleadings all of the grounds of recovery he may have). A plaintiff cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after loss of the first merely by limiting the theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first action. Best Coin-Op, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 545 N.E.2d at 493. The rule against claim-splitting, which has been described as an aspect of the law of preclusion, is based upon the principle that litigation should have an end and that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of lawsuits. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 340, 665 N.E.2d at 1207; Saxon Mortgage, Inc. v. United Financial Mortgage Corp., 312 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1109, 728 N.E.2d 537, 545 (2000). Plaintiffs cannot indulge in piecemeal litigation. Radosta v. Chrysler Corp., 110 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1068, 443 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1982). At the time when this appeal commenced, the controlling authority on claim-splitting was the supreme court's holding in Rein that a plaintiff engages in claim-splitting where, after an

5

1-04-3800 involuntary dismissal of a part of his claim, the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the entire action for the purpose of appealing that decision and then later attempts to refile a new action. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d 325, 665 N.E.2d 1199. In Rein, there were two cases and two sets of appeals. In the first case (Rein I), plaintiffs filed a complaint against a securities dealer and a salesman, alleging that the defendants fraudulently misrepresented the nature of certain securities purchased by the plaintiffs. The complaint contained counts that sought rescission of the purchase pursuant to section 13 of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 (Ill. Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 121

Download Piagentini v. Ford Motor Company.pdf