ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends on appeal that the application of section 13-214.3(d), requiring her tofile suit within six months after Dopp's will was admitted to probate, is inconsistent with theplain language of the statute and the legislative intent. The interpretation of a statute is aquestion of law, subject to de novo review. Petersen v. Wallach, No. 89947, slip op. at 4 (Ill.Jan. 25, 2002). The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effectto the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,503-04, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). The language of the statute is the most reliable indicator ofthe legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392, 667N.E.2d 91, 93 (1996).

The statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and, where thelanguage is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids ofstatutory construction. Petersen, slip op. at 4. The court must not construe a statute to addexceptions or limitations or change the law set forth in the statute so as to depart from thestatute's plain meaning. Moreover, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, butmust be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Antunes v. Sookhakitch,146 Ill. 2d 477, 484, 588 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (1992).

With these principles in mind, we examine the Limitations Act as applied to legalmalpractice claims. The Act provides in relevant part as follows:

"(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise (i)against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in theperformance of professional services * * * must be commencedwithin 2 years from the time the person bringing the action knew orreasonably should have known of the injury for which damages aresought.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action described insubsection (b) may not be commenced in any event more than 6years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.

(d) When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occuruntil the death of the person for whom the professional serviceswere rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years afterthe date of the person's death unless letters of office are issued orthe person's will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period,in which case the action must be commenced within the time forfiling claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validityof the will of the deceased person, whichever is later, as providedin the Probate Act of 1975." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1994).⁽¹⁾

Thus, generally the legislature provided for a two-year statute of limitation as set forth insubsection (b), and a six-year statute of repose as set forth in subsection (c). Plaintiff maintainsthat subsection (d) is triggered only in those instances when the six-year repose period hasexpired and would otherwise bar the plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice. Under herinterpretation, because she filed her cause of action on August 18, 1999, prior to the running ofthe statute of repose as set forth in subsection (c), she maintains that her cause of action is timely. Nothing in the statute conditions the application of subsection (d) on whether the reposeperiod in subsection (c) has expired. Rather, the plain language of subsection (d) provides that itapplies to all claims for legal malpractice "when the injury caused by the act or omission does notoccur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered." 735 ILCS5/13-214.3(d). Accordingly, a party may commence an action against an attorney up to twoyears after the death of the decedent client. However, if the will is admitted to probate or lettersof office are issued within that two year period, the malpractice action must be filed within thetime to file a claim against the estate or to contest the validity of the will. Petersen, slip op. at 5; Palmrose v. Barcelona, 284 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645, 672 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (1996); Witt v. Jones& Jones Law Offices, P.C., 269 Ill. App. 3d 540, 542, 646 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1995).

Here, Dopp's will was admitted to probate on January 9, 1998. Section 8-1 of the ProbateAct of 1975 provides that "[w]ithin 6 months after the admission to probate of a domestic will ** * any interested person may file a petition * * * to contest the validity of the will." 755 ILCS5/8-1 (West 1998). Thus, the time for filing a petition contesting the validity of Dopp's willexpired on July 9, 1998. As set forth in the Certificate of Publication issued pursuant to sections18-12 and 8-3 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/18-12, 5/8-3 (West 1998)), the time forfiling claims against Dopp's estate expired on July 19, 1998. Accordingly, under subsection (d)of the Limitations Act, her malpractice action had to be commenced no later than July 19, 1998. Consequently, her complaint filed on August 18, 1999, was untimely.

While we are cognizant that the effect on plaintiff in this case was to shorten the period oftime in which she had to file her claim, "we can neither restrict nor enlarge the meaning of anunambiguous statute." Petersen, slip op. at 7. Additionally, unlike a statute of limitation whichis triggered when a cause of action accrues, the applicable provision in subsection (d) acts as aperiod of repose. Goodman v. Harbor Market, Ltd., 278 Ill. App. 3d 684, 691, 663 N.E.2d 13, 18(1995). Where the will has been admitted to probate or letters of office issued, the legislatureintended to terminate the possibility of liability after a defined period of time, regardless ofwhether plaintiff's cause of action has accrued. The fact that a repose provision may, in aparticular instance, bar an action before it is necessarily discovered is said to be "an accidentalrather than necessary consequence." Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 424, 490N.E.2d 665, 669 (1986).

Plaintiff next contends that section 13-214.3(d) is unconstitutional as applied because itviolates her right to equal protection. Defendant initially argues that this argument has beenwaived as it was not raised before the trial court. Additionally, defendant argues that plaintifffailed to comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 19 (134 Ill. 2d R. 19) requiring thatnotice be given to the Attorney General by any party questioning the constitutionality of a Statestatute in a proceeding where the Attorney General is not already a party. However, waiver is alimitation on the parties and not on the jurisdiction of this court. Where the issue is ofconstitutional dimensions and has been fully briefed and argued, we choose to address plaintiff'scontention. See Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 518-19, 732 N.E.2d at 542.

The constitutional right to equal protection of the law guarantees that the State must treatsimilarly situated persons in a similar manner. People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 237, 644N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (1994). The guarantee of the equal protection clause prohibits the State fromstatutorily dividing persons into different classes and providing for different treatment of eachclass for reasons wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. Where a statutoryclassification neither impinges on a fundamental constitutional right nor is based on a "suspect"class, a court will use the "rational basis" test to review the statute's validity. Under the rationalbasis test, the statutory classification is constitutional if it bears a rational basis to a legitimatestate interest. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237, 644 N.E.2d at 1141.

Plaintiff argues that a person with a malpractice claim arising out of the preparation of awill, which is not admitted to probate, has two years to file suit, whereas if the will is admitted toprobate the person has significantly less time to file their claim. We find that any distinctiondrawn by subsection (d) is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. It reflects apolicy of law intended to balance several different interests: it provides a claimant with areasonable time after the decedent's death to pursue a cause of action; it balances the defendant's right to be free of stale claims; and addresses the need for closure with respect to matters relatedto a decedent's estate as necessitated by the Probate Act. Therefore, the statute is notunconstitutional as applied.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.

1. Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995) repealed subsection (d). However,the public act was held unconstitutional in its entirety by this court in Best v. Taylor MachineWorks, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). Therefore, the prior version of the statuteremains in effect.