SECOND DIVISION
May 01, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Jozefa Puszkarska filed a complaint alleging she was injured on a Chicago TransitAuthority (CTA) bus when the driver stopped the bus suddenly, causing her to fall. Defendant CTAfiled a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)), contending that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of section41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998)). The trial courtdismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that she cannot be held to the strict noticerequirements of section 41 because the CTA did not provide her with a copy of section 41 when itreceived written notice of her injury from her attorney. We agree and reverse.

Section 41 reads as follows:

"No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the Authority by anyperson for any injury to his person unless it is commenced within one year from thedate that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. Within six (6)months from the date that such an injury was received or such cause of actionaccrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action in any court againstthe Authority for damages on account of any injury to his person shall file in theoffice of the secretary of the Board and also in the office of the General Counsel forthe Authority either by himself, his agent, or attorney, a statement, in writing, signedby himself, his agent, or attorney, giving the name of the person to whom the causeof action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date andabout the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accident occurred andthe name and address of the attending physician, if any. If the notice provided for bythis section is not filed as provided, any such civil action commenced against theAuthority shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of actionaccrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further suing.

Any person who notifies the Authority that he or she was injured or has acause of action shall be furnished a copy of Section 41 of this Act. Within 10 daysafter being notified in writing, the Authority shall either send a copy by certified mailto the person at his or her last known address or hand deliver a copy to the personwho shall acknowledge receipt by his or her signature. When the Authority isnotified later than 6 months from the date the injury occurred or the cause of actionarose, the Authority is not obligated to furnish a copy of Section 41 to the person. In the event the Authority fails to furnish a copy of Section 41 as provided in thisSection, any action commenced against the Authority shall not be dismissed forfailure to file a written notice as provided in this Section. Compliance with thisSection shall be liberally construed in favor of the person required to file a writtenstatement." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998).

Absent a claimant's strict compliance with the section 41 notice requirements, a cause ofaction will be dismissed. Bonner v. Chicago Transit Authority, 249 Ill. App. 3d 210, 212, 618N.E.2d 871, 872 (1993). "The written notice must contain each of the required elements set forthin the statute and is insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted." Yokley v.Chicago Transit Authority, 307 Ill. App. 3d 132, 137, 717 N.E.2d 451, 455 (1999), citing Thomasv. Chicago Transit Authority, 29 Ill. App. 3d 952, 954, 331 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1975). The legislatureadded the second paragraph of section 41 in a 1998 amendment. Pub. Act 90-451, eff. July 1, 1998(amending 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1994)).

In this case, the alleged injury occurred on June 18, 1999. On October 6, 1999, the CTAreceived plaintiff's written notice that she would bring an action for damages. In numberedparagraphs, the notice listed each element required by section 41. Paragraph 3 listed: "The date andhour of the accident," but only provided the date, not the hour. The notice was signed by plaintiff'sattorney and stated: "This notice [is] filed in accordance with the Provisions of Section 41 of theMetropolitan Transit Authority Act."

On its face, the notice shows plaintiff's familiarity with the notice requirements set out in thefirst paragraph of section 41. It was filed within the six-month limitations period. Its only defectis the omission of the hour the accident occurred.

Plaintiff argues that the notice should be considered written notice to the CTA that she wasinjured, triggering the second paragraph of section 41, which requires the CTA to furnish a copy ofsection 41 to plaintiff. The second paragraph further provides: "In the event the Authority fails tofurnish a copy of Section 41 as provided in this Section, any action commenced against the Authorityshall not be dismissed for failure to file a written notice as provided in this Section." 70 ILCS3605/41 (West 1998). The CTA responds that, because the notice was filed by plaintiff's attorneyand not plaintiff herself, it was not a written notice that triggered the requirement that the CTA sendplaintiff a copy of section 41. The CTA further argues that the notice clearly shows that plaintiff,or her attorney, was already aware of section 41's formal notice requirements and did not need a copyof section 41 from the CTA. The trial court, apparently, agreed with the CTA's argument.

We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619 of the Code. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735(1993). Statutory construction is a question of law to be decided by the reviewing court withoutdeference to the judgment of the trial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12,678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015 (1996). "The primary rule of statutory construction, to which all other rulesare subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature." People ex rel.Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 197, 607 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (1992). A court should consider thereason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy and the objects and purposesto be obtained. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435, 657 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1995). If thestatutory language is clear, we need not look further to construe the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d1, 9, 727 N.E.2d 990, 994 (2000). But if the language is ambiguous, we may look to the legislativehistory. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 40, 630 N.E.2d 797, 799 (1994).

We first look to the language of section 41 itself. The second paragraph begins, "Any personwho notifies the Authority that he or she was injured or has a cause of action shall be furnished acopy of Section 41 ***." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). The CTA argues that this means that onlythe person who was injured may notify it and be furnished with a copy of section 41. The CTAcontends that if the legislature had intended to allow agents or attorneys to notify the CTA andreceive a copy of section 41 on a claimant's behalf, the legislature would have plainly said so, as itdid in the first paragraph of section 41: "either by himself, his agent, or attorney."

We note that the second paragraph of Section 41 also states: "Compliance with this Sectionshall be liberally construed in favor of the person required to file a written statement." 70 ILCS3605/41 (West 1998). In Yokley, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 139, 717 N.E.2d at 457, the court held:

"The sentence obviously requires the CTA to liberally construe the writtencommunications it receives from possible claimants as constituting sufficientnotification that a cause of action may exist so that these potential claimants are senta copy of the section 41 statute by the CTA. The clear import of the amendment isthat the legislature did not intend that compliance with the notification elements ofsection 41 be liberally construed."

Liberally construing plaintiff's notice, we disagree with the CTA that the notice should bedisregarded as an initial communication simply because it was filed by plaintiff's attorney on herbehalf. "The legislative history shows that the purpose of the amendment was to notify possibleclaimants of the six-month statute of limitations and filing requirements of section 41 so thatlegitimate claims would not be dismissed because the claimant was unaware of the noticerequirement. 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, May 21, 1997, at 52." Yokley, 307 Ill. App.3d at 138-39, 719 N.E.2d at 457. Unlike the detailed requirements set out in the first paragraph forsection 41 notices, the second paragraph of section 41 provides no guidelines or requirements, otherthan that they be in writing, for initial communications triggering the CTA's duty to provide a copyof section 41. "Upon receipt of any written communication that can be reasonably interpreted asnotification that an individual claimant was injured or has a cause of action, the CTA is required tofurnish the claimant with a copy of section 41 within 10 days." (Emphasis in original.) Fields v.Chicago Transit Authority, No. 1-00-0592, slip op. at 6 (February 20, 2001).

In light of the requirement that initial communications to the CTA be liberally construed, theCTA may not, in our view, pick and choose which written communications trigger its duty to providea claimant with a copy of section 41 or divine the state of mind of the claimant or her attorney. Aperson who notifies the CTA in writing that she was injured or has a cause of action "shall befurnished a copy of Section 41." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). Because the statute includes noother requirements, the CTA does not have discretion to add requirements not expressly stated in thestatute or attempt to discern from a claimant's written communication whether she was already awareof section 41's formal notice requirements and statute of limitations. Nor is there language in thestatute that empowers the CTA to assume that notice from the claimant's attorney waives the dutyof the CTA to furnish a copy of the statute. So long as a claimant notifies the CTA in writing thatshe was injured or has a cause of action, regardless of the form of that notice, the CTA must providethe claimant a copy of section 41. In view of the six-month statute of limitations and "the onerousburden of section 41's formal notice requirement" (Fields, slip op. at 5-6), we find it only fair thatthe CTA strictly comply with the statutory obligation to provide claimants with a copy of section 41. In so doing we are only imposing on the CTA the same zealous adherence to the statute it asks usto impose on the claimant.

Here, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with thesection 41 notice requirements. Because the CTA failed to provide plaintiff a copy of section 41within 10 days of receiving her written notice that she had a cause of action, the action "shall not bedismissed" for failure to strictly comply with the formal notice requirements. 70 ILCS 3605/41(West 1998).

We reverse the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remand for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

GORDON and COUSINS, JJ., concur.