JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Dawn Radtke filed suit against defendant Schal-Bovis aftershe tripped and fell while working on a construction project atNavy Pier. Defendant was the general contractor in charge of theconstruction project. Plaintiff's complaint alleged StructuralWork Act violations and negligence. The trial court grantedsummary judgment in defendant's favor, finding plaintiff couldnot establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the cause ofher fall. On appeal, Radtke contends the trial court erred ingranting summary judgment. We agree. We reverse and remand forfurther proceedings.

FACTS

On October 5, 1994, plaintiff was working for L/C/B Tri-Venture as a laborer on a construction site at Navy Pier. L/C/BTri-Venture was a subcontractor on the project. She was onscaffolding, carrying mortar to bricklayers, when she tripped andfell. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging violationsof the Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Plaintiff's complaint alleged her injuries were caused by thescaffolding's "improperly placed crank shaft handle."

Several of plaintiff's co-workers were deposed. During hisdeposition, Kevin Zesch testified he was employed by defendant. Zesch was the senior field superintendent on the Navy Pier site. He was responsible for coordinating the schedule, for logistics,and for plans with all subcontractors at that site.

Zesch said a Morgan scaffold was a scaffold used by masonsand laborers. A jack is used to elevate the scaffold as thelaborers progress up the wall. The jack handle normally sits inan upright position, out of the way of the path on the scaffold. Morgan scaffolds were used in the project site where plaintiffworked. The laborers typically erected the scaffolds. Zeschtestified defendant did not inspect the scaffolds after they wereerected. However, if any of defendant's supervisors noticedsomething unsafe about the scaffold, work would stop until theproblem was rectified. Zesch agreed that Schal-Bovis wasresponsible for safety at the job site.

Norman Graves, who was Tri-Venture's foreman at the projecton the day plaintiff was injured, was deposed. He testifiedplaintiff was working as a laborer on the day she was injured. She was putting out mortar for the bricklayers at the job site. Graves characterized Morgan scaffolding as unsafe. He said hecomplained about the scaffolding several times. Graves testifiedthat there were problems with broken jack handles. He complainedabout it, but the problem never was fixed. Graves said the jackhandles fell out of their upright position and into the walkingpath on the scaffolding if they weren't working properly.

John Kentgen, a laborer who was working with plaintiff onthe day she fell, was deposed. Kentgen testified plaintiff was amember of his crew. Kentgen said he was walking toward plaintiffwhen she fell. He was about 10 to 12 feet away from her. Kentgen said plaintiff was carrying a shovel full of mortar whenshe tripped. He did not see what plaintiff tripped on.

Kentgen said plaintiff told him "right away" that shetripped on a jack handle. Kentgen said when he saw plaintifffall, he knew she tripped over the jack handle because "[t]hat'sthe only explanation." Kentgen testified he had tripped overdefective jack handles several times during the project.

During her deposition, plaintiff testified there wereproblems with the jack handles on the scaffolding for as long asshe worked at the project site. Plaintiff said the jack handleswould fall into the path where the laborers walked.

Before the accident occurred, plaintiff was shoveling mortaronto the mortar boards for the bricklayers. Plaintiff testifiedshe used a shovel to carry the mortar. She had mortar in theshovel when the accident occurred. She was looking at the mortarin her shovel to make sure the mortar wasn't falling out of it. She did not remember being distracted by anything before shefell. She believed she tripped on the jack handle. She believedthis because she spoke to several people who saw the accident. The people she spoke with said she fell on the jack handle. Plaintiff also testified she had a red mark across her foot afterthe accident occurred.

Plaintiff said that at the time she fell, she wasn't surewhether she fell as a result of uneven planking or because of ajack handle. When she fell, the handle of the shovel was shovedinto her chest.

During his deposition, Charles Franklin testified he workedon the Navy Pier project with plaintiff. He was working as alaborer. Franklin said he complained to the project supervisorsabout bad jacks on the scaffolding. A jack that was workingproperly would stand straight up and would not extend over thewalkway of the scaffolding. When they were broken, the jackhandles would fall down onto the walkway.

Franklin testified he had a clear, unobstructed view ofplaintiff's fall. When she fell, Franklin was about 20 feet awayfrom plaintiff. He was facing her. Franklin was walking towardplaintiff when she fell. Plaintiff was carrying a shovel. Though Franklin did not see plaintiff's foot come into contactwith the jack handle before she fell, he assumed the handlecaused her fall because it was in the pathway and plaintiff fellnear the handle. Franklin testified there wasn't any overlappingplanking in the area where plaintiff fell. Franklin said, "[I]tcouldn't have been nothing but the jack handle. There wasnothing else out." Franklin said the jack handle was one of thedamaged handles that constantly fell over the walkway. He saidthere was nothing else on the walkway that plaintiff could havetripped over.

Plaintiff's expert witness, Dennis Puchalski, said hebelieves plaintiff tripped and fell on a defective jack handle. He based this opinion on plaintiff's description of the accident.

Defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, in partarguing plaintiff could not prove her injuries were proximatelycaused by any unsafe condition of the scaffolding. That is, noneof the witnesses to the accident could state, with certainty,that the fall was caused by a defective jack handle. The trialcourt granted the summary judgment motion:

"[P]laintiff cannot create a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the cause of her fall. A review ofall the evidence presented indicates that no one cansay they saw what caused plaintiff to fall. *** [T]hereis no rule against basing an inference on anotherinference, but reasonable inferences other than thejack handle causing plaintiff's fall can be drawn fromplaintiff's and Charlie Franklin's testimony. Hence,there is no circumstantial evidence that creates anissue of fact as to the jack handle causing the fall."

Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which the trialcourt denied.

DECISION

Plaintiff contends a genuine issue of material fact existsas to whether a fallen jack handle caused her fall. Defendantresponds by asserting that while plaintiff established thepossibility that the handle may have caused the fall, she failedto establish the probability that it did. According todefendant, in order to establish sufficient proximate cause tosurvive the summary judgment stage, plaintiff's evidence mustdemonstrate with reasonable certainty that defendant's negligencecaused plaintiff's injury.

Review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment is de novo. Lajato v. AT&T, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 126,135, 669 N.E.2d 645 (1996). Summary judgment is proper when thepleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file, construed in thelight most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish there isno genuine issue of material fact and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lajato, 283 Ill. App.3d at 135. The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is notto decide the facts but to ascertain whether a factual disputeexists. Barber - Colman Co. v. A&K Midwest Insulation Co., 236Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1070-71, 603 N.E.2d 1215 (1992).

In pleading negligence, the plaintiff had to allege factsshowing the defendant (1) owed her a duty of due care; (2)breached that duty; and (3) that this breach was the proximatecause of her injuries. Turner v. Roesner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 482,488, 549 N.E.2d 1287 (1990). The Structural Work Act codifiesthe duty that the person who has charge or control of the worksite owes to workers:

"All scaffolds *** erected or constructed by anyperson, firm, or corporation in this State for use inthe erection, repairing, alteration, removal orpainting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, orother structure, shall be erected and constructed,placed and operated as to give proper and adequateprotection to the life and limb of any person orpersons employed or engaged thereon, or passing underor by the same, and in such manner as to prevent thefalling of any material that may be used or depositedthereon." 740 ILCS 150/1 (West 1994).⁽¹⁾

Proximate cause ordinarily is a question of fact for thejury. Bakkan v. Vondran, 202 Ill. App. 3d 125, 128, 559 N.E.2d815 (1990). "It becomes a question of law only where there canbe no difference in the judgment of reasonable men on inferencesto be drawn." Bakkan, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 128. "Whereinferences may be drawn from facts which are not in dispute, andwhere reasonable minds would draw different inferences from thefacts, then a triable issue exists." Block v. Lohan Associates,Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d 745, 756, 645 N.E.2d 207 (1993).

Here, we find the evidence sufficient to create an issue offact concerning proximate cause. The deposition testimony ofCharles Franklin, in which he says the jack handle was down andwas the only thing blocking plaintiff's path at the time of thefall, combined with Grave's and Kentgen's testimony thatdefective jack handles had been a problem on the scaffolding, isenough to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion. BothFranklin and Kentgen testified that while they did not seeplaintiff's foot make contact with the jack handle, they saw herfall and that nothing else could have caused the fall. Franklinsaid there was no other trip hazard in plaintiff's path beforeshe fell.

Defendant cites several cases to support its claim thatsummary judgment is appropriate. However, in each of these casesthe plaintiff provided little more than the fact that an accidentoccurred. See Bakkan, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 131 (no witness toplaintiff's fall and no evidence that plaintiff was even on thescaffold/ladder when he fell); Monaghan v. DiPaulo ConstructionCo., 140 Ill. App. 3d 921, 924, 489 N.E.2d 409 (1986)(plaintiffhad no memory of accident and admitted he did not know how ithappened and the only witness did not know why accidentoccurred); Snell v. Village of University Park, 185 Ill. App. 3d973, 978, 542 N.E.2d 49 (1989)(witnesses who observed falltestified it did not appear plaintiff came into contact withallegedly defective object); Gentile v. Kehe, 165 Ill. App. 3d802, 808, 520 N.E.2d 827 (1988)(no evidence that any negligentact was proximate cause of plaintiff's injury where no one knewcause of accident).

More on point is Block v. Lohan Associates, in which thecourt found that while no one actually witnessed plaintiff'sfall, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to precludesummary judgment. In Block, the plaintiff was the wife of aninjured construction foreman. Plaintiff alleged that her husbandwas reaching for a crane line in order to attach a "boatswain'schair" to it when he fell from the ladder he was standing on. Plaintiff claimed the injury occurred when the ball and hook onthe end of the crane's line struck her husband, or somehow causedhim to fall from the ladder he was standing on.

Defendants argued that because there were no witnesses whoactually saw plaintiff's husband fall from the ladder, there wasinsufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court disagreed:

"The present case provides us with sufficientissues of fact as to proximate cause so as to avoidsummary judgment. The testimony of plaintiff's pre-occurrence and post-occurrence witnesses on the sceneprovides circumstantial evidence of proximate cause,although no witnesses saw Block fall. The craneoperator, testified that he knew Block was intending toattach the boatswain's chair to the hook so that aworker could weld the columns cover connections. A co-worker saw Block going to retrieve the boatswain'schair and knew that it was intended that either he orBlock would get into the chair. Another worker sawBlock start up the ladder, and later heard Block say'hold it' before he saw him lying on the ground. Athird worker saw Block carrying the boatswain's chairimmediately prior to the accident and heard Block'surgent words, 'hold it,' which sounded as if they camefrom a height level equal to the witness's when thewitness was on his ladder." Block, 269 Ill. App. 3d at757.

Here, the witnesses provided at least as much circumstantialevidence, if not more. Not only did the witnesses testify thatthe jack handle was in the walkway immediately after plaintifffell, they also testified that the jack handles on thatscaffolding presented problems throughout the project. Kentgensaid he had tripped on defective jack handles on the samescaffolding. Two witnesses said they did not see anything elsethat could have caused the fall. In addition, the red markacross the plaintiff's foot can be seen as an indication ofcontact with the jack handle.

In McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corporation, 161 Ill. App. 3d 518,515 N.E.2d 157 (1987), also a Structural Work Act case, defendantclaimed it was entitled to either a new trial or judgment n.o.v.because no one saw plaintiff fall from the allegedly defectiveladder, or even saw plaintiff on the ladder. The court foundthis interpretation of the facts "unduly restrictive:"

"The directly observed facts in the presentinstance were that McKanna's co-worker, Wollard, sawMcKanna standing on the roof near the boiler roomladder hatchway, saw McKanna place his left hand on thehatchway cover, saw him turn around, apparently inpreparation for his descent on the ladder, and he thenperipherally perceived McKanna's fall. Wollard did notsee McKanna actually on the ladder or McKanna slip fromthe ladder due to one of the alleged defects in theladder. These omissions in his direct observations,however, do not automatically make plaintiffs' claimsnonactionable. [Citation.] Wollard witnessed McKanna'sactions immediately prior to the crucial instant, andthose actions clearly permit a reasonable inferencethat McKanna intended to descend the ladder." McKanna,161 Ill. App. 3d at 527.

Here, as in McKanna, Franklin's and Kentgen's testimonyconcerning plaintiff's actions just before she fell, along withtheir observations of defective jack handles on the samescaffolding, permit a reasonable inference that the jack handlecaused plaintiff's fall. This is enough to avoid summaryjudgment. Ordman v. Dacon Management Corp., 261 Ill. App. 3d275, 285, 633 N.E.2d 1307 (1994)(summary judgment on issue ofproximate cause improper where witness heard decedent fall,seconds later saw decedent laying on large patch of ice, andpersons approaching decedent slipped on same patch of ice).

CONCLUSION

We find an issue of fact exists concerning proximate cause. We reverse the trial court's order and remand the case forfurther proceedings.

Reversed and cause remanded.

HALL, P.J., and SOUTH, J., concur.

1. Though the Act was repealed in 1995, it was in effect atthe time of plaintiff's injury and therefore applies to thiscase. Atkins v. Deere & Co., 177 Ill. 2d 222, 685 N.E.2d 342(1997).