1-00-2912

FOURTH DIVISION
APRIL 18, 2002

Plaintiff law firm, Richard F. Mallen & Associates, Ltd., filed a three count complaint foran injunction against defendant, Myinjuryclaim.com Corporation, alleging that defendant wasengaging in the unauthorized practice of law (count I), violated the Uniform Deceptive TradePractices Act (count II), and violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (count III). Count I of thecomplaint was dismissed due to plaintiff's lack of standing. Plaintiff appeals. Defendant has filedno response brief, nevertheless; this court elects to consider the appeal on its merits. First CapitolMortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976).⁽¹⁾

Plaintiff specializes in personal injury law and brought suit on behalf of a class consistingof all Illinois attorneys practicing personal injury law. Defendant, which is not a professionalcorporation and is not authorized to practice law, operates an internet web site which advisesindividuals injured in automobile accidents concerning their legal rights and evaluates their claims. Defendant's web site is accessible in Illinois and invites injured individuals to pay a fee of up to$500 in exchange for information regarding the fairness of any settlement offer they receive, apersonalized demand letter to submit to the insurance company, and a jury verdict search.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), arguing inter alia, that plaintiff lacked standingto bring a cause of action against defendant for the unauthorized practice of law.⁽²⁾ Following ahearing, the circuit court dismissed count I with prejudice for lack of standing and found, pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 304 (155 Ill. 2d R. 304), no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of thatorder. Counts II and III were dismissed without prejudice and are not part of this appeal .

The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiff lackedstanding to bring a cause of action against defendant for the unauthorized practice of law. An ordergranting a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is reviewed de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion,188 Ill. 2d 211, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (1999) (Glisson).

The doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in acontroversy from bringing suit, assuring that issues are raised only by those having a real interest inthe outcome of the controversy. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. Standing requires some injury in factto a legally cognizable interest. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462,524 N.E.2d 561 (1988) (Greer). The claimed injury may be actual or threatened, and it must be (1)distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely tobe prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93.

In Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N.E.2d 264 (1945)(Smith), the court considered the question of standing to bring a cause of action for the unauthorizedpractice of law and found that "an attorney is the proper party to bring the suit, and that an injunctionis the proper remedy, for the unauthorized practice of law." 326 Ill. App. at 669. The court reasonedthat an attorney had sufficient interest in the subject matter to bring such a suit because the right topractice law was a special privilege or franchise entitled to protection.

In an analogous situation, the supreme court in Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d59 (1956), found that a licensed chiropractor had standing to bring a cause of action to enjoin thedefendants from practicing chiropractic without a license because such practice by an unlicensedperson constituted an infringement of the rights of those who are properly licensed. The courtreasoned that one who holds a medical license has a "property right" in the sense that laws affectinghim in his practice must satisfy due process of law. Citing Smith, the court noted that the medicallicense conferred a right in the nature of a franchise, granting the privilege of doing that which doesnot belong to the public generally by common right. "This being true, whether the right to practicethe profession be called a franchise, a license or a privilege, it is certainly a valuable interest thatshould, in justice, be entitled to protection." Burden, 9 Ill. 2d at 118-119.

Similarly, one who holds a license to practice law has a "property right" in that license in thesense that laws affecting him in his practice must satisfy due process. See In re Chandler, 161 Ill.2d 459, 641 N.E.2d 473 (1994) (attorney may not be disciplined for instances of unchargedmisconduct because to do so would violate due process rights); In re Doyle, 144 Ill. 2d 451, 581N.E.2d 669 (1991) (same). As the court recognized in Smith, a law license confers a right in thenature of a franchise. Consequently, the right to practice law is a valuable interest that is entitled toprotection.

Clearly, the injury sought to be prevented here emanates from defendant's practices. Anunlicensed corporation dispensing legal advice without possessing the requisite expertise orcompetence is predictably apt to cause irreparable harm to many citizens, as well as to the judicialsystem itself. See 134 Ill. 2d Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble.

Because the practice of law by an entity not licensed constitutes an infringement upon therights of those who are properly licensed, attorneys and law firms have standing to bring a cause ofaction for such unauthorized practice. Defendant's suggestion before the circuit court that only barassociations may bring such an action was unsupported by any authority and no such authority isfound. There is nothing in the statute prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law that precludesindividual attorneys or law firms from pursuing such a cause of action. 705 ILCS 205/1 (West2000).

Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause isremanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

THEIS and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.

1. The Illinois State Bar Association was granted leave to file a brief as amicus curiae.

2. Lack of standing is an "affirmative matter" that is properly raised under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000)). Glisson v. Cityof Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (1999). The circuit court treated defendant's motionto dismiss as one pursuant to section 2-619. See B.C. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 205 Ill. App. 3d 5,562 N.E.2d 533 (1990).