FOURTH DIVISION
April 17, 2003

Plaintiff, Phillip Rizzo, sought administrative relief from a decision of defendant, theBoard of Trustees of the Village of Evergreen Park Police Pension Fund (the Board), denying hisapplication for a disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1996)) (the Code). The trial court reversed the Board's decision and the Board nowappeals from that judgment. The issues presented for review are whether the Board correctlyinterpreted and applied section 3-115 of the Code and whether the trial court erred in finding thatthe Board's decision denying Rizzo's application for a disability pension was against the manifestweight of the evidence. We reverse the trial court's decision and affirm the Board's ruling.

Rizzo became a police officer with the Village of Evergreen Park on December 1, 1986. On October 17, 1994, Rizzo injured his right ankle in the police station parking lot whileentering the station when he stepped into a hole, causing his foot to roll over and making himfall. Rizzo underwent surgery on his ankle in May 1995. He returned to the police departmenton July 19, 1996, in a light duty position and was ordered by the police chief to return to full dutyon August 15, 1996. On August 14, 1996, Rizzo filed an application for a line of duty disabilitypension pursuant to section 3-114.1. 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 1996). He did not return to fullduty.

The Board held hearings on Rizzo's application in June 1997 and June 2000. At thehearings, two of the three physicians selected by the Board, Dr. William Malik and Dr. HerbertLoseff, submitted reports finding that Rizzo was disabled and unable to return to his job as anEvergreen Park police officer. The third physician, Dr. James Ryan, found that while Rizzo wasimpaired, he was not disabled and could return to full, unrestricted police duties. Only Ryan andLoseff submitted sworn certificates as to their opinions. Additionally, the deposition transcriptsof Dr. Ryan, Dr. Malik, Dr. Charles Mercier, and Dr. Michael Pinzur were admitted along withDr. Barry Fischer's and Dr. S. I. Yen's reports and various medical records. In his June 25, 1996and January 30, 1997 reports, Dr. Mercier stated that Rizzo did not have a permanent disabilityand he could return to work without restrictions. However, in his deposition, Dr. Mercier statedboth that Rizzo was disabled and that he was able to return to work.

Dr. Pinzur, Rizzo's treating physician, testified that Rizzo was permanently disabled andwas not able to return to his police duties. Dr. Yen stated that as of October 23, 1995, Rizzo wasnot able to return to work and would need several months to recover from surgery. In his April1999 report, Dr. Fischer stated that Rizzo sustained injuries resulting in a disability whichprecluded him from returning to his previous work activities as a police officer. Rizzo alsotestified before the Board.

In its decision dated October 13, 2000, the Board made the following findings of fact. Rizzo testified that he was not discharged by Dr. Pinzur, but he had not seen him in years. Rizzocurrently worked as a HVAC service technician, repairing, installing and servicing furnaces,heating units and air conditioning systems. This line of work required him to load and unloadfurnaces, heating and air conditioning equipment. Rizzo had been employed in his currentposition since November 1998 with no apparent problems and did not lose any time because ofhis ankle injury. Following his surgery, Rizzo had no problems riding his motorcycle. Themedical evidence presented in this case and the deposition testimony of the physicians were inconflict as to what, if any, medical problems Rizzo had and whether he was disabled.

Dr. Ryan examined Rizzo on behalf of the Board and submitted a physician's certificatethat Rizzo was not disabled. The Board quoted from Dr. Ryan's report, where he stated that atthe time of his examination, Rizzo had

"no disability. The original injury was most probably a strain, which did notproduce any instability. No disability was caused by the alleged on duty injury ofOctober 17, 1994. His explanation is consistent with the injury he sustained. Heneeds no further medical care and he is certainly not a surgical candidate. He canreturn to full, unrestricted police duties."

The Board further found that three doctors selected by the Board had not certified that Rizzo wasdisabled for service in the police department.

In its analysis, the Board noted the conflict in medical evidence as to whether Rizzo wasdisabled, but after a careful review, afforded more weight to Dr. Ryan's opinion that Rizzo wasnot disabled. The Board further found that Dr. Ryan's report was consistent with Rizzo'stestimony that he rode his motorcycle after his ankle surgery and worked as a HVAC technicianwith no apparent problems. Secondly, the Board denied Rizzo's application for benefits pursuantto section 3-115. 40 ILCS 5/3-115 (West 1996). Under that section, three physicians selected bythe Board must certify that the applicant was disabled in order to qualify for a disability pension. Dr. Ryan, one of the Board's selected doctors, certified that Rizzo was not disabled and thus, adisability pension could not be granted. As an alternative holding, the Board found that even ifRizzo was found to be disabled, he would only be entitled to a non-duty pension because he wasnot performing an act of police service at the time of his injury.

Rizzo then filed a complaint for administrative review in the trial court. After a hearingin July 2001, the trial court reversed and remanded the case to the Board because Dr. Malik hadnot submitted a sworn physician's certificate, as was required under section 3-115. On remand,the Board noted that it had received Dr. Malik's certificate wherein he certified that Rizzo wasdisabled. The Board adopted its previous decision and order and again denied Rizzo'sapplication, finding that he was not disabled. Rizzo filed another complaint for administrativereview, maintaining that he was entitled solely to a non-duty pension. The trial court reversedthe Board's decision, contending that the Board improperly interpreted section 3-115 and itsdecision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board then filed this timelyappeal.

The Board first argues that it correctly interpreted section 3-115 of the Code whendenying Rizzo's application for disability benefits. It contends that section 3-115 mandates thatbefore a disability pension can be granted, all three examining physicians selected by the Boardmust certify that the applicant is disabled. Because only two of the Board's selected physicianscertified Rizzo as disabled in this case, Rizzo cannot receive a disability pension. Rizzodisagrees with the Board's interpretation and responds that while the Board must have threecertificates from its selected doctors, all three certificates do not need to find the applicantdisabled in order to award a disability pension. Therefore, Rizzo argues, even though one doctorcertified that he was not disabled, Rizzo could still obtain a pension.

In a reviewing a final decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101et seq. (West 1996)), we review the agency's decision and not the trial court's determination. Martino v. Police Pension Board of the City of Des Plaines, 331 Ill. App. 3d 975, 979, 772N.E.2d 289, 293 (2002). When the issue is one of law only, we review the agency's decision denovo. Martino, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 980, 772 N.E.2d at 293. This case involves a question ofstatutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. Land v. Board of Education of the Cityof Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 781 N.E.2d 249, 254 (2002). However, we give substantialweight and deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it enforces. Village of FranklinPark v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 265 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001, 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1146(1994). In interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain the legislature's intent, which is foundin the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 421,781 N.E.2d at 254. Where the statutory language is clear, the court will give that language effectwithout resort to other aids of construction. Martino, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 980, 772 N.E.2d at 294.

Section 3-115 provides in relevant part:

"A disability pension shall not be paid unless there is filed with the boardcertificates of the police officer's disability, subscribed and sworn to by the policeofficer if not under legal disability, or by a representative if the officer is underlegal disability, and by the police surgeon (if there is one) and 3 practicingphysicians selected by the board. The board may require other evidence ofdisability." 40 ILCS 5/3-115 (West 1996).

The plain and clear language of the statute requires that a police officer cannot obtain a disabilitypension unless the Board receives certificates stating that the officer is disabled from threepracticing physicians who were selected by the Board. Additionally, the Board may require"other evidence" of his disability, or evidence in addition to the three certified statements fromthe Board's selected physicians that the applicant is disabled. However, Rizzo cites Caauwe v.Police Pension Board of the Village of Midlothian, 184 Ill. App. 3d 482, 540 N.E.2d 453 (1989),for the proposition that physician's certificates are required by three doctors to establish either theapplicant's disability or lack thereof.

In Caauwe, the Board denied disability benefits based on unverified and unsworn medicalevidence. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the doctors failed to certify theapplicant's disability or lack thereof, holding that section 3-115 mandated the Board to selectthree practicing physicians and required them to furnish the Board with subscribed and sworn-tocertifications of the applicant's disability. Caauwe, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 486, 540 N.E.2d at 455-56.

Under the clear language of section 3-115, certification of an officer's disability is onlyrequired where the Board will be providing benefits to an applicant, not when it is going to denybenefits. Daily v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of Springfield, Illinois, 251 Ill.App. 3d 119, 127, 621 N.E.2d 986, 991 (1993). "To the extent Caauwe mandates certification ofan applicant's disability prior to denying benefits, we find it is in express contradiction of thelanguage of the statute and decline to follow it." Daily, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 621 N.E.2d at991. We agree with Daily and decline to follow Caauwe.

In the present case, one of the three physicians selected by the Board to examine Rizzo,Dr. Ryan, did not certify that he had a disability. Based on section 3-115, without suchcertification, the Board could not award Rizzo a disability pension. Thus, we find that the Boardcorrectly interpreted section 3-115 and properly denied Rizzo's application for disability pensionbenefits.

On administrative review, this court may affirm an agency's decision on any groundappearing in the record. Rainbow Apartments v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 326 Ill.App. 3d 1105, 1109, 762 N.E.2d 534, 537 (2001). Because we affirm the Board's decision basedon the application of section 3-115, we need not address the Board's other argument that the trialcourt's decision to reverse the Board's determination was against the manifest weight of theevidence.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and affirm theBoard's decision to deny Rizzo disability pension benefits.

Circuit court reversed; pension board affirmed.

HARTMAN and KARNEZIS, J.J., concur.